The interpretation I dislike is the one that says that to ask "why are their clouds and why do they produce rain?" is to have become bewitched or fallen into incoherence. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course we can say: "but this is no issue. It would be a total violation of common sense to say we can't follow public rules. When someone violates a rule in chess we can see it and point it out to them. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, but the questions I think his philosophy points to is: "from whence rules? Why are they useful? How do we come to understand them? Why are they natural to human behavior?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
258. 'Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. -- But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. -- How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation -- and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. -- But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. -- Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. -- But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."
Someone else can read the note, so it doesn't count as private language — Ludwig V
How does any individual ever know that they are properly chastising someone for following a rule wrong? Per Wittgenstein, they can't be sure that they ever understand a rule — Count Timothy von Icarus
Would that question not be simply what produces clouds and how do they in turn produce rain— a scientific question? I can't think of any other way to coherently frame the question. I mean you could feel a sense of great wonder that there are clouds and rain, and indeed a world at all, but I don't see any coherent question that sense of wonder could be transformed into other than the scientific ones.
I agree with that.Imo the private language argument is about showing that when you have no external enforcement of these criteria, any kind of stable foundation for word meaning evaporates... — Apustimelogist
Yes. But I thought that was one of Wittgenstein's points. Because you said it was a counter-example, I thought that you were saying that because we can write notes to ourselves (which we clearly can), Wittgenstein was wrong. I regularly write notes to myself and they work perfectly well. But Wittgenstein's point is not that we need to be validated every time we follow a rule - that's absurd - but that we need validation sometimes - a practice of validation - , so that there is agreement about how to apply the rule.The counterexample introduces the same kind of practical enforcement as the social case and so it doesn't contradict the point being made imo. — Apustimelogist
There is no criterion beyond agreement between us. So if I am understood and understand, everything is in order. (It's not a question of chastisement, really. Either communication works, or it doesn't). It is also true that communication can and frequently does, break down, for one reason or another. But, again, the point is that there are ways of restoring it and even ways of coping with failures.Right, but you see the problem here right? How does any individual ever know that they are properly chastising someone for following a rule wrong? Per Wittgenstein, they can't be sure that they ever understand a rule. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I like that. Though some analytics don't cut themselves off from their tradition, but re-interpret it into their own language. Mind you, a lot of all that has gone on throughout philosophy, hasn't it? It just means that analytic philosophy is less special than it thinks it is. But then, every new philosophical approach thinks that. It's all very confusing.analytics cut themselves off from most pre-analytic philosophy, did everything "in-house" which entailed a lot of reinventing of the wheel in ways that look horribly philistine and only appeal to a very specific niche of people who like goofy decontextualized thought experiments, [...] — Lionino
[...] and then at a later phase, claim to have been conversant with the wider philosophical tradition all along / rediscover the wider philosophical tradition, but still subordinate that tradition to goofy analyticisms and still somehow retain the decontextualized feel of early analytic philosophy.
[...]
It just means that analytic philosophy is less special than it thinks it is. — Ludwig V
every new philosophical approach thinks that — Ludwig V
Yes, that's true. But both have their uses in a building. Whether the same proposition can be a hinge and a foundation is hard to say. We could perhaps say that the same proposition might be used as a hinge in one context and a foundation in another. But not, I think, at the same time. Case studies would be interesting. — Ludwig V
There's no harm in pushing a metaphor as far as it will go. But it is to be expected that it will break down sooner or later. I didn't quite follow the last half of your post.I agree with holding to the metaphor — Moliere
I wouldn't disagree ssewith you about either arrogance or bad temper. But I think a certain level of arrogance, or at least self-confidence, is necessary to do philosophy at all.I am not sure if that arrogance is universal. Wittgenstein had quite the temper. — Lionino
Yes. Wittgenstein isn't very clear about defining his target. But that may be because he wants to target all the varieties of dualism, and doesn't want to tie himself down to any specific varieties.To me I don't see the inherent distinction between a public language and a private one other than only one person uses it. So to me it is a counterexample to the private language used by only — Apustimelogist
It depends on your definition of inaccessible. The only thing I'm clear about is that he intends "logically" inaccessible. I don't know about communication with myself. I find "mental notes" very unreliable.that language is meaningless without the need for the communication of inaccessible information, whether that communication being with other people or yourself. — Apustimelogist
I wouldn't fight over the question of priority. That it has multiple uses is not in question, I think.Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought — Apustimelogist
