A variant of the chariot of the passions - Phaedrus? — Banno

Good catch, but an important difference in Phaedrus is vitalism - the existence of the soul - which opens up a whole new category of questions.

The chariot = the soul
The two horses = moral impulses and irrational passions
The charioteer = the intellect

and now you are starting to do ethics... — Banno

But there is nothing else to us, except our evolution.

Well that's just the tip of the iceberg, convertability doesn't entail a perfect symmetry.

Just consider the types of things we call "true" or "false." These will almost always be statements, propositions, beliefs, etc. It does not make sense to call things true in most contexts. A tree standing outside is not true or false. Things said or believed about it are true or false. The act of running is not true or false. Things said of it might be. Same goes for states of affairs. These obtain or fail to obtain, but are not true or false.

Now, occasionally we might call things true, as in "this is a true Picasso." But here we are just saying that something apt to be an imitation is not. Or we might praise a baseball player by saying he is a "true center fielder," or a man by saying he is a "true gentleman," but by this we mean something more like "good," i.e., truly embodying some standard.

It's quite the opposite with "good." Dogs are good, or the Sun, or blue skies, or a baseball pitch, or a presidential term, etc. It is primarily things or states of affairs that are good or bad. It does not generally make sense to call a proposition or belief "good" unless we are either:
A. Referring to the goodness of what the proposition refers to (e.g. a claim about a state of affairs, it is "good that it is true that it obtains.").
B. Expressing that the rhetorical or grammatical form of the proposition is good.
C. Expressing that a belief is good because it is true.

This difference is why very many philosophers locate truth primarily in the mind. Not all of course. Some located the bearers of truth in an infinity of abstract objects—propositions—outside of space and time that are somehow subsistent and intelligible in isolation, and which the mind somehow "grasps." However, the view that "truth is primarily in the mind and secondarily (or only fundamentally) in things," is quite common (it's akin to the idea that time is fundamentally in nature and actually in observers, but more widely embraced).

Today, it's common to hear that the good must be in the mind, on the "subjective" side of the dualistic ledger that splits reality. This is a rather new development. For much of philosophical history it was assumed that goodness must lie primarily in the things that are good. Why?

Well, suppose hungry monkeys tend to find bananas to be good, choiceworthy. Suppose we run an experiment where we lower bananas into their environment periodically. When the monkeys see the bananas they climb up and get them. Without the bananas, they don't bother climbing up. The bananas motivate action in the monkeys without themselves doing much aside from being what they are.

Of course, the bananas don't motivate the same behavior in tigers, things' relations vary, but it's the entities that are apt to find things good (i.e. organisms) that are generally reacting to the good as stimulus, not good things reacting vis-á-vis organisms (aside from the more complex cases involving multiple organisms). A wolf doesn't need to do anything to scare a sheep in the same way, just its ambient scent or appearance is enough.In the simple cases, good things like food and water simply broadcast their desirability through their default interactions with the media around them, e.g. ambient light bouncing off water.

We could go a step further if we identify the good for organisms with, in a general sense, not dying (exceptions apply) and fulfilling key biological functions (e.g. reproducing, even if your a male spider who tends to get eaten doing this). We might suppose that the unity by which any thing is anything at all, by which part/whole relations exist, is related to goodness. And so we might go an extra step in locating goodness in ens reale (things) and not ens rationis (creations of mind). Yet, IMO this is unnecessary for concluding that, if relatively inert things like water motivated complex behavior, the goodness sought by the complex behavior lies primarily in what gets sought, not the seeker. Much good seeking involves actual consumption, the introduction of the good thing into the body/whole of the entity seeking it, and this doesn't make sense if all goodness is already in the organism doing the seeking.

. And so we might go an extra step in locating goodness in ens reale (things) and not ens rationis (creations of mind). Yet, IMO this is unnecessary for concluding that, if relatively inert things like water motivated complex behavior, the goodness sought by the complex behavior lies primarily in what gets sought, not the seeker. Much good seeking involves actual consumption, the introduction of the good thing into the body/whole of the entity seeking it, and this doesn't make sense if all goodness is already in the organism doing the seeking — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is there a way to separate out truth from goodness as fulfillment of normative expectations and purposes? Are such norms to be located inside the organism, in the things outside the organism, or in the ways of functioning that take place BETWEEN organism and its world? If it is the latter then one doesnt have to choose between an inside and an outside in order to arrive at the site of truth and goodness.

we ought to do what is good just because it is good. — Janus

Agreed, of course, but we are still left with determining what thing to do, sufficiently reflecting that good already decided.

