In your case the question would be: Okay, so then you don't think, "Do not kill the innocent," is the conclusion of a sound argument? — Leontiskos

I believe that time slows down (relatively) near a black hole. I don't have a sound argument for it, though. I just know that's what experts say. Most would consider my belief rational. I have a good reason to believe it. Other rational bases for belief would be things like direct observation, some use of logic, or that everybody believes P. Believing P for emotional reasons isn't usually considered rational.

If you believe X because experts attest to it, but you simultaneously deny that the experts could have any sound arguments to hand, then you are being irrational. — Leontiskos

I guess. Experts are expected to have evidence, though.

I guess. — frank

So if you can only rationally accede to an expert if you presume that they possess sound arguments, then you cannot accede to an expert regarding the proposition, "Do not kill the innocent," while simultaneously claiming that such propositions are not rational (i.e. cannot be the conclusion of a sound argument).

More simply, if you continue maintain that the only possible support for a proposition like, "Do not kill the innocent," is rationalization, then you would be irrational to assent to that proposition on the testimony of an expert. Indeed, if some field is full of nothing more than rationalization, then there are no experts of that field.

So if you can only rationally accede to an expert if you presume that they possess sound arguments, then you cannot accede to an expert regarding the proposition, "Do not kill the innocent," while simultaneously claiming that such propositions are not rational (i.e. cannot be the conclusion of a sound argument). — Leontiskos

Having sound arguments is only one kind of acceptable justification. There are others.

If you believe P without justification, your belief is irrational.

Rationality is not a property of statements or propositions. It's a property of behavior and belief.

If you believe P without justification, your belief is irrational.

More simply, if you continue maintain that the only possible support for a proposition like, "Do not kill the innocent," is rationalization, — Leontiskos

I've never maintained that.

Having sound arguments is only one kind of acceptable justification. There are others. — frank

I think you're nitpicking. What does the expert have that you don't?
(Evidence is not had independent of argument and reasoning.)

I've never maintained that. — frank

Your earlier posts seem to tell a different story.

Having sound arguments is only one kind of acceptable justification. There are others.
— frank

I think you're nitpicking. — Leontiskos

Having sound arguments is only one kind of acceptable justification for belief.

- That's precisely the sort of irrationality and intransigence that justifies dismissal. :up:

That's precisely the sort of irrationality and intransigence that justifies dismissal. — Leontiskos

What do you think counts as acceptable justification for belief?

I am reminded of some psychology/neuroscience research that showed similarities between moral approbation and disgust/fear of contagion. I don't remember them that well though, so perhaps they aren't that convincing. But it is a well documented fact that people have particularly strong reactions to cheaters and norm violations.

Hence, I think part of the issue might be that, since we rely on social norms to survive, we have an intuitive aversion to norm breakers, and obviously moral norms will be particularly salient. If the response is akin to fears of contagion (which has a certain logic, norm breaking tends to spread), it would make sense to quarantine the infected through ostracism.

You could probably go deeper with that thought using the idea of memes as being akin to viruses. Some ideas are seen as infectious agents. They need a host to thrive. You don't want the hijacking the faculties of a fellow citizen with good oratory skills, social capital, status, wealth, etc., else they might spread the disease.

Perhaps this also explains why people often feel more comfortable with marginalized groups being racist, sexist, etc. They don't fear contagion from those groups. "Let them hate Blacks in the trailer park, or talk about killing gays in the ghetto, it won't spread here," but if the same thing shows up in campus discussions, it becomes dire.

I am reminded of some psychology/neuroscience research that showed similarities between moral approbation and disgust/fear of contagion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that's right, as long as you meant something like "disapprobation" rather than approbation.

You could probably go deeper with that thought using the idea of memes as being akin to viruses. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think what you say is exactly right, but I think the explanation needs to be taken a bit farther.

Not all viruses are pathogens.* Some are in fact beneficial. Therefore we are not actually concerned with virus contamination per se, but rather with pathogenic virus contamination. What this means is that we need a way to determine whether a virus is pathogenic or beneficial, otherwise the disgust/disapprobation phenomenon can never get off the ground in the first place.

