I sense that your discussion has taken a different line from the rest of the thread, but I feel I should chime in here to say that I don't think Austin made any specific claims about realism (direct or indirect) in 'Sense and Sensibilia'. In fact, here is a quote from the first section:

I am not, then––and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning––going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects). This doctrine would be no less scholastic and erroneous than its anthesis.

Austin's argument is about what he sees as the misuse of particular words in philosophy. He is not making (or does not see himself as making) arguments about 'realism' (naive, indirect, or otherwise) per se.

Right. Austin was saying that people who claim that all vision is indirect are undermining the meaning of the very words they're using. That's true.

It seems to me pure nonsense to say 'we only ever see indirectly', because it draws on the image of 'direct seeing' only to deny that such a thing exists. — cherryorchard

Right, and when I tried to bridge your thread with the thread discussing whether we see colors or only our perceptions of colors I ran into this same problem (link).

It's a little like saying 'we only ever drive cars indirectly, because we use the pedals and the steering wheel' – that is what driving a car consists of. 'Indirect' (or indeed 'direct') doesn't enter into it, unless there are two varieties of driving (real or imagined) that can actually be classified using those words. — cherryorchard

This is a great analogy. It is right to give the rejoinder that driving a car in itself is not direct or indirect, it is just what it is, namely driving a car. What the proponent of indirectness might say is that when we "drive" our body we are doing so directly, and in comparison to this driving a car is indirect. They would probably say that to drive is to mobilize, and that when we interact with the steering wheel and the pedals we are interacting with the things that interact with other things that mobilize the car. I would rather say that we use instruments (or instrumental causes) to drive a car, and that there is no such thing as driving a car without this instrumental causality.

But note that if a relevant contrast can be provided, such as "driving" a body, then the statement can be made sense of. The reason I think Austin is correct is because the people who speak in this manner can usually only provide a superficial contrast, which does not hold up under scrutiny.

But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument. — cherryorchard

Usually when this topic comes up on these forums the proponent of indirectness ends up being pushed in the direction which says that we directly see our sensations and impressions, and then we infer from those sensations something about the external world. It would be a bit like if you received an encrypted message, and once you decrypted it you would possess information about the external world. As far as I can see, the correct response to this idea is that sight does not involve anything like this inferential process, and that to go further and talk about subconscious inference places us in very dubious waters.

(Oh, and just for future reference, though I realise it's hardly relevant to our discussion – I am a 'she' rather than a 'he'!) — cherryorchard

Well that's refreshing! I am in the habit of making the assumption on this forum and this is the first time I was wrong. Sorry about that.

I don't know Austin's claim. I was replying to your comment.

Austin's argument is about what he sees as the misuse of particular words in philosophy. He is not making (or does not see himself as making) arguments about 'realism' (naive, indirect, or otherwise) per se. — cherryorchard

Sure - words can be problematic in philosophy. People get stuck discussing words rather than ideas all the time, so there is room for "ordinary language philosophy".

But there's also the temptation to treat all philosophy or almost all of it, through this lens which is a way to sidestep issues rather than deal with them.

It's up to each one to see if the topic under discussion is or is not an issue concerning the misuse of language.

That's a very good post. Gellner made a great splash with "Words and Things". I think it was rather a marmite book. You either loved it or hated it. Personally, I hated it.

(The Contrast Theory when made explicit leads to a neat paradox; on its own grounds, a language should sometimes be usable without contrast, so that "contrast" may have a contrast.)

That's a kind of argument that's very popular with philosophers, because it is a slam-dunk. Unfortunately, such arguments are usually mistake, because they have over-simplified the issue.

In this case, there is a slam-dunk reply. You can obtain a contrast to any assertion by inserting "not". So the contrast to the contrast theory:-

a term and its denial between them do not exhaust the universe, or at least a universe of discourse.

Here, I'm following Gellner's argumentative tactic. It doesn't help much, does it?

Actually, I'm more than a bit puzzled about his claim that ordinary language philosophers, who rejected the idea that philosophy was about theories or doctrines, had any theory of meaning, as such. I don't recall this theory from my (admittedly not exhaustive) reading of them. If this is Gellner's summary, the possibility that there is distortion here cannot be ruled out. Where is the quotation that would back his claim up?

