He only sees that logic and interest are tied together. But Cicero argued that a good speaker had to be a good man. Plato just didn’t trust individuals to be up to the task. — Antony Nickles

Anything can be used as a tool. Philosophy is no exception.

The history of philosophy is rife with one camp picking apart another and calling into question what philosophy actually is. — Antony Nickles

It is also rife with those who pretend that what they represent is more than a camp.

Yes, the history of philosophy is one attempt after another of trying to remove the human... — Antony Nickles

@schopenhauer1 has already addressed this strawman.

And drawing a limit around knowledge is exactly what Plato... — Antony Nickles

On the contrary, the boundary excludes certain forms of skepticism, and the one who is skeptical of philosophy has ceased doing philosophy. This is particularly true in this case where his skepticism attempts to undercut the discipline itself.

I would argue Witt is saving the true nature of philosophy from itself. — Antony Nickles

...by creating something new, something incommensurable with philosophy. This is yet another attempt to have it both ways.

This seems obvious, unless someone wishes to claim that when Wittgenstein criticizes philosophy he is at the same time criticizing himself? — Leontiskos

Me, I do. In a sense he is recognizing that everyone (and not just philosophers) wishes to side-step our part in our lives and our lives together. All philosophers including him (and not just because of who he was in the Tract) are tempted to do things like simplify things, create dichotomies, not examine premises, and, in this case, want to have knowledge (truth) take the place of our ongoing responsibility to answer for our speech and actions.

- Wittgenstein criticizes in order to propose an alternative. He does not criticize in order to continue in the same general direction, with a slight adjustment. The whole, "What I preach to you I also preach to myself," is not particularly convincing. It simply is not true to the extent that it would need to be in order to avoid the fact that a distancing from philosophy is occurring.

...And now I will disappear for a time.

There are two different senses of “know” here at p. (246), one being: with certainty, the other being knowing as acknowledging, recognizing. The part of the sentence you are quoting is the second kind. “I’m in pain.” “I know” or “He’s in pain!” “I know, but he’s so dramatic, he’ll be fine.” There is an assumption in thinking we understand how “to know” works; that it is just the same for pain as it is for other things, indeed, that it works the same in all instances.

Another’s pain is not known, it is responded to — Antony Nickles

This contradicts Wittgenstein, who tells us at PI 246 that: “other people very often know if I’m in pain.”

There are a few points I'd like to address further.

One is this business of psychoanalyzing. Of course in debate one philosopher not uncommonly accuses another of relying on a suppressed premise, of being in thrall to a myth (Sellars), or of consciously adopting an assumption they needn't, and also not uncommonly with the suggestion that this move is not made entirely knowingly.

That bears a vague resemblance to psychoanalysis and I think it's apt in one sense but not in another: the sense in which it fits -- and which philosophers are very likely to bristle at -- is the idea of speaking for the person you're having a discussion with; the sense in which it differs is that in popular usage "psychoanalyzing" specifically connotes delving into a person's motives, and that's not really what's going on in the standard philosophical exchange. Around here, we have a norm -- not always observed -- against that sort of questioning.

And that's the thing -- no matter how you do it, it comes off as questioning someone's motives. Just so, @Leontiskos gradually transitioned from a point about framing, to psychoanalyzing, to criticism (meant I think in the everyday negative sense), to skepticism, to undermining. Next would be "attacking" I suppose.

Which brings me to my second point.

The point that I have been making over and over again is that the one making the criticism of philosophy is intending to step outside philosophy. This seems obvious, unless someone wishes to claim that when Wittgenstein criticizes philosophy he is at the same time criticizing himself? — Leontiskos

Oddly, I had raised exactly this possibility earlier:

I think he's very interested in the sorts of things we do willy-nilly, oversimplifying, overgeneralizing, and not just to say "don't do that". It's here I think there is something deep about Wittgenstein, this feeling that there are things we might legitimately call "mistakes" we cannot really avoid. — Srap Tasmaner

If that were true, then indeed Wittgenstein would also be criticizing himself. There is a certain amount of "we" and "us" in the Investigations, even some famous ones:

115. A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.

(On the facing page, by the way, is this:

121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order.

for what that's worth.)