The term "social norms" has the same bivalent nature as "virus." To merely pass on norms for the sake of passing on norms, or to merely avoid virus contamination for the sake of avoiding virus contamination, is not rational (at least unless we have reason to believe that norms/viruses are good/bad either per se or at least on the whole). So someone who has no justification for determining whether a virus is pathogenic or beneficial is not rational in trying to avoid contamination; and someone who has no justification for determining whether a moral norm is true or false is not rational in propagating that moral norm within society. If we can't assess the particular then we can't assess the aggregate, and pointing to the aggregate is not a real solution until we can also point to the particular (translated into virus language: "If we can't assess the virus then we can't assess the question of contamination, and pointing to the disgust/disapprobation phenomenon is not a real solution until we can also decide whether the virus is pathogenic or beneficial"). This is precisely the same problem that runs up when he leans so heavily on faith that he falls into a vicious circle—as fideists are also wont to do—for faith in a scientist who cannot discern a beneficial virus from a pathogenic virus is otiose.

In other words, it seems to me that what basically happens in these cases is that we forget to distinguish viruses from pathogenic viruses, or matter from form. For example:

• Moral proposition: "Attend to the victim"
• Virus: "Inattentiveness to the victim"
• Social norm: "Attention to the victim"

But when you run this algorithm day and night without keeping Aristotle's mean in mind, what you end up with is the excesses of intersectionality and a culture where victimization (or its appearance) is the ultimate prize. When the culture reaches that extreme everything flips, and the virus becomes beneficial whereas the social norm becomes pathogenic.

Jonathan Haidt follows some of the disgust research. His conclusion is that conservatives tend to avoid contamination whereas liberals tend to seek contamination (or cross-pollination). The societal pendulum swings to the left when excessive conservatism pathologizes good viruses, and it swings to the right when excessive liberalism greenlights pathogenic viruses. Nevertheless, the point I want to emphasize is that we must be able to determine which viruses are beneficial or pathogenic and why. This is the task set before us by the OP, at least insofar as social norms are concerned.

* I realize that I am here altering your negatively connoted sense of 'virus', but bear with me...

I'm fairly confident you're misreading Anscombe, as a side-effect is not intended. But Bob Ross and I beat this to death a year ago, and the topic will take us too far afield. — Leontiskos

Yes, the side effect (deaths of the innocents) is unintended; therefore, the innocents are not murdered by the bomber, but rather killed.

Okay, so then you don't think, "Do not kill the innocent," is a rational statement? There is no reason not to kill someone just because he is innocent? — Leontiskos

It functions fine as a general rule, but it's unserious when said to, e.g., a navy captain preparing to attack a port or a bomber pilot preparing for war.

Morality must be practical/doable; otherwise, it is useless, if not worse than useless.

Okay, so maybe you think the statement is rational because it harms the murderer. — Leontiskos

Sure, we could say that - it would be true as a general rule. Perhaps there are some hardened killers out there to whom one more death would mean nothing.

It functions fine as a general rule — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, so it sounds like you now think there is something other than divine commands which support this prohibition.

Sure, we could say that - it would be true as a general rule. Perhaps there are some hardened killers out there to whom one more death would mean nothing. — BitconnectCarlos

That something is morally wrong does not mean no one would ever do it.

It functions fine as a general rule, but it's unserious when said to, e.g., a navy captain preparing to attack a port or a bomber pilot preparing for war. — BitconnectCarlos

...Continuing, we might say, "It functions fine as a general rule, but it's unserious when said to, e.g., Hitler preparing to exterminate the Jews." Hitler killed innocents, but it does not follow from this that it is not wrong to kill innocents. Whether or not the navy captain is right is not determined by what he does, as if the killing is made right by his doing it.

Bombing ports or weapons factories is necessary for war, and Anscombe holds that what is necessary cannot be evil. — BitconnectCarlos

Anscombe does not hold that everything which is necessary for war is permissible. That is in fact her broader point regarding the nuclear bomb.