So where did he get the idea that ordinary language philosophers did have this theory of meaning?

One possibility is that he is distorting something that they do say - that a given concept will always be part of a structure, or family and so not comprehensible outside that structure. So you cannot understand what "north" means unless you understand what "south" means (what often gets left out is the you also need to understand what "east" and "west" and how the other main points like "south-west" are constructed from the basic framework). Understanding the use of the word means understanding the use of it in the context of its family.

Another possibility is that he is picking up on an argument of, I think, Ryle, that it is not possible for all coins to be fake. If there is no such thing as a real coin, there is nothing to fake and so "fake" has no meaning. As I remember it, this was intended to apply to sense-datum theory, because that theory essentially claims that my belief that everything that I see is a three-dimensional object located in space-time is an illusion. In this case, at least, "fake" or "unreal" are defined in relation to "genuine" or "real", so there is a contrast here.

A third possibility is that he is picking up on an argument that was popular with analytic philosophers, but not necessarily with ordinary language philosophers. This is about logic. In truth-functional calculus, an analytic statement turns out to be true in all possible circumstances. This was described as not asserting anything and hence not denying anything. (Empirical, contingent statements do, of course, deny something in asserting something.) So analytic (logically true) statements were labelled "trivial". That was the basis for Logical Positivism. Traditional philosophy expected philosophically true statements to be logically true (or necessarily) true, so all traditional philosophy could be labelled trivial - unless they were false in which case they were meaningless or nonsense.

BTW Any ordinary language philosopher worth his salt would ask "Does Gellner ever give an example of a term that does not have a contrast?". That's the basis of a good counter-argument, because just one example would refute the theory. So, does he?

Sure - words can be problematic in philosophy. People get stuck discussing words rather than ideas all the time, so there is room for "ordinary language philosophy". — Manuel

Actually, Austin is quite modest about ordinary language philosophy, only claiming that it is an important preparation. He does not explicitly rule out the possibility that some philosophy may survive the fire and need further consideration. But he does not explore what that further consideration might consist of, so perhaps he thought it was a purely theoretical possibility.

Thanks for this reply – again, very helpful.

What the proponent of indirectness might say is that when we "drive" our body we are doing so directly, and in comparison to this driving a car is indirect. — Leontiskos

I think this would be toying with language a little too freely. In English at least, we don't 'drive' our bodies, we 'move' them. And in fact, we usually don't even 'move our bodies' – we just 'move'. The body is the subject, not the object. 'Driving' always applies to our movement of things other than ourselves ('driving cattle', 'driving him away', etc.).

Now I sound like I'm doing an impression of JL Austin. But whatever about 'driving', I do think words like 'see', 'sense', and 'perceive' require a lot of specificity and care to avoid descending into nonsense.

Usually when this topic comes up on these forums the proponent of indirectness ends up being pushed in the direction which says that we directly see our sensations and impressions, and then we infer from those sensations something about the external world. It would be a bit like if you received an encrypted message, and once you decrypted it you would possess information about the external world. As far as I can see, the correct response to this idea is that sight does not involve anything like this inferential process, and that to go further and talk about subconscious inference places us in very dubious waters. — Leontiskos

Yes, this is the argument I've encountered – and I've also seen its proponents claim that this is the model of perception best supported by scientific research. I have to say, I find this theory more perplexing than wrong. I don't think I really understand what it means. But I can't tell whether that's because there is something not-quite-meaningful lurking inside it, or I'm just failing to understand what it says.

We all understand and accept that different creatures with visual organs perceive the world differently. Only certain wavelengths of light are perceptible to human eyes, etc. So of course there is no 'one' objectively correct way of seeing the world. And sometimes we are subject to illusions, delusions, hallucinations, and so on. But I don't understand the leap from these clearly acceptable claims to the claim that we don't see material things at all. Where does the 'sense-data' come from, if not from the world outside? And if it does come from the world outside, what are we arguing about? The work we have to do to interpret it once it arrives? But that seems to me like a completely different question.

From your posts, I'm starting to think that what I really need to do is read Aristotle's Metaphysics...

Thanks for this reply.

