nonsense. — Banno
Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense. Under the label of unsinnig can be found various propositions: “Socrates is identical”, but also “1 is a number” and “there are objects”. While some nonsensical propositions are blatantly so, others seem to be meaningful—and only analysis carried out in accordance with the picture theory can expose their nonsensicality. Since only what is “in” the world can be described, anything that is “higher” is excluded, including the notion of limit and the limit points themselves. Traditional metaphysics, and the propositions of ethics and aesthetics, which try to capture the world as a whole, are also excluded, as is the truth in solipsism, the very notion of a subject, for it is also not “in” the world but at its limit.
Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is not inside the bounds of sense to oblivion. He makes a distinction between saying and showing which is made to do additional crucial work. “What can be shown cannot be said,” that is, what cannot be formulated in sayable (sensical) propositions can only be shown. This applies, for example, to the logical form of the world, the pictorial form, etc., which show themselves in the form of (contingent) propositions, in the symbolism, and in logical propositions. Even the unsayable (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic) propositions of philosophy belong in this group—which Wittgenstein finally describes as “things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (TLP 6.522). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
Could Mary discover what it's like to see red just by studying it? Or does she need to experience it? If the latter, then something like what is it like to be something that can echolocate? is only discoverable through experience. — RogueAI
because what it is like to be you changes.
So it is unreasonable t conclude that it makes sense for a bat - which bat, when? — Banno
Only if "there is something it is like" makes sense. And it doesn't make sense for "there I something it is like to be RogueAI", because what it is like to be you changes.
The Banno of five minutes ago is still you. — RogueAI
So you can show us what it is like to be a bat?
Go on, then. — Banno
That is to say, I can't know. I can describe what the bat is doing, and try to analogize it to my own subjectivity, but that's about it. — schopenhauer1
It's rather that we cannot even determine if there is a something that it is like to be a bat. — Banno
Animals have a degree of consciousness but this is not self-consciousness and does not include the ability to imagine.
It is our ability to imagine that truly separates us from other animals. — Athena
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained.
There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
...will leave out the subjective essence of the experience...
It's rather that we cannot even determine if there is a something that it is like to be a bat.
You've admitted that dolphins feel pain, so there is something that it is like to be a dolphin in pain: namely, a dolphin in pain. The question then naturally arises: is a dolphin in pain similar to a human in pain? Is your claim then that that's a nonsensical question or simply one that can't be answered? — RogueAI
Banno, are subjective experiences real? If so, are they only real in the moment, or is a past experience "real" in any sense? What about a future experience? — RogueAI
The question is not what is it like to be in pain, but what it is like to be a Bat. — Banno
Are experiences real? Yes.
I'm puzzled that you need to add "subjective". It's a term that carrie so much baggage. Drop it, and get on with doing stuff.
...and those experiences are then subjective. — RogueAI
...subjectiveness is contained within the word "experience". — RogueAI
We can talk about what it might be like to have the experiences of a bat - what it might be like to use echolocation, for example.
What happens when you add the word "subjective"? Can we talk about what it might be like to have the subjective experiences of a bat? The typical answer is "no", guided by a sentiment that says we can't know another's subjective experiences. But what happened here? What changed when we added "subjective"? I can tell when someone is in pain, despite pain being subjective... I can understand that someone is grieving, or ecstatic, or fatigued; all supposedly subjective experiences that we cannot know... — Banno
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