I think I agree with most of that except the idea that traditional metaphysics departs from empirical knowledge and logic. — Leontiskos

I don't want to take the thread off-course, but I just want to say that I cannot see how metaphysical speculations can be either empirically or logically confirmed or disconfirmed.

...One can do an intersubjective thing and call that rational, even with respect to morality. So one might say that racism is not objectively irrational but it is intersubjectively irrational. That could perhaps constitute a point of more general agreement within the thread. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure what "intersubjectively irrational" could mean regarding racism. In the case of something like murder, it seems to work insofar as virtually no one would think murder is a good thing. But perhaps you are working with a different idea about what "Intersubjectively irrational" should be understood to mean.

I myself think racism is objectively irrational, in much the same way that "3 > 3" is irrational. Or as you imply, any implicit argument for racism will seem to be unsound, given that the conclusion is in fact false. This doesn't mean that we can beg the question and assume ahead of time that everyone's argument is unsound, but it is a basis for a judgment that the position is irrational. — Leontiskos

I think this is more along the lines I was thinking. There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another. And since such a claim could be the only justifiable premise for a rational defense of racism, it would seem to be objectively indefensible.

Really cool thread.

I don't think there's a good answer other than "I have limited time" for non-theists. Most theists have a weak argument, anyway. I don't think there is anything but a rational justification for dismissing one on the basis of what they're saying. Is it a waste of your time? Fair enough. But you can't use morality to justify your own morality, which is what must be informing your actions. Its just instrumental rationality that would have you not 'waste time' or some such.

But unfortunately, that says absolutely nothing about the other person, and only about you and your views. I don't think many people front to that. Therefore, most people interpret their dismissiveness/discontinuance in such circumstances as morally justified. In some sense, it is. Their moral views justified the action. But it seems to me this is, prima facie, just toddler-like over-emotional behaviour. It isn't moral. It's "I'm right, you're wrong". So we're left with the practical consideration of whether or not its helpful/beneficial/worth it to continue the exchange/relationship.

For me, the only time I genuinely feel justified in dismissing someone is when they clearly are not listening. Their views never make me feel justified in shutting them down.
My views do, though, at times, because I think practical considerations are in play and not moral ones.

Really cool thread. — AmadeusD

Thanks! I wrote the OP late at night when I was tired and it has gone in all different directions, which is great.

I don't think there's a good answer other than "I have limited time" for non-theists. — AmadeusD

Okay. I think limited time is an important non-moral means of dismissal (in the sense that we are at least not making a moral judgment about our interlocutor). As you imply, the word "dismissal" may not even be the right word for this sort of thing.

Therefore, most people interpret their dismissiveness/discontinuance in such circumstances as morally justified. — AmadeusD

I agree. I was going to ask if you ever feel this way, but you yourself provide one exception:

For me, the only time I genuinely feel justified in dismissing someone is when they clearly are not listening. — AmadeusD

First, I agree that one's own morals are implicated in the judgment that, "I have limited time; I must depart." In that sense this is a moral dismissal. Nevertheless, let's save the term "moral dismissal" for the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior. Ergo: "I am dismissing you because of such-and-such an action of yours, or such-and-such a behavior of yours, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you."

With that groundwork laid, when you dismiss someone who is not listening are you engaged in a moral dismissal? In your head are you saying to them, "I am dismissing you because you are clearly not listening, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you"?

"Not listening" can seem like a small exception to the rule—in this case the rule that dismissals pertain to time constraints. Nevertheless, I think "not listening" dismissals are actually very substantial, important, and common. I think it would be worthwhile to explore the idea that we dismiss someone who is clearly not listening to us.

Their views never make me feel justified in shutting them down. — AmadeusD

From this it sounds like you would reject the idea that a material position is sufficient grounds for dismissal.

I'm not sure what "intersubjectively irrational" could mean regarding racism. In the case of something like murder, it seems to work insofar as virtually no one would think murder is a good thing. But perhaps you are working with a different idea about what "Intersubjectively irrational" should be understood to mean. — Janus

I actually don't know what it means either. I was just trying to throw a bone to the people around here who talk that way. :sweat:

I think this is more along the lines I was thinking. There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another. And since such a claim could be the only justifiable premise for a rational defense of racism, it would seem to be objectively indefensible. — Janus

Okay, good. I agree.

