One thing that strikes me as a little odd is that descriptions can be faithful without being exhaustive, and, knowing that, we expect there to be many faithful descriptions of a thing, only some of which compete directly. 7 is a prime number, a lucky number, the most common roll of a pair of dice, the average number of items a person can hold in short-term memory, etc., none of those to the exclusion of the others.

The same seems to be true, but maybe to a lesser degree, when we talk about explanations rather than descriptions. The macro-scale, observable phenomena we're talking about, things people do in the way of talking, reasoning, making decisions, all admit of multiple descriptions and explanations, depending, as you say, on context, on what we're interested in. --- It's even a standard technique in humor to switch descriptive framework in the middle of the joke, or to suggest one framework but reveal another. (Why did the chicken cross the road?)

Lewis's premise is that reasoning admits of only one description. He could have claimed that other accounts leave out what he's interested in, that they miss the reasoning in an act of reasoning and treat it like any other psychological or biological event. Instead he claims that no such description is even possible, and that nothing that could be so described and explained could be what he considers reasoning.

The question is, why would he think that? And it looks like the answer is: theology.

And it looks like the answer is: theology. — Srap Tasmaner

Christian theology...


I do see why philosopher George Lakoff describes consciousness as 'embodied brain'. It's hard to see how consciousness can create an awareness and point of view, without being part of a physical being. We understand the world in terms of what we can do with our bodies. We like to think of reason as being all head and no heart, but it originates from whole beings.

The question is, why would he think that? And it looks like the answer is: theology. — Srap Tasmaner

Of relevance, however, is the Marcus book I mentioned, Rational Causation, which explores similar territory without any reference to theology. 'We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism—a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of “naturalizing” the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way.

Marcus argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation—rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades.'

Likewise, Thomas Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion also examines 'the naturalisation of reason' from the perspective of secular, analytical philosophy rather than religion per se (although acknowledging that philosophers such as Plato and Spinoza have a 'quasi-religious' aspect.) That essay too argues that the 'sovereignty of reason' is called into question by evolutionary naturalism, which depicts reason as a form of adaptation, not of discerning truth. It also contains the often-quoted passage where Nagel writes that the 'fear of religion' is what drives a great deal of the 'scientism and reductionism of our times'.

It's hard to see how consciousness can create an awareness and point of view, without being part of a physical being. — Tom Storm

My take is that is very much characteristic of modern objective consciousness. Our world-picture is one of separate embodied subjects in a domain of objects configured by impersonal laws, whereas the world-picture of the pre-moderns was that the world is an expression of a will with which we ourselves have a relationship through faith. But, you know, 'compulsory disenchantment'.

We have no knowledge or experience of any immaterial entity of process. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself here. Your use of "we" is out of place.

Cite an instance when and where Newton's 3rd Law and/or any conservation laws "have been transcended" even once. — 180 Proof

Newton's first law is "transcended" with every freely willed act. A body's motion changes without the application of force. The conservation of energy law is broken with every act which occurs, as some energy goes missing which cannot be accounted for. The idea that the laws of physics are never broken, or "transcended", is naivety at best.

(And as to whether 'abstractions are causal', that is another question altogether. But the formative role of mathematical physics in science at least points in that direction.) — Wayfarer

As usual, we are treading in swampy terrain here, with pockets of philosophical quicksand all around. So, this post is likely to get your feet wet & squishy. will enjoy ROFLing and eye-rolling in bemused incredulity ; keeping his feet dry, by studiously avoiding the sodden speculations of theoretical Philosophy, in favor of the "hard" facts of empirical Science. Please pardon my excursion beyond the solid ground of objective Matter into the mucky bog of subjective Mind*1, on the leaky platform of a philosophy forum. :cool:

The vocabulary of dogmatic Materialism seems to exclude that which is behind the eyeballs*7 (ideal, abstract, private, subjective Representations/Meanings), and defines as "real" only that which lies on the objective (public) side of the lens, and labels the majority vote as Reality. Yet Kant --- echoing Plato --- noted that the observer actually knows only the internal ideal representation --- along with any personal biases --- not the external reality, or the ultimate ding an sich. But Materialists are not Kantians. So they naively believe that their abstract subjective image is the concrete objective thing; real enough for practical purposes.

