If claims are not intersubjectively verifiable and yet not "articles of subjective belief" then what are they? You are not actually saying anything that I could either agree or disagree with. — Janus
I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief. — Janus
The real point at issue for Wayfarer is the possibility of "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition. Is it possible to have such knowledge of reality? Obviously, he believes it is possible, and that some humans have achieved such enlightenment. The problem is that if it is possible, you would have no way of knowing that unless you had achieved it yourself. — Janus
And even then, how could you rule out the possibility of self-delusion? — Janus
I'm not ruling out the possibility of a "much deeper understanding of reality", but I have no idea what it could look like, and if it were not based on empirical evidence or logic, then what else could it be based on? — Janus
People who think like Wayfarer believe that such an understanding existed more in the past than it does today, but they would not call it science, unless by 'science' is intended something like the original meaning of simply 'knowing'. — Janus
When we perceive an object, we run through a manifold of aspects and profiles: we see the thing first from this side and then from that; we concentrate on the color; we pay attention to the hardness or softness; we turn the thing around and see other sides and aspects, and so on. In this manifold of appearances, however, we continuously experience all the aspects and profiles, all the views, as being “of” one and the same object. The multiple appearances are not single separate beads following one another; they are “threaded” by the identity continuing within them all. As Husserl puts it, “Each single percept in this series is already a percept of the thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see this book. It is always one and the same thing.” The identity of the thing is implicitly presented in and through the manifold ~ Robert Sokolowski — Count Timothy von Icarus
There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness') concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. ...Traditionally, the neural binding problem concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades (rapid movement of the eye between fixation points). But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. ...There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion....But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene... — The Neural Binding Problem, Jerome S. Feldman
We, therefore, in our experience and thoughtful activity, have moved from a perception to an articulated opinion or position; we have reached something that enters into logic and the space of reasons~ Sokolowski.
Perhaps the "bifurcation of nature" is due to the bicameral structure of the brain. — Gnomon
Apparently, most animals survive mainly with instinctive & intuitive thinking. But humans have developed a talent for processing abstracted concepts (ideas) that can be analyzed in more detail (logic). — Gnomon
If someone says that they have a special form of knowledge but there is no way for anyone else to confirm that they have a special form of knowledge, then they are probably flubbing. This applies to all knowledge, including procedural et al. — Leontiskos
I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief. — Janus
It is an impossible conviction to argue for, though, or at least I've never seen an argument for it, from you or anyone else, that would convince the unbiased. — Janus
I'm not denying that there are those other kinds of knowledge—I've said so on these forums many times myself. It is only propositional knowledge which is intersubjectively decidable or testable in terms of truth. — Janus
Certainly you can find that in the Bible, but in general Christianity has tended to stop at "loving humans" and not considered what it might mean to actually love animals -- or the environment in general, as we are now seeing, to our dismay. — J
What leads you to assume that your intuitions are better than the equally intelligent people I have met who were convinced he was the real thing — Janus
I also very much value a further extension -- did the Greeks have a word for it? -- that would refer to love of Creation itself, and all the beings, not just humans. — J
I still don't understand by it what you interpret as an agapē that pays no regard to persons. — javra
My honest hunch is that Zen Buddhism is somehow often misconstrued, even among certain self proclaimed Zen Buddhism teachers/masters/experts which further the misconstrued. — javra
Agapē, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented any any person(s)? — javra
Yet, again, when one loves, one is necessarily attached - — javra
I'll uphold that the Dalai Lama, as with the original Buddha, is extremely attached/biased toward what some in the West term the Good — javra
I think Kant put paid to the idea that traditional metaphysical truth is attainable — Janus
I think intellectual honesty demands that we acknowledge that the truth of such speculations cannot be known. — Janus
Your idea that it is impossible to provide evidence for non-standard forms of knowledge is simply not true. — Leontiskos
Propositional knowledge is the knowledge of ‘facts’ or other ‘truths’ expressed in clear statements. It’s all about propositions. It’s the sort of logical and theoretical side of knowledge.
This type of knowledge answers the “what” questions about the world. For example, knowing that “the Earth orbits the Sun” is a piece of propositional knowledge.
These types of knowledge can be easily written down and communicated, making them the most familiar and widely studied form of knowledge in traditional educational systems.
Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to do specific activities and sequences of activities.
This type of knowledge explores the “how” of things. It is the knowledge of processes and skills, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle or play a musical instrument. Reading a book on riding a bike will give you the propositional knowledge about it, but won’t actually help you do it.
This type of knowledge is often implicit and gained through practice and repeated actions rather than through verbal instruction. It’s what is often referred to as “know-how,” as opposed to the “know-what” of propositional knowledge. [Note: this was something emphasised by Michael Polanyi in his 'tacit knowledge']
Perspectival knowledge is about knowing what something is like from a certain angle or perspective or context. It’s about being able to see it in a certain way, potentially from someone else’s view point, through a certain lens.
This type of knowledge might be subjective and grounded in the first-person. It’s the knowledge of “what it is like” to be in a certain situation.
For instance, knowing how it feels to be in a crowded place or understanding one’s emotional response during a stressful event are both forms of perspectival knowledge.
Perspectival knowledge is about having a particular standpoint or perspective and is intimately tied to our individual perceptions, experience of the world and cognitive state. These are not things that we can fully learn through propositions and processes.
Participatory knowledge is the knowledge of what it’s like to play a certain role in your environment or in relationships.
Vervaeke considers this to be the most profound of the four types of knowledge. It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something greater than yourself.
It is not just knowing about, but knowing through active engagement and transformation within specific contexts or environments. It shapes and is shaped by the interaction between the person and the world, influencing one’s identity and sense of belonging.
This kind of knowledge is experiential and co-creative, often seen in the dynamics of relationships, culture, and community participation.
I much prefer the current Dalai Lama's underlying tenet that Buddhism is a faith grounded in reason. — javra
These are those dhammas, bhikkhus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized for himself with direct knowledge, propounds to others; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak. — The Brahmajala Sutta
Same point as? — javra
I always say that every person on this earth has the freedom to practice or not practice religion. It is all right to do either. But once you accept religion, it is extremely important to be able to focus your mind on it and sincerely practice the teachings in your daily life. All of us can see that we tend to indulge in religious favouritism by saying, "I belong to this or that religion", rather than making effort to control our agitated minds. This misuse of religion, due to our disturbed minds, also sometimes creates problems.
I know a physicist from Chile who told me that it is not appropriate for a scientist to be biased towards science because of his love and passion for it. I am a Buddhist practitioner and have a lot of faith and respect in the teachings of the Buddha. However, if I mix up my love for and attachment to Buddhism, then my mind shall be biased towards it. A biased mind, which never sees the complete picture, cannot grasp the reality. And any action that results from such a state of mind will not be in tune with reality. As such it causes a lot of problems.
According to Buddhist philosophy, happiness is the result of an enlightened mind whereas suffering is caused by a distorted mind. This is very important. A distorted mind, in contrast to an enlightened mind, is one that is not in tune with reality. — H H The Dalai Lama
the claims to know by direct insight the true nature of reality and the meaning of life. — Janus
It so far seems to me that to have compassion for others and the world at large one must necessarily hold opinions of what is right and wrong, of what is just, etc., and, furthermore, that via compassion one must become moved - if not into action then at the very least into personal sorrow - by the injustice-resulting sorrows of others in the world. — javra
...does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is not eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
Does Master Gotama have any position at all?"
"A 'position,' Vaccha, is something that a Tathagata has done away with. What a Tathagata sees is this: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is feeling, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is perception...
It's just as if a man were wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon, and the man would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the man who wounded me was a noble warrior, a brahman, a merchant, or a worker.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know the given name & clan name of the man who wounded me... until I know whether he was tall, medium, or short... until I know whether he was dark, ruddy-brown, or golden-colored...
The claims they make are not testable predictions, so how are we to assess the veracity of what is claimed by them? — Janus
Don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, "This contemplative is our teacher." When you know for yourselves that, "These qualities are unskillful; these qualities are blameworthy; these qualities are criticized by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to harm & to suffering" — then you should abandon them.' Thus was it said. And in reference to this was it said.
