I'm not convinced that the desire for a universal principal is simply the result of us wanting to shirk our responsibility or culpability. — Benj96

We do not want gravity to be a universal principal; it already is one. We want a rule about what is right to be like gravity, because then if we follow it, we could never be judged to be wrong. If a good act were like a science experiment, the results would always be the same, so it wouldn’t matter who did it.

That’s not to say shirking our duty is the only reason for wanting certainty. Cavell generalizes it as not wanting to have a voice—not be a singular limited human. Kant killed off our connection to what we find important in the world (in his terms, the thing-in-itself) because we didn’t meet his standard of certainty. But, as Wittgenstein shows, it is our interest in things that create the shared judgments and criteria that reveal what is essential to us about anything. Thus why someone like Emerson has us believe in ourselves, follow our whim, skate on the surface of “appearance”. If we recognize that we might err, we are less likely to doubt ourselves, but also not need to think of ourselves as infalible, thus able to be less dogmatic. So instead of an epistemological endeavor, we have virtues like trust, humility, openness, forgiveness, etc.

In the face of the truth of the human condition that it is possible for things to go wrong, come to a place we are lost—that our very lives might clash—we fixate that it is always a matter of “trial and error” (or appearance and reality; reason or feeling; objective or subjective) and create the fantasy of “first universal principles” to avoid our responsibility to look closer to see how we are ordinarily able to work things out, or work harder to become intelligible to each other, because we always can.

Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason. My question is how does one know when that is the case - ie they're chatting sh*t. And to the contrary, when they really do know what they're talking about. What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse with others which may be either just as misinformed or very much astute and correct? Is there a universal logic/reason? Or only a circumstantial one? — Benj96

This is basically the path to the slippery slope caused by the fear of skepticism, from Descartes.

“It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation…” (First Meditation, p. 1)

The disappointment @Benj96 feels about our limitations leads to the same place as the surprise that Descartes experiences. It creates the question: “How does one know?” (“What is true?” as @Banno puts it.) Now the question is taken as: “What is the litmus test?”, but not examining this first step, as Wittgenstein says (PI 308), “commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter” which leads us to where Descartes ends up, which is: how can we be certain? (as @180 Proof says we aspire to, then admit is unattainable) Trapped in that picture, but without an answer, we resign ourselves to “confidence”, “approximations” (as philosophy puts it: “appearance”, “subjective”, “belief”).

I’m trying to point out that the reason for wanting an answer, is that we want to avoid our disappointment and surprise, to not just “know when that is the case [when we are being “rash… stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason]”, but to know it beforehand, before we speak, before we commit ourselves to error or immorality (or to even take us out of the picture altogether, substituting us with “depersonalized” knowledge, as @Benj96 suggests). This desire is how we slide from doubt to hoping knowledge will save us (from being wrong, from being human).

What we overlook is that: there are ways to fix our screw-ups, after the fact (apart from certain predictable knowledge). Our everyday remedies are why Wittgenstein is trying to get us to look at the bigger picture (PI 122)—the ordinary workings (“Grammar”) of each activity. Austin will point out that our unavoidable fallibility is why we have excuses, correction, apologies, etc.—why he focuses on how things fail rather than trying to find something perfect—which hinge more on accepting responsibility (as @BC points out), than knowledge. The continuing nature of discourse is the vehicle from our past errors to our redemption (the awareness @Max2 suggests that we may acknowledge, about ourself); not the solidity of any universal or circumstantial knowledge, logic, or reasoning.

…[an animal’s] inability for it to question its existence or purpose does not alleviate guilt on my part then I should be grateful for the food put on my table.… At what point does a human being rationalize its consumption? — Deus

But I think people's inclinations can be affected by arguments… on average, more truthful arguments receive some advantage from their truthfulness. — xorn

I have responded to a similar thread here with the short version being that a moral claim about eating an animal is the same (in the same structural category) as, e.g., looking at a human as labor. It is a matter of our position in relation to them, the way in which we value them (or not)—see them in an aspect as Wittgenstein puts it—and so not a matter of an intellectual argument (or emotional empathy), but just that my actions to another make a claim on me to account for those acts, that they reflect who I am.

And so @Deus is responding to the claim on him of an animal seen as sacrifice, to be responsible for being worthy of it. This not to justify it rationally, as if any knowledge or reasoning would convince you (as @xorn hopes for, as it might in other problems), but a stance for which he puts himself in a position to answer for. The work is to understand what we have inherited and what we take on as representative of us; to make conscious our commitments and the implications of our lives as they are.

When you draw the workings of language as: intention—words—interpretation, you insinuate that it is just my trying to read your thoughts, which you take as only known to you, so I can’t possible know what I claim to with any authority other than my skill, generosity, cooperation, etc., which I was equating to the analogous position that unsubstantiated opinion has to certain knowledge. You know your intention; I am only guessing (I have no facts to back it up with, as with my opinion). But the possibilities language has in a certain situation are limited and are proscribed by the history of human practice. Any English speaker is familiar with the version of belief when one says “I believe in God” that is different than “I belief it is raining” and so could agree with me on the senses I outlined or correct any mistakes or provide further necessities of context. Words already have a way they work in the world in certain situations, and you just apologize or promise or make a statement or a proclamation. Language does not work like names for “thought” like for objects. Intention is something you ask about only when something strange happens.

So when you say,

That's one hell of a big inference about a whole hell of a lot people you know nothing about. — Vera Mont

it is not me making a judgment about people; I am just describing how disclaiming belief works in the world. And I’ll consider a competing claim, but dismissing the entire project as impossible claiming that I’m in no position is to remove any rationality from philosophical discourse. If someone is claiming they don’t believe in God, in a certain sense they are saying there is no mystery in the world and nothing outside of (above) our power. Now, they might not want that to be the implication of it, but those are some of the things which are believed, and so some of the things which are refused in the denial.

