Philosophers in need of Therapy

Shawn

This thread is a follow up on my previous thread about, Why does language befuddle us?

Instead of asking the question as to why philosophy should profess itself as a form of therapy, I have the more grounded question to ask before we can answer as to why philosophers are in need of therapy, according to Wittgenstein.

Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy. By saying this, there are some remarks of Wittgenstein that were published in the 1980's regarding the philosophy of psychology. Wittgenstein planted a seed in my mind, all the back in the Tractatus with his typical obscurantism.

4.1121 Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science.
The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.
Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes which philosophers held to be so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got entangled for the most part in unessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger for my method.

4.1122 Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science.

Nobody really talks about it, but hey, there's even "Darwin" in the Tractatus, who would have thought(?) Essentially, the non-mentalism of the Tractatus gave way to the mentalism of psychology and language in the Investigations.

Now, I want to quote myself by saying that I have always been a resolute reader of the Tractatus. I say this because I believe that the richness of fundamentally understanding itself and the scientific treatment of philosophy found in the Tractatus, is superior for the study of philosophy. I made it sound tautological, as does logic taking care of itself. I believe that if one were to approach language as Wittgenstein wanted to in the Tractatus, then maybe instead of talking about logic, he would have, quite possibly, approached the problem of syntax. I believe this was mostly a concern in the Investigations, but I'll leave it at that.

Anyway, given the topic is pretty conceptual in nature, then what are your own thoughts about, (not necessarily Wittgenstein's remarks), the need for therapy in philosophy?

Pierre-Normand

I had interpreted Wittgenstein's claim about philosophy and therapy (there may be more than one?) not so much as a claim that philosophers are in need of therapy than a claim that achieving conceptual clarity in philosophy is akin to therapy. The reason for this is that philosophers confronts conceptual puzzles that stem from their deeply ingrained habits of thinking (many of them arising from subtle misuses of ordinary language). Therefore, unlike problems that might arise in the natural sciences or in technical contexts, finding the "solution" of the problem doesn't dissolve it all at once. Dissolving a philosophical problem rather is a protracted process by means of which interlocking habits of thinking must be weakened or reformed, and this is what makes philosophical progress more akin to therapy that to progress in technical fields. (One could argue, though, that revolutionary change in sciences, unlike Kuhnian "normal science" episodes of puzzle solving, likewise resemble a process of therapy where scientists must progressively habituate themselves to see a whole conceptual landscape in a new light.)

Shawn

I had interpreted Wittgenstein's claim about philosophy and therapy (there may be more than one?) not so much as a claim that philosophers are in need of therapy than a claim that achieving conceptual clarity in philosophy is akin to therapy. — Pierre-Normand

I think that the practice of philosophy and the philosopher are one and the same, according to Wittgenstein's ethos.

The reason for this is that philosophers confronts conceptual puzzles that stem from their deeply ingrained habits of thinking (many of them arising from subtle misuses of ordinary language). — Pierre-Normand

Yes, well the bewitchment of our intelligence by the misuse of language, according to the latter Wittgenstein of the Investigations, is due to what, in your opinion?

Tom Storm

↪Shawn

Didn't W simply mean that philosophy clarified conceptual issues for philosophical problems in much the same way that therapy is meant to provide insight into life challenges?

This only holds true if you believe that a lack of conceptual clarity is causing you harm. As someone who views truth and reality as either largely out of reach or contingent human constructs, I find that there’s only so much clarification I am interested in. Most of us require neither therapy nor philosophy to be content.

Pierre-Normand

I think that the practice of philosophy and the philosopher are one and the same, according to Wittgenstein's ethos. — Shawn

Yes, I was using "philosophy" and "philosophers" rather interchangeably. I was rather highlighting the contrast between philosophy being in need of therapy (as if something was wrong with philosophy) and the philosophical process being akin to therapy. I was stressing the second idea although Wittgenstein might very well have meant it both ways.

Yes, well the bewitchment of our intelligence by the misuse of language, according to the latter Wittgenstein of the Investigations, is due to what, in your opinion? — Shawn

The felt need to not leave anything hidden, the appeal to universality, the attractiveness of theory, the fact that what is closest is the most difficult thing to see.

Shawn

Didn't W simply mean that philosophy clarified conceptual issues for philosophical problems in much the same way that therapy is meant to provide insight into life challenges?

This only holds true if you believe that a lack of conceptual clarity is causing you harm. As someone who views truth and reality as either largely out of reach or contingent human constructs, I find that there’s only so much clarification I am interested in. — Tom Storm

I think, with what you said in mind, Wittgenstein was very strict, in the Tractatus, about drawing a line between science and philosophy, for reasons related to mostly ethics. This demarcation left out the field of psychology, as I understand it. What Wittgenstein did do was something, to me, ridiculous. He set up the study of psychology (remember, in those days, psychology was treated as the study of the human soul, which Wittgenstein actually talks about also in the Tractatus) to the field of epistemology, and thus denies the existence of a "soul". It would almost seem that the only purpose of any person would be the development of one's knowledge to discover who they are, as does the whole purpose of education should be about, which Wittgenstein harshly criticized education itself, even though he was a teacher himself.