Is there a way to separate out truth from goodness as fulfillment of normative expectations and purposes?

Depends on what you mean by "separate." Medicine is a normative practice. However, consider a child with cancer. It's bad for them to have cancer. It's good to cure it. Suppose the doctors give the child a treatment that is thought to be a good treatment for this sort of cancer. It isn't. It actually causes the cancer to become more aggressive.

We wouldn't want to say that the treatment is a good one when the normative standard is to give the treatment and only becomes a bad one later. Indeed, it would come to be deened a "bad treatment" in the normative framework because of the truth about its effects.

Are such norms to be located inside the organism, in the things outside the organism, or in the ways of functioning that take place BETWEEN organism and its world?

Let's start with a simple example of relation, such as "larger than." This involves two subjects. Does truth follow this form?

It's hard to see how it would because we can say true things about what does not exist. This is less "x > y" and more "x > ".

But moreover, people can have beliefs or make statements about themselves. Where is between here? Between the person and themselves?

What sort of things are apt to have beliefs or make claims (the sorts of things apt to be true or false)? It seems to me that "nothing in particular," doesn't believe or claim anything, nor does the interval between speakers and the subjects of their speech.

If being good is not your goal, then naturally you will ignore what you “ought” to be doing in order to be good.

If something is good, it's choice worthy. It doesn't make sense to choose the worse over the better. People do choose the worse over the better, but this will be due to ignorance about what is truly good or weakness of will.

What is choiceworthy will depend on what one's goals are. If one is seeking an aim, it doesn't ever make sense to choose what is worse for that aim, unless you face tradeoffs against other aims. But aims themselves can be more or less choiceworthy, more or less good. And we might suppose that in order to determine which aims are most choiceworthy we should seek to discover what is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for some other good or end. For example, acquiring money might be thought not to be an "end in itself," for money is only useful when one parts with it. It is a means to other goods. To be confused about this is to mistake apparent good, appearances, for reality (unless, perhaps one is Scrooge McDuck and enjoys swimming in gold coins for its own sake).

Even Milton's Satan must proclaim, "evil be thou my good." It would not make sense to pursue evil as evil for oneself, "evil be thou evil for me.

But aims themselves can be more or less choiceworthy, more or less good. And we might suppose that in order to determine which aims are most choiceworthy we should seek to discover what is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for some other good or end. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But:

What is choiceworthy will depend on what one's goals are. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the challenge is to explain how "choiceworthy for its own sake" isn't incoherent. I'm not saying it can't be done, I'm just pointing out the difficulty. You need a way of talking about aims that is significantly different from how we talk about goods. If "it doesn't make sense to choose the worse over the better," this would seem to apply to our aims as well -- we'll choose better aims rather than worse ones. But it's supposed to be those very aims that determine good choices, so how do we get out of the circle? What is the meta-level above aims that results in an aim being intrinsically choiceworthy?

↪Joshs

Is there a way to separate out truth from goodness as fulfillment of normative expectations and purposes?

Depends on what you mean by "separate." Medicine is a normative practice. However, consider a child with cancer. It's bad for them to have cancer. It's good to cure it. Suppose the doctors give the child a treatment that is thought to be a good treatment for this sort of cancer. It isn't. It actually causes the cancer to become more aggressive.

We wouldn't want to say that the treatment is a good one when the normative standard is to give the treatment and only becomes a bad one later. Indeed, it would come to be deemed a "bad treatment" in the normative framework because of the truth about its effects. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Micro norms can be nested within larger norms. We can change our minds about the benefits of a particular treatment without dislodging the superordinate norms (good vs bad methodology) on the basis of which modifying a specific treatment is intelligible.

But moreover, people can have beliefs or make statements about themselves. Where is between here? Between the person and themselves? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I dont happen to view the self as a hermetically sealed
solipsism , but as the derived effect of a system of elements that are neither strictly internal to the organism nor merely interjected from its environment. This system of elements organizes itself into a unitary, autonomous whole producing intentional directionality. But because this autonomy is only that of a certain operational closure rather than that of an internal milieu divided off from an outside, deliberation, intentionality and reflection are not the activities of an inside, but of an organism-world interaction.

