Could Mary discover what it's like to see red just by studying it? Or does she need to experience it? If the latter, then something like what is it like to be something that can echolocate? is only discoverable through experience.

Animals have a degree of consciousness but this is not self-consciousness and does not include the ability to imagine. — Athena

You can't possibly know that.

Are you denying the existence of the subjective experiences of, say, dolphins? That's implausible. — RogueAI

I'm denying that "there is something it is like to be a dolphin".

The notion of subjectivity is fraught with nonsense.

Do you know what it's like to be a bat? — baker

What is it like to be baker? Tell us.

Well, let's explore this. Do you think dolphins experience pain?

nonsense. — Banno

Defined by Merriam-Webster, Wittgenstein, or something else?

Merriam-Webster: words or language having no meaning or conveying no intelligible ideas

Wittgenstein:

Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense. Under the label of unsinnig can be found various propositions: “Socrates is identical”, but also “1 is a number” and “there are objects”. While some nonsensical propositions are blatantly so, others seem to be meaningful—and only analysis carried out in accordance with the picture theory can expose their nonsensicality. Since only what is “in” the world can be described, anything that is “higher” is excluded, including the notion of limit and the limit points themselves. Traditional metaphysics, and the propositions of ethics and aesthetics, which try to capture the world as a whole, are also excluded, as is the truth in solipsism, the very notion of a subject, for it is also not “in” the world but at its limit.

Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is not inside the bounds of sense to oblivion. He makes a distinction between saying and showing which is made to do additional crucial work. “What can be shown cannot be said,” that is, what cannot be formulated in sayable (sensical) propositions can only be shown. This applies, for example, to the logical form of the world, the pictorial form, etc., which show themselves in the form of (contingent) propositions, in the symbolism, and in logical propositions. Even the unsayable (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic) propositions of philosophy belong in this group—which Wittgenstein finally describes as “things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (TLP 6.522). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/

Could Mary discover what it's like to see red just by studying it? Or does she need to experience it? If the latter, then something like what is it like to be something that can echolocate? is only discoverable through experience. — RogueAI

Only if "there is something it is like" makes sense. And it doesn't make sense for "there I something it is like to be RogueAI", because what it is like to be you changes.

So it is unreasonable t conclude that it makes sense for a bat - which bat, when?

Dolphins feel pain.

because what it is like to be you changes.

So it is unreasonable t conclude that it makes sense for a bat - which bat, when? — Banno

If he said, "that bat" would it change for you? I think he means that if we were to experience what another does, it would have a general commonality that we can (literally) empathize with, that something as foreign as a bat to our subjective "way in the world" can not easily analogize.

Only if "there is something it is like" makes sense. And it doesn't make sense for "there I something it is like to be RogueAI", because what it is like to be you changes.

That's a copout. The Banno of five minutes ago is still you. Questions about your subjective experiences are sensical: what is Banno's experience of pain like? Is it like mine? What about his (her?) experience of red? Same as mine or slightly different? Those are questions that make sense and have answers (even if we'll never be sure of them). Agree so far?

So you can show us what it is like to be a bat?

Go on, then.

The Banno of five minutes ago is still you. — RogueAI

But that's irrelevant. Even if ther ewere something it is like to be RogueAI, what it is like to be RogueAI now would not be like what it was like to be RogueAI before the influence of my last brilliant post. What it is like to be RogueAI changes.

You two prefer to argue than to think.

See this.

What would be constant here? what would be using "What it is like to be RogueAI" in the same way as you did before? How was "What it is like to be RogueAI" used in the first place?

There can be no such continuity here.

So you can show us what it is like to be a bat?

Go on, then. — Banno

No, I meant it in the way Nagel was saying "What it's like to be a bat". That is to say, I can't know. I can describe what the bat is doing, and try to analogize it to my own subjectivity, but that's about it.

That is to say, I can't know. I can describe what the bat is doing, and try to analogize it to my own subjectivity, but that's about it. — schopenhauer1

He can't know, not because of any failing in his capacity to observe, but because knowing does not fit here.

It's not that there is a something it is like to be a bat, but you cannot observe and understand it; It's not event that there is not something that it is like to be a bat; It's rather that we cannot even determine if there is a something that it is like to be a bat.

Sorry, I'm too daft, apparently, to discern the reference. B ...? — baker

‘Being’, capitalised, as a proper noun, which is often the case in discussions of, e.g. ‘the meaning of Being’.

It's rather that we cannot even determine if there is a something that it is like to be a bat. — Banno

Okay, but you'd have to explain that.

You didn't follow the article in SEP I referenced?

This is an application of the private language argument.

See this.

