I will start off with a quote from W.V. Quine from his seminal work "Word and Object." He says, "There are however, philosophers who overdo this line of thought, treating ordinary language as sacrosanct. They exalt ordinary language to the exclusion of one of its own traits: its disposition to keep on evolving." Of all of the criticisms of ordinary language philiosophy I have read, I find this one to be the most compelling. Another criticism often brought up of ordinary language philosophy is that of defining philosophy's role as merely description. For some, this is too narrow of a definition and ignores the fact that philosophy can, should, and/or does have a normative function as well.

I believe these two ideas are essentially what Gellner is ultimately worried about in this book, however, he does not do a great job in expressing it in a succinct manner. For example, pg 78 (section 6 The Contrast Theory of Meaning) he says "In fact, contrast often overlay presuppositions which are worth bringing out, and sometimes worth denying: the contrast between good and bad witches is worth ignoring for the sake of denying that either kind exists. Far from thought generally moving within a tacitly determinate system of contrasts, it often happens that by refining a concept which at the time is contrast-less, a new contrast, a new concept is brought into being." And, pg 78 "The error springs in each case from the failure to realise that thought is not bound and enslaved by any of the language games it employs, but on the contrary that a most important kind of thinking consists of reassessing out terms, reassessing the norms built into them and reassessing the contrast associated with them." Here I believe are a good examples of language evolving, new ideas being created. Additionally, pg 267 (section 4 Failue of Normativeness) he say, "What is conspicuous about Linguistic Philosophy is its abdication of any kind of normative role, both in its practice and in its programmatic announcements." Or pg 72, "Yet this is precisely what philosophy is and should be: The asking, not of specific questions within a category, but of questions about categories as whole, about the viability, possibility, desirability, of whole species of thinking." Here Gellner is speaking of the normative role pf philosophy.

Thanks for this. I understand Gellner's critique of ordinary language philosophy is wide-ranging and not limited to identifying a few 'fallacies' (of which my post only addresses one). The quotations you select point to more interesting areas of argument (in my opinion) against ordinary language philosophy as a whole – which isn't to say I agree, but I can see there is a good deal of argumentative value there.

But I am stuck on the 'contrast theory' section because I suspect there's something I don't understand about it. Per my reading, Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean. There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly'. And thus (Austin argues) the term 'seeing indirectly' when used in this way appears to mean something but actually doesn't. (Wittgenstein might call it 'disguised nonsense').

But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. We simply have no concept of what such a machine would be like. That doesn't mean my explanation was wrong, does it? Or that I was using language incorrectly?

Are the sense-data theorists just using the word 'indirectly' to help us to define the way we perceive things? And if something is part of a definition, maybe the contrast rule doesn't apply? We expect definitions to exhaust the conceivable meaning of a term, don't we? So that it's hard to imagine the antithesis, etc.

I feel I am going wrong here somewhere – both when I try to argue against Gellner and when I try to agree with him. But I don't see quite where I am going wrong.

But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. We simply have no concept of what such a machine would be like. That doesn't mean my explanation was wrong, does it? Or that I was using language incorrectly? — cherryorchard

No, I think you were right the first time when you pointed out that the contrast theory of meaning does not require that the opposite trait be exemplified for the exact same object under discussion. A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. In this case, the universe of discourse would include all kinds of machines (or all kinds of things), and we can readily come up with examples of machines or things that do not make coffee.

- :up:

But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. — cherryorchard

Is it possible to imagine any other kind of machine?

For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference).

One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate.

This falsely assumes that the Contrast Theory is one-directional. Gellner himself denies this with, "either so severe, or so loose." Like Aristotle's theory, the Contrast Theory seems to nestle term meaning between two erroneous extremes.

One could go on to ask whether the Contrast Theory can be contrasted with other theories, and it obviously can, qua theory. If we think about the principle as an ontological law instead of a theory, then it becomes something like the principle of non-contradiction, elucidated in Aristotle's Metaphysics IV. One can also state the PNC linguistically, as applied to language. In that sense we would say, "If language is to have meaning, then the Contrast Theory must hold." The relevant contrast here is the scenario where language has no meaning, and authors like Aristotle do not deny this at least as a logical possibility. Indeed, Aristotle claims that those who do not apply the PNC to language and predication are not able to use language meaningfully.

