To some extent, I think Gerson is reverse engineering what Plotinus assumed to be the case. — Paine

Got ya. Thanks.

If I am correct, then Gerson has misunderstood Aristotle. — Paine

I'm sure that Lloyd Gerson doesn't misunderstand Aristotle, it's more likely that I misunderstand Lloyd Gerson, or rather, have taken one of his arguments out of context.

I'm not that knowledgeable about the Platonic forms, but I do think that they're frequently misunderstood as a kind of immaterial template or blueprint purportedly 'located' in some 'ethereal realm'. It is under that kind of reading that they're usually dismissed. But I think there might be a plausible case that what is meant by the 'forms' is much nearer in modern terms to 'principle', 'concept' or 'universal' in the sense understood by Scholastic realism.

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. — Edward Feser

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy

I look forward to challenging anyone who would champion his position as a scholar. — Paine

Here's his google scholar page. The paper I quoted that passage from is Platonism vs Naturalism.

So you think this process undermines or disproves naturalism? — Tom Storm

It doesn't disprove it, so much as being incommensurable with it. The activities of reason are grounded in intuitive insight into the relations between abstractions (which we designate 'facts' or 'propositions'). Whereas the naturalistic account seeks reasons in terms of antecedent physical causes. I don't get why this is such a hard distinction to grasp. (I've already noted that this objection may not apply to the more recent forms of naturalism such as biosemiotics, but then, they've also in the main moved away from the mechanistic materialism which the argument is against. But it remains a powerful influence.)

It doesn't disprove it, so much as being incommensurable with it. The activities of reason are grounded in intuitive insight into the relations between abstractions (which we designate 'facts' or 'propositions'). — Wayfarer

Ok. But is it 'incommensurable' or seemingly so? Do you think we have enough information to make this call? Is anyone here defending mechanistic materialism? And does anyone here advocate Dennett in this space? The question seems to me to be, can we rule out naturalist explanations for reason (and what we call mental processes)?

I have read that essay several times. It is not an argument built upon assertions but a 'by means of negation':

The strategy I employed was to follow a sort of via negativa, examining the dialogues for the philosophical positions that are therein totally and consistently rejected. The ‘consistently rejected’ part is important because many would maintain that the difficulty in determining Plato’s philosophy is in part that his views changed over the course of the dialogues. So, we hear about the early, middle, and late Plato, terms of periodization that, we should never forget, are entirely fictitious.
The apotheosis of such fictional construction is the hermeneutic version of an astronomical
epicycle, the ‘transition’ dialogue, supposedly including those works which do not fit neatly into the early, middle, or late categories

My problems with his argument have nothing to do with this sort of speculation.

The apparently inviolable constraints of physical laws have been transcended many times in the history of science. — Wayfarer

Cite an instance when and where Newton's 3rd Law and/or any conservation laws "have been transcended" even once. :lol:

when you see causal relationships between ideas, that this is distinct from the mindless processes typically invoked by physicalism. You're seeing the connection between ideas. That is a different process to that of physical causation. — Wayfarer

It's a different framework, sure. The question is why you think the existence and utility of this framework, our everyday understanding of mentality, invalidates the framework used in neuroscience and biology at large.

Neuroscientists in the lab use that same everyday framework to talk to each other and their subjects. They'll continue to say things like "I'll be right there, just grabbing my coffee," even if they're about to sit down with a nice interviewer from PBS and tell them, and the audience at home, that "the self is a myth," or something like that.

Is anyone here defending mechanistic materialism? And does anyone here advocate Dennett in this space? — Tom Storm

No, they're mainly picking arguments with me. I select Daniel Dennett because he's unapologetically materialist so I can't be accused of attacking a straw man. But it's relevant to note that Dennett does defend the claim that humans are no different in principle to robots or computers. He's a walking, talking illustration of what I think is meant by the 'forgetfulness of Being'.

Cite an instance.... — 180 Proof

The general point is that science has accomplished many things which were previously thought impossible according to then known physical laws. The understanding of what constitutes 'the physical' is constantly changing (as per Hempel's dilemma).