I don't think Wittgenstein holds himself apart from philosophy, above it, immune to the errors of those benighted souls who came before him. He no more stands outside philosophy than he stands outside language when he talks about that.

(Now maybe there is something going on here, underground, as it were. Maybe this is all a bit like his own Confessions: he too once lived in error as we do, but he's here to tell you salvation is possible -- and he was the worst of all, more committed to logical purity than any man who ever lived -- why, if he can be saved, then so can you -- just pass the hat along there, and give whatever you can.

I don't think so, but it's not crazy. I think he's more like a man talking about the human condition; that man is talking about himself and his own life too. That's the spirit of the philosophy/orthography remark anyway.)

Which leads to my final point, which is that I'm still inclined to treat the question "What does philosophy want?" differently from the question "What do philosophers want?" and so also the questions about why that's wanted.

We sometimes, on this forum, talk about science a little like this, as an institution or worldview with a sort of mind of its own. Right there, in the two remarks I quoted, Wittgenstein reaches for just this sort of personification: language does this, philosophy speaks of that.

I can't, off the top of my head, call to mind Wittgenstein attributing a motive to one of these personified entities, but it's not unheard of. The ersatz motives of science, of business, of government, of academia, all have been called into question on this forum, more or less daily. Maybe all that is evidence that this is not a great idea, I can't say.

(Questioning motives was more or less central to Nietzsche's genealogical critique and to Marx's materialist critique. Together with Freud, already alluded to, Ricoeur's fathers of the hermeneutics of suspicion. Does Wittgenstein belong in their company? Not to my mind, but I'm sure some would think so. @Antony Nickles speaks of Wittgenstein reforming philosophy by putting humanity back in it, and some would say either Marx or Nietzsche got there first.)

With all that out of the way, I still like the question "What does philosophy want?" It doesn't really matter to me that it arose in the context of Antony's interpretation of Wittgenstein; I intended to strip that context away entirely, but I was unsuccessful.

I think it's a good question, but maybe it isn't, I don't know. Does philosophy want something? Does it want something it can get? If it gets it, what then? Would philosophy be over, or would it carry on, protecting its prize? And of course the point of it all is that if philosophy does want something, how does that affect it? How does that color the practice of philosophy? How does philosophy deal with not having what it wants?

This seems obvious, unless someone wishes to claim that when Wittgenstein criticizes philosophy he is at the same time criticizing himself? — Leontiskos

In the preface to the PI Wittgenstein says:

Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas. Then it suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old ideas and the
new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my older way of thinking.

For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book.

So, yes. He is at the same time criticizing himself.

There are two different senses of “know” here at p. (246), one being: with certainty, the other being knowing as acknowledging, recognizing. The part of the sentence you are quoting is the second kind. “I’m in pain.” “I know” or “He’s in pain!” “I know, but he’s so dramatic, he’ll be fine.” — Antony Nickles

Which of these senses of "know" is the way the word "is normally used", as W says at PI 246?

If there is a sense of "know" that means "acknowledging, recognizing", then you are saying that we do know another's pain (at least, sometimes). I agree, but this is contrary to your earlier statements that we do not know another's pain.

I think it's a good question, but maybe it isn't, I don't know. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is, it makes philosophy impersonal. Some think this is as it should be, but I don't think Wittgenstein is one of them. In a letter to Rush Rhees he says:

My own problems appear in what I write in philosophy. What good does all my talent do me, if, at heart, I am unhappy? What help is it to me to solve philosophical problems, if I cannot settle the chief, most important thing?

In the Tractatus he says:

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

When in the Tractatus he talks about "my world" he is not talking about the problem of other minds. The world as it is for me is the world as I experience it. My life. As he says:

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

(6.43)

If there is a sense of "know" that means "acknowledging, recognizing", then you are saying that we do know another's pain (at least, sometimes). I agree, but this is contrary to your earlier statements that we do not know another's pain. — Luke

Sorry, I didn’t make it clear in that post that “know” has more than one sense. The point I was getting at is that we do not “know” pain in the way the philosopher that Witt is critiquing wants, with certainty, identity, etc.

philosophers are very likely to bristle at […] the idea of speaking for the person you're having a discussion with; — Srap Tasmaner

