Personally, I don't read ↪Wayfarer's modest proposals as "challenging science" or arguing for "exclusivity" of philosophical reasoning versus scientific reasoning. — Gnomon
Did you read the OP? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. But perhaps I read it with different preconceptions.

I understood him to be questioning the metaphysical assumptions of doctrinal Materialism, not the empirical methods of practical Science. As pragmatist/naturalist John Dewey noted, modern Materialism pretends to be Monistic, but as an explanation for the emergence of mental phenomena from a material substrate, logically it must assume Dualistic origins : similar to Aristotle's theory of Hylomorphism. :smile:

PS__The "foundational assumption" he was "challenging" is that of philosophical Materialism, not of pragmatic Science. So, his "alternative theory" was philosophical, not scientific.


THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MATERIALISM :
In his first published article, "The Meta-physical Assumptions of Materialism" (written in 1881), Dewey found the doctrine "which declares that matter and its forces adequately account for all phenomena -- those of the material world, commonly so called, and those of life, mind, and society" -- to be lacking both in clarity and logical consistency. Of the several destructive conclusions which he discovered to be implicit in monistic materialism one was to be of particular importance for his later naturalism: if the materialist begins with the assumption that mind and the molar forms of matter are constructed ultimately from molecular blocks of matter, he must end "with the conclusion that the ultimate form of matter has dualistic 'mind' and 'matter' properties . . . . If a materialist were to say that this double-sided substance is what he means by matter, we could only reply that he is playing with words--that it is just as much mind as it is matter.
http://home.uchicago.edu/~rjr6/articles/Dewey.pdf

John Dewey :
John Dewey was a leading proponent of the American school of thought known as pragmatism, a view that rejected the dualistic epistemology and metaphysics of modern philosophy in favor of a naturalistic approach that viewed knowledge as arising from an active adaptation of the human organism to its environment.
https://iep.utm.edu/john-dewey/

Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism

It's a class and category thing. The first premise claims that rational and biological are classes, and a given phenomenon can be in one or the other but never both. The response (beginning with Anscombe) has most often been that rational and biological are categories, and there's no reason at all something can't be both. (Calling these both 'dualisms' obscures the distinction.)

Here's a bit from the conclusion of the article you linked:

In the early years of his career he was an absolute idealist and in no way could be considered a materialist. The second stage of his thought on this question, reaching definitive proportions with Experience and Nature, revealed him to be a neutralist: the ultimate reality is neither physical nor mental, but such that it permits the ascription of those properties through inquiry. The sense in which he might be considered a materialist at this stage is in his disavowal of mind as an independent entity shaping the destinies of matter. In the final period of his thought Dewey still affirmed the ultimately neutral character of natural events, but saw their transactional phases so inextricably linked in the situational complex that the hope was provided that with the advance of scientific inquiry someday the necessary and sufficient conditions for mental behavior might be given in terms of its physical matrix. Thus, if the hypothesis that the proper manipulation of the physical properties of the human organism can assure control of its mental properties is materialistic, then in his last years Dewey was indeed a materialist.

I've only begun reading Dewey, so I don't know him remotely as well as I should. His early essay on the importance of Darwin and how evolution ought to reshape philosophy I thought extraordinary. (Might make more sense for y'all to reach for James, who, though a genuine working scientist, always left more than a little room in his philosophy for spirituality and religion.)

I'm not sure what's to be gained from lining up on two sides to say "There's one kind of thing!" or "There's two!!" More interesting is what you can do with such a claim. Naturalism is pretty straightforward as a working assumption, rather than a dogma; you know how to proceed, what sorts of things to look for, how to design experiments, how to craft a research program. I'm not clear what the other side offers except a defense of people's common pre-scientific beliefs. How are we to investigate the transcendence of biology? Is there a way to do that scientifically? If so, bring it on.

This is why I have tried to force y'all to be more specific. If you say, here's something evolution can't do, what do you mean by that? Are you in the trenches of biology, offering an alternative theory? Evidently not. Are you challenging science's approach to knowledge production? No one will say so. If you're saying that here's something that by definition evolution can't do, then you're playing semantic games and the rest of us can ignore you.