The question is why you think the existence and utility of this framework, our everyday understanding of mentality, invalidates the framework used in neuroscience and biology at large. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't necessarily think that at all. (There was an amazing segment (might be geo-blocked) on a current affairs program yesterday about a female virtuoso violinist who fell victim to a rare condition called dystonia which affected her muscular co-ordination, meaning she suddenly, and completely, lost the ability to play. She was treated with a form of magnetic resonance in an fMRI scanner, which ameliorated her condition and restored her ability, such that she's now planning to resume her career. In those kinds of cases and millions of others, like the ability to provide paralysis victims with the ability to walk, neuroscience verges on the miraculous. But that is not the point of the philosophical issue at hand. In practice, probably many neuroscientists hold a generally materialist or physicalist framework but whether they do is irrelevant to the problems they are dealing with. The philosophical issue is one of philosophy of mind and the nature of being. (Although there have been some neuroscientists, like John Eccles, Roger Sperry ('In calling myself a ‘mentalist’, I hold subjective mental phenomena to be primary, causally potent realities as they are experienced subjectively, different from, more than, and not reducible to their physicochemical elements') and Wilder Penfield, who have argued against brain-mind identity on the basis of their practical experience with neurosurgery subjects.)

As for biology, as there has been a sea-change in physics since the discoveries of the 1920's, so too there has been in biology, although there are still many hold-outs (more in biology than in physics, some say). But the change towards biosemiotics, epigenetics, and other developments, call into question the kind of neo-darwinian materialism that is the subject of the argument from reason.

I don't necessarily think that at all. — Wayfarer

Then what are we talking about?

How do you feel about neuroscientists saying things like "the self is an illusion"? --- Before answering, note that no reduction is implied; it's not a claim that the self is "really" a bit of functioning brain tissue, but that our everyday ideas about our selves don't seem to have a correlate in the brain, just as our visual field has no real correlate in the brain and is, in a suitable sense, an illusion.

I'll take your latest non-answer as a concession to my edifying points here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/818106 You're welcome, Wayf. :smirk:

Then what are we talking about? — Srap Tasmaner

The philosophical distinction between physical causation and logical necessity, and the implications of that.

How do you feel about neuroscientists saying things like "the self is an illusion"? --- Before answering, note that no reduction is implied; it's not a claim that the self is "really" a bit of functioning brain tissue... — Srap Tasmaner

For eliminative materialism, the claim really is that reductionist - e.g. Dennett's 'competence without comprehension'.

As to the sense in which self is an illusion - as many have pointed out, illusions are artefacts of consciousness, a mistaken perception. I can't see how to avoid the necessity of there being a subject of such an illusion.

just as our visual field has no real correlate in the brain and is, in a suitable sense, an illusion — Srap Tasmaner

What do you mean, 'suitable', here. Are you referring to the neural binding problem in respect of the subjective unity of experience (e.g. here)?

The philosophical distinction between physical causation and logical necessity, and the implications of that. — Wayfarer

If I put three cupcakes on a table otherwise devoid of cupcakes, I have caused an odd number of cupcakes to be on the table.

Which one is that, physical causation or logical necessity?

If I put three cupcakes on a table otherwise devoid of cupcakes, I have caused an odd number of cupcakes to be on the table. — Srap Tasmaner

The act of putting them there is physical, from which you then can draw mathematical conclusions. Dual, you see - physical in some respects, mental in others.

As to the sense in which self is an illusion - as many have pointed out, illusions are artefacts of consciousness, a mistaken perception. I can't see how to avoid the necessity of there being a subject of such an illusion. — Wayfarer

I heard David Bentley Hart making this argument some years ago. It almost deserves its own thread.

But it's relevant to note that Dennett does defend the claim that humans are no different in principle to robots or computers. — Wayfarer

'Moist robots'... great term. Whether it is plausible or not, I have to say I greatly enjoy the idea that much for what passes as the human might be illusory.

Out of interest, what do you think is the specific harm of Dennett's view (if accurately represented)? You seem to dislike it for aesthetic reasons - that it robs us of enchantment and special meaning.

The philosophical distinction between physical causation and logical necessity, and the implications of that. — Wayfarer

physical in some respects, mental in others — Wayfarer

I give up.

If you ever figure out exactly what you want to say, let me know.

Peace

You seem to dislike it for aesthetic reasons - that it robs us of enchantment and special meaning. — Tom Storm

Speaking of Hart, take a look at his review of Dennett ('so preposterous as to verge on the deranged').

If you ever figure out exactly what you want to say, let me know. — Srap Tasmaner

I think the original post makes a perfectly intelligible point, and one not of my invention - I'm puzzled by the fact that it seems so incomprehensible to you. You said already a few times in this thread that it was drawing a distinction between different senses of the word 'because' - which is closer to what it's getting at than anything said by anyone else here. But you then say you can't see the point of the distinction. The fact that humans are physical and mental combined in a unity is hardly a novel philosophical idea. So I don't really understand what it is you're not understanding, although again, thanks for making the effort.