Perhaps there is a happy via media between the "self as a hermetically sealed solipsism," and rejecting that it is primarily people (or more broadly organisms) that possess beliefs? Just as we need not declare that organisms are hermetically sealed nor subsistent beings in order to declare that "only things with legs run." And it is of course things—substances*—that properly run: horses, men, ants, and now robots, as opposed to the world generally or nothing in particular.

*These would have to be substantial unities because to run requires legs and a body, which is to make up a whole with parts. Something lacking much unity, like a cloud, cannot run, except in some equivocal, metaphorical sense. But to have beliefs is also something determinant, since it is to affirm some things but not others is belief is to have any content.

I can't understand hte question, really.

If something is Good, it's because you have personally understood/decided it is good. You couldn't support that with any extrinsic facts.

The 'right' action is to do with achieving something. That something must be arbitrary, at base. So, i don't get hte question.

You asked

If evolution does not tell us what to do, what does? — Questioner

And answered

But there is nothing else to us, except our evolution. — Questioner

What is your claim here? That there is no variation in out behaviour? Or perhaps that we do not make choices? If either of these were true, then the question of "what ought we do?" is meaningless, because we just do as evolution dictates.

But you are now choosing whether and how to reply to this post. You remain confronted by choice.

What will you do?

You will choose.

If something is Good, it's because you have personally understood/decided it is good. You couldn't support that with any extrinsic facts.

The 'right' action is to do with achieving something. That something must be arbitrary, at base. So, i don't get hte question. — AmadeusD

In my experience, this (bolded part) is not how ethics is usually taught. Instead, teaching ethics goes something like this:

"You don't know what is good and right and so you need to be told so.
X is good and right.
You should do X."


If anything, the direct answer to "Why ought one do that which is good?" is "Because one is bad" and perhaps with the addition "so that by doing good, one may become good as well."

What is your claim here? That there is no variation in out behaviour? Or perhaps that we do not make choices? If either of these were true, then the question of "what ought we do?" is meaningless, because we just do as evolution dictates. — Banno

My claim is that we are the result of our evolution - but it produced wide spectrums of behavior, emotions, aptitudes, perspectives, intellect, abilities, ways of thinking, etc. etc.

My claim (belief) is that there is not a supernatural cause for our behavior.

There are tons of variation in our behavior - but it all represents genetic activity subject to environmental stimuli. That's one big umbrella.

I am not ready to give up on the question, "What ought we do?"

Because clearly, there are things we should do and things we should not do.

And returning to my main point, the need to belong to the group in deciding what we should do cannot be underestimated.

But you are now choosing whether and how to reply to this post. You remain confronted by choice.

What will you do?

You will choose. — Banno

I'm sorry if I gave the impression we humans have no choice. Of course we have choice.

I return to the story I told earlier about the sons of an alcoholic.

One son became an alcoholic. When asked why, he replied, "My father was an alcoholic."

The other son never drank. When asked why, he replied, "My father was an alcoholic."

How else to explain the difference than by a differing influence between the two sons' genes?

You claimed,

...the good is to practical reason as truth is to theoretical reason — Count Timothy von Icarus

I made a precise logical point about the difference between "true" and "good". I pointed out that "p" is true IFF p, but that there is no similar equation for "good". So there is a break in the symmetry you proposed. You don;t appear to have spoken agains this, so I will take it as read.

is unnecessarily long.

Perhaps in your third and fourth paragraphs you are saying something not unlike direction of fit, that some sentences set out how things are, while other sentences set out how we might prefer them to be. But you combine this with what appears to be talk of the objective and subjective.

You also slide from what is good per se to what is good for an organism.

Meh.

My claim (belief) is that there is not a supernatural cause for our behavior. — Questioner

That's a relief, becasue you were apparently proposing that evolution take on the role of handing down our commandments. Replacing god with evolution doesn't solve the problem of what to do.

...the need to belong to the group... — Questioner

You do not need to appeal to evolution to maintain this. That you are writing using a language shows that you are embedded in a culture, along with all that implies.

So we still have the question, "what to do?"

But freed from the irrelevance of both god and evolution

My claim is that we are the result of our evolution - but it produced wide spectrums of behavior, emotions, aptitudes, perspectives, intellect, abilities, ways of thinking, etc. etc. — Questioner

Question, then: is it not possible that humans are under-determined by evolution? This would mean that, while certainly not denying the facts of evolution, it is legitimate to question the sense in which the human condition might be understood solely through the lens of biological theory.