But here's a question. Let's suppose—as you seem to imply—that claims must be susceptible to empirical data or logic. With that in mind, consider our claim, "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." What justifies this claim empirically or logically? Specifically I want to explore the question of whether this claim is empirically or logically falsifiable. If it isn't empirically or logically falsifiable, then must we say that it is a kind of nonsense?

I don't want to take the thread off-course, but I just want to say that I cannot see how metaphysical speculations can be either empirically or logically confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus

I suppose the easiest answer is that metaphysical speculations could be logically disconfirmed by the principle of non-contradiction, no? Beyond that, I will leave the topic to the many other threads that cover it. (Although I suppose it is worth noticing that my question above is asking whether our claim is "metaphysical" in your sense of the word.)

Is your definition of "terrorist" just "enemy combatant"? Do you disagree with the proposition that all insurgents are terrorists? — Leontiskos

I don't think you understand my point here at all.

Who is defined basically just a troll or a crackpot, a criminal, a terrorist, an illegal/legal combatant depends on the political situation and the general acceptance of the issue. I've tried now to explain with examples that for a long time.

I think political scientists also have to reckon with logical validity. Suppose, as seems reasonable, that a terrorist is not merely an enemy combatant; and it is not true that all insurgents are terrorists. — Leontiskos

Legality of a combatant is defined by the Geneva Protocols and Hague Regulations. What also here is crucial is what the response is. Some Anders Breivik doing a deadly terrorist attack in Norway was a criminal case and Breivik is in prison for his action in Norway. The UK engaged with the provincial IRA in Northern Ireland was a de facto insurgency, but the UK government kept it as an de jure criminal case against the IRA members, however reached a political solution in Northern Ireland, which has held. The US invading Afghanistan faced a de facto insurgency against the Taliban, and basically negotiated peace directly with the Taleban turning the back on the Republic of Afghanistan, which then the latter simply collapsed with the Taleban offensive.

In all cases from Breivik to the IRA and to the Taleban, at some stage they were named to be terrorists, yet the end result was totally different.

What more is there to say about terrorism? But just because we have covered terrorism, that doesn’t mean we have covered the notion of dismissal. — Leontiskos

Dismissal works actually the same way. If one person holds a view that everybody else thinks is wrong and false, we will dismiss him either being a troll or some crackpot. Yet if there are many people who hold this view, then comes issues like is it a proper thing to say, is it acceptable in the Overton window of our society. If it's something that millions of people hold a similar view in our society, then we will likely give respect to the view, even if we personally oppose it.

lol, the word I was searching for was "opprobrium."

I agree with you, and we could stretch the analogy to say that overly aggressive conservatism is like an autoimmune disease that attacks the proper ordering of the body. It's like anaphylaxis. Perfectly healthy food sources become downright fatal, depriving the organism of what would otherwise be healthy food. Whereas the liberal pathology might be something more akin to AIDS, an inability of the immune system to recognize pathology, or in the more advanced forms of Wokism that lead to Cultural Revolution style struggle sessions and the destruction of institutions and history, it becomes like MS, the immune system actually attacking the body because it sees it, and not the pathogens as threats.

But of course you are right, we can and should exercise rational discernment in such matters. Whether we always do is another matter. A lot of this stuff is habit so overcoming pathology means intentional training. The problem is that the disease can also involve efforts at intentional training (e.g., some tolerance and DEI trainings have been shown to have the opposite of the results they are intended to have, or to be supported by pseudoscience, and yet they remain common practices because to challenge them is seen as being against "diversity, equity, and inclusion," and who would want to be against that?)

For me, it's probably because God/the Bible/the universal lawgiver says so. I'm inclined toward divine command theory... — BitconnectCarlos

Let’s use your notion of divine commands to take a step back. Why does the OP care about rationality in the first place?