I've read it. Bentley is a gifted thinker and writer. Even if he can be a bit of a bitch. It's pretty much your argument being made here.

Of course you will assume that information is physical ... — Wayfarer

For the *Quantum Woo Crew* ...

You're welcome, gents. :smirk:

@Gnomon

encore:

It seems to me a lot of our traditional "mental" vocabulary does not refer to exclusively internal states of human beings, but rather to mental rather than, I guess, bodily interactions with the environment and objects. We distinguish, and presumably have for a very long time, between chopping down a tree and looking at it, wondering if it's big enough for the beam we need. Both descriptions involve both the guy with the sharp implement and the tree, so just as <chopping down a tree> doesn't map cleanly onto postures and movements of my body alone, in the absence of a tree, so <estimating a tree's yield> needn't map onto something going on in my brain in the absence of a tree. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree. We talked about the mind long before we gave much thought to brains--that is, when we were describing certain activities rather than describing something the brain does--but even from this point of view, what is mental can still be seen as material, just not in the neuro-reductionist way.

As it happens, representational theories of mind will map the necessary tree onto my internal representation of the tree, and you'll see often on this forum theories that claim my goal in either case to produce a certain state of my internal model. I think that's a very different issue from whether our everyday vocabulary around thinking, perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on, not only presupposes objects for these activities but folds them into terms that are in some ways holistic. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not quite clear what you mean here. If you mean that a non-neuro-reductionist understanding of the mind, while it does presuppose mental objects, need not presuppose internal representations, then I think I probably agree.

↪Gnomon
I'd really appreciate it if you deleted that inane graphic. — Wayfarer

Does it remind you of someone you know? :smile:

what is mental can still be seen as material, just not in the neuro-reductionist way — Jamal

I think scientists instinctively talk this way -- "When the light from this object passes through your retina and strikes these cones, blah blah blah". A word like "vision" describes an interaction between an organism and some part of its environment, not just the internal state of the organism, interesting though that is. And you can still describe the whole tableau in naturalist terms, which doesn't change "vision" being the sort of thing we think of as mental.

Just as I have a mind, and that takes in a lot of my interactions with my environment, I have a gait -- somewhat like my father's I am told -- which is not exactly a property of mine, is not evident when I am sitting, but is a consistent feature of how I ambulatorily (!) interact with my environment. There's nothing non-physical involved in how I walk, but how I walk is only available within a particular descriptive framework, and one that necessarily involves both my body and the ground I tread.

If you mean that a non-neuro-reductionist understanding of the mind, while it does presuppose mental objects, need not presuppose internal representations, then I think I probably agree. — Jamal

I don't mean anything in particular. There's the older reflex action model -- which James describes as the singular achievement of 19th century physiology -- which is triadic: input-processing-output. The way James tells it, you have to learn to consider thinking and friends as just this middle step between sensation and action, and action -- in furtherance of life -- is the point of the whole system. But then there's the newer model, in which it's the state of the middle part that's the point, reducing its level of excitation (through action), minimizing surprise (through prediction) to minimize future excitation. (Freud's death drive but with better math.)

All I was saying is that I don't really think we need to take sides here, let alone address thorny questions of representation, to recognize that our everyday mental vocabulary is not a vocabulary about our internal states, so there's no reason to expect our everyday vocabulary to map cleanly onto whatever neuroscience discovers about those internal states.

What throws people is the identification of consciousness with the mental -- better to allow that simpler organisms may have mind but not consciousness -- because consciousness appears to be exclusively internal. Mostly it isn't, of course, else we wouldn't have it; consciousness is primarily consciousness of our environment. But there are derivative phenomena like remembering and dreaming and analysing, where all the stuff to be thought about has already been accumulated. So you go down the empiricist rabbit-hole of starting out saying sensation is the ultimate source of all of our thoughts (the thread James picks up) and end up allowing that so far as the internal state is concerned, there's just whatever's given, and you've no real way to tell where it came from.

Even worse is going on to equate mind and consciousness and self-consciousness. Even worser is equating all of those with the non-physical.

Blah blah blah. We just don't have to get into all that for the straightforward recognition that our everyday mental vocabulary is not about our internal states, so a lot of the putative problems with neuroscience are not problems at all.

Of course you will assume that information is physical ... — Wayfarer
For the *Quantum Woo Crew* ...