The main drivers of adaptive behaviour are the ability to compete, and show up in most vertebrate behaviour as the famous 'Four Fs' of behaviour - fighting, feeding, fleeing, and sexual reproduction. It is not difficult to trace the influence of these behaviours on human activities. But how does this dictate or determine ethical behaviours?

Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. If we decide that we should neither “dissolve society” through extreme selfishness, as (biologist E. O.) Wilson puts it, nor become “angelic robots” like ants, we are making an ethical judgment, not a biological one. Likewise, from a biological perspective it has no significance to claim that Ishould be more generous than I usually am, or that a tyrant ought to be deposed and tried. In short, a purely evolutionary ethics makes ethical discourse meaningless. — Richard Polt, Anything but Human

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory — Richard Polt, Anything but Human

You would think a Heidegger scholar would be able to do better than that. If we stick with the oldy-moldy neo-Darwinism that ignores the side of the equation where the environment is reciprocally shaped by the normative goals of the organism rather than unilaterally imposing itself on the organism, then the biological ‘is’ has no connection. to the ethical ‘ought’. But when we see the aims of the organism not simply in terms of static survival of a body, a strand of dna or a species, but in terms of the preservation of a certain normative pattern of functioning, then the functional organization and behavioral direction of the organism is all about normative ‘oughts’.

Where would I look for examples of this kind of approach? And in respect of human culture, how would 'normative patterns of functioning' be related to or grounded in evolutionary biology per se?

The elephant is our instinctual, emotional self, and our rationality is the rider. — Questioner

Plato had something similar to that, albeit a charioteer rather than an elephant. But it's a venerable metaphor.

↪Joshs Where would I look for examples of this kind of approach? And in respect of human culture, how would 'normative patterns of functioning' be related to or grounded in evolutionary biology per se? — Wayfarer

I recommend Joseph Rouse’s work on evolutionary naturalism. He ties together biological and cultural
normativity. Here’s a place to start:

https://www.academia.edu/86909328/_Practices_Normativity_and_the_Natural_History_of_Human_Biological_Niche_Construction_Joseph_Rouse_Wesleyan_University_Presented_at_Bergen_Workshop_on_Wittenstein_and_Practice_May_2022

Thanks, but going on the review, hardly mainstream ('discursive niche construction?' :yikes: ) And I'm sure, not what the post I was responding to has in mind. What that Richard Polt OP is criticizing, is the widespread tendency to simply assume that evolutionary biology provides a kind of default basis for normativity, along the lines of what is 'advantageous for survival' ('oldy-moldy darwinism'). It's more evolution as secular alternative to religion.

That's right. We ought to do what is good. But determining what is good is not always easy.

evolutionary biology provides a kind of default basis for normativity, along the lines of what is 'advantageous for survival' — Wayfarer

When it comes to normativity it is not merely the survival (and flourishing) of individuals that counts, but the survival (and flourishing) of communities. Now we find ourselves in a dire situation where it is not merely the survival of individuals and communities which is at stake, but the survival and flourishing of the race itself.

What's always puzzled me about questions such as these is that they tell us almost nothing about goodness.

We should do what is good, granted. Why? Because it is fair, just, correct (good). That says virtually nothing about what goodness is.

We can point to specific acts of doing good things, but it's always been very obscure to me. Kind of like we lack the capacity to scrutinize what goodness is, other than pointing out instances of it.

I feel there is much more to this, but we can't say much about it.

I'm sure not what the post I was responding to has in mind. What that Richard Polt OP is criticizing, is the widespread tendency to simply assume that evolutionary biology provides a kind of default basis for normativity, along the lines of what is 'advantageous for survival' ('oldy-moldy darwinism'). It's more evolution as secular alternative to religion. — Wayfarer

Right. As Rouse puts it, scientific accounts of evolution have been treated as though they offered a sovereign grounding for human social and ethical processes. As you say, religious accounts ( as well as many philosophical ones) attempt to usurp this authority by placing it within the idealist subject rather than in empirical realism. What Rouse is trying to do is get beyond both the sovereignty of realism and the authority of idealism by positing a nature-culture intertwining that produces a context-dependent social normativity all the way down.

For the link I sent you:

Evolutionary biology has long emphasized how environments exert selection pressures that transform organismic lineages. Biologists now recognize organism-environment relations as a two-way process. Niche construction is the process through which organisms act on their environments and change the selection pressures on their own and other lineages. It includes behavioral niche construction— forms of behavior that generate selection pressures to produce descendants of that behavior in subsequent generations. Human languages are probably the pre-eminent example of behavioral niche construction.