So when I make a claim about the implications of what you are saying, I am not judging you nor trying to guess your thoughts. When you say a particular thing in a certain situation, there is only so much it can be doing, and not all of it will be what you wanted. Your words can betray you, you can be caught out by them, reveal more than you thought you would, because they work in the world, not as a reflection of your mind. So I await any response other than ‘That’s not what I meant’ or ‘That’s just how you see it’.

You were drawing out the inference you made of what I said. Your interpretation. — Vera Mont

This makes it sound like it depends on me how language works; as if it depends on you how what you said, says what it does. But the reason we can infer implications (the hidden consequences and acts of our words) is that all of it existed before us in our history. Now, you may chose what words to say in a given situation, but how they do what they do, and the implications of having said it, are not up to you. So to suggest that the implications of what you say are just my opinion, is to overlook the rationality of language, again. Now my claim may be wrong or overblown or too board, but there are ways those can be corrected because what we say is evidence, for which there are requirements or criteria for judging (through inference) what the implications are of what we say (too whom) in a given situation. In fact, I take these as the tools of philosophy.

An ‘ordinary’ context is an example that shows us, that reveals, what makes an expression what it is, why it matters, how we judge it, etc. More to the point, philosophy has a habit of starting at the opposite end from discovering that our everyday world is enough, and creates ahead of time the requirements of a context in order to force a particular solution, such as Plato’s forms being necessary because he’d only allow for certain, generalized, universality; and, imagining everything is in response to one made-up question so they all have to be “answers”.

Before every such statement [“I think there is a god." or "I believe there is a god." or "I believe in God."] there is an expressed or implied question. — Vera Mont

Well, we already established that “I think” and “I believe” are used interchangeably in the role of a hypothesis. The context that comes to mind with “I believe in God” is as an expression of trust, even if that was learned as “…[the word of] God” to tell me what to do; or as an attitude toward the world: that there is reason in what we see as chaos and mystery. Thus why “I do not believe in God” is said by those lost to the particular cause, or hopeless, maybe for anything going the way they hoped someone they trusted would do, but also by those that feel they know everything and have complete control over the world.

“I believe there is a god.” is said in the same senses but also as a response by someone confronted with the dismissal of what they take as important to them; by someone who, through the lense of knowledge, lays down the challenge/attack: “I don’t believe [ I doubt or do not know ] there is a god”. The affirmative is not the answer of a question nor a lesser version of knowledge, only unsubstantiated, but as an exasperated, shocked reaffirmation that, even if you don’t believe you will be judged one day, I conduct myself as if everyone were watching.

the statement points back to a requirement for making it. — Vera Mont

This is very good actually, I agree. And those “requirements” (or factors, conditions) I would call the context, which determines what criteria should be applied to judge what version (sense) of the expression it is. But to say every statement is an answer is to abstract from any context so much to imagine one criteria applies to all of them, like true or false. And that classic example ignores the necessity of the contexts and criteria of other things we say to meet the same values of precision, rationality and identity.

you might want to consider if there's a charitable interpretation of the original post that could resolve this apparent inconsistency. - GPT-4 — Pierre-Normand

This should be in the forum’s guidebook.

I believe this is one of those misconstructions through the substitution of similar but not interchangeable words. The words 'slippery', amorphous' and 'ever-changing' do not mean 'irrational'; nor does 'difficult' mean 'unable to be clarified'. — Vera Mont

I was drawing out the implications of what you said, which was to make language seem sketchy (characterize it as such). Part of language’s “polysemantic” nature (which @Lionino points out) is not only that different words can have the same sense (meaning), but that language can be doing/revealing multiple things. A threat can also be a promise. So what we imagine we are saying, even if we are correct, can be blind to how it is otherwise meaningful. Slippery does imply that something can’t be grasped or nailed down; thus, analogously (which is the sense in which it is used here), with respect to language, unable to be made specific, as if it is imprecise, as if language doesn’t have particular ways in which it works. Further, amorphous implies there are not distinctions (language’s shapes) to distinguish one thing from another. If these do not imply that language lacks reasons for how it works, then I have just made a mistake—though that claim would have to be accounted for—that is not a reflection on the nature of language, as if to say, that it is:

…subject to imprecise applications and interpretations. — Vera Mont

Most of the time we do fine. At times, interpretation is not even a possibility (language is not always subject to imprecision; though of course someone can always erroneously claim anything), and, even when it is, not because of an “amorphous” nature of language, but because of multiple possible contexts (which can be narrowed) or because, as I said, we speak poorly or come to judgment too hastily, etc.

[“I believe in God”, “I think there is a god”]…are …separate uses …in the same context: answering the question: "How do you regard God?" — Vera Mont

This is forcing two statements into the same requirements by dictating a question; that is not there ordinary contexts. When someone says they believe in God, it is in the context of expressing their conviction (thus a claim to community), not a claim of knowledge (believing as a hypothetical answer to a question). Sometimes both are said to be claiming God “exists” but as a conviction: God exists (is “real”) in the sense of importance, impact, centrality.

Because of the place of information in our world, I think we bring the assumption that there is always something we are going to be told, that the goal is to find some knowledge, or that argument is meant to justify a conclusion (something you are working to “understand”). But Socrates is searching, and teaching/asking you to search along with him, thus the goal is in a sense self-knowledge, explicating all our judgments and criteria and practices that we mindlessly operate under without considering. Plato makes it seem like there is a solution to the questions, but no one he questions is “wrong” about how the world works, they just don’t meet the standard he desires.