For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference). — Leontiskos

Yep. That is all it is. Meaning is constrained in nested hierarchical fashion. The basic contrast of sameness and difference. Or the differences that make a difference versus the differences that don’t.

The differences that matter are the ones that must get said.

In that sense we would say, "If language is to have meaning, then the Contrast Theory must hold." The relevant contrast here is the scenario where language has no meaning, and authors like Aristotle to not deny this at least as a logical possibility. — Leontiskos

Indeed, the challenge for the Contrast theory to meet its own criteria or meaningfulness would be to point out actual or potential instances where language fails to meet its prescriptions. The challenge would be met with examples like Austin's:

Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean. There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly'. And thus (Austin argues) the term 'seeing indirectly' when used in this way appears to mean something but actually doesn't. — cherryorchard

(Some ordinary language philosophers leveled a similar criticism against the realism vs nominalism debate.)

The challenge would be met with examples like Austin's:

...

(Some ordinary language philosophers leveled a similar criticism against the realism vs nominalism debate.) — SophistiCat

Yes, it's a good point, and we've seen it manifest often enough on these forums. For example:

First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? — Leontiskos

---

- :up:

To me this seems like a fair description of some passages in Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' and in, e.g., Austin's 'Sense and Sensibilia'. — cherryorchard

Some examples might be helpful here. Can it be shown that Gellner addressed Ordinary Language Philosophy, rather than his own caricature of it?

If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. We simply have no concept of what such a machine would be like. That doesn't mean my explanation was wrong, does it? Or that I was using language incorrectly? — cherryorchard

A coffee machine is not a toast machine.


Except when it is.

Thanks for this response – it's extremely helpful.

For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference). — Leontiskos

I suppose what I'm struggling to understand is how exactly we know which sort of term is a 'genus' and which isn't. 'Coffee machine' is quite obviously just a specific example of a 'machine' (so I apologise for the inanity of my example). But then, 'seeing' is perhaps just a specific example of 'perception' or even 'experience', or at least some people could plausibly think so. Sense-data theorists might say something like 'we can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly' – and thus hold that their claim 'we never see directly' still has meaning, because 'seeing' is contrasted with other kinds of 'experience' like feeling pain.

I think the issue is in the particular conjunction of terms. The word 'seeing' has meaningful contrasts, as does a word like 'directly' and a word like 'never'. But the combination of these terms together in the claim 'we never see anything directly' is meaningless because it eliminates the possibility of any contrast. That makes complete sense to me – I'm just still struggling to pinpoint why. Is it because 'seeing' is sui generis, and nothing else is really 'like' it? But is that a subjective judgement?

No, I think you were right the first time when you pointed out that the contrast theory of meaning does not require that the opposite trait be exemplified for the exact same object under discussion. A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. In this case, the universe of discourse would include all kinds of machines (or all kinds of things), and we can readily come up with examples of machines or things that do not make coffee. — SophistiCat

Thanks for this! I thought I was right the first time too... It intuitively makes sense to me that 'we can never see material things directly' is not a meaningful claim. And I found Austin's discussion of this sort of claim in 'Sense and Sensibilia' very persuasive. It was only afterwards that I started worrying I hadn't really understood what he was saying.

It's not that I think anyone on this thread is wrong and Gellner is right. I found Gellner's argument unconvincing. I'm just trying to understand why 'we never see material things directly' is qualitatively different from a claim like 'we only ever digest what we consume'. It is hard to imagine any other kind of digestion, but that doesn't make that particular statement meaningless. Whereas 'we never see material things directly' seems to be haunted by the ghost of 'direct seeing'.

Some examples might be helpful here. Can it be shown that Gellner addressed Ordinary Language Philosophy, rather than his own caricature of it? — Banno

I did raise that possibility myself in the very next section of the post you quote from.

I also find the argument, as stated by Gellner, to be convincing in itself, so I don't think Gellner is misrepresenting his opponents' views. (But I may be wrong). — cherryorchard

If you think I am indeed wrong, and that Gellner is misrepresenting his opponents, I would love to know how – it would help very much to clarify the muddle I've got myself into.