Shawn

Yes, I was using "philosophy" and "philosophers" rather interchangeably. I was rather highlighting the contrast between philosophy being in need of therapy (as if something was wrong with philosophy) and the philosophical process being akin to therapy. I was stressing the second idea although Wittgenstein might very well have meant it both ways. — Pierre-Normand

I believe he meant it both ways at the time. Although people consider the first analytic philosopher as Bertrand Russell, I think the logical positivists were actually the first, and hence Wittgenstein the chief logical positivist of them all, as they themselves would credit to him. I say this because at the time there was very little of the study of logic, which both Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein were logicians. So, it seems pertinent to point out that Wittgenstein thought that the field of philosophy was leading him into mental cramps, and the process of education wasn't leading anywhere in his mind. It might be sad to say that Wittgenstein may have been an unhappy man upon his death.

Wayfarer

↪Shawn

I think origin of the word 'therapy' was associated with a religious sect in the ancient world called the Therapeutae. According to the Wiki entry, 'the term therapeutes means one who is attendant to the gods although the term, and the related adjective therapeutikos carry in later texts the meaning of attending to heal, or treating in a spiritual or medical sense. (The same article carries the suggestion that the term itself was a corruption of the Buddhist 'theravada', which had been carried to Alexandria via Silk Road trade.) 'Catharsis' is of a similar vintage, and carries a similar meaning, namely, purification, and is nowadays taken to mean the expurgation of repressed or forgotten memories resulting in a 'cathartic experience' (it was originally associated with the dramatic arts.)

So I take it the malady which Wittgenstein sought to cure was more than simple confusion or befuddlement, it was more like a state or a condition of ignorance. Wittgenstein was not overtly religious, but he has a quasi-mystical side (see John Cottingham Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion). Unfortunately the term 'religion' carries a lot of cultural baggage which 20th century philosophy doesn't want anything to do with, but the idea of ignorance as a kind of deep cognitive error definitely has resemblances to some spiritual philosophies. For example the concluding remarks about his words being a ladder which ought to be discarded after having served their purpose has a direct resemblance to the Buddhist 'parable of the raft' and the 'finger pointing to the moon' (hence scholarly comparisions to Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism.) Indeed there's a strong hint of apophaticism in his concluding remark, albeit in his case, devoid of the symbolic context in which that kind of 'negative way' was presented in its earlier historical forms.

So I think he means therapy in an existential sense, of freeing oneself from confusion in a deeper sense than the simply linguistic, although I suppose that will be a contentious argument.

Banno

Too much on the Tractatus.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.

593. A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one
nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.

254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
where we have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — Philosophical Investigations

Wayfarer

4.1122 Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science. — Shawn

:100: :clap: Already I like him more.

Shawn

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear. — Philosophical Investigations

I believe that what Wittgenstein was alluding to, in modern terminology, was the study of syntax and linguistics. In those fields, what Wittgenstein said in the quote, do rules in language make any sense. Had Wittgenstein been alive today, do you think he would have been interested in syntax and linguistics? Noam Chomsky's greatest idol was Bertrand Russell after all, as was Russell the closest friend to Wittgenstein.

Antony Nickles

why philosophers are in need of therapy — Shawn

We could also call it a logical error that philosophers make, and that philosophy itself (its method) is always in a state of revolution or self-criticism, but I take it that traditional philosophers create a requirement beforehand, what is sometimes called “objectivity” or “knowledge”, and then try to find a way to force the world into that mold. Wittgenstein starts with this kind of singular logical standard in the Tractatus, what he later will call purity, and then in the Investigations he realizes that each different thing has its own criteria. To call it a therapy maybe records that it takes self-reflection and growth (that PI is an argument for philosophers to act a certain way ultimately), and also because there are reasons why we want that kind of answer. As @Banno points out—Wittgenstein is interested in what motivates philosophers; why they are “inclined” to say this or that, and then learn from the contrast with what other contexts we say the same things.

Shawn

Wittgenstein starts with this kind of singular logical standard in the Tractatus, what he later will call purity, and then in the Investigations he realizes that each different thing has its own criteria. — Antony Nickles

What do you mean by "its own criteria"?

I view it as methodological nominalism, which the Investigations appealed to.

Shawn

↪Antony Nickles

Here's an old thread of mine.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2452/wittgenstein-and-nominalism

Shawn

Here is the quoted passage from the Investigations on what, seemingly, Wittgenstein continued in his methodology between his earlier period and latter period:

'We are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. So it may look as if what we were doing were Nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on such a description'. — (L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, I/§383)

Shawn

@Banno, may I kindly ask, what do you think?

Antony Nickles

What do you mean by "its own criteria"? — Shawn

In comparison to the Tractatus, which, as you point out, held everything that could be said to make sense to a generalized standard for truth (based on nominalism, or reference), in the PI, each practice is true to the extent it, internally as it were, meets its own different criteria, e.g., for an apology, for acknowledging pain, for following a rule, continuing a series.