I never liked how Socrates got people to accept premises but then forced a conclusion on them. Witt allowed me to finally realize that he had rigged the question to only accept one answer. But Wittgenstein follows the same method of speaking for all of us (including the interlocutor). He comes up with examples of what we say when we talk about, say: belief when it is raining, and then proposes (on behalf of everyone) that it is in the sense of a hypothesis (that this is how it works). Now it is up to us to see its mechanics and accept that, but he certainly doesn’t make it seem like an option is to deny it, to add varied mechanics based on the situation, etc. I would say this is not a case of lack of claiming greater authority (as everyone has the same) and lack of possibility (we can all explicate this grammar), and more a case of being impolite—a poor philosophical bedside manner.

I agree with @Shawn that it is better to start with the Blue and Brown books, as, I imagine because he is in person with those whom he must bring along to have the validity he desires (the uncontroversial acceptance of us all), he has more of a speculative openness then the flat statement-like seeming conclusions his proposals have come to be once they reach the PI. As if he can skip the “As we all would agree” nature of his conjectures, and he states them as if they have already been worked through and wouldn’t possibly be readily accepted; thus his “arrogance”.

Austin suffers from the same affliction, but he is even more ruthless as he directly addresses a real person and uses them as a punching bag in showing the unanticipated implications and missteps of imposing a requirement before first looking at a practice, but he is so good at completely and reasonably drawing out our ordinary criteria that there is almost a begrudging forgiveness in the respect of acceding to him.

But I think @Srap Tasmaner is correct in that it feels invasive to be told the motivation you have in saying something, as if our reasons were not our own. But a lot of the times here people say things as if the reasoning is self-evident, so I find myself putting words in their mouth to try to politely move the conversation along (rather than saying I simply don’t understand). I attempt to be generous, as Socrates admonishes us in the Theatetus, to imagine the strongest argument they could be making, and also to phrase it that “I take you to mean” to show that it is provisional, but I am not trying to tell someone the reasons they have for saying something, but trying to show them the implications and fallout of saying those words here and now. Part of what Witt is pointing out is that our expressions always have these connotations, except when they are abstracted from any context and forced to adhere to manufactured criteria.

And these criteria are not individual (psychological, or “self”) interests (or feelings, being persuaded), but all our history of human lives of distinguishing and identifying and judging, i.e., what is essential to us about a practice, the various reasons that count with/to it. — Antony Nickles

The difference between psychology and philosophy is expressed this way in Philosophy of Psychology:

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.
I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this expe-
rience “noticing an aspect”.
114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts
of experience. — Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment

That places the two activities in closer contact than the sharp lines drawn in Tractatus.

4.1121 Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science.
5.641 What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way. — ibid.

But the remark about causes in PoP 114 does show a continuity with the limits of induction laid out in Tractatus:

6.363 The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences.
6.3631 This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological one.
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized. — ibid.

These approaches to experience are an exploration of "the world is my world". I don't understand what you mean by "our history of human lives" in the context of the distinction made by Wittgenstein.

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.
I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this expe-
rience “noticing an aspect”.
114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience. — Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment

Noticing or seeing aspects is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy that often goes unnoticed. This is related to "concepts of experience".

111. Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

He goes on to say at 116:

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. - So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

The idea of seeing something according to an interpretation blurs the line between seeing and thinking. "Now I see it" can mean, "Now I understand". Seeing is not limited to passive reception, it involves both perception and conception.

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

The focus on propositions can occlude the importance of seeing for both the early and latter Wittgenstein. Seeing connections involves making connections and seeing things from the right perspective. This is what Wittgenstein calls an übersichtliche Darstellung. a surveyable representation, (alternatively translated as perspicuous representation):

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

For Wittgenstein philosophy is not the "view from nowhere":

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value)

Witt says:

“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly” (6.54).

He also says:

“The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical propositions, but to make propositions clear” (4.112).

Elucidations comes to us from Frege and serve a pragmatic role:

“Definitions proper must be distinguished from elucidations. In the first stages of any discipline we cannot avoid the use of ordinary words. But these words are, for the most part, not really appropriate for scientific purposes, because they are not precise enough and flucuate in their use. Science needs technical terms that have precise and fixed meanings and in order to come to and understanding about these meanings and exclude possible misunderstandings, we give elucidations of their use”

Frege admits:

“Theoretically, one might never achieve one’s goal this way. In practice, however, we do manage to come to and understanding about the meanings of words. Of course we have to be able to count on a meeting of minds, on others guessing what we have in mind. But, all this precedes construction of a system and does not belong within the system”.