You do not need to appeal to evolution to maintain this. That you are writing using a language shows that you are embedded in a culture, along with all that implies. — Banno

Our need to belong to a group goes way further back than the dawn of culture and language.

So we still have the question, "what to do?"

But freed from the irrelevance of both god and evolution — Banno

We can never be free of our evolution. it's like taking the cream out of ice cream.

But, to address your question:

Are we talking about limits on behavior? Then, how to define the limits? By what is immoral? then how do we define moral? Or do we define good behavior by what is not disgusting? then, how to define disgust? So, not only do we need parameters, we need to define those parameters.

is it not possible that humans are under-determined by evolution? This would mean that, while certainly not denying the facts of evolution, it is legitimate to question the sense in which the human condition might be understood solely through the lens of biological theory. — Wayfarer

Not just genetics, as the environment definitely plays a role. We are a responsive creature. Even our brains grow in response to the stimuli they receive, especially in the first years of life. (But of course this is biology.)

The main drivers of adaptive behaviour are the ability to compete — Wayfarer

Not necessarily. There's a whole theory about inclusive fitness, which posits that an organism’s genetic success is derived from cooperation and altruistic behavior. Genes that are related to you then have better fitness.

there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt, Anything but Human

I'm not sure we have to put them in an hierarchy. They both played a role in our evolution.

the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. — Richard Polt, Anything but Human

Maybe that's why I had trouble with the word. Natural selection has no goals.

Right - it makes sense. In some ways it's similar to the enactivist 'building the path by walking it' approach. There are similar ideas coming out of cognitivism, and, of course, the Vervaeke lectures and the 'salience landscape' and 'relevance realisation'. But that is a fair distance from the hard core neo-darwinian view.

Natural selection has no goals. — Questioner

Right. That's the salient point when it comes to invoking evolutionary biology as a rationale for ethical normativity.

Why should you or I or anyone else value “sustaining society” more than our own comfort or advantage? — J

Arguably, the two are explicitly linked. Unless you can drop someone, right now, in the middle of a desert or jungle with nothing but say a knife and a spool of thread and they can live to their fullest comfort and advantage as their desire dictates, that person, including their comfort or advantage, is contingent on that particular society's sustainability. Perhaps not to a perfectly symbiotic degree, no. Perhaps the person is unusually well off, walled off behind a castle with its own self-contained agricultural and social microcosm and would remain unaffected if society were to disappear. That's not most people, however. While I understand the emphasized point in your inquiry to be "why should one value sustaining society more than one's self", as in possibly neglecting one's own well being for that of a neighbor's, I still think that for most people "no man is an island" rings true, particularly in one's darkest hour. Meaning, for the average person, if society suffers, so will they; ergo, in the most selfish flavor of logic, while it may not mean doing squat for anyone at all, to at least not hinder or hamper such well-being serves one's own self interest as well. In which case, helping others can in fact indirectly help oneself, which advances comfort and provides advantage (arguably). As to what degree, it certainly depends. Some people who don't have kids or don't care for the future well-being of their own (the "here for a good time not a long time" or "just looking out for number one" type) being notable and common exceptions.

Still, the sentiment and implications of your inquiry as I understand them ring true. There may not be a strictly logistically rational (directly beneficial) reason to value the well being of society more than one's own, however the average person who is dependent on society more than they would like to give credit for (infrastructure, utilities, grocery stores, relatively-safe streets free of war) would be wise to do what is in their power to ensure the longevity of said society, if not just for the time they or anyone they consider "in their self interest" is alive.The shortsighted aside, most people today consider the things society and society alone offers (power, roads, public services) as "bare necessities" and would either not survive or be comfortable and have advantage without.

That, to me, is a genuine ethical question that can’t even be posed until, as @Banno points out, we stop thinking that some naturalistic fact about human beings or evolution is going to contain the answer. — J

I'd have to argue that the nature of a subject is not only highly relevant but paramount to any sort of matter related to said subject.

I don't see any argument as to it being an unreasonable place to begin, at least. Are our desires and as a result, will -- and to an extent, identity -- not based on, or at least in constant entwinement with, our own nature? Sure, a functional and civilized modern-day adult is miles above his deep primal nature in virtually all his affairs and doings, but that doesn't mean he doesn't feel the same emotions and desire to act on such inclinations as one who is the opposite, at least on more than nominal an occasion. I agree there's better places to look and any "solution" derived solely from the aforementioned is shortsighted and above all likely to be ineffectual or otherwise just "not true" ie. superficial.