For my own part, I think Gellner's account of the 'contrast theory' bears a fair resemblance to passages like the following, from Austin's 'Sense and Sensibilia':

… it is essential to realise that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers—‘directly’ takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite

Or even passages like this from Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty':

If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

In this thread I've mostly been using the example of 'seeing directly' to consider Gellner's argument. But it would, I think, also be possible to consider how the argument applies to Wittgenstein's 'game of doubting' in 'On Certainty'.

Again, I should say that I do think Gellner is wrong. I'm just asking for help in getting my own thoughts straight on exactly why he's wrong. And I appreciate the contributions of everyone who has taken the time to reply!

... For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? We can't imagine any other way of hearing (or at least I can't). But intuitively, I don't find this statement to be meaningless. Of course, there are things we don't hear and things that aren't sounds. But couldn't a sense-data proponent say there are things we don't see and things that aren't indirect? Just no such thing as direct seeing – as there is no such thing as hearing smells.

Again, I think I am wrong here. I just want to be clear with myself on where I am going wrong.

Thanks for this response – it's extremely helpful. — cherryorchard

Okay, good. :up:

I suppose what I'm struggling to understand is how exactly we know which sort of term is a 'genus' and which isn't. 'Coffee machine' is quite obviously just a specific example of a 'machine' (so I apologise for the inanity of my example). But then, 'seeing' is perhaps just a specific example of 'perception' or even 'experience', or at least some people could plausibly think so. — cherryorchard

At minimum what we would say is that to convey an understanding to another, there must be a genus and a specific difference. Examples would be "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference), or "the perceptual act" (genus) "which is visual" (specific difference). We could also put this in SophistiCat's terms:

A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. — SophistiCat

A coffee machine is that subset of coffee-making things within the superset of machines. "Seeing" is that subset of visual acts within the superset of perceptual acts. In order to point to some kind of thing we must delineate the genus or superset or universe of discourse, as well as the species or subset within that broader set. Whenever we are conveying an understanding we are doing this, and if we are not doing this then we are not going to be able to convey an understanding.

So suppose we are on the phone and I try to point you to the machine that makes coffee, but you can't find it. I might pivot and say, "It is the medium-sized black machine." This gives you at least one additional genus-specific difference identifier: "The medium-sized machine" (genus) "that is black" (specific difference). Or in SophistiCat's terms, that subset of black things within the superset of medium-sized machines. According to my information this subset should contain only one thing.

Sense-data theorists might say something like 'we can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly' – and thus hold that their claim 'we never see directly' still has meaning, because 'seeing' is contrasted with other kinds of 'experience' like feeling pain.

I think the issue is in the particular conjunction of terms. The word 'seeing' has meaningful contrasts, as does a word like 'directly' and a word like 'never'. But the combination of these terms together in the claim 'we never see anything directly' is meaningless because it eliminates the possibility of any contrast. That makes complete sense to me – I'm just still struggling to pinpoint why. Is it because 'seeing' is sui generis, and nothing else is really 'like' it? But is that a subjective judgement? — cherryorchard

These get a bit tricky:

1. We can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly
2. We never see anything directly

The genus of (1) can be construed as actions, the set which includes things like feeling (pain) and seeing (objects). Within that broad genus one can distinguish feeling from seeing, and argue that to feel is more direct than to see. Whether they are right or wrong remains to be seen, but their distinction is not prima facie irrational. The coherence of the argument depends on the idea that the directness of feeling can be compared to the directness of seeing.

If (2) is not placed in a genus-context similar to the genus-context of (1), then it is a nonsensical statement. This will depend on the backdrop of (2) and the context of the locution.

'we only ever digest what we consume' — cherryorchard

3. We only ever digest what we consume

The contrast obviously requires the possibility that we might digest something that we have not consumed. In a literal sense (3) is very self-evident. Is a tautology meaningful? In fact most things we call tautologies are not strictly tautological (e.g. p is p). The act of digestion is separate from the act of consumption, and to understand that digestion only ever results from consumption requires an understanding of the relation between the two (and it is debatable whether knowledge of one entails knowledge of the other).

