Thanks. Looking forward to it.

As mentioned, I am going to put together a reading of the first section that I will post after Nov 5.

Thanks for setting this up. I'm looking forward to it.

That may well be interesting. I'll be sure to read some and give my opinion and/or ask for feedback, etc.

I won't participate, probably, but I will watch the thread like a hawk to ensure it stays textual if you like @Antony Nickles. If you're leading the group and want assistance keeping this on topic, please PM me regarding any poster who isn't being sufficiently textual/exegetical and I'll come in and examine. Any actions I take to keep things on topic wouldn't be seen as formal mod actions or warnings etc, it would just be to keep something that could be very excellent indeed very on topic.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner

Since sense data (what Witt takes as “feeling, hearing, seeing” p.1) is not a simple philosophy-101 idea, I feel I should offer a brief overview (outside the text, so without defense, to be taken or left).

The idea and framework come from something very old and fundamental in philosophy: skepticism.

For Descartes it came from doubt; in response he divided everything into reality and ‘representation’. “…the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true…” (1st Med, p.7)

Plato pictured a “shadow” (Republic ln. 515) to save the possibility of something true in comparison.

Ayer’s idea of ‘perception’ is that the world always appears different (we read Austin's response here).

and Kant internalized into each of us the paranoia that ‘appearances’ “to every different eye, in respect of its colour, …may appear different.” (Crit. Of Pure Reason §§4).

‘Sense data’ is an amalgamation of all these constructions.

‘Sense data’ is an amalgamation of all these constructions. — Antony Nickles

Where would one place the notion of a "concept" with the above about "sense-data" in mind?

Where would one place the notion of a "concept" with the above about "sense-data" in mind? — Shawn

Well that’s a pretty fuzzy word**, but if we are dealing with “feeling, hearing, seeing”, and so tangential to ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, ‘thinking’, where ‘thought’ is considered like an object as well, then there is a traditional interpretation of ‘concept’ as an ‘idea’, then an ‘idea’ is in the same placeholder as ‘appearance’ or ‘representation’.

Witt uses the word ‘concept’ but it is an individually-defined term for him, which is just a grouping of activities and practices, like: pointing, or following a rule, or identifying pain, etc. So he will talk about the concept of playing a game, but he does not mean: the ‘idea’ of playing, but the criteria and steps etc. that fall under the umbrella of that activity.

**Idea could also be an image for, or speaking to, yourself.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner @Shawn

Section 1 pp. 1-3 Mental objects & Use (cut the first section a little short; and not waiting until after U.S. election).

Wittgenstein starts with claiming that we are incorrectly structuring ‘sense data’ (feelings, visions, thoughts) after an object, as when he says “a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.” (p.1, emphasis added) (“A substantive” is defined as something that has importance to us, is meaningful.) He refers to this desire for correspondence as a “temptation”—which will be a theme—as if we are compelled to turn something that matters, into ‘matter’, compared to insubstantial ‘mind’ or ‘idea’, to avoid it being unstable and ensure its importance to us. (He will draw the skeptical picture of mind and its mechanisms—which have something “queer” about them—at the end of page 3.)

One other point is his discussion of method, which a lot of this book introduces and explains. He says we can be “cured” of the temptation (to need objectivity) by “studying the grammar [ workings ] of the [ an ]expression”. As if, when we saw each things’ different rationality, we would let go of the desire to impose the framework (and standard) of an object.

Now a “verbal” definition sets the terms of our words (“attributing” and “predicating” it, he says (p.2)—where the idea that we ‘agree’ to language comes from), which is why he prefers an “ostensive” definition, which is a demonstration by pointing out examples. (I leave the questions he asks to others; we can’t all be interested in the same things—thus why we may have multiple, non-conflicting readings.)

It would seem he is doing the exact opposite when he says it is the job of the O.D. “to give it a meaning”, but he means giving an expression a context of different relevances (fleshing out the “this-ness” as it were, I will take it, in contrast). “This is a pencil” can be taken, or seen, or said, as: its being “round” in that it is not shaped like a carpenter’s marker; or “wood” in that it is not just charcoal; or “one” in that it is “a pencil” (not two pencils), or “hard” (which ?? maybe you can find the circumstance that fits). A “ostensive definition” here is what in the PI he calls a “description” (PI #496, #665).

These are different possible ‘senses’ of the expression “This is a pencil”; he will also call these the ‘uses’—which is not meant to point out that we ‘use’ words—they reflect our interests, the reason to say it (then), and its possibilities, etc. (what he calls “criterion”) along with the circumstances, and practices, say, of picking out things, like instruments. He calls them here “interpretations”, not meant as ‘perceived’ differently, but taken to apply to a different context, under the associated kinds of facts that matter (to the related criterion) in that circumstance.

The already-established associations (criteria, practices) are the reason why we do not usually make a separate decision (unless and until we do; his example: “interpreting before obeying” (p.3)). The example of getting the red flower is evidence that with “the usual way” we don’t have any reason to deviate from or reflect on our life-long patterns (like searching, and matching colors), as we do in politics, and philosophy.

I'm doing this to show an actual involvement, to not lazy my way out of at least some of this.

1) I am foggy brained right now but will attempt to reply to what I think is interesting.

2) I am assuming that the pages you mentioned are the ones that show up in the document you shared.