(The Contrast Theory when made explicit leads to a neat paradox; on its own grounds, a language should sometimes be usable without contrast, so that "contrast" may have a contrast.)
That's a kind of argument that's very popular with philosophers, because it is a slam-dunk. Unfortunately, such arguments are usually mistake, because they have over-simplified the issue. — Ludwig V

I'm interested that you call Gellner's 'paradox' argument a 'slam-dunk'. I confess I can't make sense of what he means at all. 'Words function through contrast with an antithesis' seems like a perfectly valid and meaningful theory of how words function. There are no words in the theory that lack an antithesis. But Gellner seems to suggest here that the theory requires not only that words have antitheses, but also that all theories have meaningful exceptions. Why should it require that? I can't see how it follows logically.

Another possibility is that he is picking up on an argument of, I think, Ryle, that it is not possible for all coins to be fake. If there is no such thing as a real coin, there is nothing to fake and so "fake" has no meaning. As I remember it, this was intended to apply to sense-datum theory, because that theory essentially claims that my belief that everything that I see is a three-dimensional object located in space-time is an illusion. In this case, at least, "fake" or "unreal" are defined in relation to "genuine" or "real", so there is a contrast here. — Ludwig V

This is interesting, thank you. I haven't read Ryle – do you remember where this idea comes up in his work? It strikes me as reminiscent of passage 345 in Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations':

“If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game, then it might be possible for everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.”—Thus we are under a temptation to misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words.
Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose.

I think this is the sort of thing Gellner is objecting to in 'Words and Things' (as opposed to, for instance, logical positivism). But I think Wittgenstein's point here is coherent and convincing, whereas I can't understand what Gellner means at all.

Right, and when I tried to bridge your thread with the thread discussing whether we see colors or only our perceptions of colors I ran into this same problem — Leontiskos

There's a quick put-down available, I think. Our perception of colours is our seeing of the colours. Your "opponent" is being misled by the common philosophical tendency to assume that every noun denotes an object.

that is what driving a car consists of. 'Indirect' (or indeed 'direct') doesn't enter into it, unless there are two varieties of driving (real or imagined) that can actually be classified using those words. — cherryorchard

See
One possibility is to challenge your opponent to explain what "direct" means, if not using the steering wheel and pedals. Remote control of the car would be indirect, I think.

There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) — cherryorchard

This is one of those very difficult muddles that are very hard to articulate. "Indirect experiences" is a rather peculiar phrase. In the cases of sight and smell (and hearing), what is seen etc. is at a distance, but the sense-datum is experienced directly; what is experienced indirectly is the object of the experience, not the experience itself (the sense-datum). Mind you, if that is what he meant, I would say that this is another example of assuming that a noun always denotes an object. But "sense-datum" or "experience" is not an object, it is an event. A common mistake in philosophy.

I'm interested that you call Gellner's 'paradox' argument a 'slam-dunk'. I confess I can't make sense of what he means at all. — cherryorchard

i call it a slam-dunk, because some people try to apply the format to all sorts of statements. It's formulaic and refutes without attempting to understand, which, for me, is debating, not philosophy. "We can never be certain of anything" is an example, but the reply "Are you certain of that?" suppresses the argument rather than exposing where it has gone wrong. (Mind you, in that case, the argument is sound.)

whether we can meaningfully make such statements as 'we only ever see things indirectly' or 'we can never be certain of anything'. — cherryorchard

You have to consider that Gellner might believe one or both of those propositions. You don't. So Gellner would think that these are examples of contrast-free statements. If he did so, he would, of course, be begging the question, which is whether those claims are meaningful.

My point about logic was not clear enough. Take any analytic statement, "All bachelors are unmarried" is a nice stock example. It is not possible for any bachelor to be married. It is contrast free. Ryle's examples below don't apply and Gellner has a case for saying that this is an example of a contrast-free statement, and, in a sense, it is. But that isn't paying attention to the kind of statement it is, and to the point that of course there are some people who are not bachelors. It's just that there are no married bachelors.

This is interesting, thank you. I haven't read Ryle – do you remember where this idea comes up in his work? It strikes me as reminiscent of passage 345 in Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations': — cherryorchard

I agree with you about that passage.

