People (or bats) have experiences, not brains or minds.

A person is made up of many things: arms, legs, organs, tissue, brain, etc. If I stub my toe and experience pain, where exactly in my body is that experience taking place? Not in my pinky. Not in my kidney.

I agree, and often spell out, that the philosophical use of the term 'substance' is problematical, because of it's conflation with the every day sense of 'substance' as 'a material with uniform properties'... — Wayfarer

I'm not keen on that approach. Purloining ideas form other areas of philosophy - in this case ontology - is fraught. Where you see it as drawing attention to the difference between a rock and a bat, I'm thinking it confuses the distinction. After all, chemically, the difference between a bat and a rock is one of quantity rather than quality; and physically the difference is explained in terms of entropy and complexity, and again is one of quantity rather than quality.

I'm confident that the discussion here shows that the notion of what-it-is-like is also fraught, caught in a between what can be said, what can be shown and what is ineffable.

I'd drop the ontological analysis, for the sake of simplicity, and simply say that the bat is worthy of moral consideration whilst the rock is not. This strikes me as dropping the questionable ontology whilst addressing the core issue.

I'll add that I don't think there is a need to defend or justify the idea that the bat is worthy of consideration in a way that the rock isn't. If someone disagrees with that, then I'd just say they have misunderstood what is going on.

So we agree that there is a difference in quality between a rock and a bat, but disagree as to how to elucidate that difference.

Edit: see above.
Edit:

the very worst thing about modern philosophy is NOT differentiating beings from things. — Wayfarer

I think it clear that the difference between a bat and a rock is made clearer by talk of minds and morals than talk of substance and being.

So we agree that there is a difference in quality between a rock and a bat, but disagree as to how to elucidate that difference.

One has a mind and the other doesn't. That's the fundamental difference between the two: one is conscious and other isn't (or maybe the rock is? Anyone want to argue that?).

Looks so simple, doesn't it? Yep, but how does describing this in terms of being help?

The fact that one has a mind and the other doesn't is a "being" statement? It's just a factual description: the rock is mindless, the bat has a mind.

Yep; that's what I asked.

↪Andrew M
People (or bats) have experiences, not brains or minds.

A person is made up of many things: arms, legs, organs, tissue, brain, etc. If I stub my toe and experience pain, where exactly in my body is that experience taking place? Not in my pinky. Not in my kidney. — RogueAI

The pain is in your toe (unless it's referred pain). But no experience is taking place in your toe. It is you that is experiencing pain (or is in pain), not your toe.

If you want to know what caused you to have that experience, then you look at factors like the place you were in when it happened (say, your backyard) and what you stubbed your toe on (say, a rock).

You can also investigate physiological factors, such as the role of the brain and nervous system.

But at no point does it make sense to say that an experience such as the above happened in your mind, or in your brain, or in your toe. People have experiences like kicking a football, or watching a sunset, or stubbing their toe and they happen in particular environmental contexts.

It is you that is experiencing pain (or is in pain), not your toe.

This is a problem. Suppose I've made an exhaustive list of everything that makes up me. I'm also experiencing some pain from stubbing my toe. If I ask you: is my kidney experiencing pain? And you say: no. Is my toe experiencing pain? and you say: no. Is my x experiencing pain? And on and on. Eventually, you're going to have to say "yes" to one of my questions or else concede that I'm in pain, but no part of me is experiencing any pain, which of course is an absurdity.

Is there any gain to using the word "being" when talking about whether rocks and bats have minds? If so, what is it?

That was indeed what I was asking of @Wayfarer.

I think the answer is that introducing "being" confuses things unnecessarily.

I agree, so why did you bring it up?

Who, me?

I think the topic started here.

think the answer is that introducing "being" confuses things unnecessarily. — Banno

I think the fact that it can’t be introduced without causing confusion is because we’re confused.

or else concede that I'm in pain, but no part of me is experiencing any pain, which of course is an absurdity. — RogueAI

No, that's the fallacy of division. It doesn't follow that something predicable of the whole should be predicable of any of the parts.

In this case, one's body parts are not living organisms, so it's absurd to attribute experiences to those body parts.

It doesn't follow that something predicable of the whole should be predicable of any of the parts.

That's true. Each individual neuron doesn't think or feel anything, but combined, they are more than the sum of their parts. Your position is going to lead to the hard problem: if the parts of a person don't experience pain, but the person does, how does that work? Which parts are involved? What's their function? How do they combine to produce the experience of pain? Why pain and not some other experience?

Yes, so conceivably echolocation technology could be embedded into the brain and body so that a person could see (so to speak) with their eyes closed. Things would look different via that sense modality since the information received would be different.

Indeed, empathy depends on recognizing points of difference as well as points of commonality. — Andrew M

You reminded me of the day I went through an art museum with my eyes closed and experiencing everything through touch. Touching was a big no-no but I couldn't stop myself. That was a much more intimate experience with my surroundings than we have by looking at things. I realized when we look at things we keep them at a distance and don't actually experience them, but when we touch, that sensation must travel through our fingers to our brains. I would say with touch, instead of keeping things at a distance, we internalize what we touch.

But then some people think I do drugs. :lol: I don't, but I do think I have times when I experience life differently. I would love to do an art show that is all about touch. When a person came in the person would be given a mask and be invited to experience everything through touch. It would be good if they came with another person who serves as a guide and perhaps they take turns with one using the blindfold and then the other, and communicating with each other their experience.

Now add a tea room for the visitors to the touch art show. Have a fountain with bubbling water and perhaps some birds singing. So people can sit and leisurely communicate their experience, getting in touch with themselves and each other.

Not knowing what it’s like to be something else We don't even know our own experience of life and that we can experience it differently. I think we are all rather numb to life, and living in our heads without a good connection with our bodies and what is around us.

The whole meaning of materialism is that there’s no essential difference between people and things. — Wayfarer

Inasmuch does this view overlap with the concept of anatta, where do they differ?

Each individual neuron doesn't think or feel anything, but combined, they are more than the sum of their parts. Your position is going to lead to the hard problem: if the parts of a person don't experience pain, but the person does, how does that work? Which parts are involved? What's their function? How do they combine to produce the experience of pain? Why pain and not some other experience? — RogueAI

Of course, no one can answer that these days. But maybe a picture will help. Consciousness is like superconductivity, it is there or not. If something is not right (too high temperature, too strong magnetic field), then the superconductivity disappears. The whole system is superconducting, not the single atoms.

Of course, no one can answer that these days. But maybe a picture will help.Consciousness is like superconductivity, it is there or not. If something is not right (too high temperature, too strong magnetic field), then the superconductivity disappears. The whole system is superconducting, not the single atoms.

I've been thinking about that. We tend to value animals in proportion to their perceived intelligence, but does intelligence mean anything when talking about consciousness? Is my consciousness "greater" than a person born MR? That doesn't make any sense, and when I get high, my IQ drops to fantastically low levels, but my consciousness seems to expand. If consciousness IS an on/off thing, as I suspect it is, then we need to find out what the consciousness dividing line is, if one exists. Maybe the panpsychists are right and everything has a rich inner mental life, even electrons, although idealism seems the more parsimonious theory.