For me the most interesting question asks from whence the moral disapproval arises. One person thinks black people are inferior to white people; another thinks black cats are inferior to white cats; another thinks black pens are inferior to white pens. Supposing that all three are irrational, why does moral disapproval attach to the first but not to the second or third? All of our various pejoratives seem to signal irrationality, but we do not deem all forms of irrationality to be immoral. Is there some added ingredient beyond irrationality that makes racism or bigotry immoral. Malice? Obstinacy? Harm?

The key is probably negligence, the idea that they should know better. We have a tendency to prejudge negligence even in a complete stranger, given assumptions about their cultural education.

But the strange thing about our current culture is that strong tribalism has mixed with an environment in which everyone’s content consumption is unique in an unprecedented way. Or in other words: we are assuming that we are all on the same page precisely when we are least on the same page. For this reason we tend to impute fault without sufficient justification.

-

Another observation is that “being at cross purposes” seems to play a fairly significant role in dismissal. Some kind of communal short-circuit occurs. For example, if someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, they are not at cross-purposes in the deeper sense, because they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution. Similarly, when two football teams face off, they are not at cross-purposes given that they are both engaged in the same genus of activity, even though they are opposed within that genus.

“Writing off” or dismissal seems to occur when the actual genus of activity differs between two people. For example, if someone comes to TPF to advertise their newest invention, they will literally be dismissed by the moderators because they are not engaged in the requisite kind of activity. Or if a musician aims only to make money rather than art, then her fellow musicians will dismiss and ostracize her in a way that they wouldn’t dismiss or ostracize a technically inferior musician who possessed the proper aim. Or if one person is engaged in a practical activity such as anti-racism, and another is engaged in a speculative activity such as studying racial characteristics, they will tend to dismiss and oppose one another. Other examples include the philosopher and the sophist, or the pious and the charlatan. It would seem that in order for moral indignation to fully flower the genus of activity must differ subtly, and in such a way that the second genus could be reasonably mistaken for the first. It may be that moral outrage occurs because someone is seen as an impostor, pretending to be what they are not and in danger of fooling and misleading onlookers. The more intentional, subversive, and potent the imitation or likeness, the stronger the moral outrage.

If this is right, then much of the trigger-happy moral outrage probably has to do with the “impostor!” reaction. At the most fundamental level is probably the idea that someone is selling the irrational or the harmful under the guise of the rational or beneficial. Even a material position, when proposed, is liable to raise the ire of someone who opposes it, for it is only the impostor who would propose what ought to be opposed.

What’s interesting about this is that it’s not altogether wrong. For example, the taboo against anti-Semitism has a rational undergirding, particularly in places like Germany. The cultural consensus balks at non-conformity, and this is rooted in both harm and a form of reparations. On the other hand, our cultural moment is one of false assumptions of unity, of faux-taboos, without foundation in reason or consensus. To label everything one dislikes “Nazism” is to mistake the cultural consensus regarding [insert political fad here] for the cultural consensus regarding anti-Semitism, and that is a facile equivocation.

Yet even if the trigger-happy moral outrage has to do with the “impostor!” phenomenon, it nevertheless holds that well-founded moral outrage is also often rooted in the identification of an impostor, both because the impostor is dangerous and because the duplicity or incongruence is inherently ugly and disagreeable. Maybe this goes at least partway towards answering the OP.

A worthy guide is Dante's inferno. The last circle, the ninth, for those who betray, who lie, engage in treachery. For "dismissal," the punishment ought to fit the crime. And when it cannot because of the scale of harm and damage done, then there is a good argument for a default level of severity.

Again, in this thread I want to explore the question, “What is it about this type of person that justifies dismissal?”* — Leontiskos

It's not clear whether you're interested in "types" of people or what they do. We all have our likes and dislikes, but justice, as in justification, calls for attention to whatever might be the facts of the matter, which usually is about what people have done.

