About Wayfarer

About Essays of interest

Philosophy of Maths and Universals
The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, Jacques Maritain
Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross
The Mathematical World, Jim Franklin
What is Maths? Smithsonian Magazine
The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, Eugene Wigner


Philosophy of Physics
The Debate between Plato and Democritus, Werner Heisenberg
Does the Universe Exist if we’re Not Looking? (profile of John Wheeler) - Discover Magazine
A Private View of Quantum Reality - QBism, Chris Fuchs
The Multiverse Idea is Rotting Culture, Sam Kriss, The Atlantic


Philosophy and Evolution
Anything but Human, Richard Polt, NY Times
It Ain't Necessarily So, Antony Gottlieb, New Yorker
The Core of Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel, NY Times
The God Genome, Leon Wieseltier, NY Times
The Illusionist David Bentley Hart, The New Atlantis

Philosophy of Science
The Blind Spot of Science is the Neglect of Lived Experience, Aeon
Minding Matter, Adam Frank, Aeon

Science, Philosophy and Religion
Does Reason Know what it is Missing? Stanley Fish, NY Times
The insidious cult of scientism, Medium
He Is Who Is - review of David Bentley Hart's Experience of God
Secular Philosophy & The Religious Temperament, Thomas Nagel
Evolutionary Naturalism & The Fear of Religion, Thomas Nagel
The Fear of Religion - Thomas Nagel's review of The God Delusion
Sorry, but your Soul just Died, Tom Wolfe
The Neural Buddhists, David Brooks

Scholarly/Academic
Philosophy and Spirituality in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter. Opens up the dimension of philosophical spirituality in Kant's philosophy

Mind Over Matter, interview with Bernardo Kastrup

Phillip Goff responds to my criticism of his article
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Favourite quotations
Philosophical rationalism is not scientific, and scientific rationalism is not philosophical. — Wayfarer

Reality is fundamentally experiential in nature, and matter is fundamentally an object of experience, not its ground. — Wayfarer

Quantum mechanics is a law of thought. — Chris Fuchs
(See essay under Philosophy of Physics)

There is something for which Newton — or better to say not Newton alone, but modern science in general — can still be made responsible: it is splitting of our world in two. I have been saying that modern science broke down the barriers that separated the heavens and the earth, and that it united and unified the universe. And that is true. But, as I have said, too, it did this by substituting for our world of quality and sense perception, the world in which we live, and love, and die, another world — the world of quantity, or reified geometry, a world in which, though there is place for everything, there is no place for man. Thus the world of science — the real world — became estranged and utterly divorced from the world of life, which science has been unable to explain — not even to explain away by calling it "subjective". — Alexander Koyré, Newtonian Studies (1965).

I am very astonished that the scientific picture of the real world around me is deficient. It gives a lot of factual information, puts all our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously. — Erwin Schrodinger, Nature and the Greeks

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos