If someone is a flat earther, don't engage with them. What's the point? Same with neonazi's, Qanon, electiondeniers, etc. They're not immoral, but they're not fun to talk to. — RogueAI

Okay, good. You've answered the OP:

1. I don't engage those who are not fun to talk to
2. Flat Earthers are not fun to talk to
3. Therefore I do not engage flat Earthers

That's a good example of a non-moral answer to the OP. :up:

What are the rational grounds for deeming someone or something beyond the pale and dismissing them or writing them off? — Leontiskos

There is no rational basis. It's a question of values - what is important to the people who make the decisions about what is allowed. Using the forum as an example, there is a written set of rules for what is acceptable and what is not. Those rules were established by the administrators and moderators and are updated from time to time. By participating in the forum we accept those rules. Our hope is that they will be reasonable and fair. In general here, they are. When members don't like the rules or the manner in which they are administered, we whine and complain. Sometimes the moderators will change a decision based on feedback, sometimes not.

So that's the answer to your question. Who decides what is beyond the pale? Them what's in charge based on their values.

We need to distinguish between different types of rationality. Regarding instrumental rationality, certain decisions are definitely favored over others. Once we agree that Western civilization or our religion is worth preserving, we can talk about rationality towards that end. Rationality absent an end is a different matter... one that I am much less sure about. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, that's fair enough as far as it goes.

At the risk of derailing my own thread, are you comfortable with the inference that anger or moral indignation is never rationally justified if there is nothing beyond instrumental rationality?

There is no rational basis.

...

Our hope is that they will be reasonable and fair. — T Clark

So you think that there is no rational basis to any rule regarding dismissal/exclusion, and yet you also hope that the rules of an internet forum will be reasonable and fair? It sounds like you are contradicting yourself.

Also, I would prefer speaking about "internet forums" in the generic sense, as I don't want this thread to become a thread about TPF.

Rationality absent an end is a different matter... one that I am much less sure about. — BitconnectCarlos

On my view racism (thinking that one race is generally superior or inferior to another) is false, and therefore irrational. The OP was taking this for granted, but maybe that was a mistake.

But the kicker comes in the fact that we shun/exclude/dismiss racists, and yet we don't shun/exclude/dismiss everyone who is irrational. So why do we shun racists in particular? At a societal level, it is almost certainly because we fear they will reenact a societal mistake of the past. And that's fine - it's a bit like telling your kid not to play near the fire to decrease the probability that they will be burned. Yet even that account is insufficient given that deterrence does not require shaming/shunning/excluding. In any case, there is nothing particularly moral about what I have said thus far. Culpability has not yet entered into the conversation.

But we do view racists as immoral. Are we wrong to do so? Should we just treat them like innocuous children who have wandered too close to the fire? On my view the moral attribution has to do with some form of obstinacy, malice, or negligence, which layer atop the foundational irrationality. But on this view some racists will be immoral and some will not be immoral. This moral judgment also accounts for the shift from deterrence to shaming/shunning/excluding.

I don't know where your view would take this. Maybe you would say that racists are immoral but not irrational? I don't really understand accounts of morality that distance themselves from rationality.

Then give a definitive answer. Answer the OP. That's what it's there for. I gave my answer in post #2. — Leontiskos

Definitive answer to “What is it about this type of person that justifies dismissal?” or "At what point is a moral dismissal justifiable?" That's your question in the OP?

When one's statement really can be harmful to others. Not when those statements are just annoying, incorrect or wrong. One can have moderation and then have real dismissal/banning etc. Something that becomes a legal matter.

Dismissing / banning someone for one's ideas and beliefs shouldn't happen lightly as we understand how important freedom of speech is for our society to function. The reasoning for dismissal / banning should be to prevent harm to be done to others. The intent should be clear. Naturally people will have different views on just what is reasonable evidence for dismissal. Every case is likely unique.

Yet the question really should be: does this or can this truly harm someone? Because people can indeed have different views, think about the World differently and come to different conclusions. That's inevitable.

We can argue that "sticks and stones can hurt my bones, but words can't" or think that "Hate Speech" rules have gone too far, but we shouldn't forget that there is the actual threat of harm done to others.

Here the example of how the Islamic State franchises it's terrorism shows how dangerous this can be. One can get the materiel of the organization from the net and one can simply say to be a follower of the Islamic State, make a terrorist strike and the terrorist organization will happily take credit for one's actions. One doesn't have to get in contact with the organization. This strategy from the IS makes it totally understandable that various police and intelligence services do try to survey the net and social media and find possible sites and people who help or create a place for terrorist organizations to spread their message.

The Scarlet Letter, Nathaniel Hawthorne. — unenlightened

I read this during a rainy November vacation on the east coast not too far from the setting of the book. Grey days looking out on a grey ocean, thinking about Hawthorne's message: that when rationality is pitted against nature, it will lose.

The reasoning for dismissal / banning should be to prevent harm to be done to others. — ssu

Okay, thanks for answering.

The idea here is apparently that we should ban, imprison, or deport someone whose ideas and views will cause a sufficient level of harm, such as a terrorist or someone who aids and abets terrorists. This is similar to this option:

I dismiss KK because entertaining them and their viewpoint will lead to harm. — Leontiskos

Now, do you see this as a moral or non-moral move? Presumably you see it as non-moral, and might view it as I described here:

Another observation is that “being at cross purposes” seems to play a fairly significant role in dismissal. Some kind of communal short-circuit occurs. For example, if someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, they are not at cross-purposes in the deeper sense, because they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution. Similarly, when two football teams face off, they are not at cross-purposes given that they are both engaged in the same genus of activity, even though they are opposed within that genus. — Leontiskos

Or in other words, we are going to deport the terrorist, and we need to undertake no moral evaluation of their intentions before doing so. Maybe the terrorist was acting in good faith or was a victim of poor education - it makes no difference to the decision. The police and the terrorist are not at cross purposes in that deeper sense. They are playing the same game, in different directions. If this is right then they are deported but not excluded in the deeper sense, and I will say more about this below.

I think some people do view terrorists that way. Others attribute moral blame to them. In any event, this is a case that I agree to be more or less non-moral. We move terrorists out of our country, or perhaps even kill them, in the same way we move or kill rodents that have infested our home.

If we want to look at this thread in light of international issues, then perhaps a traitor is a better example than a terrorist. I wouldn't quite say that a terrorist is dismissed or excluded, given the fact that they never sought incorporation in the first place. We are not denying the terrorist anything that they intrinsically desire; only something they desire instrumentally. The traitor, on the other hand, is someone who is dismissed or excluded and who is also judged morally. I recently watched the film Breach, which is about a traitor in the FBI, and in that film those qualities are on display to a remarkable degree.

Do you think treason differs from terrorism in this moral sense? Do you think a country is rationally justified in imputing moral blame to a traitor?

So you think that there is no rational basis to any rule regarding dismissal/exclusion, and yet you also hope that the rules of an internet forum will be reasonable and fair? It sounds like you are contradicting yourself. — Leontiskos

Fairness and reasonableness are procedural rules, not rules for deciding what will and won't be sanctioned. Fairness means whatever rules there are are applied to everyone the same. When I said "reasonable" I meant that they are not applied or interpreted rigidly and there is no cruel and unusual punishment. I probably wasn't clear enough about that.

Also, I would prefer speaking about "internet forums" in the generic sense, as I don't want this thread to become a thread about TPF. — Leontiskos

My reference to the forum was a specific instance of a general rule and was not intended as a comment on the forum itself. It is the institution of this sort with which I am most familiar. As such it is a reasonable example.

I stand by my claim that deciding what is beyond the pale is not primarily based on rational criteria or processes. We can leave it at that since it doesn't seem to be the direction you want to take the thread.