It's a class and category thing. The first premise claims that rational and biological are classes, and a given phenomenon can be in one or the other but never both. The response (beginning with Anscombe) has most often been that rational and biological are categories, and there's no reason at all something can't be both. (Calling these both 'dualisms' obscures the distinction.) — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that philosophers, for the sake of argument, often make such compartmentalized distinctions, regarding controversial topics. From a general philosophical perspective, "Reason" and "Biology" and "Psychology" are in separate classes (type or kind or categories of being) with completely different physical and semantic characteristics. Yet, from the standpoint of a monistic Materialistic belief system, they are merely convenient categories for discussion, but ultimately all features & phenomena of the world are presumed to be subject to the rationally-inferred laws (regularities) of Physics.

Then, there is a monistic Meta-Physical*1 perspective, in which Matter is limited by the restrictions of physical laws, but Mental phenomena are free from such strictures. Which is why the human mind is able to believe and to tell lies. In that case, Reason is only subject to the Laws of Logic, which are essentially the same as Mathematics. :nerd:

*1. Meta-Physical : anything not perceivable via the physical senses, but conceivable by the mental faculties --- intangible, abstract

This is why I have tried to force y'all to be more specific. If you say, here's something evolution can't do, what do you mean by that? Are you in the trenches of biology, offering an alternative theory? Evidently not. Are you challenging science's approach to knowledge production? No one will say so. If you're saying that here's something that by definition evolution can't do, then you're playing semantic games and the rest of us can ignore you. — Srap Tasmaner

Specificity is a necessity for philosophical discussions, because each of us comes to the argument with a personal belief system (set of prejudices). That's why a primary rule of dialog is : first, define your terms. And that's why Wayfarer specified that his terminology is not limited to definitions classified under the heading of Materialism*2. He may not have been as specific about which alternative dictionary (or philosophical tradition) he draws his meanings from. But, I'm sure he will give you that information, if you ask him.

Regarding the evolution of Reason, I can't speak for Way. Our worldviews seem to be similar, but his philosophical background is quite different from mine. And he might disagree with some of my unconventional ideas & terminology. For myself though, I will specify that, for all practical purposes, I am a materialist, "living in a material world" (pace Madonna). And for scientific purposes, I assume that the modern synthesis of Evolutionary theory is generally correct. Anything that currently exists in the world, is something that Evolution could do, and did. And that includes things/ideas that are not made of massive matter, but of meaningful information.

So, for my personal philosophical purposes, I have developed my own "alternative" theory, which does not exclude Mental phenomena from consideration*4. My private personal theory of evolution includes insights from Quantum & Information sciences, that were not known to Darwin. And it specifically attempts to explain how the immaterial class of Mind could evolve over eons of time from the initial conditions & laws & causes in place at the beginning of space-time. This alternative theory is intended to help explain how Evolution did somehow produce immaterial Minds, only after 14 billion years of physical/material interactions , not accidentally, but guided by the inherent Laws of Nature. :smile:

PS___Regarding "semantic games", when posters on a philosophy forum do not share, or attempt to understand, the worldviews (belief system & its assumptions) of their fellows, a dialog soon devolves into a "semantic game". So, lets make an effort to see the topic from someone else's perspective.


*2. Wayfarer from OP :
In order to clearly frame the argument from reason, it is necessary to understand what it is opposed to. This is usually said to be ‘naturalism’, but I will instead propose that its target is better named physicalism or materialism.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14418/the-argument-from-reason/p1
Note --- He didn't say he was opposed to the Nature or the scientific method, only to certain belief systems that claim the absolute authority of Scientism.

*3. The Mind-Evolution Problem :
The Difficulty of Fitting Consciousness in an Evolutionary Framework
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01537/full

*4. Evolution of Mind :
But then the conscious mind constitutes a special dilemma, since this modern picture was produced precisely by excluding all mental properties from physical nature.
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-illusionist

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. — Whitman

:up: He's on the money here. Thanks for the verse.

I can't help feel that it is animals who often live the superior life... — Tom Storm

Perhaps that innocence is what was lost in the mythology of the Fall.