A worthy guide is Dante's inferno. The last circle, the ninth, for those who betray, who lie, engage in treachery. — tim wood

Okay, good. But we could still pare down that word "liar" in the way I pared down "racist" or "Nazi." What is a lie and why is it bad? We could do the same thing with "treachery" or betrayal.

For "dismissal," the punishment ought to fit the crime. — tim wood

So what punishments fit the crimes that Dante depicts in the last circle of Hell? What punishments fit a liar? Or a betrayer?

It's not clear whether you're interested in "types" of people or what they do. — tim wood

Speak to whichever one you prefer. I used the word because the two things you distinguish need not be separate. For example, "Betrayer" is a type rooted in actions.

For me the most interesting question asks from whence the moral disapproval arises. — Leontiskos

Think not first about "moral disapproval", think first about something that would be clearly illegal by current legislation. How about a site that gathers funds to Al Qaeda and Isis? Or a discussion not about kittens, but about certain human beings. Would you participate there? Would you be totally OK that some would have these thoughts and spread them publicly... because we have freedom of speech?

The rational grounds are simply things like public security and safety, for starters. Far later come things where would have a discussion about if the issue is morally right or wrong.

Think not first about "moral disapproval", think first about something that would be clearly illegal by current legislation. How about a site that gathers funds to Al Qaeda and Isis? — ssu

Okay, so you think we should dismiss (or act negatively towards) a site or person that gathers funds to Al Qaeda and Isis? And you think we should do so on the basis of "public security and safety"?

I think it is well-accepted that when someone overtly tries to harm us we attack them (and I don't see how this would be unrelated to morality). Perhaps in the OP I am more interested in forms of exclusion which do not involve overt violence. Shunning, excluding, dismissing, etc. But you could also take the thread in the direction of self-defense if you wish. Principles of self-defense are probably somewhat related to principles of exclusion or dismissal.

(I don't want to step on the toes of moderators, but a paradigm example of the question of the OP would be to ask about criteria for banning a member from an internet forum. It is not the motivation behind this OP, but it is the example of "dismissal" that TPFers would be most commonly familiar with.)

In Fowles' The French Lieutenant's Woman, the main character says she has set herself beyond the pale. This is related to her taking hikes in the woods in spite of being a single woman. Apparently in Victorian England that's all it took, and being beyond the pale came with potentially harsh consequences.

American society doesn't have anything to compare with that. You can't set yourself beyond the pale because no matter how bizarre you are, someone has you beat.

So the answer to the OP is: use the quaint terminology however you like.

Far later come things where would have a discussion about if the issue is morally right or wrong. — ssu

Questions about the breadth of the moral sphere aside, it seems clear to me that when someone wishes to dismiss or exclude someone with a charge like, "Racist!," they are almost always involved in a moral judgment. The implication is that the racist has done something (morally) wrong, and as a consequence of that wrongness they are being dismissed, excluded, etc.

This thread is meant to tease out exactly what is going on in that sort of phenomenon. If we had to break it down rationally, what is it about a racist, or a Nazi, or a bigot, or a liar, or a betrayer, or a troll (etc.) that rationally justifies some form of dismissal or exclusion?

From the OP:

Very often we are invoking moral blame when we assess someone’s beliefs in this way, and this is a curious phenomenon. Is it rationally justifiable? Do we have to downgrade our moral dismissals to non-moral dismissals? At what point is a moral dismissal justifiable? — Leontiskos

Okay, so you think we should dismiss (or act negatively towards) a site or person that gathers funds to Al Qaeda and Isis? — Leontiskos

Yes. Leontiskos, you and I go to jail if we gather funds to terrorists. Being OK with that happening wouldn't be good for the administrator of this site.

If this site has moderation rules like the following: "Racists, homophobes, sexists, Nazi sympathisers, etc.: We don't consider your views worthy of debate, and you'll be banned for espousing them.", then something that is considered far more dangerous than hate speech (described in the moderation rules) surely isn't allowed.