On the other hand, some idealist Mathematicians (e.g. Tegmark) tend to think of their immaterial mental abstractions as somehow more real than the material embodiment of an essential logical structure of interrelationships. Tegmark's Mathworld is theoretical, while Dennett's Naturalistic world is empirical. Are you an Either/Or thinker? Do you define "Truth" as solely Real or only Ideal? For little ole me it's both : look to objective Reality for pragmatic (concrete) purposes, and to subjective Ideality for theoretical (abstract) reasons*4. Taken together, we may be able to get Closer To Truth.

Whereas Chemistry is mostly concerned with Matter (real malleable stuff), Physics is mainly focused on Energy (spooky invisible action)*3 . Hence, 21st century physicists no longer assume that reality is composed of hard material atoms. Instead, they imagine that the world is fundamentally an invisible Field of mathematical relationships (space-time nodes and meaningful links between them). In what sense is an abstract mathematical quantum field of Potential Energy Real*5? Quantum scientists find evidence that an invisible intangible nonlocal "cloud" of statistical possibilities can have tangible local actual effects*6. Is that real enough for your practical or theoretical purposes? :smile:


*1. Rejections of Idealism, often accuse Idealists of denying objective Reality, then metaphysically affirm the opposite. But that is an example of simplistic black vs white thinking, which defeats the purpose of Philosophy : to question assumptions, while avoiding dogmatism. I can't speak for Wayfarer, but the definitions in footnote *2 do not define my more complex integrated worldview, which is intended to combine the Objective (concrete) view of empirical science with the Subjective (abstract)*5 perspective of mind-probing philosophy, into a single holistic worldview. If you must label such a view, try inclusive portmanteau words like Re-dealism or I-realism, but please avoid the exclusive facile oppositions of Realism versus Idealism. :chin:


2. Within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism :
a. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
b. although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

*3. Is energy real or a concept? :
What is energy? Energy is one of the most basic concepts in physics, but also one of the hardest to define.
https://cosmosmagazine.com/science/physics/what-is-energy/
Note --- Is "ability" a real thing? Is "work" a physical object? Is "causation" an observation or an inference?

*4. What is reality? :
“Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.”
___Philip K. Dick
"Ideality is that which, when you stop reasoning, goes away."
___Gnomon

*5. What is the philosophy of abstract thought?
Abstract thinking is the ability to understand concepts that are real, such as freedom or vulnerability, but which are not directly tied to concrete physical objects and experiences. Abstract thinking is the ability to absorb information from our senses and make connections to the wider world.
https://www.healthline.com/health/abstract-thinking

*6. Does quantum physics disprove causality?
No, quantum physics does not disprove causality. On the contrary, our best working quantum theory to date, quantum field theory, quite properly respects causality both on the macroscopic and on the microscopic level.
https://www.quora.com/Does-quantum-physics-disprove-causality


*7 PHYSICAL OPTICS plus METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION (meaning)
See the little raindrop, full of images, in the head? Is it the pineal gland or the soul? How do you know?

Non sequiturs abound.

Sorry, but misunderstanding on your part does not qualify as non sequitur on my part, as much as you like to think so. But go ahead, and think what you like.

:up:

Yes, yes, we all know there is another framework. What you need to argue for is exclusivity.

I think your position is that naturalism itself makes an unjustified claim to exclusivity, and you're just rebutting that. I mean, yeah, you do that all the time, but the argument from reason claims that biology needs to get off reason's lawn. And that has to be argued for.

It's worth noting that this idea of competition has of course been institutionalized in science. Scientific theories do face competition, but only from other scientific theories. It's for this very reason that cdesign proponentists have been trying to pass off their faith as just as scientific as something that's really science.

As I understand it, you are not proposing an alternative scientific theory, and imagine your quest as challenging a foundational assumption of science.

But already science allows such challenges. There are some really obvious examples I dare not mention.

Your choice then is (1) present your view as a genuine scientific hypothesis; (2) challenge the methodology of science. Mostly theists opt for door number 2, and defend revelation as knowledge producing.

There is one last alternative, which is not to challenge science but to live alongside it, as religion continues to do, but also art, sports, geez all the other stuff people get up to, and most especially our standard ways of talking about things like the sun rising, tables being solid, people picturing things in their head -- all of that is fine, and scientists also do all that stuff when they're not doing science.