Both seemed to assume, more or less as I do, that our intelligence is on some kind of continuum with other animals. "Continuum" is not a great word there, though, because it may not be a matter of having more or having less of one thing, general intelligence, but of having more or having fewer cognitive skills, particular abilities. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem-solving abilities of crows and such are often cited in this context. Parrots are also clearly intelligent with problem-solving skills. I suppose it's seen as the basis for a continuum, a proto-version of what our intelligence turns out to be, so conforming with the idea of 'gradual development'.

But I see a radical break - an ontological distinction, in philosophical terms - at the point where humans become fully self-aware, language-using and rational creatures.

I think the cultural dynamics behind this, is that for modern culture, 'nature' is now the nearest thing we have to 'the sacred'. Hence the (laudable) reverence for environment, first nations peoples, and so on. Conversely Biblical religions are said to have encouraged the subjugation of nature. So the assertion of a radical difference between humans and animals is, I think, seen as a relic of Judeo-Christian mythology.

There's a passage in Max Horkheimer's book, The Eclipse of Reason, about this dynamic:

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature – even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man – frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — Eclipse of Reason, pp. 123-127

(Important to note that Horkheimer is referring to 'popular Darwinism' which he distinguishes from what Darwin himself wrote.)

Language, for example, allows displacement, the ability to communicate about objects not in our present surroundings; you could describe that as "transcending" the limit of referring only to what other animals can or do perceive. — Srap Tasmaner

That's certainly part of it. There's a book I've never got around to (one of thousand) by Chomsky and a collaborator, Why Only Us? In that book Chomsky and Berwick argue that human language is a distinct and innate cognitive capacity that sets us apart from other animals. They propose that language is not a result of gradual evolution, as commonly believed, but rather a sudden and unique emergence in human history. They emphasize that the development of language cannot be explained by natural selection acting on incremental changes, as is the case with other biological traits. (Chomsky however always intends to stay within the confines of naturalism, whereas I myself don't suffer from that inhibition.)

In any case, in traditional philosophy and religion, I believe the reverence accorded to reason as a kind of 'divine instrument' is at least symbolically meaningful. After all, here we are, the day before yesterday we were chasing wildebeest around the savanah, now we're able to weigh and measure the Universe. Something which no crow will ever do.

If you're saying that here's something that by definition evolution can't do, then you're playing semantic games and the rest of us can ignore you. — Srap Tasmaner

Again - it's not evolutionary theory that is at issue, but darwinian materialism, represented in popular culture by Dawkins and Dennett, but implicit in a great deal of naturalism. Not all though. There are non-materialist evolutionary biologists, many of those mentioned by Apokrisis, for instance Robert Rosen:

For centuries, it was believed that the only scientific approach to the question "What is life?" must proceed from the Cartesian metaphor (organism as machine). Classical approaches in science, which also borrow heavily from Newtonian mechanics, are based on a process called "reductionism." The thinking was that we can better learn about an intricate, complicated system (like an organism) if we take it apart, study the components, and then reconstruct the system-thereby gaining an understanding of the whole.

However, Rosen argues that reductionism does not work in biology and ignores the complexity of organisms. Life Itself, a landmark work, represents the scientific and intellectual journey that led Rosen to question reductionism and develop new scientific approaches to understanding the nature of life. Ultimately, Rosen proposes an answer to the original question about the causal basis of life in organisms. He asserts that renouncing the mechanistic and reductionistic paradigm does not mean abandoning science. Instead, Rosen offers an alternate paradigm for science that takes into account the relational impacts of organization in natural systems and is based on organized matter rather than on particulate matter alone. — Life Itself

Are you in the trenches of biology, offering an alternative theory? — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not ‘in the trenches’, but there's a lot of dissent from the neo-darwinian orthodoxy.

The vast majority of people believe that there are only two alternative ways to explain the origins of biological diversity. One way is Creationism that depends upon intervention by a divine Creator. That is clearly unscientific because it brings an arbitrary supernatural force into the evolution process. The commonly accepted alternative is Neo-Darwinism, which is clearly naturalistic science but ignores much contemporary molecular evidence and invokes a set of unsupported assumptions about the accidental nature of hereditary variation. Neo-Darwinism ignores important rapid evolutionary processes such as symbiogenesis, horizontal DNA transfer, action of mobile DNA and epigenetic modifications. Moreover, some Neo-Darwinists have elevated Natural Selection into a unique creative force that solves all the difficult evolutionary problems without a real empirical basis. Many scientists today see the need for a deeper and more complete exploration of all aspects of the evolutionary process. — The Third Way of Evolution

Steve Talbott whom I mentioned previously is represented on this site, along with many others, none of them ID representatives (which is the inevitable suggestion for anyone who questions the consensus.)