A country which had no coinage· would offer no scope to counterfeiters. There would be nothing for them to manufacture or pass counterfeits of. They could, if they wished, manufacture and give away decorated discs of brass or lead, which the public might be pleased to get. But these would not be false coins. There can be false coins only where there are coins made of the proper materials by the proper authorities.
In a country where there is a coinage, false coins can be manufactured and passed; and the counterfeiting might be so efficient that an ordinary citizen, unable to tell which were false and which were genuine coins, might become suspicious of the genuineness of any particular coin that he received. But however general his suspicions might be, there remains one proposition which he cannot entertain, the proposition, namely, that it is possible that all coins are counterfeits. For there must be an answer to the question 'Counterfeits of what?' Or a judge, who has found all too many witnesses in the past inaccurate and dishonest, may be right to expect today's testimonies to break down under examination; but he cannot declare that there are no such things as accuracy and sincerity in testifying. Even to consider whether this witness has been insincere or inaccurate involves considering what would be the honest or precise thing to say. Ice could not be thin if ice could not be thick. — Ryle, Dilemmas, pp. 94, 95

This would be something that Gellner might elevate to a theory. But Ryle does not present the claim that all concepts must be like this.

Take any analytic statement, "All bachelors are unmarried" is a nice stock example. It is not possible for any bachelor to be married. It is contrast free. Ryle's examples below don't apply and Gellner has a case for saying that this is an example of a contrast-free statement, and, in a sense, it is. But that isn't paying attention to the kind of statement it is, and to the point that of course there are some people who are not bachelors. It's just that there are no married bachelors. — Ludwig V

This touches on what I tried to articulate earlier in the thread (with my very silly analogy about the coffee machine). Sometimes, universal statements about a particular term are meaningful. But why is that so?

Maybe it's because the sentence 'all bachelors are unmarried' is a way of defining the term 'bachelor'. We can think of people who aren't bachelors, and people who aren't unmarried, so these terms make sense. And by conjoining them, we learn something about what the word 'bachelor' means. (In fact, 'bachelors are unmarried' does sound like something you might really say to someone who wasn't sure what the word 'bachelor' meant – a child or a language learner, e.g.).

'We only ever see things indirectly' doesn't offer a definition of the term 'seeing'. And while the word 'indirectly' does have a hypothetical antithesis ('directly'), it's very hard to see how that might apply to anything in this specific case. Someone who wasn't sure what the word 'see' meant would not be helped along if we told them 'we only ever see things indirectly'.

Only in the second instance do we run up against the lack of a meaningful contrast. 'Seeing directly' rears its head whether we like it or not. The spectre of a married bachelor doesn't really haunt us in the same way, does it? Bachelors can get married, and then they stop being bachelors and become married men. But seeing can't stop being indirect and then become something else.

I'm not sure this deals conclusively with the problem, though...

In any case, thank you for the quotation from Ryle! I will look up that book.

Sometimes, universal statements about a particular term are meaningful. But why is that so? — cherryorchard

I'm sorry. I can't work out exactly what you mean. Can you give an example - or two?

And while the word 'indirectly' does have a hypothetical antithesis ('directly'), it's very hard to see how that might apply to anything in this specific case. Someone who wasn't sure what the word 'see' meant would not be helped along if we told them 'we only ever see things indirectly'. — cherryorchard

Austin gives an example I think is helpful. But I can't remember the details, so I'll adapt it. Air traffic control radar shows a blip on the screen, with the flight number attached on a little label. The controller says "I can see flight 417", and so he does, but the visitor who peers anxiously out of the window is puzzled. The controller can see flight 417 indirectly. The visitor thinks the controller meant directly. Clearly, seeing flight 417 through the window is seeing it directly (despite the fact that it is through the window). Suppose the visitor gets out a pair of binoculars, sweeps them round a bit and says "Aha! There it is!". Does the visitor see flight 417 directly?
The last point - the unanswerable, doubtful case is quite important to me. There's no point in pretending that this stuff is cut and dried.
Now think about why you gave the answer you did give to each case. I think you'll find you understand how directly and indirectly could be applied in this case. I agree I don't think it would help anyone who doesn't already know what "see" means, but it does help us, in our situation, so that's all right.
Austin does raise the question why anyone would worry about the difference in normal life - did you feel the same when you read the example? He's sort of saying that, despite the example, he's not at all sure that "direct" and "indirect" to "see".