(In fact, the US pushed this legislation so much here in Europe that lawyers here not that giving financial aid to Al Qaeda would get you longer prisoner terms than first degree murder.)

Questions about the breadth of the moral sphere aside, it seems clear to me that when someone wishes to dismiss or exclude someone with a charge like, "Racist!," they are almost always involved in a moral judgment. The implication is that the racist has done something (morally) wrong, and as a consequence of that wrongness they are being dismissed, excluded, etc.

This thread is meant to tease out exactly what is going on in that sort of phenomenon. If we had to break it down rationally, what is it about a racist, or a Nazi, or a liar, or a betrayer (etc.) that rationally justifies some form of dismissal or exclusion? — Leontiskos

Behavior in the social media has come to this. It's one way to silence people. And as I noted the moderation rules of this site, it's obvious what kind of accusation it is here to charge another member of being a racist here.

Calling someone racist is actually very much an American phenomenon, which has then spread especially through the Anglosphere. This is because segregation is something that the US hasn't gotten over and racism is still an issue in the US. In other countries these issues can differ. For example in Germany the accusation of being a Nazi can be pretty serious: denying that the Holocaust happened can get you five years in prison. Germans, who do have this painful history, do take it quite seriously.

My point here is that moral judgments start from things that universally are considered not only being unmoral, but even criminal. Us not tolerating them doesn't mean that we are against free speech. Even if we put here "question about the breadth of the moral sphere aside" as you said, we shouldn't forget them. It's similar to talking about the Overton window. We understand that when there is a window, there's also part which isn't in the window, but perhaps "the Overton Wall".

The most interesting and prevalent case is the overtly moral case, where KK is construed as evil in one way or another. Very often we are invoking moral blame when we assess someone’s beliefs in this way, and this is a curious phenomenon. Is it rationally justifiable? Do we have to downgrade our moral dismissals to non-moral dismissals? At what point is a moral dismissal justifiable? — Leontiskos

For me, it's when certain moral lines are crossed. When one side condones or mitigates the deliberate murder of innocents, I tune out and ignore them. Civilians have always died in war, but the question is always whether they've been intentionally targeted or were collateral damage. If someone is downplaying or supporting the intentional targeting of civilians because they belong to a certain nationality, that person is wicked. I don't know how else to put it.

Yes. Leontiskos, you and I go to jail if we gather funds to terrorists. — ssu

"It's illegal, therefore you can't do it. Don't ask any more questions."

I don't find that to be a reasonable stance. We know of all sorts of things that were illegal and yet should have been done, such as freeing slaves.

For example in Germany the accusation of being a Nazi can be pretty serious: denying that the Holocaust happened can get you five years in prison. Germans, who do have this painful history, do take it quite seriously. — ssu

Right, as I said:

What’s interesting about this is that it’s not altogether wrong. For example, the taboo against anti-Semitism has a rational undergirding, particularly in places like Germany. The cultural consensus balks at non-conformity, and this is rooted in both harm and a form of reparations. — Leontiskos

-

My point here is that moral judgments start from things that universally are considered not only being unmoral, but even criminal. Us not tolerating them doesn't mean that we are against free speech. Even if we put here "question about the breadth of the moral sphere aside" as you said, we shouldn't forget them. It's similar to talking about the Overton window. We understand that when there is a window, there's also part which isn't in the window, but perhaps "the Overton Wall". — ssu

It sounds like you have no answer to the OP, or that you want to discuss a different OP. Do you have answers to Q1 or Q2 of the OP? Or are you saying that cultural taboos and laws are unquestionable and rationally opaque, and cannot be inquired into?

American society doesn't have anything to compare with that. — frank

The Scarlet Letter, Nathaniel Hawthorne.

When one side condones or mitigates the deliberate murder of innocents, I tune out and ignore them. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why? The OP is asking, "Why?"