Language is slippery; difficult to handle effectively. I doubt any hard rule can apply to all the words in one language — Vera Mont

The characterization of language as irrational, unable to be clarified, etc. is only in contrast to the fantasy for certainty (“hard rule”s; mathematical). That words are sometimes interchangeable; that communication involves difficulty, laziness, manipulation, vagary, and the ultimate possibility that we may reach an impasse on the means of understanding, does not mean that language is relative or imprecise. Part of what I take philosophy to do (as does Wittgenstein, Austin etc.) is to make explicit the implications and various ways language works (in order to show intelligibility despite no predictable certainty—reference to something “objective” or being only true/false). Wittgenstein will call these “uses” or “senses”, which in his case is a defined terminology by which he means the various things that language does in various situations (context is important to sense, as @Philosophim points out).

Now, why did you change the example? — Vera Mont

Thus my setting out the various senses of belief by examples (and how “think” is used the same way at times) as: a hypothesis of knowledge, a claim of judgment, or an expression of faith (also, the expression of an opinion). Each has its own separate criteria and contexts in which they apply.

If God comes into it, it should be by way an example such as: "I think there is a god" - uncertainty leaning toward belief - "I believe there is a god" - growing conviction - and "I believe in God" - declaration of faith in a particular deity. — Vera Mont

And so here we are mixing up the criteria and context and way in which belief works differently in each sense. Knowledge is not justified true belief (Plato steered us wrong; exactly because he wanted knowledge to be certain in the face of opinion so it could have power over our interests, to avoid chaos, conflict, limbo). To say “I believe in God” in the sense of an expression is not the conclusion that starts with the other sense of belief as a hypothesis of knowledge (“I think there is a god”). They are two separate uses (senses) with different criteria in different contexts. Mixing them together is what creates the impasse of whether God “exists” (and creates that as a false goal). The criteria for proving a hypothesis of knowledge is not the same as an expression of conviction, and the conviction is not a conclusion or substitute for the claim of knowledge.

Separately, I would offer that “It’s raining” is not a claim to knowledge; it is a report of knowledge (even though you may be shown to be mistaken or lying, etc.). And, yes, part of the context of the sense of belief as a hypothesis is probably some clue or “sensory input”, but that does not change its structure, nor does that imply that belief as an expression of faith needs to include any proof, nor exclude that there are associated empirical “sensory input”, such as the feeling of awe, though this does not operate as evidence or proof.

I suggest looking at the Republic as an analogy for the human self. Also, note your thoughts and reactions in reading it, more than trying to understand anything you think he might be telling you. Good luck.

I didn’t address the ability to extrapolate because the issue is a red herring**. A computer very well may come up with a novel response, be “creative”, but a capability is not what makes us a “moral agent”. Picturing a moral act as a decision comes from the desire to have it be something we can be right about (win or lose), so we imagine a moral situation as one that simply hasn’t been solved yet, or, because of the lack of rules guiding us, that there must be a novel act (a new or further rule). But in these desires we just really want to know (beforehand) that our choices (because right, true, just, selfless, imperative, etc) will exempt us from being judged. But being moral is not a capacity, it is a relation to others, a position we take on. We call it the ability to judge, to show judgment, because it is an act of placing ourselves in relation to others. We are responsible not as a function of some “sense”, or an answer I conclude, but in being (continually) answerable for what we do (even to ourselves). Now we may grant this position in relation to us (of judge, say) to a machine (as we might anthropomorphize our judgment by animals, or the earth, or the State), however, this is the ceding of authority (which there may already be a case for with testing and valuation algorithms), but not because of anything inherent (similar or analogous) in the machine’s capabilities, because nothing about it in our own.

**At #143 in the PI, Wittgenstein discusses continuing a series of numbers based on a rule. The point is not the continuing (although it is under scrutiny) but the light it sheds on the relation between student and teacher. That the student may “come to an end” (#143), change their approach (#144) be “tempted” or “inclined” to speak or act (#143, or, notably: #217). The important part is they are prepared to react to each other (#145) because understanding is judged; claiming it is announcing a readiness to be judged (#146-154).

My point is that the 'AGI', not humans, will decide whether or not to impose on itself and abide by (some theory of) moral norms, or codes of conduct. — 180 Proof

I agree that AGI could be capable of imposing rules, norms, codes, laws, etc. on itself (as I was trying to acknowledge in bringing up the social contract, pictured as a decision). Preservation or perfection were merely examples of limits or goals we put on ourselves—I’m not claiming to understand what AGI would decide to choose. Our fear is that we do not have control over the rationale and outcomes of AGI; that, as you say, “How or why 'AGI' decides whatever it decides will be done so for its own reasons”. But that fear is a projection of the skeptical truth that all our talk of rationality and agreement on what is right can come to naught and we can be lost without knowledge of how to move forward.

My claim is that being moral (not just following rules) only comes up in a situation where we don’t know what to do and have to forge a path ahead that reflects who we will be, creates a new world or builds new relations between us. But AGI is limited to knowledge, and so, structurally, it can only decide and choose based on information already made explicit that it is told or learns. And, as I put it to @ToothyMaw here, knowledge cannot encapsulate the history of our lives together and our shared interests and judgments, and so any extrapolation from knowledge is insufficient in a truly moral situation. So the question is not whether AGI can be self-aware—they would be omnipresently “conscious” of why they were doing something—but they do not live a human life. I would say you were halfway right; they are incapable of human responsibility. Not that they wouldn’t have reasons, but that those can’t answer for their actions the same way humans must. Thus my solution to tie a person to the outcomes of any AGI process, linking accountability, but also identity to what you author, knowingly or not, much as we are bound to what we say.