But that child does grow into Shakespeare, a wonder of human history.

Well so it is with his species. To see those little furry things skulking about, burrowing underground or climbing trees to avoid being eaten my those freakin' reptiles, you couldn't guess their descendants would include Will Shakespeare, or that they would one day transform this planet's ecosystem or build machines that could take them into space. But we don't have to guess because we know it did happen. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, it is remarkable what language (and the opposable thumb?) has enabled those little naked apes to do. Of course, fossil fuels have been a fortuitous blessing or curse, without which we arguably would never have breached the atmosphere or even have gotten very far off the ground.

And I agree; none of this would have been predictable. We like to think we have a certain destiny, but that is radically mistaken, human hubris.

Nice! I love Whitman!

Of course! I posted the quote only because Wayfarer's "revelations" were being implicitly compared to divine revelations, in the service of religion instead of science. — Gnomon

I don't know what others had in mind, but I was responding just to your posting of the Einstein quote. There are those who think the metaphysicalist imagination should be unfettered by science, by physicalism, and I don't think Einstein was one of them. That is all my response was concerned with.

We like to think we have a certain destiny, but that is radically mistaken, human hubris. — Janus

also a convenient way to dodge the implications of our existential situation.

I have no idea what you are referring to. The implications of our existential situation are a matter of interpretation as I see it. I see science as playing a huge role in any rationally informed understanding of our existential situation.

But I see a radical break - an ontological distinction, in philosophical terms - at the point where humans become fully self-aware, language-using and rational creatures. — Wayfarer

Yes. I've read one or two of your posts. Is there a radical break when creatures started living on land? When they took to the skies? When they started using tools? No? When they developed communication? When they developed the ability to navigate across thousands of miles by sensing the earth's magnetic field? No? When they developed social structures? No?

None of the things characteristic of any other species count as transcending biology. Why on earth would something unique to us? Why do we alone transcend biology?

And I ask that, still not knowing what it means, or how it is supposed to have happened. Was it a biological process by which we transcended biology? Is there any way to know whether dolphins have too? Or maybe octopuses?

Why do we alone transcend biology? — Srap Tasmaner

Aristotle differentiated man as ‘the rational animal’. Rationality is certainly one aspect - it enables h sapiens to see well beyond the stimulus-response perception of other creatures. There are other faculties as well, artistic, spiritual, philosophical, scientific - I think these differentiate h. Sapiens from other creatures. You don’t agree?

Another relevant snippet from Horkheimer:

We might say that the history of reason or enlightenment from its beginnings in Greece down to the present has led to a state of affairs in which even the word 'reason' is suspected of connoting some mythological entity.

:lol: :lol: :lol:

That we do things other creatures don't? Of course we do. And other creatures do things we don't. Where does the transcending biology come in? Is being a living thing not extraordinary enough?

Now and then, I look around the yard, trees and grass, deer, birds, squirrels, and I think there is really only one life form on earth -- it's DNA and cells packed with protein machines everywhere you look, the rest is just details, specialization. We share about half our genes with those trees, and more than half with the squirrels and deer. Is that not extraordinary enough? That cedar tree is my kin. That moth too. How we all got this way is an interesting story, but I don't see the transcending of life anywhere in it.

If we are capable of extraordinary things other plants and animals aren't, science and art but also weapons of mass destruction and chattel slavery, it's because life is capable of those things, and we just happen to be the specific form of life realizing those possibilities. We are apes that wear clothes. We have Mozart, but we also kill each other for made-up reasons. The "rational animal," sure we are.

Where does the transcending biology come in? Is being a living thing not extraordinary enough? — Srap Tasmaner

I feel there's a distinction here that you're not seeing. But then, that's been the case all through this thread. Thanks all the same for your responses.