The OP is thinking of cases where we invoke some rule or law that binds both of us, for the sake of dismissing someone who has transgressed that binding rule. What this requires is something that has binding force, whether we like it or not.

1. He did X
2. X is beyond the pale
3. Therefore, I dismiss him

Note that dismissing someone (i.e., 3) is not generally permissible or justifiable. We can’t just go around dismissing people for no reason at all. We must have a good reason to do so. Now the reason given must be something which binds them (and also us, of course). The ‘X’ in (1) must be sufficient to justify (3), and the justification must be something that the dismissed can themselves recognize. If they cannot recognize it, then morally judging their action to be culpably wrong is irrational.

4. The transgression of a law is only applicable if the transgressor is accountable to the law
5. Everyone is accountable to reason and rationality
6. Therefore, if a law is derived from reason, then it will be generally applicable

The OP cares about reason because reason provides a binding law or norm. If there is no binding norm then, “I dismiss you because you are guilty of pedophilia,” is no more justifiable than, “I dismiss you because you breathed on my goldfish.” If there is no binding norm then we have no reason to tell others not to kill innocents. In that case everything is just a power game.

The trouble with divine commands is that they are local to a subset of people. A divine command can be used to dismiss someone who accepts the divine command, but it has no force over someone who does not accept the divine command. It does no good to tell a would-be murderer about God’s command against murder if he doesn’t believe in God.

This may all be obvious, but I think it bears mentioning. If there is no binding norm which undergirds our dismissals then, on pains of irrationality, I think we simply have to stop accusing people of racism, pedophilia, murder, dishonesty, unkindness, etc. If there is no binding norm then the accused murderer should say something similar to the accused goldfish-breather, “What’s at all wrong with breathing on goldfish!?”

But it is a well documented fact that people have particularly strong reactions to cheaters and norm violations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps because the correlation amounts to a circular argument. The choice of words like ‘cheater’ and ‘violator’ has already decided on condemnation and blame, which emerge out of the affectivity of anger. One could say, then, that it is a well documented fact that people have particularly strong reactions to people who make them
angry.

But of course you are right, we can and should exercise rational discernment in such matters. Whether we always do is another matter. A lot of this stuff is habit so overcoming pathology means intentional training. The problem is that the disease can also involve efforts at intentional training (e.g., some tolerance and DEI trainings have been shown to have the opposite of the results they are intended to have, or to be supported by pseudoscience, and yet they remain common practices because to challenge them is seen as being against "diversity, equity, and inclusion," and who would want to be against — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, it seems to be a contradiction in terms to indoctrinate for ‘diversity, equity and inclusion’. But the urge to yoke aspirational goals to a sovereign principle is a secularized holdover from the long-held belief in a divinely-anchored sovereign material and ethical nature, which the use here of ‘pathological’ and ‘unscientific’ depends on.

Thanks! — Leontiskos

Very welcome!

the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior — Leontiskos

I think this is the right way to think of a 'moral' judgement in this context.

In your head are you saying to them, "I am dismissing you because you are clearly not listening, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you"? — Leontiskos

This probably happens, but in terms of habit, no, this isn't the case. What I'm thinking internally is "I have other things to be getting on with, and this is not satisfying enough to overturn my commitment to the other things" or something similar. I often engage in hilariously dumb conversations when I have the time (I find it relaxing, in some way, so there's no sort of sacrifice happening there).

I think it would be worthwhile to explore the idea that we dismiss someone who is clearly not listening to us. — Leontiskos

To be fair, I think its a dismissal of the event, not the person. I think this is a crucial difference between some practical constraint, and some psychological constraint (the oft-repeated "I just can't..." among younger socio-political commentators). Leading to...

From this it sounds like you would reject the idea that a material position is sufficient grounds for dismissal. — Leontiskos

This one is a bit more complicated. What do we mean by "dismissal"? Are you dismissing the person, as a whole, from your entire worldly purview? Are you dismissing that view of theirs? Are you dismissing their expertise on a topic they're woefully unqualified to profess on?
In the case, that i take from you OP, that we're wanting to morally condemn the person in a way that means something like "they are a bad person, and I won't engage with them", then no. No, I don't think I've had that happen in the last decade at least. Views are views. People are people. People hold views but do not become them.