Witt never says that Philosophy is meaningless; he says philosophy is elucidatory...it attempts to clarify thoughts and ideas, in order to mitigate misunderstanding.

Which is why he says:

“The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said [clearly], i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions…” (6.53).

Notice how he says that the propositions of natural science have nothing to do with philosophy, simply that the proper way to engage in the problems philosophy is concerned with, is by using the propositions of science.

This isn’t to say much more than when engaging in metaphysics, use only expressions that can be tied back to reality (even as possibilities).

This is why Witt says:

“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive.’”

Philosophy doesn’t tell us what there is out there in the world, but it can help us understand what must be the case given a certain set of assumptions.

An example, I think, of what Witt has in mind can perhaps be seen in Einstein’s work on general relativity. In analyzing the concept of space and time, E gives several thought experiments, sometimes of impossible situations like trains going the speed of light. At the end of his work, he doesn’t accomplish anything scientific, so to speak – nothing was proven. But, he used the propositions of science, and descriptions we can all understand and agree to, in order to paint a new picture of space and time that made sense, and explained more than previous “vague” notions like absolute space and absolute time…. Only later did the “theory” get scientifically confirmed, and explained thereby changing our whole picture of reality.

I don't understand what you mean by "our history of human lives" in the context of the distinction made by Wittgenstein. — Paine

When I said: “Looking at what we would say when doing… for example: (following) rules, meaning (what we say), understanding (a series), seeing (an aspect), knowing (as being certain), etc., reveals the criteria (standards) of a practice (its grammar), because what we say expresses us. Our expressions show how and why we are interested in our practices. And these criteria are not individual (psychological, or “self”) interests (our feelings, being persuaded), but all our history of human lives of distinguishing and identifying and judging, i.e., what is essential to us about a practice, the various reasons that count with/to it.” (Emphasis added)

What I meant by “the history of our human lives” is that the way we judge a practice is based on our interest as a society in our practices, such as excuses, or apologies, or vengeance. What is a mistake and what is an accident is judged by criteria that have been developed and distinguished (or forgotten by our culture) as part of why we care about blame and responsibility (what matters to us about them) over the history of human life. This gives our actions and the response to them a shared context of judgment so that they are not individual or personal (though of course we can fly in the face of tradition). Most will argue that human interests should not be taken into account and will talk of “subjective” or individual (whimsical, relative, “self-interested”) or feelings or “psychological”, which I take as something like not conscious or not ours, ourself. Part of what I see Witt doing is making explicit our unexamined shared criteria, which is the same thing Plato’s interlocutors do.

If there is a sense of "know" that means "acknowledging, recognizing", then you are saying that we do know another's pain (at least, sometimes). I agree, but this is contrary to your earlier statements that we do not know another's pain. — Luke

Is there a difference between knowing someone's pain and knowing that someone is in pain?

Because there's certainly a difference between knowing someone's mother and knowing that someone has a mother.

I recognize an archeological perspective in Wittgenstein, using language to uncover experiences we do not have a clear view of. That element seems to make the boundary between the personal and the social more arbitrary. The distinction serves some purposes but conceals others.

I don't offer that as a rebuttal to your description of the work as a moment of philosophical history. But it does leave out what I find most interesting. We do not know what we are doing.

Is there a difference between knowing someone's pain and knowing that someone is in pain? — Michael

It’s an interesting question, but I think it makes little difference given @Antony Nickles earlier non-epistemic view of (edit: other people’s) pain; that we do not stand in a knowledge relation to (edit: other people’s) pain:

We cannot know other minds because our relation to others is not knowledge, but how we treat them, our “attitude” in relation to them, in its sense of: position “towards”. I treat you as if you have a soul. — Antony Nickles

As with others’ souls (p. 178) or the pain causing another to writhe in front of us (p. 235), we do not know it, because that is not how knowledge works. We respond to them (or ignore them). That is how humanity and pain are treated, the way in which they matter to us, their grammar. — Antony Nickles

But, as I noted, this contradicts Wittgenstein’s comments.