I suspect we will probably have to wait for 'AGI' to decide for itself whether or not to self-impose moral norms and/or legal constraints and what kind of ethics and/or laws it may create for itself – superceding human ethics & legal theories? – if it decides it needs them in order to 'optimally function' within (or without) human civilization. — 180 Proof

I was discussing “deciding” and self-imposing norms, as you mentioned, and the difference between that picture of morality and the idea of responsibility I am suggesting.

I don’t know if that’s an expression of a lack of interest or an inability to follow, but, assuming we’re here to understand each other, I was pointing out again that imagining “deciding” as the basis for moral action narrow-mindedly frames it as a matter of knowledge or goals like “optimal function”. This way of looking at acting comes from a desire for constant control and a requirement for explicit rationality that we would like have for ourselves (rather than, in part, our personal and shared interests). Imagining our power over action this way is what feeds the idea that AI could be “human” because it could fulfill this fantasy. But without any interest in explaining where and how you got lost, I can’t really help.

but I am the only one who can bind me to my word. if you bind me to my word, you still do not know what is going to come out of my mouth. — Arne

Well of course you can says things like “that’s not what I meant” or “I’m sorry you took it that way” or “that’s just your perspective” but when someone says something in a specific situation, there is only so many ways it can having any import. So it is not me that ties you to the implications of your expression, but the whole history of human activity and practice. And so whether a threat or a promise is also an actual difference apart from you, not created by your desire or intention. Thus why we can know that you were rude despite your being oblivious, or that you’ve revealed that you are jealous in what you said.

I don't believe that ethics is characterized by rule following — 013zen

I was characterizing deontological morality, and roughly attributing the desire we have for it to be rational certainty so that I don’t have to be personally responsible because I followed a rule, which, in this case, is the only form of morality that AI is capable of, thus the need for another option since it may not care if it is personally responsible.

Now, I agree that this overlooks an actual moral situation, as you say, “when faced with ethically challenging situations”. But I would point out that describing our navigation of “uncertainty” in “knowing” “good and bad” or the “best situation” plays into the desire to have certain knowledge of judgment and at the same time concede that we can’t have it, which makes it seem like we lack something we should have. My point is that this seeming lack shows that the nature of morality is different than knowledge in that we step into ourselves (possibly a new world) in acting in an unknown situation. Thus the need for a thread to the user in order that who they are is tied to what they do (or do with AI, or is done in their name).

If an AI ever feels something that we might characterize as an internal conflict regarding what makes the most sense to do in a difficult situation, that will affect people's lives in a differing but meaningful manner, then perhaps I might consider it capable of moral agency. — 013zen

And this is why there is discussion of whether AI is or could be “human”, because we associate morality with knowledge and choice. But, even if we assume that your example could happen (and why not)—that AI would find itself in a moral situation (beyond rules) and weigh options that affect others—my point is that it cannot be responsible to the future nor extrapolate from the past like a human. So it’s “agency” is not a matter of nature, but of categorical structure.

But then your argument seems reducible to putting safeguards in place so we can all sleep better at night. . . and relieve ourselves of any moral responsibility for the results of bad actors. — Arne

I’m not saying self-monitoring is the only means, but, without being bound to your word, who knows what is going to come out of your mouth. Though without user-identity it wouldn’t matter, yes, we could look and say: “This is a bad outcome. Let’s make a law.” But with AI, playing catch up and whack-a-mole is untenable because the outcomes are almost unimaginable and the effects could be devastating, and could be even with a user picturing the world watching. So I’m not saying we rely on everyone behaving themselves, but, that only a human has the capacity to be responsible in a void of criteria for judgment when what action is itself is up for grabs.

I suspect we will probably have to wait for 'AGI' to decide for itself whether or not to self-impose moral norms and/or legal constraints and what kind of ethics and/or laws it may create for itself – superceding human ethics & legal theories? – if it decides it needs them in order to 'optimally function' within (or without) human civilization. — 180 Proof

Not attributing an inherent nature to AI is something Hobbes of course famously also assumed about humans, which anticipates moral agreement only coming from mutually-assured destruction (the state of nature as the Cold War), or accepting limitation of freedom for self preservation. I don’t think it takes something only “human” to know what annihilation is, nor to “fear” it, or, alternatively, what perfecting oneself is (nor do I take that as evidence for “consciousness” of a “self”, which I would simply pin on a desire to be special without working at it).

But AI does not love and hate, which is not to say, “have emotions”, but that it does not become interested or bored, which is the real basis of the social contract: not just “self interest”, but personal interests (not rationality so much as reasons). Thus AI would only be able to make the social contract (in avoiding death or reaching for a goal) as an explicit choice, one that is decided, as with Mill, or when Rawls tries to find the best position from which to start, rather than falling into sharing the same criteria for an act because of a history of our human interests in it, as with Locke or Wittgenstein (thus the need to “remember” our criteria, as Plato imagines it). As AI is not part of the weave and warp of human life, everything must be calculated, and, as is its limitation, from what is already (and only) known.