In your other post you ask “what is the difference here being made about 'phenomena' and 'concepts about phenomena'?” It is explaining his method, not a different approach to the world. He is not avoiding phenomena, but he is looking at what we say about something because that tells us how we judge it. Elsewhere he will call this the “possibilities of phenomena” (PI 90) as Kant will talk about a thing’s “conditions”.

Shawn

In comparison to the Tractatus, which, as you point out, held everything that could be said to make sense to a generalized standard for truth [...] — Antony Nickles

Yes, dare one say this approach was almost taken to "scientific" standards. Yet, I feel as though it was a work guided by sheer intelligence, to state what was said. Wittgenstein often complained in his letters that if only he had a greater intelligence, then his task of elucidations in philosophy would have been possible or achievable.

In your other post you ask “what is the difference here being made about 'phenomena' and 'concepts about phenomena'?” It is explaining his method, not a different approach to the world. He is not avoiding phenomena, but he is looking at what we say about something because that tells us how we judge it. — Antony Nickles

Yes, well let us start out with perhaps the only clue left in the Investigations about what it is all about:

'We are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. — (L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, I/§383)

So, how can a concept stand for a word? This strikes me as pragmaticism. Is this really an implicit reference to pragmatism in the Philosophical Investigations?

Banno

what do you think? — Shawn

About what?

Shawn

↪Banno

About the passage of the Philosophical Investigations, I/§383, regarding "concepts as words" and Wittgensteins nominalism.

Banno

↪Shawn

What do you think a concept is? A thing in your head? Then how is it that you and I can be said to have the same concept?

Shawn

What do you think a concept is? A thing in your head? — Banno

I never really approached this question the way others do. I've always held that by obeying the same grammar, which allows people to coherently formulate their thoughts in language, we are able to understand what Wittgenstein calls, "concepts as words."

Then how is it that you and I can be said to have the same concept? — Banno

I think it would be easier to frame this question in terms of syntax and grammar, as per the aforementioned.

Banno

I've always held that by obeying the same grammar, which allows people to coherently formulate their thoughts in language, we are able to understand concepts. — Shawn

So you say sharing a common grammar makes it possible for us to understand concepts. What are concepts?

Shawn

So you say sharing a common grammar makes it possible for us to understand concepts. — Banno

It sounds oversimplified, and there's much more to say; but, sure, by having a common grammar we are able to understand even concepts.

What are concepts? — Banno

From the inner aspect, they are governed by grammar. From the external aspect, they are determined by linguistic rules.

Is your next question going to be about what are "linguistic rules"?

Banno

↪Shawn

Consider the concept blue, the concept democracy, and the concept of cycling. What do these have in common such that we can call them all concepts?

The sue of these words is governed by Grammar, sure. Is a concept just a set of grammatical rules? A democracy is not only a set of grammatical rules, nor is a bicycle.

Concepts are (perhaps) governed by grammar, but isn't something more involved?

Shawn

Consider the concept blue, the concept democracy, and the concept of cycling. What do these have in common such that we can call them all concepts? — Banno

Yes, well, every concept is defined by what rules govern their use in a language game. I don't think these rules exist outside the hypothetical realm of what constitutes what can be said, according to grammar.

Concepts are (perhaps) governed by grammar, but isn't something more involved? — Banno

Well, what is your take on the matter on what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar? If it is all about the externalities of the topic, then I'm only concerned with the internal aspect of how concepts are understood.

Banno

If it is all about the externalities of the topic, then I'm only concerned with the internal aspect of how concepts are understood. — Shawn

So concepts have "internal" and "external" aspects? We might leave aside for now how it is possible to talk about these "internal" aspects, and suppose that the grammar, since it is shared, is "external". See PI §385.

What do you make of PI §381-2? This by way of addressing your "what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar?"

Shawn

So concepts have "internal" and "external" aspects? We might leave aside for now how it is possible to talk about these "internal" aspects, and suppose that the grammar, since it is shared, is "external". See PI §385. — Banno

Sure; but, if we're to talk about how Wittgenstein saw it, then I would like to mention his concern with how rules are followed and obeyed. I think that we can nowadays say that grammar and syntax are what define such "rules". So, I think, there is some internal aspect of how learning can at all take place...

What do you make of PI §381-2? This by way of addressing your "what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar?" — Banno

Are you alluding to qualities of concepts, which describe them? There are quite a few...

Banno

So, I think, there is some internal aspect of how learning can at all take place... — Shawn

But "And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm."

It seems you think a concept is something only in one's mind, a rule to be followed. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree?

Are you alluding to qualities of concepts — Shawn

Not qualities, but uses. In addition to the grammar, there is what we do - we choose the blue bicycle and go for a ride. That's not grammar.

Shawn

But "And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm." — Banno

Again, I am not interested in the complexity of the external aspect of a concept, this is something that Austin described with speech acts and stuff like that.

It seems you think a concept is something only in one's mind, a rule to be followed. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree? — Banno

No. One cannot speak a language without being taught about how to use words and phoneticize sounds for the words. It's a whole can of worms that I am not really interested in delving into at the moment.

Banno

↪Shawn

So what sort of thing is a concept?

We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word.

What more is there to any given concept than what we do?

Philosophers in need of Therapy

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