We cannot know other minds because our relation to others is not knowledge, but how we treat them, our “attitude” in relation to them, in its sense of: position “towards”. I treat you as if you have a soul. — Antony Nickles

But, as I noted, this contradicts Wittgenstein’s comments. — Luke

So what I am not a fan of, is when something that is pretty common understanding of things is presented as if it’s profoundly innovative wisdom.

Is there a difference between knowing someone's pain and knowing that someone is in pain? — Michael

Excellent observation. What Witt would do is create a situation and give examples of what we’d say. “I’m in pain” “Me too” “But I have a headache.” “Me too!” “Mine’s a shooting zing behind my ear” “Right! Boy, I know your pain.” Thus why he will conclude that, as a matter of identity, to the extent we agree, we have the same pain (PI # 235).

But when I say “I know that they are in pain” I am acknowledging that the other is in pain. One instance would be someone writhing in pain and I am doing nothing. You say “They’re in pain.” To which I might say “Yes, I know. I like to see my enemies suffer.” This is not the only sense of know than that of certainty, and it is a rare occurrence, but it is knowledge of another person (as @Luke correctly clarifies).

But, as I noted, this contradicts Wittgenstein’s comments. — Luke

P. 246 does not force this realization, but it is an occurrence of the two senses colliding. He is showing that the philosopher would like to “know” another’s pain, as in be certain (identical), and that in regular use, we “know” another’s pain, as in acknowledging (as better addressed on p. 223).

So what I am not a fan of, is when something that is pretty common understanding of things is presented as if it’s profoundly innovative wisdom. — schopenhauer1

Well, if this is meant to say that our regular use is not profound, I agree, as it is meant to be obvious. The wisdom we gain is in the contrast to the philosophical criteria that we now see that we are manufacturing and imposing in approaching the matter in abstraction. The philosopher imagines “knowing” another’s mind as being (requiring) an identical equation, thus the impression you could never know my pain, have the same pain, and why the philosopher comes up with a carrier, an object, for this imagined uniqueness, as a pain “sensation”, pain “perception”.

The philosopher imagines “knowing” another’s mind as being (requiring) an identical equation, thus the impression you could never know my pain, have the same pain, and why the philosopher comes up with a carrier, an object, for this imagined uniqueness, as a pain “sensation”, pain “perception”. — Antony Nickles

Which philosopher(s)? There is identity theories I guess that propose certain neuronal firings indicate a certain brain state, but I am not sure Witt knew about those. No one presumably thinks that we actually can feel the same exact thoughts as through ESP. And surely, the whole point of empathy is that we imagine others pain is similar to our own.

This is making a caricature of common notions.. Yeah, almost everyone agrees that they can't see inside what another person is feeling, and you take it on habit and as a matter of course that people feel similarly when they are in pain or other sensations. And that it is impossible if their pain is exactly the same. But I am not sure pointing out that obvious point is making some grand philosophical point.

For example, a much more interesting philosophical point is that of "p-zombies", a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers. But that is more interesting because it imagines that people don't have any inner sensation. But the point of it is to prove the weirdness of subjectivity and why it exists at all and that if materialists are correct, you can have a completely behavioral based model, that shouldn't account for internal states. But you see why this actually is meant to elicit various questions related to the mind-body problem.

Excellent observation. What Witt would do is create a situation and give examples of what we’d say. “I’m in pain” “Me too” “But I have a headache.” “Me too!” “Mine’s a shooting zing behind my ear” “Right! Boy, I know your pain.” Thus why he will conclude that, as a matter of identity, to the extent we agree, we have the same pain (PI # 235). — Antony Nickles

The fact that we use the same word "pain" to refer to your sensations and to my sensations isn't that your sensations are the same as my sensations.

We are getting rather far afield from Witt’s approachability, however,

Which philosopher(s)?… No one presumably thinks that we actually can feel the same exact thoughts… a much more interesting philosophical point is that of "p-zombies", a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers. But that is more interesting because it imagines that people don't have any inner sensation. — schopenhauer1

The idea of the automaton (Descartes’ originally I believe) is the same thing (identity) except inverse and to the absurd: the panic that we can’t know (with certainty) what is in the other’s mind, which is the possibility there is nothing; the doubt of the other as created by the desire for certainty (not just, “I can’t read them”).