But already science allows such challenges. There are some really obvious examples I dare not mention. — Srap Tasmaner

Please do!

think your position is that naturalism itself makes an unjustified claim to exclusivity, and you're just rebutting that. — Srap Tasmaner

It’s more that I think some taken-for-granted elements of the scientific worldview amount to popular mythology, which has subtle but important consequences.

Please do! — Wayfarer

It's the obvious ones, really.

I'll give you one, but only the definition: biological theory everyone thinks they understand.

I'm not hiding anything. I like to think of these as the philosophical equivalents of Godwin's law. So I am carefully not summoning those demons only because it amuses me.

:chin:

Would I be right in surmising that you find 'the argument from reason' an affront to common sense?

No. What gave you that idea?

OK, never mind. Mistaken impression on my part.

I can't speak for Wayfarer, but the definitions in footnote *2 do not define my more complex integrated worldview, which is intended to combine the Objective (concrete) view of empirical science with the Subjective (abstract)*5 perspective — Gnomon

The model I'm trying to flesh out posits mind or consciousness as being a latent attribute or dimension of reality, which manifests when and wherever the appropriate physical conditions exist (apparently a rare occurrence) through the processes we know as evolutionary biology. This implies that the mind is not the outcome of that process, but at the source of it - but not as a creator Deity, more like Schopenhauer's Will. It is also not to say that ‘everything is conscious’ in the pantheistic sense, or that sub-atomic particles have some primitive form of experience. I see that as an attempt to rescue materialism by the injection of mind-stuff.

Consider this quote:

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Julian Huxley

In my view, mind is as fundamental as atomic structures although not reducible to them. But here's the key point: it is never encountered as an object - it only ever manifests as the subject of experience, not to the subject as an object of cognition. So it is not anything - no-thing or not-a-thing - but at the same time, is at the foundation of existence. (I don't think Julian Huxley saw it that way, but his brother Alduous might have.)

You can also see why such an insight is outside the purview of naturalism, although I think phenomenology understands it (for which see It is never known but it is the knower, Michel Bitbol, .pdf.)

Where reason comes into the picture is that reason and mathematics provides the logical structure of experience and cognition. Objects are given in perception but the received sensory data is structured by cognition and reason (per Kant, although I am more inclined to admit the reality of universals).

Notice also this snippet on C S Peirce 'The phrase "matter is effete mind" is attributed to Peirce and reflects his metaphysical views on the nature of reality. Peirce believed in a form of philosophical idealism, which means that he considered mind or consciousness to be fundamental and primary, with matter arising from it in some sense. He argued that matter, rather than being something independent or external to mind, is a product or result of mind.

He conceived of three categories that underpin his philosophical system: firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Firstness refers to the realm of pure possibility, potentiality, and quality. Secondness is associated with concrete individual instances, facts, and brute realities. Thirdness encompasses generality, law, and the relational aspects of things.

According to Peirce, mind or consciousness belongs to the category of firstness, characterized by a pure qualitative aspect. Matter, on the other hand, falls within the category of secondness, representing concrete, individual manifestations of existence. However, Peirce posited that matter, as we perceive it, is not entirely separate from mind but is derived from it or evolved from it.'

(Still trying to put the pieces together, may well not succeed.)

Mostly theists opt for door number 2, and defend revelation as knowledge producing. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't it obvious to you though, that revelation must produce knowledge? If we were to restrict our definition of "knowledge" so that it only contained ideas produced by science, then how would we account for all the rest of the ideas that we would normally call "knowledge"? This would include the tools applied by science, like the axioms of mathematics.

This is the problem of epistemology, to give an accurate account of what knowledge actually is, rather than some definition, or set of criteria which we believe knowledge ought to be. If we say "knowledge is..." when this reflects what we think knowledge ought to be, rather than what knowledge actually is, this will mislead us in any attempt at ontology.

These two are very different, as demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus. In that dialogue, they went looking to describe "knowledge", with a preconceived idea of some criteria as to what could constitute "knowledge". Then Socrates demonstrated how it was logically impossible that any description they came up with as to how knowledge actually exists, could not fulfil the preconceived criteria. In the end they realized that the preconceived idea must be misleading them in their quest to figure out what knowledge is.