Fairness and reasonableness are procedural rules, not rules for deciding what will and won't be sanctioned. Fairness means whatever rules there are are applied to everyone the same. When I said "reasonable" I meant that they are not applied or interpreted rigidly and there is no cruel and unusual punishment. I probably wasn't clear enough about that. — T Clark

Okay, but "cruel and unusual" is a non-procedural constraint. I mean, if there is a cruel and unusual rule that is applied equally to all, would you have a complaint? Would there be something wrong or irrational about the rule?

My reference to the forum was a specific instance of a general rule and was not intended as a comment on the forum itself. It is the institution of this sort with which I am most familiar. As such it is a reasonable example. — T Clark

That's fair. I just want to try to avoid the scenario where this becomes a referendum on TPF or something weird like that.

Is it rational to give air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable?

- I don't think it is rational to do that. Do you think so?

I don't think it is rational to do that. Do you think so? — Leontiskos

No, and I think the examples you gave of the kinds of attitudes which you say are deemed to be beyond the pale are generally attitudes which are not rationally justifiable. You could even define "beyond the pale" as "not rationally justifiable".

No, and I think the examples you gave of the kinds of attitudes which you say are deemed to be beyond the pale are generally attitudes which are not rationally justifiable. — Janus

Okay, good. I would even go so far as to say that they are irrational. Is that the same as what you are saying? Or are you making a more conservative claim?

Note that many here are claiming that something like racism is neither irrational nor rationally unjustifiable. For example, let's take 's concession and place it in more direct relation to the OP. Consider this statement:

This thread is meant to tease out exactly what is going on in that sort of phenomenon. If we had to break it down rationally, what is it about a racist, or a Nazi, or a bigot, or a liar, or a betrayer, or a troll (etc.) that rationally justifies some form of dismissal or exclusion? — Leontiskos

The thesis of the moral non-cognitivist* requires that there is no rational connection between any of these types of person and dismissal. For example, there is no rational connection between a bigot and the act of dismissal, such that it is no more or less rational to dismiss a bigot than it is to dismiss anyone else. "Some people dismiss bigots; some people dismiss grandmothers; some people dismiss gardeners; it's all a matter of taste. One is no more or less rationally justified in dismissing a bigot than in dismissing a gardener." That seems wrong to me, and apparently you would agree.

* I believe this is the proper descriptive term for those who would divorce morality from rationality, but others might quibble with it.

Okay, that's fair enough as far as it goes.

At the risk of derailing my own thread, are you comfortable with the inference that anger or moral indignation is never rationally justified if there is nothing beyond instrumental rationality? — Leontiskos

In that case, at most, the moral indignation would be only instrumentally rationally justified. Of course, there's rationality beyond instrumental rationality; Logical reasoning exists.

When I originally read your I thought you were joining the many moral non-cognitivists in this thread, claiming that we do not have rational justification to say that racism is immoral, and therefore we cannot say it.

I now see that you were not saying that, but there is a wrinkle along these same lines. If we are only permitted to assert things that are rationally justifiable, then in order to say, "Racism is immoral," or, "Racism is not rationally justifiable," we must ourselves be able to rationally justify these claims. So if we hold to that premise then I think "not rationally justifiable" may need to be transformed into "irrational."

Presumably your hesitancy would come in the religious realm, where you want to say that a religious tenet could fail to be rationally justifiable without being irrational. I think this may end up splitting too many hairs between holding a proposition and "giving air to an assertion." On my view a religious tenet can have a characteristically different form of rational adherence, but it nevertheless requires rational justification. In any case, this is opening a whole new vista and can of worms for the thread.

In that case, at most, the moral indignation would be only instrumentally rationally justified. — BitconnectCarlos

Right, but it seems to me that moral indignation is by its very nature not instrumental, and the force of my question comes from this premise. I don't find moral indignation to be localizable in the way that an instrumental reality is. In most cases it erupts spontaneously, much like laughter does.