…the point of it is to prove the weirdness of subjectivity and why it exists at all — schopenhauer1

The desire for certainty also creates the fantasy that I—my “subjectivity” or “consciousness”—am unknowable to others. The need to be special, that I am always inexpressible and innately unique, creates the picture of “internal states”.

…you take it on habit and as a matter of course that people feel similarly when they are in pain or other sensations. — schopenhauer1

I see that before I was falling into the trap of saying “same” and “a matter of identity” which was confusing (thus why Witt says “In so far as it makes sense” (#253), because we would only equate our pain (even in similarity) for specific circumstances, like commiseration**.

We express our pain to call attention to it (the same as a cry of pain #244). I identify it so a doctor can treat it. I identify myself with it perhaps to gain sympathy. I differentiate it because it needs attention compared to yours. “I have a hangover, and mine is bigger and so I need the last four Ibuprofen.” And, even under the ordinary criteria of pain, I can deny that you, or anyone, feels my pain. And it is possible this is not just a desire to be unknown (say I’m the man at the start of Alien, “but it feels weird in my stomach. No, I don’t have an ‘upset tummy’ Ripley!”)

The fact that we use the same word "pain" to refer to your sensations and to my sensations isn't that your sensations are the same as my sensations. — Michael

Again, sorry for the confusion, but saying our pain is the “same” is not the business of equating (or comparing); this is not an agreement on the meaning of the word pain, nor is it really an “agreement” or as @schopenhauer1 puts it “tak[ing] it on habit and as a matter of course”—and thus the importance that we look at specific cases**. We may compare and equate certain occurrences and facets when we talk about the pain of a breakup. Here we say our pain is the same, that we know the other’s pain, as a matter of connection and to identify with the other person—as commiseration. A more philosophical way to say this is that what matters to us about pain, its criteria for identity and its importance to us, is that a person has it, not the sensation itself, though that may play a part, as in location, intensity, etc. This is the “criterion of identity” that we have to be reminded of in #253.

Again, Witt’s point is not to be right about our ordinary criteria and mechanics of pain, but to draw them out to see why we looked at it the way we did in doing “philosophy”, and how that refocuses our philosophical concerns, improves our thinking. The skeptic is not wrong or confused. It is true that we may be wrong about the other, and that I might have something all my own to express, but without the pictures created by the desire for certainty, we may see the need for our relation to others (across our doubt) and our obligation of continued intelligibility for ourselves.

We are getting rather far afield from Witt’s approachability, however, — Antony Nickles

Not really though. My point is that it is a pretty asshole move by the philosopher in question to point out things as if they are novel when they are pretty readily held by the majority. In this case, the idea that we can never have perfect "certainty" of what others are feeling, so must rely on outward observations and public displays, and then take action from there and believe them. None of this is an uncommon view.

I ask you, have you ever had someone say some pretty commonsense advice as if you never thought of it? Has that ever irked you that they are providing advice as if they hit on something profound which you and everyone else knows? I gave an example of moderate politicians who say, "It's the economy stupid! That's what matters most to families!".. Well, yeah, so does that mean no other politician cares about the economy? :lol:

As a matter of connection and to identify with the other person, we say our pain is the same, that we know the other’s pain. — Antony Nickles

That we say it isn't that it's true.

Again, Witt’s point is not to be right — Antony Nickles

Then I will simply say that Wittgenstein is wrong and so we shouldn't listen to what he has to say.

point out things as if they are novel when they are pretty readily held by the majority. In this case, the idea that we can never have perfect "certainty" of what others are feeling, so must rely on outward observations and public displays, and then take action from there and believe them. None of this is an uncommon view. — schopenhauer1

But this is not a matter of competing “views”, or explanations, or that we want to know the same thing but we just have to get at it a different way. And he is not contrasting the philosopher to the “majority” as if we were just doing anthropology, a census of opinion. In fact, even our culture pictures some things exactly based on the framework of philosophy (think “objective/subjective”), and even some here imagine “ordinary” is just what they first think of.