But given that the literal sense of (3) is self-evident to almost all people, it would not generally count as a meaningful statement in dialogue. Usually it is used meaningfully in dialogue only in a metaphorical sense: something like the idea that, "He will never understand what he has not experienced." This has a real contrast given that it is not uncommon for people to impatiently expect others to understand what they have no experiential basis to understand.

For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? — cherryorchard

4. We only ever hear sounds

It is a meaningful statement to someone who is under the impression that we can hear non-sounds or we can perceive sounds in some other way than hearing. For example, are we feeling the bass at the concert or hearing it? But without that context it will not be a meaningful statement.

Of course, there are things we don't hear and things that aren't sounds. But couldn't a sense-data proponent say there are things we don't see and things that aren't indirect? Just no such thing as direct seeing – as there is no such thing as hearing smells. — cherryorchard

Generally we would say that "things that aren't indirect" are direct. Things neither direct nor indirect are usually considered to be outside of the genus of discourse.* If one wants to open up that genus of discourse they should be more explicit and say something like, "There are things we see neither directly nor indirectly. There is an entirely different way of seeing." Or, "There are things that cannot be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled, but yet can be perceived. There is another way of perceiving." But it is very hard for two people who are talking past one another regarding the genus of discourse to connect. In this case they each mean substantially different things by 'perception'.

As regards "hearing smells," the genus is supposed to also perform the role of specifying the type or domain of discourse. For instance, if I start telling you about a "bleg" you will instinctively probe for what type of thing a bleg is. Does it belong to the genus of material things? Immaterial things? Acts? Accidents? Colors? Shapes? Numbers? Times? Set-theoretical entities? Etc. Usually when we speak these very high kinds of genera are implicit and obvious, but to convey an understanding always requires them, and where they are not implicit they must be made explicit.


* For Aristotle this has something to do with the difference between contradictories and contraries. Usually 'indirect' means non-direct, not some third thing other than direct and non-direct. Usually 'indirect' is the contradictory of direct.

I would love to know how — cherryorchard

Well, can we explicated the "Contrast Theory of Meaning"?

As I understand it, he would have it that the meaning of a word is seen in contrasting it with other words. An Hegelian theory of meaning, of sorts. The problem with Hegel is the lack of fixity of the synthesis, which can be almost anything. Gellner both acknowledges and accomodates this lack of fixity with the hedge "The demarcation line between a term and its denial may perhaps shift as we change the meaning of the term".

The purported criticism is that in each case Austin and Wittgenstein use a term "without antithesis". So do they?

Austin, in the sentences quoted, is agreeing that, at least in this case, the meaning of "directly" is dependent on "indirectly". He immediately follows this with a few examples - "We might, for example, contrast the man who saw the procession directly with the man who saw it through a periscope". Austin is thereby showing that Ayer is using "indirect" infelicitously by not setting out what it would be to see directly; It is in this case Ayer, whom Austin is disparaging, who is committing the error Gellner refers to.

Gellner has it arse about. This is even clearer in the case from Wittgenstein. "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." Doubt only has a use in contrast to certainty. Wittgenstein is not using "doubt" without antithesis, but pointing out that doubt requires its antithesis, certainty.

If Gellner's criticism is that Austin and Wittgenstein are using a term without antithesis, then he has simply failed to read and understand what is going on in each case.

Which is, indeed, the usual response to his work.

If Gellner's criticism is that Austin and Wittgenstein are using a term without antithesis, then he has simply failed to read and understand what is going on in each case.

Which is, indeed, the usual response to his work. — Banno

I find Gellner is more complaining than arguing in this book. Ordinary language philosophers are like the parent telling the child you can’t just do anything with language and make sense. Gellner, the child, throws a temper tantrum and thinks he should be able to do anything he wants.

That might give Gellner too much credit. The child at least understands something of what the parents have requested.

:lol:

You are reading Gellner backwards. He is not saying that the Contrast Theory of Meaning defeats Wittgenstein and Austin. He is saying that something like the Contrast Theory of Meaning is held by Wittgenstein and Austin, and that it is incorrect. If you don't like the Contrast Theory of Meaning, then you are agreeing with Gellner, because he doesn't like it either.