Animals have a degree of consciousness but this is not self-consciousness and does not include the ability to imagine.
It is our ability to imagine that truly separates us from other animals. — Athena

I agree with you, although most won’t. I think Aristotelian philosophy believed there are ontological distinctions between living and non-living, between animal and vegetative, and between rational and non-rational beings. An ontological distinction means there’s a difference in kind. But these distinctions were discarded along with many other elements of Aristotelianism by modern science, which tends to try and explain everything in terms of matter-energy. Nagel elaborates his point in more detail in his 2012 book Mind and Cosmos where he says that:

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained.

Unless one thinks that acting like a bat, or a dog,as a human being, says much about being that specific animal.

This does not mean the bat is not conscious, it could well be. Maybe it's on the borderline between consciousness and pure instinct. I think part of Nagel's point in choosing a bat is precisely to show an edge case.

On the other hand although we do not have direct evidence, it would be strange to deny dogs are conscious and behave in "intelligent" ways. The Gap by Suddendorf goes over some of the evidence, it's very interesting to see the "killjoy" and "romantic" interpretations on these issues...

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

:100:

That's spot on.

You come to the right idea here, but for the wrong reasons. Talk about physics, chemistry or physiology is distinct from talk about desire, intent or understanding. All that paraphernalia of subjectivism is quite unneeded here.

...will leave out the subjective essence of the experience...

Subjective and Essence - two words that should give pause. When they both occur in the same phrase, one should tread with care.

We can talk about what it might be like to have the experiences of a bat - what it might be like to use echolocation, for example.

What happens when you add the word "subjective"? Can we talk about what it might be like to have the subjective experiences of a bat? The typical answer is "no", guided by a sentiment that says we can't know another's subjective experiences. But what happened here? What changed when we added "subjective"? I can tell when someone is in pain, despite pain being subjective... I can understand that someone is grieving, or ecstatic, or fatigued; all supposedly subjective experiences that we cannot know...

What happens when you add the word "essence? What is the essence of the experience of being a bat? How does the essence of an experience differ from the experience per se?

What looked profound, "the subjective essence of the experience", begins to look more like mere wordplay.

So I can't agree with your giving the quote :100:

There's a lot to say about that, but I have to get going, it's getting late here.

I agreed w/the quote, but I did not use those words - he was talking about people in that quote, not bats. Sure those words can be problematic, but in the context given, I think it's correct - perhaps with some slight modification.

I'll give you my thoughts tomorrow. Have a good one.

Cheers. Stay safe.

It's rather that we cannot even determine if there is a something that it is like to be a bat.

You've admitted that dolphins feel pain, so there is something that it is like to be a dolphin in pain: namely, a dolphin in pain. The question then naturally arises: is a dolphin in pain similar to a human in pain? Is your claim then that that's a nonsensical question or simply one that can't be answered?

such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all

Video games.

You've admitted that dolphins feel pain, so there is something that it is like to be a dolphin in pain: namely, a dolphin in pain. The question then naturally arises: is a dolphin in pain similar to a human in pain? Is your claim then that that's a nonsensical question or simply one that can't be answered? — RogueAI

The question is not what is it like to be in pain, but what it is like to be a dolphin.

That's important.

Banno, are subjective experiences real? If so, are they only real in the moment, or is a past experience "real" in any sense? What about a future experience?

Banno, are subjective experiences real? If so, are they only real in the moment, or is a past experience "real" in any sense? What about a future experience? — RogueAI

Are experiences real? Yes.

I'm puzzled that you need to add "subjective". It's a term that carries so much baggage. Drop it, and get on with doing stuff.

I'm not entering into a discussion on the temporal ontology of experiences; the topic is confused enough as is.

The question is not what is it like to be in pain, but what it is like to be a Bat. — Banno

Are experiences real? Yes.

I'm puzzled that you need to add "subjective". It's a term that carrie so much baggage. Drop it, and get on with doing stuff.

If experiences are real, then there are experiencer(s), and those experiences are subjective. There's no avoiding it- subjectiveness is contained within the meaning of "experience".

Also: if experiences are real, who's doing the experiencing? Something must be. If there is more than one experiencer, can we talk about comparing their experiences? Why not?

...and those experiences are then subjective. — RogueAI

What does that mean?

...subjectiveness is contained within the word "experience". — RogueAI

What is added by calling it "subjectiveness"?

Look again:

We can talk about what it might be like to have the experiences of a bat - what it might be like to use echolocation, for example.

What happens when you add the word "subjective"? Can we talk about what it might be like to have the subjective experiences of a bat? The typical answer is "no", guided by a sentiment that says we can't know another's subjective experiences. But what happened here? What changed when we added "subjective"? I can tell when someone is in pain, despite pain being subjective... I can understand that someone is grieving, or ecstatic, or fatigued; all supposedly subjective experiences that we cannot know... — Banno

...and those experiences are then subjective.
— RogueAI

What does that mean?

Let's start simple. You admit there are experiences. It follows there must be experiencer(s). Agreed?

The subjective is given.