It might be. But I take his point to be logical, so the expectation would be that the sceptical arguments would still apply - unless you could take "This is what I do" to be identifiable with a brain state. Don't forget that the brain is very plastic, so we may well find a great deal of variation in the ways they work. I can't see that they are likely to work in the same way that our computers work.Isn't the rule following paradox, which philosophers still debate to this day, solved by the way the language center of the brain is uniform for many newborn children? I don't see how else one would solve the rule following paradox. — Shawn
A lot depends on what you mean by language. But I wouldn't be dogmatic. It could be sufficient without being necessary and it could enable kinds of thinking that are not available to other modes. "Thinking" is a very flexible concept.Maybe that is a naïve point, but, since rats and other languageless animals are known to be able to perform mental simulations, doesn't that show in a straightforward manner that language is not necessary for thought? — Lionino
inaccessible — Ludwig V
I wouldn't fight over the question of priority. That it has multiple uses is not in question, I think. — Ludwig V
No, that's obviously true. I suppose there are questions about what's going on. But you could also say that you don't need language to communicate. Animals can do that as well. Then there's the question whether animal communication systems count as language, or what the limits of language without words are. Hence the temptation to posit a "language of thought" - "mentalese". (This was mentioned by someone earlier in the thread.) But without some empirical evidence, I don't think there's any useful mileage in speculation. Chomsky doesn't help.We don't need language to think about things. — Apustimelogist
But you could also say that you don't need language to communicate — Ludwig V
Its about the idea that language is not identical to thought. We don't need language to think about things. When — Apustimelogist
I agree. Concepts do not exist independently of language in some separate platonic reality, in which concepts exist passively waiting to have a label slapped on them so that they can be thought. Understanding language gives us concepts in terms of which we can think about various things, and so our thinking is structured by them.Language isn’t simply a tool that we use to access concepts , in its very instantiation it uses us to transform the sense of our concepts and percepts by enacting them in the world. — Joshs
Yes, the concepts of our language actually structure our perception.For Merleau-Ponty, perception is ‘languaged’, but this cannot be understood in terms of a split between thinking and communicating. — Joshs
The idea of communicating with oneself is a bit awkward, isn't it? There are examples of thinking that one might call communicating with oneself - reminding oneself, exhorting oneself and so on. But I think there are also cases of thinking that are working out a problem, organizing one's thoughts and so forth. Those are not communicating with oneself or anyone else, but doing a different kind of job.To think and perceive is to communicate with oneself by way of the world. — Joshs
I wouldn't disagree with that. But, having thought about it, I want to emphasize the multifarious uses of language, many, but not all, of which involve communication in one form or another.True. I would say that communication just generalizes language. — Apustimelogist
I'm really sorry, but I can't get my head around what you're saying here. Could you break it down for me?Similarly, what an animal communicates about is different to their actual perceptual/cognitive/physical engagement with what they are communicating about. — Apustimelogist
It's a good question and I agree that communication with others and with oneself (insofar as it happens) are different.What are we communicating to ourselves? — Lionino
To think and perceive is to communicate with oneself by way of the world.
— Joshs
What are we communicating to ourselves? — Lionino
When we speak to another we have certain expectations concerning the response, which will never be precisely fulfilled. — Joshs
Likewise when we think to ourselves we are communicating with an other, since the self returns to itself slightly differently moment to moment. — Joshs
We always end up meaning something slightly other than what we intended to mean. — Joshs
AC Grayling: "One need not take as one's target so radical a form of the thesis to show that cognitive relativism is unacceptable, however."
One way to deal with [relativism/skepticism] would be to posit nested sets of "forms of life" that people belong to. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It depends what you mean by "private".As rules are private, a rule-based language must also be private — RussellA
Dodgson's dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise makes a good point, but I'm not sure that your point is the same one. However, your concluding question is a good one. I assume you would not disagree that Wittgenstein's point is that no rule can determine its own application. I think that, for similar reason, no rule can determine application of another rule. We do make play with attempts to formulate such rules. But in the end, it is a matter of our agreement with each other; there is nothing else.For an individual, all the rules that they are aware of must be of their own invention, even if based on information received through their senses. As the tortoise said to Achilles, how can an individual discover just from the information received through their senses that a rule is a rule. Where is the rule that determines whether something is a rule or not, a problem of infinite regression. — RussellA
I don't disagree with this. But I think that our practices are a bit more complicated than this seems to propose. If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste or convenience or pragmatics. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.)We imagine chaos because we want to only accept undeniable certainty and agreement (as “knowledge”), and cast everything else as “belief” or emotion or persuasion. But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction). — Antony Nickles
But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction).
Now we can NOT understand lions, as a physical impossibility
I don't disagree with this. But I think that our practices are a bit more complicated than this seems to propose. If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.)
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