I'm not sure this deals conclusively with the problem, though... — cherryorchard

Neither am I. Philosophers always pretend they are sure of their answers. I don't see any harm in tagging something "not sure". Something may happen later that will help.

Maybe it's because the sentence 'all bachelors are unmarried' is a way of defining the term 'bachelor'. — cherryorchard

Yes, that's what I meant about paying attention to the kind of statement it is - its purpose and context. That's always part of the meaning, isn't it?

In any case, thank you for the quotation from Ryle! I will look up that book. — cherryorchard

It's good philosophy and a good read. You're welcome.

If so, then it is a sensible approach. It would be hard to believe that ethical or aesthetic considerations could be eliminated.

If so, then it is a sensible approach. It would be hard to believe that ethical or aesthetic considerations could be eliminated. — Manuel

I/m sorry. What's a sensible approach? What cannot ethical or aesthetic considerations be eliminated from?

I think this would be toying with language a little too freely. In English at least, we don't 'drive' our bodies, we 'move' them. And in fact, we usually don't even 'move our bodies' – we just 'move'. The body is the subject, not the object. — cherryorchard

Yes, I agree.

But I don't understand the leap from these clearly acceptable claims to the claim that we don't see material things at all. Where does the 'sense-data' come from, if not from the world outside? And if it does come from the world outside, what are we arguing about? — cherryorchard

These strike me as good points and good philosophizing.

From your posts, I'm starting to think that what I really need to do is read Aristotle's Metaphysics... — cherryorchard

Perhaps, but there are probably more contemporary and focused treatments of the subjects that interest you. With that said, Aristotle is great once you get the hang of him.

There are no words in the theory that lack an antithesis. But Gellner seems to suggest here that the theory requires not only that words have antitheses, but also that all theories have meaningful exceptions. Why should it require that? I can't see how it follows logically. — cherryorchard

Right: there is a difference between a word and a theory, or a word and a predication.

---

Your "opponent" is being misled by the common philosophical tendency to assume that every noun denotes an object. — Ludwig V

That seems reasonable.

(In fact, 'bachelors are unmarried' does sound like something you might really say to someone who wasn't sure what the word 'bachelor' meant – a child or a language learner, e.g.). — cherryorchard

Right, and the connotations of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' also differ. If the two terms were identical in meaning then the tautology would be informationless, and this could be chalked up to a lack of contrast. For example, "All bachelors are bachelors."

I am not aware of either Austin or Wittgenstein explicitly advocating anything close to the Contrast Theory of Meaning - They each advocated close and detailed examination of the use of a word in contrast to such general theories of meaning.

What you suggest seems to be that any theory of meaning must in the end be a Contrast Theory of Meaning, and hence Austin and Wittgenstein must have held a Contrast Theory of Meaning... I'm nto overly content with that.

So I'll maintain that it is up to Gellner to show that they held such a view, rather than up to us to show that they didn't.

To clarify and or get rid of certain words or tendencies that prevent discussion from advancing.

This applies to a lot of metaphysics and a part of epistemology.

But as for ethics or aesthetics, I don't think ordinary language helps much, because we are dealing with facets of life which we have less depth of insight. And when there is lack of depth of insight, what we can say about it amounts to very little:

Why should we be just?

Why should we not do evil?

Why is this beautiful?

These questions have answers which don't give much depth of insight. They tend to be rather trivial but are nonetheless crucial issues for life.

Thanks for the response!

I'm sorry. I can't work out exactly what you mean. Can you give an example - or two? — Ludwig V

Again, I'm sorry for being unclear. I'm talking about statements like 'all x are y' or 'x is always y' – claims about x that admit of no exception. My first example was 'we only ever see indirectly' – a claim that 'seeing' is always, with no exception, indirect. And my second example was the one you raised: 'all bachelors are unmarried'. These are both claims that admit of no exception. But to me, one of them seems like nonsense and the other one seems meaningful (in a limited way). I'm trying to work out why that is.