That [ AI ] can only consider novel situations based on already established laws is no different from how a human operates. — ToothyMaw

It seems there are at least two important differences. The first is epistemological (and ontological I guess for the AI). AI is limited to what already is known, yes, but it is also limited to knowledge, as in the type of information that knowledge is. Putting aside that it sucks at knowing the criteria for judgment—which are different, and of different types, for almost every thing—it is stuck outside of a history of curiosity, mistake, triumph, reprimand, habit, experiences, etc. and shared culture and practices that shapes and inhabits all of us without the need of being known. Even if it is able to be canonized as knowledge (because that is philosophy’s job: explicating intuition), there is no “telling” anyone that kind of wisdom (how basic do you have to get to completely explain an apology, and all the undying and attendant acts, must less: leading someone on). Also, even if AI could gather all the data of a changing present, it would still miss much of the world we instinctively take in based on training and history, much less biology. And I know we want moral decisions to be made on important-seeming things like rules or truth or right or knowledge, but we do things for reasons that don’t have that same pedigree. This doesn’t make them immoral, or self-interested (but not, not those), it’s just redemption or self-aggrandizement are complicated enough, much less just fear or something done without thinking.

I don't see anything preventing an AI from wanting to avoid internal threats to its current existence from acting poorly in the kind of situation you consider truly moral. — ToothyMaw

But if it is a truly moral situation, we do not know what to do and no one has more authority to say what is right, so without the (predetermined, certain) means to judge what “acting poorly” in this situation would be. But AI cannot hold itself up as an example in stepping forward into the unknown in the way a person can. Or run from such a moment; could we even say: cowardly?

I don't quite agree that many moral philosophers would consider you moral for following just any self-imposed rule, if you are saying that. — ToothyMaw

I was trying to allude to Kant’s sense of duty and moral imperative, with my point being that, even in that case, the desire is for impersonal rationality (certainty, generality, etc.).

Doesn't it matter though if the AI can choose between affecting a moral outcome or a less moral outcome like one of us? …shouldn't we treat it like a human, if we must follow through with holding AIs responsible — ToothyMaw

I may not have been clear that the “identity” I take as necessary to establish and maintain is not the identity of the AI, to make the AI responsible, but to tie a particular human to the outcomes of the AI.

And, while it may be that AI could curtail its actions to already-established law (as AI can only use existing knowledge), only a human can regulate based on how they might be judged in a novel situation (as I pointed out that the only truly “moral” situation is when we are at a loss as to what to do, or else we are just abiding by rules, or not). In other words, the threat of censure is part of conscience (even if not ensuring normativity), as we, in a sense, ask ourselves: who do I want to be? (In this sense of: be seen as). Anonymity diminishes cultural pressure to whatever remains of it as a voice inside me, with the knowledge that I may never be judged perhaps silencing that entirely.

we can just change the programming so that it chooses the moral outcome next time, right? Its identity is that which we create. — ToothyMaw

But the distinct actual terror of AI is that our knowledge can not get in front of it to curtail it, to predict outcomes, because it can create capabilities and goals for itself—it is not limited to what we program it to do. It’s not: build a rocket. It’s: design a better rocket. And it can adopt means we don’t anticipate and determine an end we do not control nor could foresee.

It seems to me that we are the ones who need to be put in check morally, not so much the AIs we create. That isn't to say we shouldn't program it to be moral, but rather that we should exercise caution for the sake of everyone's wellbeing. — ToothyMaw

I agree; my point is that, in the way morality works, tying the AI and its outcomes to who let it loose is the best way to put us “in check morally”—like a serial number on a gun which can tell us who shot someone. My last paragraph is just to say that if we have anonymity, we don’t have any incentive to check ourselves, as, say, in the example of words, I can’t be held to what I say, judged or revealed in having said it.

I agree that an ‘act’ (especially speech) involves not only me, and that that condition is not appreciated enough by philosophy. But he is not focused on what we physically do, nor translating anything into “physical terms”, as if what happens in the body matters in our considering something a threat or a promise. Again, we are not talking about actions, but participating in activities, accomplishing their execution. That there are actions, even speech, in a practice, does not mean that describing how the actions happen explicates our practices. The “acts of saying something” is not a breakdown of how saying works, it is how words are deemed to have achieved something, like a statement or an apology—and in this sense, “doing” something.

He is describing how these activities, “acts”, work (or fail)—at all. I do not, for example, intend acts, I conduct them (though some do require deliberateness). I may do my best to make a good (or sufficient) act (say, apology) but whether I do is judged by whether my offering meets the criteria (requirements for identity, completion, failure, etc.) inherent in the living practice of seeking forgiveness. These threshold conditions, measures, mechanics, etc., are the external, the codification of the judgment of others (even to myself); they are the “consequences thereafter” that Austin refers to as separate from the physical (e.g., the illocution, the saying). So the occurrence of the other “understanding” what we say is also a matter of judgment, whether they exhibit what is considered important in being understood in that case, which you actually partly draw out in saying “how one takes the words, uses them, and applies them in his conduct….” This is a demonstration and expression that we understand because these are what understanding consists of.

@Banno @baker @Dawnstorm

Only imagining an “act” as like a physical movement comes from the desire to insert the question of intentionality. But you don’t even make a movement an act; raising your arm is judged to be waiving down a taxi, or signaling a question. Thus , the possibility of something being multiple different acts (even, as raising your arm).

First though, Austin does not normally limit himself to acts of speech; including thinking, understanding, etc. “Speech acts” are not anything special and here are just examples of other things that words can do than just be: true or false. He wants to show that we (philosophers especially) minimize the world to things we know, things we can be certain about (true or false), as we imagine we can be certain of “our intention”, creating the seeming primacy of physical movement.

However, for example: claiming a truth and making a promise both accomplish something. One proposes something to be true, the other makes a commitment.Yes, a proposition is stated by me, but my intention is only occasionally relevant (as clarifying, not a casual necessity), though the particulars of time, place, and the audience (maybe) may matter. More universally, what I say ties me to the judgment others can make of it, and of me through it (so we are “observing the actor” not just “sifting through… expressions”). Similarly, the important part in me making a promise is that it’s me that answers for it when it’s due.

