I didn't, but reading back I can see exactly hot it comes across that way. Just had more to say about it, because a rejection would intimate i accepted the premise. Which was a bit shaky. Sorry for that. Should've been much clearer in what I was tryign to convey. I reject it. — AmadeusD

Okay, understood. I think I see what you are saying.

I think I'm judging myself in making that decision. What do my values purport to press me into? If I value the Hard Problem over the problem of Infinite Regress, I may go to speaker 2's lecture because I think my existing levels of value are secure and worth maintaining (i'm sure the implicature is clear here). That's a judgement on my own notions of what's worth my time.
Lecture 1 may have pushed me out of that, by being more interesting that my existing judgement and thus creating a new judgement about only that speaker (well, their speaking rather than the speaker). I'm not convinced this is right. But it gets me around the idea that I actually care what either speaker is doing in their respective rooms. I already care about X or Y in varying degrees. The efficient cause might be the literal speaking, but the final cause of any decision of that kind is one about myself, I think. Where I want to be, and what do I want to be doing? — AmadeusD

But when you say that the efficient cause is their speaking, you are getting at my point. Namely:

So if we consider both speakers as causes, then you judged the two causes and judged one better than the other (i.e. more interesting or time-worthy). I am not here supposing that you have morally judged either of the speakers. — Leontiskos

If you were merely "judging yourself" while making the decision, then you would have made the same decision even if you were entirely deaf. But that can't be right, and this is because you are also judging the audible content coming from the speakers' mouths (and this audible content is not coming from yourself). That is what I mean when I say that you judged the two causes (e.g. causes of sound waves) and judged one to be better than the other. Your own predilections also come into play, but they are not sufficient for the decision apart from the speakers.

I'm not gaining any new position on either comedian in making that decision. — AmadeusD

I agree, and I am not claiming that you are gaining new positions with the comedians or with the philosophy lecturers.

Whether or not I like Comedian A better than Comedian B is not moral.

Now you've entered the issue of conflicting elements of these comedians. Interesting... — AmadeusD

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to.

It's based on an assessment as against a rubric, and so I'm not actually making any judgement. Just looking at whether it fits the rubric. A does, B doesn't. — AmadeusD

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no?

I get the distinct feeling this is missing your point though. Either way, I agree its less clear. I currently am comfortable with the above, but its an immature response to your TE so I might realise its nonsense. — AmadeusD

Okay.

I suspect that what you are really doing is trying to deny that such a moral judgment is objective. I have said that when you decide between the two philosophers you have judged them, but perhaps not morally (we could investigate whether that judgment is moral). And I have said that when you decide between the two comedians you have morally judged them. But I haven't said that either of the two judgments is objective.

I am married. — AmadeusD

Okay, good work. :smile:

It's possible I am somewhat unique in not using the phrase that way. — AmadeusD

I certainly agree that the phrase can be used/intended in different ways.

Therefore, the moral judgement (which seems to be there, i admit) is certainly not about it being a waste of time. — AmadeusD

Good - I agree.

The moral judgement you're talking about I think is just misplaced but it is moral.

...

Again, not entirely sure here but it looks like there is a moral judgement which is not about time-wasting. — AmadeusD

Let me expand on this idea of morally judging another:

It seems that to morally judge someone else is really just to judge their culpability. I would say that judgments of culpability are eminently rational—at least some of the time. If these three jointly sufficient conditions are fulfilled then a person is culpable:

1. They were able to act otherwise (and better) than they did act
2. They should have acted better
3. They know that they should have acted better

Similarly, for a praiseworthy or morally appropriate act:

1p. They were able to act otherwise (and worse) than they did act
2p. They should have acted as they did
3p. They know that they should have acted as they did

If it ever happens that 1, 2, and 3 are all true at the same time, then at least one culpable act has occurred. Do you agree with this, and if so, do you think it ever happens that all three are true at the same time?

It seems to me that sometimes when a spouse tells their partner that the partner is not listening, it is a moral judgment, and therefore the spouse holds 1, 2, and 3. Your suggestion of "willful misinterpretation" is a great example. We could substitute that term into the three conditions: <You were able to not willfully misinterpret me; you should not have willfully misinterpreted me; you know that you should not have willfully misinterpreted me>. When these three conditions are met then the complaint is just.

(On my view in order to say that (some) moral judgments are rational, we need only say that this sort of common and mundane phenomenon is rational.)

This is also why, for example, the comedian who can read the room is better and more praiseworthy (ceteris paribus). He knows that he ought to be reflexively attentive to his audience, he has developed the capabilities to be reflexively attentive to his audience, and he fulfills the requirement when necessary.

"How could someone, in principle, come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a claim that contradicts your theory?" His answer is really nothing more than, "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified." Of course. But we are asking how that might be done in principle.

For example, suppose someone proposes the thesis, "The Earth is flat." I then ask, "What could falsify your thesis?" Now consider two answers to that question:

Answer 1: "Go into orbit, take a photograph of the Earth, and if the photograph reveals a sphere then my thesis has been falsified."
Answer 2: "If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a non-flat Earth claim."

Do you see how Answer 2 is not an answer to the question at all? — Leontiskos

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. So it is not a matter of scientific theories being true or false, but of their being coherent with the observed facts, and useful insofar as what they predict obtains.