"Now, Kalamas, don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, 'This contemplative is our teacher.' When you know for yourselves that, 'These qualities are skillful; these qualities are blameless; these qualities are praised by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to welfare & to happiness' — then you should enter & remain in them.
proselytizing on this platform by "believers" runs rampant in the constant defense of fallacious arguments. — DifferentiatingEgg
Elon Musk has had it with judges blocking the Trump administration’s moves.
The billionaire face of DOGE called for the impeachment of judges in a meltdown on X Tuesday night, following a flurry of court orders blocking the government’s bids to freeze funding for foreign aid and federal grants, as well as stem refugee admissions.
“The only way to restore rule of the people in America is to impeach judges,” Musk wrote in one post. “No one is above the law, including judges.”
“If ANY judge ANYWHERE can block EVERY Presidential order EVERYWHERE, we do NOT have democracy, we have TYRANNY of the JUDICIARY,” he added in another. — TheDailyBeast
some wag dubbed the "Big Bang". — Gnomon
The Bifurcation of Nature
Whitehead describes modern thought as plagued by a “radical inconsistency” which he calls “the bifurcation of nature”. According to Whitehead, this fundamental “incoherence” at the foundation of modern thought is reflected not only in the concept of nature itself, but in every field of experience—in modern theories of experience and subjectivity, of ethics and aesthetics, as well as many others. In “The Concept of Nature” (1920), Whitehead states that nature splits into two seemingly incompatible spheres of reality at the beginning of modern European thought in the 17th century: ‘Nature’ on the one hand refers to the (so-called) objective nature accessible to the natural sciences only, i.e., the materialistically conceptualized nature of atoms, molecules, cells, and so on; at the same time, however, ‘nature’ also refers to the (subjectively) perceptible and experienced, i.e., the appearing nature with its qualities, valuations, and sensations. Whitehead considers this modernist division of nature in thought—the differentiation of primary and secondary qualities, of ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature, of a material and mental sphere—a fundamental, serious, and illicit incoherence. His term for this incoherence is ‘bifurcation of nature’, for the question of how these two concepts of nature—‘objective’ and ‘subjective’—relate to each other remains largely unresolved for Whitehead within the philosophical tradition of modernity.
Nature as a Meaningless Complex of Facts
"All modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. [...] We find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances [...]."
Whitehead locates the systematic roots of thinking in the mode of substance and attribute in the hypostatization and illegitimate universalization of the particular and contingent subject–predicate form of the propositional sentence of Western languages. The resulting equation of grammatical–logical and ontological structure leads to conceiving the logical difference between subject and predicate as a fundamental ontological difference between subject and object, thing and property, particular and universal.
In general, Whitehead’s critique of substance metaphysics is directed less against Aristotle himself, “the apostle of ‘substance and attribute’” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, p. 209), than against the reception and careless adoption of the idea of substances in modern philosophy and science, precisely the notion of substances as self-identical material. Historically, Whitehead sees the bifurcation sealed with the triumph of Newtonian physics, within which the mechanistic-materialist understanding of matter was universalized and seen as an adequate description of nature in its entirety. In this way, scientific materialism became the guiding principle and implicit assumption of the modern conception of nature at large:
"One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the modern period. It is embodied in the conception which is supposed to express the most concrete aspect of nature. [...] The answer is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material [...] which has the property of simple location in space and time [...]. [M]aterial can be said to be here in space and here in time [...] in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time." ....
Whitehead’s rejection of mechanistic materialism is not only due to the immanent development of the physics of his time, which, from thermodynamics to the theory of relativity and quantum physics, limited the validity of the materialistic view even within physics itself. Rather problematic for him was the interpretation of Newton’s understanding of matter, meaning the universalization of the materialistic conception of nature or the mathematical approach, which was carried out within physics as part of its triumphal procession and its transmission to (de facto) all other regions of experience. From a philosophical point of view, however, this universalization is indefensible, since its experiential basis in Newtonian physics is so limited that it cannot claim validity outside its limited scope. As a result, Newton’s matter particles are not taken as what they are, namely the result of an abstraction, but as the most concrete components of nature as such, as concrete reality.