I'm trying to suggest it's more of a "this is what works because we have reached the (perhaps not THE ultimate, but a penultimate of sorts) pinnacle of mastery of understanding of the world and sociology with the work of every great mind and result of every study basically at our fingertips" kind of point in humanity, as opposed to simply "we evolved as social beings, so social engineering and preservation of such will either make or break us". With this new dynamic, a dramatic paradigm shift in understanding of the human experience and "condition" has been made that goes beyond "how our bodies and resulting natural inclinations work and why" unto an almost metaphysical "understanding of the soul", in a manner of speaking.

It just seems to me if your goal is to facilitate the well-being, comfort, or advantage of say, a habitat of polar bears, one would not go wrong with hiring a polar bear expert with a library of books about polar bears, than say a botanist with a litany of botanical literature, is all. Having extensive background knowledge of a subject would seem to produce a greater likelihood of reaching beneficial determinations than operating without one or refusing to check highly-relevant and applicable information as if its just needless rubbish of no value. Ethics is dishonored by suggesting it's "linked to evolution" or a simple matter of "what always was" or "what everyone thinks", I agree. I just feel many topics and subject matter that might seem vastly different to one another actually have many common threads that can lead to greater understanding.

Basically, I didn't quite mean to suggest "ethics is based solely on human nature/evolution", it just seems to be incredibly relevant, to me at least. Why do we pay a masseuse top dollar to perform an action that would otherwise be assault and battery as well as pay even higher dollar for someone to prosecute someone who actually assaults and batters us? Because we are vulnerable beings who can feel pain and can be injured or killed by certain actions, which I do believe would have to be considered facts of evolutionary nature. It has its relevance. Do you see where I'm coming from with that?

(Apologies if this is backtracking or the discussion has advanced, I'm rather interested in this line of thought. I also take it there are three definitions or usages of "good" floating around in this discussion: "wise", "pleasing", and the one I was focused on, "moral"/"ethical".)

In my experience, this (bolded part) is not how ethics is usually taught. Instead, teaching ethics goes something like this:

"You don't know what is good and right and so you need to be told so.
X is good and right.
You should do X."


If anything, the direct answer to "Why ought one do that which is good?" is "Because one is bad" and perhaps with the addition "so that by doing good, one may become good as well." — baker

Sure, and I understand (roughly) how Ethics is taught. But this literally foregoes any meaningful answer to the question, and returns to circularity. I'm not particularly intending to further some philosophical position but to address why I think the question itself is a bit moot. "X is good" requires my bolded to be sorted through. "You should do X" requires the previous sentence to be adequately addressed. So, I think this is prima facie a pretty unhelpful way to think about what to do in life.

Ignoring that "good" and "right" can come apart readily, I can't see how this conceptualisation is anything more than paternalism, rather than learning how to think and assess claims. Have I maybe missed something in what you've presented? It's likely.

Because we are vulnerable beings who can feel pain and can be injured or killed by certain actions, which I do believe would have to be considered facts of evolutionary nature. It has its relevance. Do you see where I'm coming from with that? — Outlander

I do, and it makes sense to me. Many scientific stories, including evolution, can give us information about our species and help us decide what would aid human flourishing. But ethics is asking different questions. Can evolution instruct me in whether it's better for me to feel pain or to let my mother do so? How about a stranger? The idea is that no amount of info about us as a species can provide the answer to questions about right and wrong, except in a hopelessly broad sense.

"why should one value sustaining society more than one's self", as in possibly neglecting one's own well being for that of a neighbor's, — Outlander

That would be a very mild version. I had in mind the ordinary me-first situation where a person says to themselves, "Sure, it's better for society and all that if people don't cheat and steal, but I need money and I can get away with some cheating and stealing, so I'm going to do it." Would we say to such a person, "But in the long run, society can't function that way, if everyone took your attitude?" They would presumably reply, "And? First, what do I care about 'the long run'? Second, everyone doesn't take that attitude. I'm making an exception for myself."

As for the general point about a flourishing society leading to one's individual comfort or advantage, I see too many quite common cases where it simply isn't true. (Unless you're defining a flourishing society as a perfect utopia with no injustice or immorality.) I'm not saying it might not work out that way for some people, but the connection seems weak and unreliable. This is still trying to link ethics with "my own good," and I was arguing that we haven't even reached ethics as long as we're thinking that way.