Third, a promise is meaningful to us in the same way claiming truth is, which means: a promise has its worth as what it is (differentiated from other relations between us) by criteria that necessarily, essentially, make it (judged as) what a promise is. As truth is right or wrong, a promise is binding or not, and fulfilled or reneged on. Also, a promise does have truth value: in the integrity of its criteria; either something fits into the criteria of a promise, or it is not a promise (it’s an aspiration).

Having criteria different than certainty (or physicality, or intention) does not make promising less of an act. What makes up both exists outside of, and before, us. The important part is not that the words are the consequence of me. The way it works is that I submit myself to (or avoid) the responsibility for, and the consequences of, what my acts are judged as.

@Banno @Ludwig V

I continue to struggle with Chapter 2 unfortunately. I can’t seem to see the truth or confused conflict between the two “positions”. I feel like Ryle does not do sufficient justice to developing the position of Determinism, even by drawing it out, as Austin does, only on the terms of ordinary criteria, nor by getting at why the Determinist wants or needs to hold the view they do, as Wittgenstein would. Ryle appears simply to subject Determinism to the judgment of common opinion, as a refutation, which simply overlooks what is important about or to Determinism. It does seem he thinks it is small potatoes; however, if Determinism is of little import, Free Will is trivialized as well (and isn’t the real dilemma between those two?). Maybe I will come back to it, as I am at a loss to tie the discussion to any greater point, even though he did promise that the argument between the dilemmas themselves were not the matter at hand.

@Ludwig V @Banno (if anyone else is actually reading this book, please let me know.)

Without having read the whole of Lecture I, I want to point out that Ryle is actually using Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s methods. As I have not gotten to the part where Ryle points out how two arguments which we take to clash are merely answering different questions, as alluded to in the introduction, I don’t think it is important (or it is at least premature) to consider the arguments themselves.

He is, however, making claims about the ordinary ways we—in the quote below—help (or hurt) ourselves, contrary to fatalism’s conclusion.

this argument… that nothing can be helped…goes directly counter to the piece of common knowledge that:
some things are our own fault,
some threatening disasters can be foreseen and averted, and
there is plenty of room for precautions, planning and weighing alternatives. — Ryle, p.16, broken apart by me

He is asking that the description of the mechanics of these acts be accepted on their face. Not that they are unassailable (foundational, undoubtable), say: because they are “common sense” or the opinion of “ordinary people”, but that the rationale to be made for these claims can only be done by yourself, to see for yourself; or to reject them, which is to say: point out how “fault”, “forseeing”, and actions to mitigate the foreseen, do not work this way, or that help in the face of destiny does not refute determinism.

He is pointing to what Wittgenstein will call the “grammar” of our activities (“practices” Witt says). And the method involves drawing out what we do by looking at what we would say, when…

Very often, though certainly not always, when we say 'it was true that ... ' or 'it is false that ... ' we are commenting on some actual pronouncement made or opinion held by some identifiable person…. — Ryle, p.17 emphasis added

Thus he is claiming that how our relation to the future works is dependent on an individual (and not a force) making a guess. (Wittgenstein points out that “belief”, in one sense, works as a guess (a hypothesis, PI p.190) and not as an unjustified lesser claim to knowledge.)

If you make a guess at the winner of the race, it will turn out right or wrong, correct or incorrect, but hardly true or false. These epithets are inappropriate…. — Ryle, p.18

You will note that the claim is that true and false are “inappropriate”, which is to say their implications do not apply, their criteria have nowhere to measure against, because our relation to the future is not a matter of knowledge (outside of science, which is based on repeatability, predictability; as maybe determinism would like itself to be).

Ryle is not as generous and skilled at drawing out the details of the argument for determinism as Austin was with perception (nor are these examples as various and in-depth), so I think there will be more to do in working out on what terms Ryle takes these views to stand, and thus how they miss each other from different perspectives, if that is the case.

@Banno I am reading Lecture 1 still but your welcome to move forward.

@Banno

Just catching up with the preface. I find it ironic that the book is entitled Dilemmas when Ryle says his examples are only when two thinkers have “divergent goals” “from the beginning” (p. 1, emphasis added). Ryle wants to say philosophers only take themselves as conflicting when (unbeknownst to them it would seem) they are actually addressing two different problems (answering two different questions). Ryle does say it is not our logic, but our relationship to others that is the problem. (p.1)

We learned in reading Austin that we paint a picture as black-and-white in only taking into consideration one example rather than first looking at a variety of cases. Wittgenstein felt the same as Austin about variety but starts one step back to say that it is “having a goal” at all before you start (say, a requirement for crystalline purity. PI #107) that forces your mind into one picture (and maybe in this case, against another). Perhaps Ryle will say that we see others as rivals because of our pushing an agenda (“goal”) from the start, much as we fixate only on the example that makes our best case (pain, illusion, etc.) Hegel would say we are programmed to see things as dichotomies, and that the trick is to let things be what they are on their own (as will Heidegger) and from a larger perspective (as will Wittgenstein).

First Ryle describes the (imagined) fight of, let’s call it, the skeptic, who takes there to be an “unbridgeable crevasse” (p. 2) between us and the world, and the naturalist, who picks up their utensils without doubt. But Ryle is not concerned about the minutiae of the supposed disagreement, only to find out why the two feel they are at odds (or perhaps why we take them to be at odds). Ryle does hint at how they can’t actually connect enough to conflict because the skeptic’s case is based on reason (“theoretical”, p. 3), and there are no arguments for accepting the world.