I'm happy to acknowledge that. Then by all means, set out what Gellner is saying. What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory of meaning"?

@cherryorchard

One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate. (The Contrast Theory when made explicit leads to a neat paradox; on its own grounds, a language should sometimes be usable without contrast, so that "contrast" may have a contrast.)

I think it's true that meaning is dependent on negation, but I don't see why that would exclude speech that's about unification. For instance, we may first talk about males and females, and then let that distinction fall away and talk about humans. Human still has a negation, which is all the other animals, or all the other living things, or all the creatures that don't wear clothes. I guess the negation is context dependent.

At first glance, it looks like the concept of the universe has no negation, but it does: the void. Could you explain what he means by speaking so severely or loosely that there is no real negation?

What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory of meaning"? — Banno

That is a central question of the OP, and in the second half of the OP cherryorchard gestures towards a few of Gellner's objections to try to get the ball rolling. I don't have the book of Gellner's in question.

Yep. I tried to read it, back in the day, but "simply failed to read and understand what was going on".

I think it's true that meaning is dependent on negation — frank

ALL of meaning?

If Gellner is suggesting that both Wittgenstein and Austin agree here with the most extreme version of Frank's suggestion, what are we to say?

Wittgenstein suggested we look at use instead of meaning, Austin suggested we examine with great care how we use words. Neither of these is prima facie some sort of dialectic.

ALL of meaning? — Banno

I'm not sure what that means, so I'll just go with yes, all of it. :blush:

It doesn't concern me a great deal exactly what Wittgenstein or Austin held. The OP is an inquiry into the question of whether The Contrast Theory of Meaning (or some contrast theory of meaning) can stand. So cherryorchard is looking at Gellner's objections as well as other devil's advocate objections he thought of, and seeing if a contrast theory can stand. If you disagree with contrast theories then you could probably give cherryorchard some additional objections. Or if you want to argue that Wittgenstein or Austin did not hold to a contrast theory, I suppose you can do that.

My position is that at least the sort of meaning that is communicated to others must abide by some variety of contrast theory. This is because that which is not placed in relief against some backdrop cannot be picked out, and if someone cannot pick something out then it cannot be communicated to them. Therefore if someone is to understand what is meant, the communication must involve relief against some backdrop.

Perhaps meanings that are not communicated between linguistic agents do not need to abide by the contrast theory, but the sort of meaning that is communicated to others apparently does need to abide by some variety of contrast theory.

Nevertheless, if we are to remain within the spirit of the OP we would be asking whether there are any good objections to contrast theories.

Could you explain what he means by speaking so severely or loosely that there is no real negation? — frank

Thanks for the input. This section in Gellner's book is very brief (only a few pages long) and it's not always quite clear what he means. The example I've been using is a claim made by proponents of the 'sense-data' theory like AJ Ayer. To be very succinct (and therefore maybe inaccurate!) Ayer claims that we never see any material objects directly; we only ever see our own 'sense-data'. For Austin (one of the ordinary language philosophers Gellner is writing about), this is an example of a claim 'so loose, that [...] everything must fall under it. The term then loses any contrast; it is then used "without antithesis".' There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly' – it wouldn't even be possible to imagine what that might be – so to claim that we 'only see indirectly' would be meaningless.

Gellner is trying to argue against Austin (and implicitly for Ayer) in this section about the 'contrast theory'. I'm just trying to get to grips with what exactly his argument is, and why it's wrong.



Leontiskos, thank you for such an excellent summary of my question (and this thread generally). And I apologise for making such a summary necessary – I suspect I haven't been as clear as I wanted to be.

The genus of (1) can be construed as actions, the set which includes things like feeling (pain) and seeing (objects). Within that broad genus one can distinguish feeling from seeing, and argue that to feel is more direct than to see. Whether they are right or wrong remains to be seen, but their distinction is not prima facie irrational. The coherence of the argument depends on the idea that the directness of feeling can be compared to the directness of seeing. — Leontiskos

This is the crux of the matter for me. When I read 'Sense and Sensibilia', I feel that Austin has put the issue to bed altogether. But when I try to imagine myself defending his argument against a sceptic, I do run into this problem.