I feel there's a distinction here that you're not seeing. — Wayfarer

Oh I'm pretty sure I know what you think you see, I just think it's not there.

Did you know that humpback whales -- I think I'm remembering this right -- fuck with orcas?

It's a curious thing. When orcas are trying to kill seals and such, sometimes a couple whales will intervene. They will even scoop up a seal by rolling over and diving under it so that they surface with the seal on their belly, where the orcas can't get to it. There's even a case of whales remaining in the area to protect the dead body of a seal the orcas killed, just to keep them from actually eating it.

At first the theory was that they look enough like whale calves that it's kind of a mistake. But it turns out they will also interrupt the killing of sea turtles, of just about anything. They go out of their way to fuck with orcas.

The current theory is that it's more or less revenge. Orcas do attack whale calves, and so the whales have a clear sense of who the enemy is, and they side against them, for no other reason, with nothing to gain from it. Two whales swim in and call other whales from miles away, and they'll all swim in a ring around the seals or whatever keeping the orcas at bay, and they'll do this for hours, were still doing it at dusk when the researchers observing them headed back to shore.

Did you know that humpback whales -- I think I'm remembering this right -- fuck with orcas? — Srap Tasmaner

Gee, I must have missed that. I'd better go back and read the Argument from Reason again.

You do that.

We share about half our genes with those trees, and more than half with the squirrels and deer. Is that not extraordinary enough? — Srap Tasmaner

:up:

I don't know what others had in mind, but I was responding just to your posting of the Einstein quote. There are those who think the metaphysicalist imagination should be unfettered by science, by physicalism, and I don't think Einstein was one of them. That is all my response was concerned with. — Janus

Yes. But is not one of "those" preferring "unfettered" imagination. The negative reactions to Wayfarer's OP seem to be falsely accusing him of making unsubstantiated scientific (physical) assertions, while ignoring his explicit framing of the topic in terms of philosophical (metaphysical) concepts. He was not arguing against Evolution or Biology, but against the axiomatic (unprovable) metaphysical beliefs of Materialism*1. :smile:

PS___I quoted pragmatist Thomas Dewey above : " if the materialist begins with the assumption that mind and the molar forms of matter are constructed ultimately from molecular blocks of matter, he must end "with the conclusion that the ultimate form of matter has dualistic 'mind' and 'matter' properties . . . . If a materialist were to say that this double-sided substance is what he means by matter, we could only reply that he is playing with words--that it is just as much mind as it is matter." The problem is that doctrinaire Materialists seem to omit Mind (the observer) from their metaphysical assumptions. However, Aristotle spoke of just such a mind/body dualism in his concept of Hylomorphism : matter + mind (nous ; form) = natural bodies. So the Monism of Materialism is missing an essential ingredient to explain the emergence of abstract thought (i.e. Reason) from physical evolution. :nerd:


*1. Materialism as a belief system :

Materialism asserts that everything is or can be explained in relation to matter.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/42/What_is_Materialism

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

Materialism holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to exist is matter. Thus, according to Materialism, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions, with no accounting of spirit or consciousness.
https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_materialism.html

Here in reference to the OP’s basic contention:

Do you uphold that the basic principles/laws of thought which Aristotle brought to light are emergent properties of ever-reducible matter that, thereby, can then change with changes in the ordering of their underlying constituents of matter?

This would be in line with materialism: that laws of thought are the mutable constructs of purely material constituents. But it would also logically entail that all principles of logic/reasoning are, when ontologically addressed, a relativistic free for all—this relativity existing in relation to the order of underlying material constituents from which these principles of thought emerge—a relativism that, again, is thereby devoid of any impartial, existentially fixed standards (in the form of principles or laws) by which all variants of logic/reasoning manifest. This then being a conclusion that I take to be at the very least an unnerving suggestion; one could express it as inevitably leading into a nihilism or reasoning—i.e., in respect to logic as an authoritative means of discerning what is real or true and what is not.