Second is the argument without victor between free will vs. causation. He says “no one wants further evidence” (p.5) of either position but it is philosophy’s job to understand the “rights and obligations” (id) of the positions. He appears to be doing this in saying that a question about whether we can be moral is different than a question about whether an act was (morally) mine or determined by circumstances. (Id) In the same way a question of how we sensed something in a certain case is not answered by asking the question of how we sense at all. (p.5-6) I would venture that Ryle is highlighting confusion between a generalization and particular cases, but, too early to tell.

Lastly, he separates theology and science from tangling over “truth” by putting them in different “categories” because not only are their subject matters different, but also “the kinds of thinking they require” (p.8), meaning that their questions are different in their “terms and concepts”. (p.9) Ryle though is only saying that one question is not judged the same as another, because a ”category” is only generally created “by showing in detail how the metiers in ratiocination [means of reasoning] of the concepts under pressure are more dissimilar from one another or less dissimilar from one another”. (p.11)

The most important thing here seems to be “what is at stake” (different than what each litigant feels is) and what “considerations” should matter in each case. (p.12), which appears will be a matter of the concepts of the “highway”, the “underlying non-technical concepts employed as well in [technical theories] as in everyone else's thinking.” (Id) So, @Ludwig V, I do take the focus on particulars, dichotomies, goals, means of reasoning, criteria of what matters, similarities and differences, case-specific categories, and considerations in each case, to be right up the same alley as Austin and Wittgenstein. But we shall see.

Responsible to whom? Answer to whom? To make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read to/by whom? Judged by whom? — baker

Anyone? Myself included. Like if I make a claim and you question it; I clarify, or provide evidence, stand by my words, or rescind them, try to weasel out of the implications, etc. And we judge based on the criteria for a thing (or make it personal). I’m not sure what to say as I don’t know what the confusion or contention is.

I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

If you consider what actually makes up the criteria of "objective" (and not just the picture), then what I am describing can be reasoned and intelligible (not "arbitrary"--"real" in that it matters, has impact), and not emotional or self-interested or intuitive (what you term, "subjective"). Moral choices are not like an "Inter-subjective" contract, and, by their nature, unlike science or math, they do not always lead to agreement, but are nonetheless subject to judgment just as other rational acts.

Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

Again, it is the fact that it is dependent on me (that I am defined and held to my acts) that makes moral choices not subjective (as I take you to mean "arbitrary" or, not based on a fact).

I don’t think morality is completely arbitrary. I think that morality is either objective (exists mind[stance]-independently) or it does not (e.g., subjective, inter-subjective, etc.). — Bob Ross

If you force a dichotomy it makes it impossible to take into consideration how things actually are (as does requiring a specific standard), as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Austin discuss. Again, the meat of what “objective” is would be the actual mechanics of how we judge based on what criteria.

But would you say that this ‘fact of our position in the world’ exists mind(stance)-independently and has ‘moral’ signification? I wouldn’t. Having importance or power doesn’t make something a fact. — Bob Ross

The fact of it is not because of its import. The “reality” of it is the structure of our relation to ourselves and society following the limitation of knowledge (to answer independent of us). The fact is that what creates our moral responsibility is that our words and acts speak to who we are; that our responsiveness to others is a duty beyond trying to decide and be sure (know, be certain) what is to be done. So, although I don’t understand the terms you are couching this in, I would say that, yes, our human condition exists apart from me and has significance because it is the possibility of the moral realm at all (and not just rules or impulse).

I take it you imagine the choice is that morality is either tied to something certain (the world, etc), or at least not me, because we are arbitrary. What I am saying is that moral choices are not arbitrary (necessarily) because they are tied to me (at a certain point, beyond society’s ordinary norms and expectations).

Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected. — Banno

:up:

Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. — Bob Ross

But what I was describing is not a fact about our “psychology”. That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power; it creates who we are going to be. A moral moment is when we do not know what to do and no one is in a better position to know what is right. The reality of that position does not make the fact of what I do next “relative” or “subjective”, though it might need to be individual and revolutionary (adverse to conformity).

@Banno

On the other hand, Austin does not claim that ordinary language may not need reform (p. 63), though admittedly his description of the process, especially the phrase "tidy up", could be described as an understatement and does largely ignore the practicalities of making the changes he is contemplating. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein refers to this as well, but what I take it to mean is that sometimes OLP’s method does not work because the things we say in a particular situation distort the mechanics of that practice, rather than reflect the criteria we ordinarily judge it by (which is OLP’s means of insight). So, when they talk of “tidying up” or “rearranging” (PI #92), they are not talking about word politics, but simply using the means of OLP, say in “substituting one form of expression for another” (#90). Sometimes this just means simply drawing out multiple examples to see a wider view of how it is that a practice works despite first impressions given only one way of speaking about it. Other times we’ve taken one way of speaking and created metaphysics.

How seriously should we take the possible conservatism of OLP? — Ludwig V

On the face of it, OLP seems to be pitting what we usually say against what philosophy says. The interpretation that OLP is conservative (usually taken from Moore) is that it is just common sense refuting skepticism. Austin will appear conservative because of his snobbishness about how language is just being used clumsily, lazily, haphazardly, etc. In both cases there is the underlying condescension that skepticism is folly or abnormal. Wittgenstein shows us how our fear is warranted (that we cannot know the other, know for certain what is right). In all, I take the suggestion that we look around at the variety of the world to be license to explore our own interests, and that it is democratic to think anyone can reflect and learn.

It might be more relevant to ponder why their work has been so widely disregarded. — Ludwig V

I don’t take OLP as wanting to end philosophy (nor refute skepticism). I think Austin thought he had finally found a way to get started (though in his mind this was just going to be a kind of cataloguing). Wittgenstein took on the same nemesis, however, seeing that the skeptic was part of himself, he realized the desire for certainty is a reoccurring part of all of us, thus, the battle was not to kill the hydra, but only cut of (charm?) each snake as it comes up. And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill.