The model I'm trying to flesh out posits mind or consciousness as being a latent attribute or dimension of reality, which manifests when and wherever the appropriate physical conditions exist (apparently a rare occurrence) through the processes we know as evolutionary biology. This implies that the mind is not the outcome of that process, but at the source of it - but not as a creator Deity, more like Schopenhauer's Will. It is also not to say that ‘everything is conscious’ in the pantheistic sense, or that sub-atomic particles have some primitive form of experience. I see that as an attempt to rescue materialism by the injection of mind-stuff. — Wayfarer

Sounds very similar to my own personal project. Which I began a few years ago, after a quantum physicist remarked on what he saw on the quantum level of reality : "it's all information". That observation seemed to confirm John A. Wheeler's 1989 "It from Bit" conjecture. His Participatory Anthropic Universe sounds a lot like Panpsychism, plus the notion that human consciousness was somehow intended from the beginning of evolution. But being a scientist, he wouldn't be expected to make a religious doctrine of what he saw as a mere fact of Nature.

I'm not as familiar with philosophical literature as you are, so I Googled Schopenhauer's "Will and Representation (Idea)", and it looks to be generally compatible with my Enformationism worldview --- which I am also still "trying to flesh out". With no formal training in Philosophy, I began from the conjunction of two modern sciences -- Quantum & Information -- instead of from ancient philosophical & religious conjectures. However, I did find Plato's functional notion of First Cause to be a plausible way to express the un-knowable Source of the "Will" that is being expressed in gradual physical evolution. Early in the development of my thesis, I wrote an essay*1 to summarize my understanding of how intentional evolution might work, while avoiding the doctrinal prejudices of Intelligent Design. My primitive understanding has evolved since then, mainly due to feedback from this forum. Since I have no direct revelation from the First Cause, I can only guess at He/r characteristics & intentions, if any.

My personal worldview has a lot in common with ancient theories of Pantheism, but I would prefer to call it PanEnDeism*2, to avoid any dogmatic theistic implications. Also, I take issue with descriptions of primitive entities as "experiential". To me, that term seems to imply that sub-atomic particles consciously interact with their environment. Instead, I think of causal EnFormAction --- similar to Shop's "Will", but more like a goal-directed computer program --- as a primitive form of intentional Causation/Energy that took 14 billion years to evolve into Living & Thinking creatures, and most recently into Self-Conscious beings. This is not a Genesis account, but merely an educated guess. Why the wheelspinning of eons before the advent of philosophical cosmologists? I suppose it has something to do with FreeWill within an otherwise deterministic system of willful causation : matter + energy + laws.

I describe my thesis as a scientific/philosophical update of ancient Atomism/Materialism and Monism/Spiritualism, with new insights from Quantum & Information theories. Unfortunately, 180 scorns it as merely a sci-fi rehash of outdated mind/body Dualism/Spiritualism. :smile:

Note --- My guess is that Self-Consciousness "manifests" when the Cosmic Program of Evolution reaches the minimum necessary complexity for feedback loops of information.
"Feedback occurs when outputs of a system are routed back as inputs as part of a chain of cause-and-effect that forms a circuit or loop. The system can then be said to feed back into itself." ___Wikipedia


*1. Intelligent Evolution :
If the physical universe is not eternal, then the various speculative “multi-verse” and “many worlds” theories cannot explain the brute fact of our temporal existence. Instead, we must devise a theory
that accounts for the finite beginning and formless end envisioned by the cosmological experts.
https://gnomon.enformationism.info/Essays/Intelligent%20Evolution%20Essay_Prego_120106.pdf

*2. PanEnDeism :
Panendeism is a non-religious ontological position that explores the interrelationship between G*D (The Cosmic Mind) and the known attributes of the universe. Combining aspects of Panentheism and Deism, Panendeism proposes an idea of G*D that both embodies the universe and is transcendent of its observable physical properties.
https://panendeism.org/faq-and-questions/
1. Note : PED is distinguished from general Deism, by its more specific notion of the G*D/Creation relationship; and from PanDeism by its understanding of G*D as preter-natural creator rather than the emergent soul of Nature. Enformationism is a Panendeistic worldview.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page16.html

I'm not as familiar with philosophical literature as you are, so I Googled ...

With no formal training in Philosophy, I began from the conjunction of two modern sciences --

My primitive understanding has evolved ...