The alternative doesn’t then necessitate that biology, genotypical evolution, and a concurrent phenotypical evolution of behavior (with the generality of “behavior” including that of (reason-adherent) cognition) are in any way bogus. (I, for one, uphold that lesser animal can and do utilize reasoning to various lesser degrees). Instead, it would only necessitate that the materialist paradigm (including its just aforementioned entailment of relativity in relation to laws of thought) is mistaken as a metaphysical outlook.

logic/reasoning — javra

Short answer is that I wouldn't write these with a slash between them. Logic is a system of relations among propositions; reasoning is something people do, and they can do it well ("logically") or poorly ("illogically").

@apokrisis would have me say that even logic is just habitual, patterns of inference that have proved their worth, but he's got a whole metaphysics that makes that the natural move, and I'm not there yet.

So I don't think insisting that reasoning is something living creatures do requires me to reduce logic itself to biology.

Short answer is that I wouldn't write these with a slash between them. Logic is a system of relations among propositions; reasoning is something people do, and they can do it well ("logically") or poorly ("illogically"). — Srap Tasmaner

I've addressed both of them, with a slash for concision of expression, in that the occurrence of both are dependent on basic laws of thought. (edit: this irrespective of how either term might be interpreted, given both terms' multiple meanings)

So the dilemma I've presented remains: namely, either the soundness of materialism's position which inevitably results in a nihilism of both reasoning and logic (that, I'll add, can then be applied to materialism itself) or, else, the necessity that materialistic metaphysics is, in some way, erroneous.

apokrisis would have me say that even logic is just habitual, patterns of inference that have proved their worth, but he's got a whole metaphysics that makes that the natural move, and I'm not there yet. — Srap Tasmaner

BTW, while I can't speak for apokrisis's metaphysical outlook, Peirce would have it that laws of nature evolve as global habits exactly via globally fixed laws, else expressed, principles - hence, via metaphysically fixed global principles that supersede natural laws and which are not themselves emergent from the latter: Peirce has a trifold system to this effect and - something that apo so far has disallowed in my conversations with him - the principle of Agapism as ultimate cosmic goal. Such that neither of these are emergent habits of the cosmos but, instead, are the immutable global principles via which the habits of effete mind (i.e., of physicality and its natural laws) evolve.

all principles of logic/reasoning are, when ontologically addressed, a relativistic free for all—this relativity existing in relation to the order of underlying material constituents from which these principles of thought emerge—a relativism that, again, is thereby devoid of any impartial, existentially fixed standards (in the form of principles or laws) by which all variants of logic/reasoning manifest — javra

It's a very good question, and I thank you for it.

As I read your response more closely (which I shouldn't be doing since I'm at work!), it seems the question cashes out like this: would logic be the same, and thus the rules of valid inference, even if nature were very different?

That's a very difficult hypothetical, but I am inclined to say no. I think we think the way we do, and find success thinking the way we do, because nature is the way it is. We do think of logic as being above natural law, as being prior to it, but in a universe that behaved very differently than this one, if there could even be creatures like us to speculate, insisting upon the logic that works in this universe would look foolish, and nothing like the high road to truth.

That's to say, what counts as logic for us presumes a universe in which that version of logic is reasonable, is successful, does tend to lead to truth.

So I'll put my chips on what seems to me a naturalist and pragmatist view, and find some way to fight off the threat of nihilism.

So I'll put my chips on what seems to me a naturalist and pragmatist view, and find some way to fight off the threat of nihilism. — Srap Tasmaner

:grin: :up: Fair enough.

And since you're at work, I won't push too much in this direction. All the same, even if what you say might be true in regard to alternative worlds, it would still remain a reality that we - here, in the world we inhabit - could only fathom any such alternative world only if it were to abide by the law of identity, and then other laws of thought that could be argued derivatives of this one.

At any rate, thanks for the compliment! (Re: it being a good question :razz: )

we - here, in the world we inhabit - could only fathom any such alternative world only if it were to abide by the law of identity, and then other laws of thought that could be argued derivatives of this one — javra

Oh yeah, that's a mess. Hmmm.

If you have further thoughts, do post, and I'll try to give better responses later.

If you have further thoughts, do post, and I'll try to give better responses later. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, OK. Maybe this is nothing worthy of debate. All the same:

As a fallibilist, I'm as confident as one can be that no one can ever infallibly settle this (or any other) issue - namely, that of it being possible to have a world devoid of ontically fixed laws of thought (or, at the very least, some ontically fixed law(s) to the like). Laws that therefore don't emerge out of constituent stuff, whatever this "stuff" might be - but instead "just are" and thus govern what is.