Whitehead therefore tirelessly emphasizes that the materialistic understanding of nature is an abstraction that can only be applied to a certain segment, that is, to the solid bodies or inanimate nature in the Newtonian sense of the term. This error of mistaking an abstraction for concrete experience, of confusing (the result) of an abstraction with reality itself is what Whitehead calls the “‘Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness’”.This logical fallacy poses a far-reaching and highly consequential problem because it excludes essential realms of experience from the metaphysical context by “explaining [them] away”. For everything that does not fall within the scope of mathematical explanation and cannot be grasped in mechanistic terms is seen as located in the (human) subject alone, and thus denied ‘reality’ and, consequently, value. This way, the differentiation between primary and secondary qualities, mind and matter, nature and culture, subject and object, human and non-human is constantly re-established. (He's looking at you, Dennett.)
Subjectivity versus Nature
One of the most decisive systematic–historical reasons for the inconsistency within the concept of nature and the concomitant exclusion of subjectivity, experience, and history from nature is, according to Whitehead, the abstract, binary distinction between primary and secondary qualities of the 17th century physical notion of matter based on the substance–quality scheme. Quantitative, measurable properties, such as extension, number, size, shape, weight, and movement, are for Galileo via Descartes through to Locke real, i.e., primary qualities of the thing itself. They are conceived as inherent to things as well as independent of perception. In contrast, secondary qualities, such as colors, scents, sound, taste, as well as inner states, feelings, and sensations, are understood to be located in subjective perception, in the mind, and are considered to be dependent on the primary qualities. They only appear to the subject to be real qualities of the objects themselves. In modernity, then, the subject—which, by the way, theoretically as well as practically, cannot be justifiably defined as naturally human—has to endow the ‘dull nature’ with qualities and values, with meaning.
These “psychic additions” (Whitehead 1920, p. 29, 42f.), as Whitehead also calls them, are, in contrast to the primary qualities, not describable in the language of mathematical physics, i.e., not quantifiable and therefore do not possess any (‘objective’) ‘reality’. Consequently, they are of no use for science, and the sensuously perceived nature becomes a (‘subjective’) ‘dream’. Meanwhile, the nature of the sciences becomes a ‘hypothesis’ since it can never become an object of perception as such, given that the primary qualities can only be experienced in a mediated way, for example in experiments. In the course of separating the secondary from the primary qualities, the ‘realm of the objective’, the ‘realm of the hard facts’ is only complemented by the ‘realm of the subjective’; for itself, according to a frequently used formulation in Whitehead, nature is conceived as completely devoid of subjectivity, i.e., values, feelings, and intentions. Against this background, Whitehead can then also suggest, in an ironically exaggerated way, that the Romantic poets are completely wrong in praising the rose for its scent or the nightingale for its song. ...
I was just looking for some background the easy way, — Mww
The key insight of phenomenology is that the modern interpretation of knowledge as a relation between consciousness as a self-contained ‘subject’ and reality as an ‘object’ extrinsic to it is incoherent. On the one hand, consciousness is always and essentially the awareness of something, and is thus always already together with being. On the other hand, if ‘being’ is to mean anything at all, it can only mean that which is phenomenal, that which is so to speak ‘there’ for awareness, and thus always already belongs to consciousness. ....
Consciousness is the grasping of being; being is what is grasped by consciousness. The phenomenological term for the first of these observations is ‘intentionality;’ for the second, ‘givenness.’ “The mind is a moment to the world and the things in it; the mind is essentially correlated with its objects. The mind is essentially intentional. There is no ‘problem of knowledge’ or ‘problem of the external world,’ there is no problem about how we get to ‘extramental’ reality, because the mind should never be separated from reality from the beginning. Mind and being are moments to each other; they are not pieces that can be segmented out of the whole to which they belong.” Intended as an exposition of Husserlian phenomenology, these words hold true for the entire classical tradition from Parmenides to Aquinas. While this may seem a new and striking insight to those for whom philosophy begins with, say, Descartes, or who approach even ancient philosophy from a modern perspective, it is in fact largely a recovery of the classical vision, a recovery that would scarcely be needed had that vision not been lost in the first place. — Thinking Being, Eric Perl, p 8-9
magine a small neural implant that enhances human empathy, allowing people to understand deeply and care about the feelings of others. — Rob J Kennedy
We aren't even in control of this construct, we are just given an emotional experience that we are, an illusion that isn't even experienced by an acting will, the illusion and the one experiencing it is one and the same. But that's a whole other topic. — Christoffer
Being more versed in the classics, what do you think an example, the chronological forerunner, of the modern(-ish) principle of induction would be, which says there can be no empirical discovery of capital T truth? — Mww
While this may seem a new and striking insight to those for whom philosophy begins with, say, Descartes, or who approach even ancient philosophy from a modern perspective, it is in fact largely a recovery of the classical vision, a recovery that would scarcely be needed had that vision not been lost in the first place.