If someone is downplaying or supporting the intentional targeting of civilians, that person is wicked. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why should wicked people be tuned out and ignored? Is it supposed to be self-evident, such that no real explanation is possible?

I think @ssu must be reading the OP as tendentious, but I gave my own earnest answer in the second post. I am sincerely interested in the rational grounding for the various varieties of dismissal or exclusion, and I am in no way claiming that dismissal/exclusion is never appropriate.

Okay, but why should wicked people be tuned out and ignored? Is it supposed to be self-evident, such that no real explanation is possible? — Leontiskos

You can continue; it just turns into a different type of discussion. Now, you're trying to curb them from their view rather than engaging in objective philosophical discourse.

The example of attempting to prevent a sickness from spreading by decapitating kittens, while perhaps valid with respect to the proposition that all kittens should be decapitated, has no parallel among phrenologists, for example; to be a phrenologist is to engage in harmful, pseudoscientific bullshit for the purposes of rationalizing white on black racism no matter how you cut it. No phrenologist has ever claimed that a certain dimple or feature associated by the phrenologist with people of color somehow indicated some positive trait relative to the white man. This is to say that there are some positions that cannot be rationally or morally justified in a larger context by digging deeper into motives or whatever you might do in moving beyond the material position because there are only a few plausible reasons for adopting that position. In light of this, I don’t think that we need to litigate every single seemingly odious and/or controversial assertion or position to find out some sort of deeper, justified reasoning. Racists, for instance, are often stupid or misinformed and, quite predictably, parrot certain talking points, bits of pseudoscience, or misinformation/disinformation such that they can be easily identified. I don’t think you have refuted that some positions cannot be explained except by explicitly racist, bigoted, etc. reasoning or appeals to pseudoscience or other notable falsehoods, and, thus, sometimes one is justified in classifying someone merely based on their professed "material positions" - be that as a bigot or a misinformed person or both. So no, I don’t grant that we must always go beyond the material position - or at least not in the way you propose.

I mean, a material position, as you define it, could carry just about any content, as the only condition you seem to put on it is that it is a proposition that one adheres to. It could contain an entire antisemitic conspiracy theory of whatever variety one might imagine - if that is what someone is putting out there. We don’t need to go beyond such a statement to justify writing them off as an antisemite, as they are saying something explicitly antisemitic; at least some of the statements people are concerned with deeming evil put out there by other people are not nearly as opaque as what KK says. I think that answers SQ1.

Overall, I think you are conflating people that can be dismissed with those that should not be on the basis that people should limit their use of moral language when faced with a certain amount of uncertainty - which is somewhat reasonable. My problem with that is that you have not addressed anything about the relevant thresholds for dismissal or the specific cases in which the material position implies or explicitly states bigotry or something else morally undesirable.

When one side condones or mitigates the deliberate murder of innocents, I tune out and ignore them.
— BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why? The OP is asking, "Why?"

If someone is downplaying or supporting the intentional targeting of civilians, that person is wicked.
— BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but why should wicked people be tuned out and ignored? Is it supposed to be self-evident, such that no real explanation is possible? — Leontiskos

Isn't that it is recognized as a war crime enough? Aren't war crimes pretty much as universally understood to be bad as anything else? Are you saying we need to provide moral facts in support of our stances such that we believe we can justifiably dismiss terrorists? If that is the case, then I'm not sure anyone can dismiss anyone on any grounds.

You can continue; it just turns into a different type of discussion. How do you start explaining to someone that a 3-year-old is not a valid target just because they belong to a certain nationality or race? — BitconnectCarlos

Well let's keep these two distinct:

1. You should not (deliberately) harm the innocent
2. Those who (deliberately) harm the innocent should be dismissed/excluded/shunned/etc.

The thread is primarily about (2), but it may well be that (1) must be considered in the analysis.