There is a practical issue. Simply, that the style of argument that Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein deploy is much, much harder than it looks. — Ludwig V

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial.

I get really annoyed about the examples one sees that are tiny thumbnails, which are treated as the whole story, when it is clear that a wider context would reveal complexities that are ignored. — Ludwig V

The fact that taking into consideration further or wider circumstances (and even responses) can change what is meaningful about an expression shows that the expression itself is just kind of “ya know what I mean?” and whether you do is based on so much more that came before it and is happening around it and what happens after, if necessary. There are times when the actual words matter, but much of the time they are as if a cue in a particular direction of what can already be expected in that situation. Thus why our words seem to move right past each other when we don’t take into consideration we might be standing in different worlds (of interest, implication, anticipation).

It seems to me that a form of words always suggests a context, no matter how tiny the thumbnail sketch… Context isn't everything, but it isn't an optional extra. — Ludwig V

And I agree but would double the bet. Words not only “suggest a context”, they require it. If I am going to say “I’m sorry” and there is no harm done, the expression itself here can only move along the attendant earmarks of an apology; so that we all know what the next thing is that will be said in this instance, as if it were required—as if it must be said. It’s not the words here that have the power, which seems even to overwhelm our free will in only being able to respond “Sorry for what?”. So maybe we could say the context isn’t always everything, but we definitely do not have certainty in what we “perceive” nor control over what is said in what we express.

What do you mean here by "responsibility"? — baker

Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make excuses for it, etc. That words not only do not stand outside of the circumstances in which they are spoken, but that an expression is an event that has an afterwards, to which you are tied.

Ditch Sophie’s World. It makes the error of requiring a certain answer which twists the “inquiry” into the issues. I would also skip summaries and histories as you’ll think you know something when you shouldn’t. You are much better off going to the library and pulling original philosophy texts and reading a bit to see if you can make sense of it and are interested in the subject. You want something readable and relatable. And focus on your thoughts and questions while reading it—don’t automatically assume they are right. You don’t have to start at the beginning but some writing is responding to earlier texts (avoid Kant, Wittgenstein, Descartes, Nietszche, early Heidegger, and Hegel for now). I find Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Dewey, J.L. Austin easier. You could also avoid the technical stuff and stick with more social reflection like Hannah Arendt, Foucallt, etc. Good luck.

Just to throw a curveball out there, Stanley Cavell makes the claim that it is our shared lives that are normative, in that we have (implicit) criteria to judge each other, which come from what we are interested in (as a culture), what matters to us as a society. So, our actions are not constrained by facts, but conformity. That is not to say that others’ judgment is our moral condition. A moral situation is just when we run out of rules and norms (the “ought”), in which case our responses dictate our character; we are morally obligated, responsible as a (real) fact of the limitation of knowledge.

Can we know what is best ahead of time? No. Does anything anyone decides or argues for have power over what we do? No. Nevertheless, we act and learn, excuse, refine, better ourselves, and these things are not individual, necessarily based on whim, emotion, irrationality, unintelligibility—it is “real” in that it matters and is subject to judgment. Those are facts of our human condition, but outside the realism/anti-realism distinction, which is just the desire to avoid our responsibility for our acts by making it about just doing what is right, what we “ought” to—made certain (apart from me) by “facts”.

Switching to newer discussion.

@Banno

Possible wrong assumptions are not a matter of propositions/sentences (i.e forms of words) but of forms of words in the circumstances of their use, i.e.statements. — Ludwig V

I feel this might be misunderstood if we don’t make clear that the circumstances are of greater importance than any “form of words”. Yes, there are expressions that take a particular form, like a statement (or “empirical proposition”), but it is the attendant circumstances which make stating a fact important; whether that it is true, or hurtful, or both. More than that, there are also expressions that do not take a “form of words” at all, because they are simply a threatening gesture, but also because we don’t judge by the words (or the word’s “use”; or my “use” of them) but by the place the expression (or practice) holds in the circumstances, i.e., its sense or “use” (which is here what Wittgenstein is referring to) e.g., a plea, an overture, an apology, pointing, seeing, mocking, etc. To some expressions, the form (or practice) is crucial, like a knock-knock joke, to others, it is the deviance from any form that makes the expression what it is, like modern art, or its singularity, say, the cry of pain from me.

But we don’t hedge unless there’s some reason for doing so. The best policy is not to ask the question. — Ludwig V

This harkens back to Lecture X (p.112), when Austin pointed out that Ayer was pulling back behind “precise” sense-data to allow us to be uncommitted to our expressions. Here “hedging” our claims about the world qualifies our relation in order to mitigate our liability as well. Austin is claiming that our ordinary expressions do not inherently need to be hedged, unless there “is something strange or a bit off-colour about the particular situation.” (P.142) But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. We can unreasonably question another, but in doing so we put ourselves out (too familiar perhaps), or put them out (opening ourselves to calls of libel). In any case, we subject ourselves to judgment, and it is that responsibility Austin wants to be certain we understand.

OLP couldn't exist without definitions — RussellA

I’ll grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions; Austin is drawing out how we judge their use, distinctions, application, possibilities, the circumstances they come up in, etc., so that we understand the variety and logic of more than one case or dichotomy.

Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language? — RussellA

Num 2, except it’s technically “what we say when”, like the different kind of things we say on instances of, in this case: “seeing” something, but, also, he’s not just imagining instances of what we say in ordinary use, but also trying to flesh out the criteria and circumstances for philosophical use as well.