What does "capital T truth" mean? — Leontiskos
Eckhart was a Dominican, not a monastic. — Leontiskos
A bit baffled that "DOGE" also affects the budget of the James Webb telescope. — javi2541997
. Which means that I can be dead (the worldly self) and the "I am" is still originally self-evident. — JuanZu
The multiple appearances are not single separate beads following one another; they are “threaded” by the identity continuing within them all. As Husserl puts it, “Each single percept in this series is already a percept of the thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see this book. It is always one and the same thing.”
A federal judge in Washington said on Monday that the way the Trump administration set up and has been running Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency may violate the Constitution.
The skepticism expressed by the judge, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, did not come as part of a binding ruling, but it suggested that there could be problems looming for Mr. Musk’s organization, which is also known as the U.S. DOGE Service.
“Based on the limited record I have before me, I have some concerns about the constitutionality of U.S.D.S.’s structure and operations,” Judge Kollar-Kotelly said at a hearing in Federal District Court in Washington. She expressed particular concern that it violated the appointments clause of the Constitution, which requires leaders of federal agencies to be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Mr. Musk was neither nominated nor confirmed.
….
At the hearing, Judge Kollar-Kotelly repeatedly asked a lawyer for the government, Bradley Humphreys, to identify the service’s administrator. He was unable to answer her.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly also asked Mr. Humphreys what position Mr. Musk holds. Mr. Humphreys responded that Mr. Musk was not the DOGE Service’s administrator, or even an employee of the organization, echoing what a White House official had declared in a separate case challenging the powers of the group.
When the judge pressed him on what Mr. Musk’s job actually was, Mr. Humphreys said, “I don’t have any information beyond he’s a close adviser to the president.”
That exchange seemed to irk Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who signaled her skepticism about the organization’s structure and powers.
“It does seem to me if you have people that are not authorized to carry out some of these functions that they’re carrying out that does raise an issue,” she said. “I would hope that by now we would know who is the administrator, who is the acting administrator and what authority do they have?” — Judge Questions Constitutionality of Musk’s Cost-Cutting Operation, NY Times
The Great Way is not difficult for those who have no preferences. When love and hate are both absent, everything becomes clear and undisguised. Make the smallest distinction, however, and heaven and earth are set infinitely apart. If you wish to see the truth, then hold no opinions for, or against, anything. To set up what you like against what you dislike is the disease of the mind¹¹.
“Does Master Gotama have any position at all?”
“A ‘position,’ Vaccha, is something that the Buddha has done away with.”¹²
Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there’s anything lying behind them.
This mode is called emptiness because it’s empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and to define the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. So they get in the way when we try to understand…¹³
Now you may ask what this detachment is that is so noble in itself. You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honour, shame or disgrace, as a mountain of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. …
You should know that the outer man can be active while the inner man is completely free of this activity and unmoved … Here is an analogy: a door swings open and shuts on its hinge. I would compare the outer woodwork of the door to the outer man and the hinge to the inner man. When the door opens and shuts, the boards move back and forth but the hinge stays in the same place and is never moved thereby. It is the same in this case if you understand it rightly.
Now I ask: What is the object of pure detachment? My answer is that the object of pure detachment is neither this nor that. It rests on absolutely nothing and I will tell you why: pure detachment rests on the highest and he is at his highest, in whom God can work all His will … And so, if the heart is ready to receive the highest, it must rest on absolutely nothing…¹³
Believing that there was a time before humans is mind-dependent. There being a time before humans, isn't. — Banno
'The world' outside any mind has no structure or any features.
— Wayfarer
You can't know that. that's the step too far. All you can say is that you do not know what that structure might be. At least until it is understood, by coming "inside" the mind. — Banno
Nothing odd about that, except that the world already has some structure apart from that mind, and hence novelty, error and agreement. — Banno
The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.
Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271
Yet you say that this too is created by mind. — Banno