So if I were to take a stab at your example, I would say that the one who deliberately harms the innocent is unfit for society, given the liability they pose to societal peace and wellbeing. Therefore, for the sake of the society's health, they are to be excluded from society at least until they have accepted (1).

That is an attempt to replace your "wicked" with a reasoned explanation. I think that explanation is sufficient to justify their exclusion, even if it is not a complete explanation of (2). It may not be complete given that it makes no mention of culpability.

I altered my post. The discussion can continue but in a different capacity. You become like a priest to them, trying to get them to see the light. It's no longer philosophy so much as moral reformation.

A worthy guide is Dante's inferno. — tim wood

Dante's Inferno makes me nervous. The Nine circles of hell are: Limbo (unbaptized and virtuous pagans), Lust, Gluttony, Greed, Wrath, Heresy, Violence, Fraud, and Treachery.

The only one which I could not, under any circumstances, qualify for is Limbo. One way or another, I fit the rest. Hence, my concern.

Just for those who aren't familiar with the term, "The Pale" of Settlement was the area restricted for Jews created by Catherine the Great. The Pale of Settlement included all of modern Belarus, Lithuania and Moldova, much of Ukraine and Poland, and small parts of Latvia and the western Russian Federation. The only way to legally move from the Pale of Settlement into other parts of Russia was to convert to Orthodox Christianity. Or one could emigrate.

People living "beyond the pale" (in gentile areas) had a higher social ranking than Jewish people within the Pale of Settlement. So, paradoxically, being "beyond the pale" might be a good thing.

What puts Socialists either "within the pale" or "beyond the pale", depending on how you want to slice it, has nothing to do with kittens. It is that we want to take your real property away from you. We're not interested in your crappy furniture from Target or your cheap clothing from Walmart. We're going to take your wealth-producing property--that apartment building you rent to people; the jewelry store you own; your factory producing widgets... If you are a billionaire, you'll probably be stripped of everything down to and including your shoestrings.

Isn't that it is recognized as a war crime enough? — ToothyMaw

The deliberate murder of innocents can sometimes be understood as a form of resistance. A popular slogan today you'll see at protests is "You don't get to choose how we resist," i.e., the oppressed ought not be bound by such restraints when throwing off their shackles. You really don't have to look far for such thinking.

You become like a priest to them, trying to get them to see the light. It's no longer philosophy so much as moral reformation. — BitconnectCarlos

Are you saying we need to provide moral facts in support of our stances such that we believe we can justifiably dismiss terrorists? If that is the case, then I'm not sure anyone can dismiss anyone on any grounds. — ToothyMaw

It sounds like you guys don't believe that opposing murder or terrorism is a rational act. That in opposing murder or excluding a murderer we are acting like "priests," not "philosophers," and that there is no rational justification for opposing murder or terrorism, or dismissing/excluding those who engage in these acts.

Is that right? If so, Aquinas would find this quite amazing.

- Thanks for the background. I wanted to look that up but the internet was down when I drafted the OP.

Is that right? If so, Aquinas would find this quite amazing. — Leontiskos

I think that's right. I see fighting terrorism as instrumentally rational in that it preserves Western civilization and our religious heritage.

Aquinas is not a part of my religious tradition.

I don't find that to be a reasonable stance. We know of all sorts of things that were illegal and yet should have been done, such as freeing slaves. — Leontiskos

We were talking about terrorism. Yet you say then later:

It sounds like you guys don't believe that opposing murder or terrorism is a rational act. That in opposing murder or excluding a murderer we are acting like "priests," not "philosophers," and that there is no rational justification for opposing murder or terrorism, or dismissing/excluding those who engage in these acts.

Is that right? If so, Aquinas would find this quite amazing. — Leontiskos

Make up your mind.

It sounds like you have no answer to the OP, or that you want to discuss a different OP. Do you have answers to Q1 or Q2 of the OP? Or are you saying that cultural taboos and laws are unquestionable and rationally opaque, and cannot be inquired into? — Leontiskos

I think you didn't understand my point.