Austin gives an example I think is helpful. But I can't remember the details, so I'll adapt it. Air traffic control radar shows a blip on the screen, with the flight number attached on a little label. The controller says "I can see flight 417", and so he does, but the visitor who peers anxiously out of the window is puzzled. The controller can see flight 417 indirectly. The visitor thinks the controller meant directly. Clearly, seeing flight 417 through the window is seeing it directly (despite the fact that it is through the window). Suppose the visitor gets out a pair of binoculars, sweeps them round a bit and says "Aha! There it is!". Does the visitor see flight 417 directly?
The last point - the unanswerable, doubtful case is quite important to me. There's no point in pretending that this stuff is cut and dried.
Now think about why you gave the answer you did give to each case. I think you'll find you understand how directly and indirectly could be applied in this case. I agree I don't think it would help anyone who doesn't already know what "see" means, but it does help us, in our situation, so that's all right.
Austin does raise the question why anyone would worry about the difference in normal life - did you feel the same when you read the example? He's sort of saying that, despite the example, he's not at all sure that "direct" and "indirect" to "see". — Ludwig V

I'm not sure I understand this. Seeing something represented on a monitor may be a way of seeing it 'indirectly'. Seeing something in a mirror is another example – e.g., 'From where I was sitting, I couldn't see the door directly, but I could see it in the mirror.' That sounds like ordinary language to me.

'I couldn't see the airplane directly but I could see it with my binoculars' does not strike me as a familiar use of the word 'directly'. If you wanted to explain that you could only see the plane with binoculars, you might say something like: 'it wasn't visible with the naked eye'. The word 'directly' wouldn't ordinarily be used like that. But I suppose if someone was just chatting and not being mindful of how they expressed themselves, they might say 'I couldn't see it directly'.

All that said, I'm not sure where this gets us. The fact that we can think of uses for the words 'directly' and 'indirectly' as applicable to 'seeing' doesn't seem to clarify whether it's meaningful to say something like 'we only ever see indirectly'. I suppose elucidating the specific usage suggests that 'directly' and 'indirectly' only work in contrast to one another. But it doesn't prove as much. Or does it?

Thank you for the response.

These strike me as good points and good philosophizing. — Leontiskos

That's very kind. At the start of the thread, I felt I was making a bit of a fool of myself. So I'm glad to know I'm not talking total nonsense!

Perhaps, but there are probably more contemporary and focused treatments of the subjects that interest you. With that said, Aristotle is great once you get the hang of him. — Leontiskos

If you can think of any particularly interesting contemporary accounts of these questions, I'd be very happy to look them up.

I'll maintain that it is up to Gellner to show that they held such a view, rather than up to us to show that they didn't. — Banno

I have provided a few specific examples where Austin and Wittgenstein argued that an absence of contrast (or antithesis) rendered a word meaningless. Ludwig V also cited Ryle's example of the counterfeit coins.

Of course, these examples are specific to particular words, and not expressed in terms of a general theory. Still, it's hard to imagine what sort of word this logic would not apply to – a word that would be meaningful even while lacking any contrast. Can you think of one?

I sense you may reply that the onus is not on you to think of an example that violates the 'contrast theory', but on Gellner to prove that the theory was ever actually proposed by the philosophers he is criticising. Fair enough, but the initial aim of my post was to consider his critique of the theory as he expressed it.

Seems to me that there is a difference between holding that every use of a word is dependent on a contrast and holding that this use of a word is dependent on a contrast.

Without looking up the source (pretty sure it's "plea for excuses"), I'm pretty confident that Austin at most holds that some words, not all, suffer this complain.

See also
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14753/austin-sense-and-sensibilia/p1

So

It does not pay to assume that a word must have an opposite, or one opposite, whether it is a 'positive' word like 'wilfully' or a 'negative word like 'inadvertently'. Rather, we should ask ourselves such questions as why there is no use for the adverb 'advertently'. For above all it will not do to assume that the 'positive' word must be around to wear the trousers; commonly enough the 'negative' (looking) word marks the (positive) abnormality while the 'positive' word, if it exists, merely serves to rule out
the suggestion of that abnormality. — Austin, Plea for excuses, Philosophical Papers, p. 192

Seems to me that there is a difference between holding that every use of a word is dependent on a contrast and holding that this use of a word is dependent on a contrast. — Banno

I understand that's your position. I suppose I could reply that Wittgenstein and Austin selected specific words for discussion because they felt that those specific words were being misused for philosophical purposes without a meaningful antithesis. Again, from 'On Certainty': 'If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything.'

