@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul
The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. — Ludwig V
Just to tweak this a bit, Austin is not “shifting” from true and false
to commitment (abandoning truth), but only adding that a claim (even to truth) is made
in a circumstance, and I am only underlining his recognition that one of the pieces of the circumstance is that it is made by a person subject to the future (responsible to it, to further intelligibility—his “amending” or “retracting” as only examples)
rather than philosophy’s desire to try to
solve for the future, avoid the possibility of error
entirely (be incorrigible, abstractly, universally—thus, also removing our part).
One would have to show this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.) — Ludwig V
Again, Austin’s claim is not that statements
are ordinarily (not metaphysically) incorrigible
because they are made
by me (first-person), but because of the circumstances that make, say, “I am in pain” intelligible, for example, that I am informing you so that you might help me, even if I am not in pain, which is not a matter of it being “wrong”, but of me lying (p. 113, 118), which is always a possibility in that case (without recourse). My understanding is that neither Austin nor Wittgenstein claim that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. However, in the sense above, it
is important that
it is me that is making this claim (with respect to my responsibility to it).
Also, saying that Austin is relying on “standard, or at least shared, ways” overlooks the fact that we might not find a right answer (p.66), that he leaves the whole matter of judgment open to new circumstances (though I can’t find that part again, maybe p. 74), and, in any event, any discussion
is only brought up when it is under “suspicion” or is questioned, as “if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question [of doubt, thus criteria] simply doesn't come up” (p.76). This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a
specific situation. Wittgenstein is read as claiming a foundation based on much the same thing, but he also ultimately finds an end to all that (rules, “my” “mental processes”, “language games”, etc.) and looks at much the same circumstances when investigating “continuing a series”, among other things.
The fundamental point is that what
matters is the fact that claims are made in a situation. The conclusion is the same for first-person statements as with identification of a pig, or a color. And not only do they have different criteria (which is more Wittgenstein’s focus), but the application of those criteria still depends on the circumstance (what the “use” or “sense” is of something in that instance Wittgenstein would say).
Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. — Ludwig V
The whole point here for Austin is that the more stringent our presumed standard (incorrigibility), the less cases that actually meet that requirement. Again, this is why philosophy reduces itself to the best-case of objects (or first-person claims). In fact, no case actually meets that requirement for certainty (not as a lack, but categorically/mechanically—thus philosophy makes up something, e.g., sense-data). As I stated above, Austin addresses this, among other places, in discussing the desire for, and outcome of, generalization (p.112), but also that it is less likely to cover “novel situations” (p. 130). Emerson refers (in “Experience”) to this as everything slipping through our fingers the harder we try to grasp (which Heidegger alludes to in “What is Called Thinking?”).