He is drawing out (making explicit) the type of criteria in individual cases to contrast them with the philosophical fixation with knowledge as certainty, or that we have to settle for some lesser version in contrast… because we “never have perfect” knowledge.

The point is not the answer, nor to say philosophy is stupid or useless, but to allow for self-reflection, to see our projection into our thinking. The obviousness of our ordinary criteria, once we see them, is uncanny (Cavell’s term) for me exactly because I have been trained so long to think in the frameworks of philosophy.

He is drawing out (making explicit) the type of criteria in individual cases to contrast them with the philosophical fixation with knowledge as certainty, or that we have to settle for some lesser version in contrast… because we “never have perfect” knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Right, but my contention is that this thing he is setting up of "perfect knowledge" and "making due" is a false narrative, and thus a strawman that doesn't need addressing really.

The point is not the answer, nor to say philosophy is stupid or useless, but to allow for self-reflection, to see our projection into our thinking. The obviousness of our ordinary criteria, once we see them, is uncanny (Cavell’s term) for me exactly because I have been trained so long to think in the frameworks of philosophy. — Antony Nickles

So I am just focusing on this idea of not knowing what someone is really thinking internally, this doesn't seem like something that needs deconstruction because it never was constructed. It's a straw man.

One thing I do not like is obtuse bantering against a belief that doesn't exist.. Someone mentioned for example, cherry picking as a foil Augustine, so one can take that as the view that the "ordinary or majority X (philosopher/person) holds. I just think this is bad faith arguing to make a point that one doesn't need. Perhaps again, this is just him talking to himself about his previous views, but then, why should I care about his previous views or his current views?

That we say it isn't that it's true. — Michael

Right, but this might be because one is feigning agreement because they are pitying the other, or being stoic, and maybe not some way for our pain to be “truly” the same, which philosophy perhaps simple creates in order to impose the requirement we wanted all along.

And this is part of the problem of Wittgenstein. It denies the reality of reference. Many words refer to things, and the word like pain refers to a sensation. — Michael

He is not denying that we talk about how our pain feels, and, when we do, that there is not a feeling which we are describing. It’s just the framework of a certain correspondence between words and the world (as always objects) needs to be taken apart to show it is made from our own philosophical desires.

Right, but this might be because one is feigning agreement because they are pitying the other, or being stoic, and maybe not some way for our pain to be “truly” the same, which philosophy perhaps simple creates in order to impose the requirement we wanted all along. — Antony Nickles

Or it's because the sensation I have when I stab myself in the arm is unlike the sensation you have when you stab yourself in the arm, and so our pains are not the same and we don't know one another's pain.

Right, but my contention is that this thing he is setting up of "perfect knowledge" and "making due" is a false narrative, and thus a strawman that doesn't need addressing really. — schopenhauer1

That it is a “false” narrative does not explain why Plato, Descartes, Kant, Positivism, etc. got sucked into it (belief or opinion vs knowledge; appearance vs reality; the thing-in-itself; only either true or false). That is what Witt is investigating.

So I am just focusing on this idea of not knowing what someone is really thinking internally, this doesn't seem like something that needs deconstruction because it never was constructed. It's a straw man. — schopenhauer1

However, now I am amazed at how my mind is [weak and] prone to error… I also say I see the people themselves, just as I do with the wax. But what am I really seeing other than hats and coats, which could be concealing automatons underneath? However, I judge that they are people. And thus what I thought I was seeing with my eyes I understand only with my faculty of judgment, which is in my mind. — Descartes, 2nd Meditation

This is a tough one, because it’s easy to dismiss Descartes as delusional or paranoid. The particular instance is not as important as the fabrications that create it, which is not the automaton, but turning our human limitations into a problem, here, only seeing “appearance” because we want to have the certainty of “reality”, when the desire is in reaction to the fear that, in fact, sometimes we don’t know whether someone is lying; that their judgments, their decisions, etc. can exist but be unexpressed; that we may be wrong about them, to trust them, to give our love to them.

why should I care… ? — schopenhauer1

Finding yourself in the grip of skepticism is also tricky (even accepting its truth) because we don’t see that: imagining we live without it (as part of the human condition) or have solved it, is to still be in its snare.