The Closer to Truth video asks "Is Information Fundamental?". And Seth Lloyd thinks it is. But, here's what The Information Philosopher says about that question :
"Seth Lloyd is quite correct that information ("bits") is physical ("its"). However, unlike things, which are concrete and material. Information is abstract and immaterial." *1 So, Information is "physical" in the same sense that Energy is physical & real : both are intangible causes that are detectable only in their effects*2. Abstractions are imaginary representations in minds.

Philosophically, you could say that the Atom of Energy is a Bit of Information. Otherwise, Energy has no measurable/quantifiable properties in itself, but only in its effects on Matter : Change, Causation. Therefore, Energy/Information is indeed "physical" and "real" in that it has effects on Material objects, even though it is not a material object/thing itself*4.

Energy is the Potential for change in Matter (e.g. motion). Information is the Potential for change in Minds (e.g. knowledge). Both are essential to knowable Reality, even though neither is a Material object. Instead, Matter is a tangible form of intangible Energy/Information : E=MC^2. Energy/Information is devoid of properties such as Mass & Velocity, but it is instead the Cause of such measurable properties*5. Energy is a Qualia (causation), but its effect/consequence is a Quanta (measurable difference).

180 seems to think that Energy/Information is "woo" simply because it it invisible & intangible, like a ghost. But most physicists believe that Energy is real, even though they have never seen a real particle of Potential (the ding an sich). Like a poltergeist, Energy/Information is knowable only when it causes a book to spontaneously fall off a shelf. To which we physicalists respond : "it was just Gravity", but what then, is gravity made of : graves, weights, heaviness?. :smile:


*1. Seth Lloyd : https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/lloyd/

*2. Is energy real?From a physics perspective, is there actually energy? If it's not a thing, what is it, and how do we know it really exists?

It’s a very good question. Speaking as a physics teacher, too few students ask it, too few instructors answer it, and too few textbooks define the word “energy” (although all textbooks use this word a lot). Everybody just assumes we all know what “energy” means, but we don’t know. Furthermore, energy is the most fundamental physical concept of all, because the universe is made of quantized fields that are themselves made of energy. So everybody needs to know what “energy” means.

The problem appears to stem from the great physicist Richard Feynman, who seems to have thought energy was undefinable. He was wrong, but his thinking was very influential because he was, after all, Feynman.

Energy is a very specific entity. It is not a “thing.” It is, instead, a property of things. Let’s start with some definitions: A collection of physical objects is called a “physical system” or simply a “system”. When we say a system “has energy,” we mean that it has the capacity to do work. So, what does it mean to ”do work?” When you do work, you exert forces in order to alter the positions or velocities of objects. That is, work is the ability to change things by exerting forces to move objects around. Of course, all this can be defined and measured quantitively (which I won’t do here). The units are joules, or calories, or BTUs, or electron-volts. Thus, when we say that a ball flying through the air has “10 joules of energy,” we mean its speed gives it the ability to do 10 joules of work on some other system. This type of energy (energy due to motion) is called “kinetic energy.”

The bottom line: Yes, energy is quite real. It is the ability*3 to do work.
https://www.quora.com/Does-mental-energy-actually-exist-as-a-real-type-of-energy-or-is-it-just-another-meaning-for-brain-chemicals

*3. Ability : the physical or mental power or skill needed to do something.
Synonym : Potential : not yet real.
Potential generally refers to a currently unrealized ability. ___Wiki

*4. Why information is energy?
Energy is the relationship between information regimes. That is, energy is manifested, at any level, between structures, processes and systems of information in all of its forms, and all entities in this universe is composed of information.
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/22084/how-is-information-related-to-energy-in-physics
Note --- A "relationship" is a mathematical Ratio or Proportion between related things or ideas.

*5. Physicalism typically involves a methodological commitment to the view that, whatever the final, accurate description of reality looks like, it will be set out in terms of physical entities:things with properties like mass and velocity.
https://iai.tv/articles/reality-is-not-revealed-by-quantum-mechanics-auid-2512
Note --- That "commitment" is a metaphysical belief based on a priori assumptions.

:eyes: :rofl:

Against better judgement, I want to revisit this exchange. My claim was that when a subject is persuaded by another's reasoning and realises the truth of a proposition, then nothing physical has transpired between the two parties. The objection was:

Abstractions themselves do not "act upon matter" because they are not evental (or causal); rather instantiations (encoding / patterning) of abstractions (from matter) in matter act upon matter (e.g. typing on my keyboard these sentences you're reading on your screen), — 180 Proof

Language is represented physically, and transmitted physically, by way of binary code across the Internet (or printed and sent). The question is, what is it that enables the 'encoding or patterning' of the specific words that have been selected, to which the answer is 'intelligence' - in the case of this example, clearly human intelligence, mine and the subjects'. And in this case, if I persuade another to see the truth of an argument, then that persuasion is indeed 'causal'. You can hardly argue that reasoned persuasion is not an enormous causal factor in human affairs.