But the same argument could apply to words generally. The word 'shoe', for instance, obviously gets its meaning from the fact that it refers only to things that are shoes, and not to things that aren't. 'If you tried to call everything a shoe, you would not get as far as calling anything a shoe'. But there was no need for Wittgenstein to say so, because nobody was going around calling everything a shoe for philosophical reasons.

I am not attributing this theory to any one philosopher in particular, but I am interested in whether or not it holds. Gellner's critiques of the theory don't make sense to me, and I'm trying to work out whether that's my problem or his. You are concerned with defending the ordinary language philosophers from the allegation that they ever propounded this theory, and I accept and understand that. But I think there is some value in taking the theory on its own merits and trying to assess whether it stands.

Can anyone think of any word that is meaningful without a contrast? I haven't seen an example yet.

Sorry, I didn't see this second reply.

It does not pay to assume that a word must have an opposite, or one opposite

By my reading, what Austin is saying here is that a word need not have an antithesis that is summed up neatly in an opposite word. And 'shoe' is a good example – we don't have or need a single word that means 'non-shoe'. The word 'shoe' does all the work itself. But it still depends on the category of 'things that aren't shoes' in order to be a meaningful word. If it did not exclude non-shoes, it would not be doing the work of the word 'shoe'.

My first example was 'we only ever see indirectly' – a claim that 'seeing' is always, with no exception, indirect. And my second example was the one you raised: 'all bachelors are unmarried'. These are both claims that admit of no exception. But to me, one of them seems like nonsense and the other one seems meaningful (in a limited way). I'm trying to work out why that is. — cherryorchard

At first, I thought that I would say that your second example is grammatical - a la Wittgenstein - and the second is not. But a second thought gives me pause. Remember, we have that argument that there is a contrast - seeing a sense-datum/experience/impression is seeing directly. So your first example becomes "Seeing an object is always, with no exception, indirect". But then experiences (etc.) are objects ("I see a red patch"), so it becomes "Seeing a physical object is always, without exception, indirect." So it looks empirical, until we realize that there is nothing that would count as seeing a physical object directly, and then it becomes grammatical. There are complications with the first that we do not find with the second. (Though I could invent some, if you want to explore an entirely trivial rabbit-hole.) The reason the first is nonsense to you is that you have a philosophical position (a grammar) and so interpret the first in a certain way. This reflects back on the contrast theory and explains why the philosophers who are accused of holding it by Gellner never articulated it.

Seeing something in a mirror is another example – e.g., 'From where I was sitting, I couldn't see the door directly, but I could see it in the mirror.' That sounds like ordinary language to me. — cherryorchard

I'll buy that.

ysyti'I couldn't see the airplane directly but I could see it with my binoculars' does not strike me as a familiar use of the word 'directly'. If you wanted to explain that you could only see the plane with binoculars, you might say something like: 'it wasn't visible with the naked eye'. The word 'directly' wouldn't ordinarily be used like that. But I suppose if someone was just chatting and not being mindful of how they expressed themselves, they might say 'I couldn't see it directly'. — cherryorchard

Good point.

I suppose elucidating the specific usage suggests that 'directly' and 'indirectly' only work in contrast to one another. But it doesn't prove as much. Or does it? — cherryorchard

What it suggests is that when we look at examples carefully, we find that a yes/no answer is difficult to impossible to sustain. That is a position that Gellner does not seem to recognize.

My point in offering the example is not to prove a point, but to help articulate what we are talking about. You suggest seeing with the naked eye - i.e. without equipment. Which makes perfect sense. Except that it hands an opening to the sense-datum theories to ask whether my eye is not the equipment by means of which I see. So it needs to be formulated more carefully. I think that dualism is the philosophical doctrine (actually assumption) behind the entire argument.