It seems to me pure nonsense to say 'we only ever see indirectly', because it draws on the image of 'direct seeing' only to deny that such a thing exists. It's a little like saying 'we only ever drive cars indirectly, because we use the pedals and the steering wheel' – that is what driving a car consists of. 'Indirect' (or indeed 'direct') doesn't enter into it, unless there are two varieties of driving (real or imagined) that can actually be classified using those words.

But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument.

(Oh, and just for future reference, though I realise it's hardly relevant to our discussion – I am a 'she' rather than a 'he'!)

But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument. — cherryorchard

Your friend, in claiming direct access to 'internal' events and only indirect access to 'external' events seems to me to fall into the abyss of solipsism. One cannot dispute with a solipsist, because one cannot access his world. The sense data of an argument are mere unpersuasive sensations. You cannot lose (or win) the argument because you cannot even have the argument. At best all, you can do is provoke sensations in the other. And these purely internal sensations are precisely those 'beetles in boxes' that drop out of the conversation, because they are irredeemably private; and language is shared.

To be very succinct (and therefore maybe inaccurate!) Ayer claims that we never see any material objects directly; we only ever see our own 'sense-data'. For Austin (one of the ordinary language philosophers Gellner is writing about), this is an example of a claim 'so loose, that [...] everything must fall under it. The term then loses any contrast; it is then used "without antithesis".' There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly' – it wouldn't even be possible to imagine what that might be – so to claim that we 'only see indirectly' would be meaningless.

Gellner is trying to argue against Austin (and implicitly for Ayer) in this section about the 'contrast theory'. I'm just trying to get to grips with what exactly his argument is, and why it's wrong. — cherryorchard

I think indirect realists would say (or at least imply) that a person sees sense data directly, by which they mean that back when we thought we were seeing the world directly, that world is actually a model populated with bits of sense data.

@Manuel Manuel, would you agree that Austin is wrong about indirect realism becoming meaningless due to a lack of contrast? I think an example of that kind of breakdown in meaning is the kind of idealism where one says everything is ideas. That makes the concept of idea meaningless because the very stuff that once gave the word meaning, that is physical stuff, has been redefined as ideas. If everything is ideas, the concept of idea becomes meaningless.

Manuel, would you agree that Austin is wrong about indirect realism becoming meaningless due to a lack of contrast? I think an example of that kind of breakdown in meaning is the kind of idealism where one says everything is ideas. That makes the concept of idea meaningless because the very stuff that once gave the word meaning, that is physical stuff, has been redefined as ideas. If everything is ideas, the concept of idea becomes meaningless. — frank

I have not read Austin.

If the claim is that if everything is indirect, then nothing is because we would have no notion of what an alternative could be, or something along those lines, then I think that's right.

We have to experience some things directly to say that are something we don't experience directly, and the other way around.

I'm not sure it would apply to idealism, because we already know of alternatives to it. With the case of realism or indirect realism, it's a bit trickier.

I have no academic background in philosophy, so I defer to those who know better, but I don't think proponents of the sense-data theory are necessarily solipsists. Bertrand Russell and GE Moore were among the philosophers who advocated the sense-data theory, and they did not argue in favour of solipsism.

In fact, some version of the sense-data theory seems to be the majority position in contemporary philosophy. (Please correct me if I'm wrong!) But the argument in this thread is not about the existence of external reality as such. It is about whether the 'contrast theory of meaning' is, as Ernest Gellner suggests, a fallacy – whether we can meaningfully make such statements as 'we only ever see things indirectly' or 'we can never be certain of anything'. I don't think my hypothetical friend is necessarily disappearing into solipsism when he takes Gellner's side against JL Austin (and me).

If the claim is that if everything is indirect, then nothing is because we would have no notion of what an alternative could be, or something along those lines, then I think that's right. — Manuel

If that's Austin's claim, then he's misrepresenting indirect realism. Their view is that one directly apprehends sense data (or a model populated with sense data).