My personal worldview ... PanEnDeism ... rehash of outdated mind/body Dualism/Spiritualism.

:eyes: :cry: :lol:

Lewis's premise is that reasoning admits of only one description. He could have claimed that other accounts leave out what he's interested in, that they miss the reasoning in an act of reasoning and treat it like any other psychological or biological event. Instead he claims that no such description is even possible, and that nothing that could be so described and explained could be what he considers reasoning.

The question is, why would he think that? And it looks like the answer is: theology. — Srap Tasmaner

Is this David Lewis you are speaking about? I'm not very familiar with his work. Is he a theist? I think you are right: that it is only theology which would allow that things are just as we perceive them to be, because God thinks them into existence and then gives us perceptions which accord with his thoughts. Everything lives and has its being in God, according to classical theism.

I see that as a possibility, but not a very plausible one.

Is this David Lewis you are speaking about? — Janus

C. S. Lewis

Ah, of course, not so familiar with him either, other than reading Mere Christianity about 40 years ago. As I remember it his arguments didn't impress me much.

Sounds very similar to my own personal project — Gnomon

The year before my first child was born - he's now 34 - I saw my first-ever laser printer, which had been bought by the place I worked (for about the price of a car). I composed a one-pager on ideas related to the Tao of Physics. When printed, it looked amazingly slick. I was so impressed with myself that I tried to start an actual publication dedicated to such ideas. Of course, it bombed - I had no experience in publishing or marketing and distribution. Tilting at windmills. Later on when blogs became a thing, I too started a blog, but it got no readership. I tried writing a couple of articles on Medium, but there are literally hundreds of thousands of people publishing there. The problem with philosophy as a field is that there are many very clever people with their own agendas. Cutting through is exceedingly difficult. That's why I respect David Chalmers and Jules Evans. Nowadays I'm more circumspect.

I try to stay within the bounds of philosophy, although I do draw on Buddhist and Hindu sources that are outside the Western canon. To my mind, a great deal of what is designated philosophy in modern culture is diametrically opposed to what philosophy originally was (as per Pierre Hadot) - there is a tension between philosophical wisdom and liberalism.

Isn't it obvious to you though, that revelation must produce knowledge? — Metaphysician Undercover

Far from being ‘obvious’, to most contributors here it would be highly objectionable. In fact you could almost say that anything designated 'revealed truth' will be discounted at the outset of any discussion. Deserves a separate thread.

In fact you could almost say that anything designated 'revealed truth' will be discounted at the outset of any discussion. Deserves a separate thread. — Wayfarer

Do it - I have an interest in this one. I would like to understand more about the nature of revealed wisdom. I had some interest back in the days when I read about Gnosticism and the notion of revealed wisdom through Gnosis. I spent quite some time talking about this (years ago) with one of Carl Jung's friends, who was a friend of my parents and a key expert on the Jung Codex.

Wow, you have some interesting friends. I'll see if I can get started on it.

------

I was going to add this snippet I was reading in a New Yorker obituary of Jerry Fodor:

“Neo-Darwinism is taken as axiomatic,” he wrote in “What Darwin Got Wrong,” co-written with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, a cognitive scientist, and published in 2010. “It goes literally unquestioned. A view that looks to contradict it, either directly or by implication, is ipso facto rejected, however plausible it may otherwise seem.”

Which reminded me of this exchange earlier in the thread:

mathematical and artistic abilities can't be accounted for in terms of the theory (of natural selection, according to Alfred Russel Wallace)

— Wayfarer

We're the only critters we know that have math and art, and we are the way we are because of natural selection, so evidently it does account for math and art. — Srap Tasmaner

You can always find a guy, but Fodor's writing on evolution found few defenders. Make of that what you will.

I have noticed that. But I think his basic criticism, that neo-darwinism has become a 'theory of everything', is solid.

:up:

... anything designated 'revealed truth' will be discounted ... — Wayfarer

Any "truth" that lacks a truth-maker or corroborating public evidence is reasonably discountable (Hume, Kant, Clifford, Popper, Sagan), except, at best, as a fiction.

I may be misremembering, but I think he claimed that evolution by natural selection is blatantly circular, which is clearly horseshit, and not a criticism working biologists even considered taking to heart.

But, hey, you go ahead and add him to your list of voices crying in the wilderness.

But then, biologists may be poor judges of philosophical argument.