Okay, so it sounds like you now think there is something other than divine commands which support this prohibition. — Leontiskos

I've already said that I see some merit or legitimacy in other reasons to not, e.g., commit murder, but the only one that truly gives murder the quality of moral wrong or evil is DCT - at least in my view.

That something is morally wrong does not mean no one would ever do it. — Leontiskos

Sure, but what I was getting at is that there are fringe cases (of murder, for instance) where the murder may occur outside of society, or the murderer's psyche truly wouldn't be affected by it.

...Continuing, we might say, "It functions fine as a general rule, but it's unserious when said to, e.g., Hitler preparing to exterminate the Jews." Hitler killed innocents, but it does not follow from this that it is not wrong to kill innocents. Whether or not the navy captain is right is not determined by what he does, as if the killing is made right by his doing it. — Leontiskos

The difference here is that the navy captain and bomber pilot are necessary; Hitler murdering all the Jews is not. What is necessary cannot be evil.

Anscombe does not hold that everything which is necessary for war is permissible. That is in fact her broader point regarding the nuclear bomb. — Leontiskos

I don't think she viewed the nuclear bomb as necessary for the war.

lol, the word I was searching for was "opprobrium." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Haha, that makes more sense. :smile:

I agree with you, and we could stretch the analogy to say that overly aggressive conservatism is like an autoimmune disease that attacks the proper ordering of the body. It's like anaphylaxis. Perfectly healthy food sources become downright fatal, depriving the organism of what would otherwise be healthy food. Whereas the liberal pathology might be something more akin to AIDS, an inability of the immune system to recognize pathology, or in the more advanced forms of Wokism that lead to Cultural Revolution style struggle sessions and the destruction of institutions and history, it becomes like MS, the immune system actually attacking the body because it sees it, and not the pathogens as threats. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, those are good analogies.

The problem is that the disease can also involve efforts at intentional training (e.g., some tolerance and DEI trainings have been shown to have the opposite of the results they are intended to have, or to be supported by pseudoscience, and yet they remain common practices because to challenge them is seen as being against "diversity, equity, and inclusion," and who would want to be against that?) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and thus some are intentionally creating bad habits of mind and society. That's where I think the OP and a focus on discerning pathogenic from beneficial viruses is helpful. We have to get down to giving actual reasons for moral opprobrium (including ).

But here's a question. Let's suppose—as you seem to imply—that claims must be susceptible to empirical data or logic. With that in mind, consider our claim, "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." What justifies this claim empirically or logically? — Leontiskos

I think the claim is supported logically by the fact that no purely logical reason for considering races to be inferior or superior seem to be possible. If they were possible, it should be easy enough to find them, or they certainly should have been found by now, and yet they have not been, and seemingly cannot be, found, hence the conclusion that they at least do not seem to be possible.

The same goes for empirical reasons. Even if, contrary to the actual situation we find, some races could be empirically demonstrated to be stronger or smarter in general than others, being stronger or smarter does not logically entail being superior tout court. That humans generally have considered themselves to be superior, tout court rather than just in this or that context, to animals is itself not a rationally defensible view.

I think the claim is supported logically by the fact that no purely logical reason for considering races to be inferior or superior seem to be possible. If they were possible, it should be easy enough to find them, or they certainly should have been found by now, and yet they have not been, and seemingly cannot be, found, hence the conclusion that they at least do not seem to be possible. — Janus

This is sort of like saying, "The racist has the burden of proof, not me." We've agreed that it is probably right, but it's not a very rigorous argument, and its conclusion is not very strong. The racist would just tell you that it has been found and you're not paying attention.

I think this sentence is really the important one to answer:

Specifically I want to explore the question of whether this claim is empirically or logically falsifiable. — Leontiskos

What could falsify our claim?

Generally the burden of proof is on those who are making extraordinary claims, and I think racism the idea that racism is rationally or empirically supportable is an extraordinary claim.

What could falsify our claim? If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a racist claim.