My point is that for Q1 and Q2 you can get definitive answer and everything isn't just a rhetorical game. These accusations aren't just insults that someone hurls at others when they disagree with them. Yet there has to reasonable evidence for this, because far too much these accusations are hurled on others as a way to win a debate / silence others.

I think that's right. Fighting terrorism is instrumentally rational in that it preserves Western civilization and our religious heritage. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, but how far does this extend? Are you comfortable with the inference that no course of action is more or less rational than any other course of action? For example, that killing your own daughter is no more or less rational than killing the intruder who is wielding lethal force? Or that excluding racists from the town hall meeting is no more or less rational than excluding 41 year-old women with 6-inch hair from the town hall meeting? Or that killing the innocent is no more or less rational than killing the guilty? Is it only priests who would make these distinctions, not philosophers?

I want to be careful about going too far out on this tangent, but we can explore it tentatively.

Aren't war crimes pretty much as universally understood to be bad as anything else? — ToothyMaw

I posted a poll awhile ago about whether Churchill would have been justified committing war crimes (e.g., using poison gas) to repel a Nazi invasion. The majority of respondents here were OK with it.

Make up your mind. — ssu

When I said:

I think it is well-accepted that when someone overtly tries to harm us we attack them... — Leontiskos

...I was saying, "Yes, obviously we oppose terrorists." Again, the question of the OP is, "Why?"

My point is that for Q1 and Q2 you can get definitive answer — ssu

Then give a definitive answer. Answer the OP. That's what it's there for. I gave my answer in post #2.

Well let's keep these two distinct:

1. You should not (deliberately) harm the innocent
2. Those who (deliberately) harm the innocent should be dismissed/excluded/shunned/etc.

The thread is primarily about (2), but it may well be that (1) must be considered in the analysis. — Leontiskos

(1) has to be considered. Is it even true? What if the innocents are factory workers making bombers to be used against you? What if they're a bunch of scientists working feverishly on enriching uranium for a nuclear bomb to be used against you? What if they're a bunch of chemists at a mustard gas plant? How many innocents are you allowed to kill while going after a military target? Is nuking Berlin OK if it means taking out Hitler?

Are you comfortable with the inference that no course of action is more or less rational than any other course of action? — Leontiskos

We need to distinguish between different types of rationality. Regarding instrumental rationality, certain decisions are definitely favored over others. Once we agree that Western civilization or our religion is worth preserving, we can talk about rationality towards that end. Rationality absent an end is a different matter...

What if the innocents are factory workers making bombers to be used against you? What if they're a bunch of scientists working feverishly on enriching uranium for a nuclear bomb to be used against you? What if they're a bunch of chemists at a mustard gas plant? — RogueAI

If the innocents aren't innocent then (1) would of course not apply to them. As far as I understand, someone working in an arms factory is not considered an innocent or a simple civilian.

Getting back to the OP, do you think it is ever rationally justifiable to dismiss or exclude someone, particularly because of some action or set of actions they have chosen? If so, when and why is this rationally justifiable?

..I was saying, "Yes, obviously we oppose terrorists." Again, the question of the OP is, "Why?" — Leontiskos

This isn't even true. What about hypothetical Jewish terrorists in Germany during WW2? Suppose German Jews had adopted a policy whereby Jewish suicide bombers blew themselves up in popular German places (restaurants, theaters, nightclubs, etc.) until the Holocaust stopped. Should we oppose that?

Getting back to the OP, do you think it is ever rationally justifiable to dismiss or exclude someone, particularly because of some action or set of actions they have chosen? If so, when and why is this rationally justifiable? — Leontiskos

If someone is a flat earther, I don't engage with them. What's the point? Same with neonazi's, Qanon, electiondeniers, etc. They're not immoral, but they're not fun to talk to.