So the question then becomes, is intelligence physical? Which is one of the key questions of philosophy of mind. Those arguing the case for dualism will answer in the negative. So while there are physical words on the screen, it is the nature of the faculty that composes and interprets them that is at issue. And I will not cede the case to materialist theory of mind.

(And as to whether 'abstractions are causal', that is another question altogether. But the formative role of mathematical physics in science at least points in that direction.)

A related issue, arising from my response to @Fooloso4's saying there can be no such thing as 'immaterial beings', was this:

Living beings, even the very simplest beings, display attributes and characteristics that actually can't be accomodated in the mind-body duality that is embedded in the modern worldview. — Wayfarer

So here, the argument concerns the materialist assumption that organisms are not ontologically different from non-organic matter, on the basis that they're all 'made from the same stuff' - that living things are just elements of the periodic table, arranged in a specific way. That is the basis of materialism and the point about which I referenced the Talbott article 'From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning'.

The point of this article is anticipated by the title - which is, to try and express it as succintly as possible, that organisms right from the outset exhibit attributes and characteristics that cannot be found in the inorganic domain. Talbott writes that much of the lexicon of biology - 'words like “stimulus”, “response”, “signal”, “adapt”, “inherit”, and “communicate”, in their biological sense, would never be applied to the strictly physical and chemical processes in a corpse or other inanimate object.'

So, what is it that organises the elements of the periodic table in such a way as to give rise to living beings? There are those that argue for those causes being physical ('the chemical paradigm') and those who argue for it being fundamentally different (code biology, biosemiotics). At this time it's an open question, but the implication is that living beings are not simply or only physical in nature. They embody intentionality and are subjects of experience - just those factors that have been excluded from the objective domain in Cartesian dualism.

So the question then becomes, is intelligence [adaptation] physical? — Wayfarer

Yes.

So, what is it that organises the elements of the periodic table in such a way as to give rise to living beings?

Quantum computation (re: Seth Lloyd, Stephen Wolfram, David Deutsch).

Intelligence is the ability to adapt, among other things, but it is not exhausted by that description. More to the point, its attributes can't be either predicted or explained on the basis of physics.

More to the point, its attributes can't be either predicted or explained on the basis of physics. — Wayfarer

So what's the deal with lesion studies, anesthesia, all the usual things people point to where changes in the brain affect a person's thinking and emotions in predictable ways?

So what's the deal with lesion studies, anesthesia, all the usual things people point to where changes in the brain affect a person's thinking and emotions in predictable ways? — Srap Tasmaner

No realistic dualism or idealism would deny that physical influences affect cognition and affect. But the argument from reason is about physicalism - that everything about the mind can be reduced to or explained in terms of physical causes. Can you see the distinction?

Earlier in the thread, I mentioned a subject whose behavioural abnormalities had been found to have been caused by a tumor. Of course there are many such cases of physical conditions or substances affecting behaviour. They are what I would designate as physical causes. But being persuaded by reason to accept the truth of a proposition is of a different order - that is an example of rational causation (hence my link to the book of that name - do take the time to read the abstract, at least.)

But the argument from reason is about physicalism - that everything about the mind can be reduced to or explained in terms of physical causes. — Wayfarer

I don't see why a decision to (for example) go to the shop to buy milk, cannot be explained in terms of physical causes (environmental conditions and neural processes), but it doesn't follow that my reason for buying milk can be reduced to a set of physical and neural causes.

I don't see why a decision to (for example) go to the shop to buy milk, cannot be explained in terms of physical causes — Janus

The simplest reason is that it's intentional, and intentionality is lacking in physical causation.

The simplest reason is that it's intentional, and intentionality is lacking in physical causation. — Wayfarer

I just see the two explanations as being different. Deciding to go to the shop can be explained in terms of intentionality or in terms of physical causes. It was because my reason for going to the shop is intentional that I said it cannot be reduced to a set of physical and neural causes.

My having a reason can be explained in those terms, but the reason itself, being intentional, cannot. To say that my reason could be explained physically would be a category error; we have two different categories of explanations: those given in terms of intentionality and those given in terms of physical causes.

To put it simply, the point was that making a decision can be explained physically, as can having a reason, but the reason for making the decision cannot; the reason itself is an explanation. It's all about context.