So - in keeping with the pragmatism that I myself uphold - the previously mentioned issue regarding laws of thought can then only be satisfactorily resolved via (not infallible proof, but) optimal explanatory power. Then:

If no inconsistencies are found in the dilemma I've provided, the claim that materialism (at least as its currently understood by most, and as it was addressed in my first post today) is a sound metaphysics can only end up being a self-refuting logical, or rational, proposal - for it results in a nihilism in relation to logic and reason (and/or rationality) which then negates its own logical, or rational, validity as a metaphysics. In short, materialism does not present a self-consistent explanation for the way things are - and, due to this, lacks cogent explanatory power.

Pragmatically, the following holds: optimal explanatory power evidences the, always fallible, and always to be improved, truth of theories.

By this I then conclude on pragmatic grounds the following: materialism must then be an erroneous stance.

Hence, in sum: ontic reality could only validly be non-materialist (else here expressed, non-physicalist, this again as physicalism is typically understood).

------

Note that I'm not one to equate either pragmatism or, more importantly, naturalism to materialism. So I maintain that both the former can be viably held in a non-materialist (else, non-physicalist) world view.

But, as a maybe important caveat to this given for the sake of frankness: Yes, the latter specified world view can also - not validate, but - logically allow for the possibility of the supernal (a view that is contradicted by naturalism). This possibility, however, would clearly remain outside the purview of the empirical sciences ... which as study can only address that which is objectively manifest and so equally apparent to all (this in principle if not also in practice). So, just as it currently is, the possibility of the supernal would remain an empirically unverifiable belief at best (or worst?) consisting of unverifiable personal experiences ... or, otherwise, an impossible to infallibly validate disbelief, this in cases where naturalism is being maintained.

That said, personally, I couldn't give a hoot as to whether or not anything supernal (e.g., angels, deities, forest fairies, etc.) might ontically be, same with the possible occurrence of extraterrestrial aliens. What I deem most important is unbiased reasoning and, maybe more importantly than this, ethical conduct. Well, just saying.

Wayfarer's OP seem to be falsely accusing him of making unsubstantiated scientific (physical) assertions, while ignoring his explicit framing of the topic in terms of philosophical (metaphysical) concepts. He was not arguing against Evolution or Biology, but against the axiomatic (unprovable) metaphysical beliefs of Materialism — Gnomon

:100:

I think we think the way we do, and find success thinking the way we do, because nature is the way it is. We do think of logic as being above natural law, as being prior to it, but in a universe that behaved very differently than this one, if there could even be creatures like us to speculate, insisting upon the logic that works in this universe would look foolish, and nothing like the high road to truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Notice this rhetorical sleight-of-hand which re-frames necessary truths as contingent. This is often deployed by way of speculations about the ‘multiverse’. It relativises the issue by suggesting that logic is 'for us', again, something of our own manufacture. Even what were customarily considered necessary truths are only conventions, after all. To be so bold as to suggest the origins of 'natural law' in Neoplatonism would be 'metaphysical speculation' but to casually introduce the possibility of 'other universes' barely causes a ripple. Even though it is:

a relativism that, again, is thereby devoid of any impartial, existentially fixed standards (in the form of principles or laws) by which all variants of logic/reasoning manifest. — javra

Peirce has a trifold system to this effect and - something that apo so far has disallowed in my conversations with him - the principle of Agapism as ultimate cosmic goal. — javra

I’ve noticed that Apokrisis tends to acknowledge only those aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which are pragmatically useful for modelling semiotic relationships whilst often disavowing his broader idealism. As Thomas Nagel put it, 'Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable'. I think that discomfort is often on display in these kinds of discussions.

I’ve noticed that Apokrisis tends to acknowledge only those aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which are pragmatically useful for modelling semiotic relationships whilst often disavowing his broader idealism. — Wayfarer

Yea, I very much noticed that too. :smile:

Thomas Nagel put it, 'Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable'. — Wayfarer

I find this quote quite beautiful. :up:

Considering the history of whaling, it's a wonder they don't also fuck with humans.