First, a comment on a few things you said, then a quote I take form him, to see what I end up with.

One other point is his discussion of method, which a lot of this book introduces and explains. He says we can be “cured” of the temptation (to need objectivity) by “studying the grammar [ workings ] of the [ an ]expression”. As if, when we saw each things’ different rationality, we would let go of the desire to impose the framework (and standard) of an object. — Antony Nickles

My question is, who is the one who is looking for this "objectivity"? Philosophers? Ordinary people?

Maybe if someone holds on to a variety of a referential doctrine in which a word "flower" literally "means" that thing we see in our garden, then I can see his point of this being a misleading way of thinking about words.

Do ordinary people think this? It's not clear to me.

He calls them here “interpretations”, not meant as ‘perceived’ differently, but taken to apply to a different context, under the associated kinds of facts that matter (to the related criterion) in that circumstance.

The already-established associations (criteria, practices) are the reason why we do not usually make a separate decision (unless and until we do; his example: “interpreting before obeying” (p.3)). The example of getting the red flower is evidence that with “the usual way” we don’t have any reason to deviate from or reflect on our life-long patterns (like searching, and matching colors), as we do in politics, and philosophy. — Antony Nickles

If you have a different interpretation of what is ostensibly the same thing, say, these words you are reading right now, or maybe the crying tree outside my window, how is this not a different perception?

I don't see a difference between interpretation and perception, in so far as differing interpretations lead to different perceptions.

This is how I am reading you now and is just to see if we are on similar pages of thought or not.

Ok, on to what he says that I find interesting:

" ... he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of searching, and it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one. ...

[an option is] ...We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to anything. To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, consider the order "imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine."

Not essential, the image? Hmmm. Perhaps it is not this way exactly. It's not as if "red flower" produces an extremely intense red image in my mind. It's relatively weak (in terms of intensity at this moment), but if I lacked it, I'm not sure I'd get a "red" flower, rather than some other flower (yellow, blue, etc.).

Yes, we can go in a non-reflexive mode, as we do when we get into a routine in which we do things without explicit thinking, and here you can do all kinds of things. But I think these are moments in which we are already familiar with what we are doing. If I get a red flower without explicitly thinking about the red, then in all likelihood I did it unconsciously, because I am accustomed to getting red flowers all the time.

I can't see removing all mental content being useful here at all, IF that's even what the issue may be.

I'll do better next time.

My question is, who is the one who is looking for this "objectivity"? Philosophers? Ordinary people? — Manuel

Here I think Witt means those who are tempted by a desire for something sure. Definitely traditional philosophy, but I would argue our larger modern culture. But I would point out that there actually is a way to how identifying and naming objects works, and that is word—thing (flower; though yes the word is not the flower), but that is exactly why we want it to work that way in every case. It is so certain and clear and simple and predictable; the evidence of our senses is so immediate and convincing to us that the idea of seeing something with our eyes is our best-case scenario in the face of doubt about our world (as is ‘pain’ about our feelings).

If you have a different interpretation of what is ostensibly the same thing, say, these words you are reading right now, or maybe the crying tree outside my window, how is this not a different perception? — Manuel

The interpretation is possible because of the criteria and circumstances, not how we see the world (in each of the above pencil cases, they are NOT “ostensibly the same thing”, though the words are). Though, of course, if the circumstances are looser, you still play some part in identifying a banjo or grouping it as a general string instrument (p.2 (though not in interpreting what identifying is, or how it goes wrong). I can miss the point, can be mistaken, disagree. But when I say, “THIS is a pencil” after you show me your new mechanical pencil, and as I bring out what I take to be the ultimate pencil, you may take this as condescending or true, but how are the underlying facts and how this situation does what it does here dependent on us?

‘it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one.’ P.3

Not essential, the image? …if I lacked it, I'm not sure I'd get a "red" flower, rather than some other flower (yellow, blue, etc.). — Manuel

What he is saying is that the image could be mental or physical, like a patch of the color. That the physical patch of color serves the same purpose as the “mental” image of color (that it is mental is inessential). Also, it is this wanting to be “sure” at all times that you express which Witt is saying creates the need for the object (fears its “lack”). But, as he demonstrates, let’s create a scenario where you have to be sure. Then you would absolutely carry a patch and match the colors of red to each other. Or, if there was a field of different flowers and we definitely wanted red, we would take care not to have a mistake happen (as I describe below). But unless we have some special circumstance, usually, I would neither need the image nor the patch. As you say, we are accustomed to it.

If I get a red flower without explicitly thinking about the red, then in all likelihood I did it unconsciously, because I am accustomed to getting red flowers all the time. — Manuel

He will address “unconscious thinking” later, but doing it “unconsciously” is different than doing it because you are “accustomed”. You could do it without thinking of the consequences (“thoughtlessly”), inadvertently, or by mistake, but the opposite of “explicitly thinking” is not “unconscious”, but, perhaps, unaware.

I can't see removing all mental content being useful here at all, IF that's even what the issue may be. — Manuel

He is not “removing” mental content; he is beginning to show that we unnecessarily picture it in the framework of an object (as a thing we can be as sure of as seeing a flower), while pointing out there is a larger, pre-existing world out there than us, and also picking at the feeling that we must have it or we “lack” something, which he says later turns into something we feel we “cannot” do.