What could falsify our claim? If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a racist claim. — Janus

See, but that's just not how an argument for falsifiability works. Suppose a scientist comes up with a theory that seems unfalsifiable and you ask him how his theory could be falsified. He responds to you, "If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a claim that contradicts my theory." Of course, if someone could do that, then it would be falsified. But we are asking him to provide evidence that it is falsifiable. We are asking, "Can someone do that?" To ask the scientist the question is just to ask him, "How could someone, in principle, come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a claim that contradicts your theory?" His answer is really nothing more than, "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified." Of course. But we are asking how that might be done in principle.

For example, suppose someone proposes the thesis, "The Earth is flat." I then ask, "What could falsify your thesis?" Now consider two answers to that question:

• Answer 1: "Go into orbit, take a photograph of the Earth, and if the photograph reveals a sphere then my thesis has been falsified."
• Answer 2: "If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a non-flat Earth claim."

Do you see how Answer 2 is not an answer to the question at all?

I think this is the right way to think of a 'moral' judgement in this context. — AmadeusD

Okay, great.

This probably happens, but in terms of habit, no, this isn't the case. What I'm thinking internally is "I have other things to be getting on with, and this is not satisfying enough to overturn my commitment to the other things" or something similar. I often engage in hilariously dumb conversations when I have the time (I find it relaxing, in some way, so there's no sort of sacrifice happening there). — AmadeusD

Okay, fair enough. :grin:

This one is a bit more complicated. — AmadeusD

I think you may have misread the sentence, or that instead of "reject" you read "accept."

Let me press you from two angles, first analytically and then experientially.

Suppose you are standing in the hall at a philosophy conference and you can hear two speakers giving two different lectures in two different rooms. You are listening to what each speaker is saying, trying to decide which lecture to attend. You can either go into the first speaker's room and listen to them, go into the second speaker's room and listen to them, or do something else entirely. Suppose you go into the second speaker's room, and let's call this the effect. On my view, a necessary cause of this effect is that you found the second speaker more interesting or time-worthy than the first speaker. So if we consider both speakers as causes, then you judged the two causes and judged one better than the other (i.e. more interesting or time-worthy). I am not here supposing that you have morally judged either of the speakers.

This is meant to demonstrate that even if we are concerned with our time, we are still judging others as causes and deciding which causes of dialogue or information are time-worthy. So far, so good? But now consider that people such as these speakers are often aware that others are judging them for time-worthiness. Switching now to comedians rather than philosophy lecturers, a comedian might think to himself, "This is going poorly; the audience is getting restless; therefore I am going to switch over to some of my older, tried-and-true jokes." He does this because he is aware of the fact that the audience is judging whether he is time-worthy, and he is adjusting his comedy routine in light of his interpretation of the audience's judgment.

Now suppose that two comedians are performing tonight in different locations but at the exact same time. You like both of them, but one of them is much better at this sort of reflexive adjusting of his comedy routine depending on the audience's reaction. He knows how to "read the room" better. Because of this, you decide to see him instead of the other comedian. At this point I think it is much less clear whether you have morally judged the two comedians. This is because you are judging the comedian's behavior, habits, abilities, and particularly his ability to be self-conscious and conscientious. At this point has your "time-worthiness" judgment of the "cause" become moral without ceasing in any way to be a judgment of time-worthiness? If not, then what would you actually have to do in order to morally judge a comedian or some other person?

(For Aristotle this is surely 'moral' (although that word is anachronistic), and there is no reason why a time-worthiness judgment must be a non-moral judgment.)


Now the experiential angle. Have you ever had a significant other? Because it is fairly common for a woman to say to her boyfriend, "You aren't listening to me!" Usually moral judgment is involved. Do you see that as irrational, given that it doesn't really seem to be a matter of time-worthiness? Could she ever be rationally justified in morally judging her boyfriend in this way?