Oops!. Perhaps the example we are looking for is the philosophical doctrine of monism. Not necessarily, provided we don't deny dualism. That's why these philosophers tend not to actually deny dualism.

Can anyone think of any word that is meaningful without a contrast? I haven't seen an example yet. — cherryorchard

No-one seems to have come up with one yet. And yet I don't think anyone has decisively endorsed or rejected Gellner's theory.

It does not pay to assume that a word must have an opposite, or one opposite, — Austin,

I think that Austin has it exactly right. Notice that he does give examples - and there are plenty more - "grumpy", "uncouth". It's a question of what you do next. He doesn't jump to a theory but considers what questions to explore. Very different from Gellner.

That is, it appears that in thinking of Wittgenstein or Austin as advocating any theory of meaning, Gellner shows he has not understood what they are up to. — Banno

Absolutely.

Ok, so is there any evidence that Austin explicitly accepted the Contrast Theory of Meaning? Especially as both he and Wittgenstein advocated looking at use rather than the mysterious, inscrutable "meaning" of a word?

That is, it appears that in thinking of Wittgenstein or Austin as advocating any theory of meaning, Gelner shows he has not understood what they are up to.

Ok, so is there any evidence that Austin explicitly accepted the Contrast Theory of Meaning? — Banno

I feel we're talking past each other now. As I have said many times, I am not attributing the theory to any particular philosopher. I'm interested in whether or not the theory holds, in itself. From my post above:

You are concerned with defending the ordinary language philosophers from the allegation that they ever propounded this theory, and I accept and understand that. But I think there is some value in taking the theory on its own merits and trying to assess whether it stands. — cherryorchard

If you are only interested in arguing that Austin (or Wittgenstein, or anyone else) never advanced this theory, I have already accepted as much. I just want to discuss the theory as it has been described.

Ok.

To clarify and or get rid of certain words or tendencies that prevent discussion from advancing.
This applies to a lot of metaphysics and a part of epistemology.
But as for ethics or aesthetics, I don't think ordinary language helps much, because we are dealing with facets of life which we have less depth of insight. And when there is depth of insight, what we can say about it amounts to very little: — Manuel

I'm inclined to agree with you.

Why should we be just?
Why should we not do evil?
Why is this beautiful?
These questions have answers which don't give much depth of insight. They tend to be rather trivial but are nonetheless crucial issues for life. — Manuel

Yes. I'm inclined to think that the problem is that they are too general. People do manage to have better discussions about specific issues within (and sometimes between) those categories.

With that said, Aristotle is great once you get the hang of him. — Leontiskos

I agree. He is not easy, however. It is a mistake to think that you can read him once and get your head around. Everything is interconnected. Very little is easy to grasp from a contemporary view-point. The contrast is very instructive.

I'm just trying to understand why 'we never see material things directly' is qualitatively different from a claim like 'we only ever digest what we consume'. — cherryorchard

... For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? — cherryorchard

I think the difference here is in how the sentences are structured. In "see... directly" the word 'directly' does not mean anything on its own. Instead, it is supposed to function as a modifier for the word 'see'. So, there is one thing here, not two: see-directly. That prompts the question: what does 'see-directly' mean? How is it different from just 'see' or 'see-indirectly'? Failing to find any plausible contrast, we realize that the modifier 'directly' doesn't do any work here: it is meaningless.

In the other two examples (digest what we consume, hear sounds) we are not introducing any new words or constructs. We are making statements that relate already well-understood words in conventional ways. The fact that the statements are self-evident does not make them meaningless. To make the latter statements more like the former, we would need to construct something like 'digest-via-conumption' or 'sound-hearing'. That would indeed raise the same issues that we had with 'see-directly'.

The problem with Ayer's direct/indirect seeing is not that he is stating something self-evident, but that he is saying something obscure.

What you say here is very clear and succinctly put. It makes sense to me that an adverb functions differently from a noun phrase and raises different questions.

The problem with Ayer's direct/indirect seeing is not that he is stating something self-evident, but that he is saying something obscure. — SophistiCat

Thank you – you've really helped to clarify this problem for me. And as I suspect there was nothing in here that needed clarifying from your point of view, I'm grateful to you for taking the time to explain!