So your points actually support the idea that there is no way to confirm or falsify a racist claim since there is no imaginable way to falsify or confirm it because it is simply not amenable to either logical proof or empirical evidence, and that is essentially what I've been saying. It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable, but that is simply an observation, which in principle could be falsified if the racist could indeed come up with either a logical proof or definitive empirical evidence to support their racism. But we know they can't do that because it is impossible in principle anyway.

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. — Janus

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route.

It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable — Janus

If you are making an unfalsifiable claim, then I would say that is a problem. On your view such a claim would seem to be "metaphysics."

If the racist mirrors your claim then this is what they would say:

• Janus: "No race is, tout court, inferior to another."
• Racist: "Some race is, tout court, inferior to another."

Is the racist's claim falsifiable? Here is what a historical U.S. racist might have argued:

1. Black people are not intellectually capable
2. Those who are not intellectually capable are, tout court, inferior to those who are intellectually capable
3. Therefore, Some race is, tout court, inferior to another

Now even if this is invalid it still looks to be falsifiable. Specifically, (1) could be falsified by producing evidence of black people who are intellectually capable (and this is precisely how opponents answered and eventually persuaded many of these racists or their progeny).

But the invalidity issue is the crux, and it is what makes your claim unfalsifiable.* The invalidity issue arises from the ambiguity of the qualification "tout court." If you don't know what it means for some race to be tout court inferior to another, then the reason the claim is unfalsifiable is because it lacks a real sense or meaning. In order to claim that such an assertion is falsifiable one must explain what it would mean for one race to be tout court inferior to another, and how we could ever come to know such a thing.

(Note too that one could choose to question the racist's claim without asserting the contradictory claim. They would do this by saying, "What you say lacks coherence," or, "I don't know what you mean by tout court." If one wanted to take a "burden of proof" stance, that would be the way to do it, but I think that approach will fail. In short, it fails because the anti-racist is more committed to the tout court claim than the racist is. For example, a strong Darwinian could be a racist without a care in the world about any tout court claims.)


* At least given secular premises.

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route. — Leontiskos

You seem to be distorting what I said. I said some think that scientific theories are not falsifiable, I didn't say I endorse that view. Simple observations are definitively falsifiable—you just need to look—you gave the 'flat earth' example. Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. That claim is falsifiable—someone would just need to come up with an empirical or logical proof.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. — Janus

That's just a burden of proof claim, as I mentioned <here>. And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. said that it is irrational to "give air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

That claim is falsifiable — Janus

It is only falsifiable in the sense that the , "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified," shows something to be falsifiable. But this is a vacuous sense of falsifiability, as I explained. The racist could say the exact same thing to you, "My claim is that Janus cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident."

This is good progress, though. First, note that no one else even tried to rationally defend their opposition to things like racism. Everyone else said that is has nothing to do with rationality. So I think your attempt is more than anyone else has done. But you've run up against a wall. You aren't giving legitimate reasons for why your claim is falsifiable, or rationally justified. I think that's normal, namely that we forget how to rationally justify our societal taboos. It is much harder to remember how to justify something that has come to be taken for granted, than something which is an object of discourse.

My suggestion would be to think about a vegetarian who confronts you, "No species is, tout court, inferior to another." Do you have to stop eating meat? Is their claim falsifiable? Does "tout court" have a discernible meaning in that context? If we cannot enslave those of a certain race, can we enslave those of a certain species?

(Of course it is possible that this suggestion will only confuse you - haha. Still, if natural reason can make these sorts of judgments about species, then at least some "tout court inferior" claims are not nonsensical or unfalsifiable. Note too that racism only came to an end with substantive answers to the falsifiability question. Racism would never have come to an end if we just claimed that the racist had the burden of proof (because the burden of proof is culture- and time-relative).)

The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.

Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable. — Leontiskos

I think you are reading what I said in a different way than intended. Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. It means that they are never definitvely falsified, or at least that they can never be definitively falsified is a defensible claim, and if you look at the literature this counter claim to Popper-s idea of falsification has indeed been made.

And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. — Leontiskos

I'm saying the claim that some races are inferior certainly seems to be unsupportable on the grounds that no one has been able to show any cogent evidence for it, and it seems impossible to imagine what cogent evidence would even look like.

I don't have time to say more right now.

The trouble with divine commands is that they are local to a subset of people. A divine command can be used to dismiss someone who accepts the divine command, but it has no force over someone who does not accept the divine command. It does no good to tell a would-be murderer about God’s command against murder if he doesn’t believe in God. — Leontiskos

Sure, we can use other reasons to try to convince the non-believer. We could even appeal to his moral system, assuming he has one. Even in that best-case scenario (where the nonbeliever has a secular system that he follows), he might not care or have some other overriding concern that trumps the system. The question of moral motivation is a different matter from moral philosophy.

I heard a statistic yesterday that around 1 in 5 young people condone stealing from large corporations, depending on the circumstances. We can use non-religious reasons to try to deter them. For instance, we can tell them that stealing from grocery stores leads to higher prices for everyone. There will always be those who just aren't motivated, though, and for those, we unfortunately need to lay down the law and ensure this type of behavior is disincentivized.