If one person holds a view that everybody else thinks is wrong and false, we will dismiss him either being a troll or some crackpot. Yet if there are many people who hold this view, then comes issues like is it a proper thing to say, is it acceptable in the Overton window of our society. If it's something that millions of people hold a similar view in our society, then we will likely give respect to the view, even if we personally oppose it. — ssu

Sure, but that's just a societal observation. It avoids all of the crucial questions of the OP. My post <here> addresses the things you are talking about, in a thread where they are relevant.

Check out <this post>. You are focused on what people, or majorities, or societies, deem to be beneficial or pathogenic. All you are really saying is, "If the society thinks the virus is pathogenic, then the virus will be treated as pathogenic in that society. And if the society thinks the virus is beneficial, then the virus will be treated as beneficial in that society." Of course. This is obvious. It sheds no light at all on the question of whether or why the individual or the society composed of individuals has formed a correct judgment about the virus. This form of circular reasoning has been very common in this thread, as if no appeal to the rationality of the virus-judgments is necessary. That sort of circular reasoning is just a recipe for societal tyranny, where everyone apes the societal trends and no one is able to think through the societal judgments rationally.

I think you may have misread the sentence, or that instead of "reject" you read "accept." — Leontiskos

I didn't, but reading back I can see exactly hot it comes across that way. Just had more to say about it, because a rejection would intimate i accepted the premise. Which was a bit shaky. Sorry for that. Should've been much clearer in what I was tryign to convey. I reject it.

This is meant to demonstrate that even if we are concerned with our time, we are still judging others as causes and deciding which causes of dialogue or information are time-worthy. — Leontiskos

I think I'm judging myself in making that decision. What do my values purport to press me into? If I value the Hard Problem over the problem of Infinite Regress, I may go to speaker 2's lecture because I think my existing levels of value are secure and worth maintaining (i'm sure the implicature is clear here). That's a judgement on my own notions of what's worth my time.
Lecture 1 may have pushed me out of that, by being more interesting that my existing judgement and thus creating a new judgement about only that speaker (well, their speaking rather than the speaker). I'm not convinced this is right. But it gets me around the idea that I actually care what either speaker is doing in their respective rooms. I already care about X or Y in varying degrees. The efficient cause might be the literal speaking, but the final cause of any decision of that kind is one about myself, I think. Where I want to be, and what do I want to be doing?

At this point has your "time-worthiness" judgment of the "cause" become moral without ceasing in any way to be a judgment of time-worthiness? — Leontiskos

No. Whether or not I like Comedian A better than Comedian B is not moral (I do, for argument sake). So far, so good. My existing preference is the reason for the choice, not an active judgement. Now you've entered the issue of conflicting elements of these comedians. Interesting...
But I still am under the impression my existing preference for a Comedian who can do such things is probably already built into my preference for Comedian A. I'm not gaining any new position on either comedian in making that decision. It's based on an assessment as against a rubric, and so I'm not actually making any judgement. Just looking at whether it fits the rubric. A does, B doesn't.

I get the distinct feeling this is missing your point though. Either way, I agree its less clear. I currently am comfortable with the above, but its an immature response to your TE so I might realise its nonsense.

Now the experiential angle. — Leontiskos

I am married. We often say this to each other. It is almost always a way to end a conversation without hard feelings. "I don't blame you personally, but this isn't getting anywhere. Lets try again another time" or some such. Perhaps we are weird.
The moral judgement you're talking about I think is just misplaced but it is moral. I think what a person in that scenario means is one of a few possible things that aren't just a complaint about time. It's possible I am somewhat unique in not using the phrase that way.
Some possibilities for an underlying implication could be:

- You are not adequately hearing me;
- You are are wilfully misinterpreting me; or
- You do not care about what I am saying.

Recently rereading Grice's Logic and Conversation recently I might just be being pedantic on how people use their expressions. But, it seems to me, no one could rightly be implying you're literally not listening in those situations. Therefore, the moral judgement (which seems to be there, i admit) is certainly not about it being a waste of time. It clearly isn't, if the complaint is that you're not being listened to. In my case, when i'm not being listened to (properly, rather than implying something else) I disengage. It isn't practically helpful (i.e productive). Again, not entirely sure here but it looks like there is a moral judgement which is not about time-wasting.