Of course, there's rationality beyond instrumental rationality; — BitconnectCarlos

You edited your previous post at the same time you wrote this line, didn't you? :wink:

Logic exists — BitconnectCarlos

I don't think the existence of logic entails that there is non-instrumental rationality. Logic is basically a framework for instrumental rationality. But in any case, what is at stake here is the question of whether there is a non-instrumental rationality that could ground moral claims, making them more than merely instrumental or hypothetical.

But in any case, what is at stake here is the question of whether there is a non-instrumental rationality that could ground moral claims, making them more than merely instrumental or hypothetical. — Leontiskos

If I were to ask you to give your fundamental reason why murder is wrong, what would you say? For me, it's probably because God/the Bible/the universal lawgiver says so. I'm inclined toward divine command theory, and my outlook is fundamentally biblical.

When you think about it, the murderer could have possibly done the victim a favor. Perhaps the victim gets a better afterlife because they were murdered. Or perhaps being dead is better than the pain that awaited the victim had they stayed alive. There are just so many unknowns, yet we all fervently believe that murder is wrong. We don't know the 30,000-foot view but still cling to the rule.

I rejected Kantian attempts to account for morality years ago. I suppose murder could be irrational in the sense that committing murder is often terrible for the mental health and life (soul?) of the murderer. That's fair to say.

Okay, good. I would even go so far as to say that they are irrational. Is that the same as what you are saying? Or are you making a more conservative claim? — Leontiskos

Interesting question! Let's take racism; if someone thinks a person is to be shunned, dismissed as inferior or even vilified on account of their skin colour, it is obvious that there is no rational justification for such an attitude because there is no logical or empirically determinable connection between skin colour and personal worth, intelligence or moral rectitude.

So, shall we say their attitude is irrational or simply non-rational? I'd say that if they concocted some completely bogus supposed connection between skin colour and personal worth or intelligence then their attitude would be based on illogical or erroneous thinking, and it would then be fair to say they are being irrational.

If on the other hand, they said they just don't like people of whatever skin colour then perhaps we could say their attitude was simply non-rational or emotionally driven. Then again it seems unlikely that their emotional attitude would not be bolstered if not entirely based on some kind of erroneous thinking,

Presumably your hesitancy would come in the religious realm, where you want to say that a religious tenet could fail to be rationally justifiable without being irrational. I think this may end up splitting too many hairs between holding a proposition and "giving air to an assertion." On my view a religious tenet can have a characteristically different form of rational adherence, but it nevertheless requires rational justification. In any case, this is opening a whole new vista and can of worms for the thread. — Leontiskos

I think there is a valid distinction, somewhat along Kant's lines, between pure reason and practical reason. For example, in regard to justice, to the idea of all people being equal before the law and being equally subject to it and equally deserving of rights. I think this is not so much positively rationally justified as it is negatively, and by that, I mean that there is no purely rational justification for treating one person differently than another tout court.

On the other hand, perhaps there is a practically rational justification for treating the POTUS differently than the rest of the people. Not to say I think that's a good idea, mind. I'm not a moral non-cognitivist, I'm more of the persuasion that morality is objective in the sense that it evolves out of the needs of the community. So, murder is objectively wrong because it is not something a functional community could condone ( at least when it comes to its own members). Obviously, communities may have practical reasons, at least in some cases, war for example, for not considering the killing of non-community members to be murder. It's a messy business this morality!

There are different legitimate (in my opinion) reasons for not entering into discussion with an individual. The first would be what you have described as "moral" disagreement (the Nazi example). However, to my mind the reason to not engage is solely to not give the individual a platform to broadcast to other third persons, I don't actually mind discussion with those with whom I disagree, even greatly disagree with. Thus it is to deprive the reprehensible ideas of "oxygen" by not engaging. However, if the discussion was not viewed by third parties, then as I mentioned, I don't mind conversing.

The second reason not to engage, is when the other party doesn't abide by logic and/or truthfulness. Since productive discussion is futile and since your opposition isn't confined to the truth, your ideas will be viewed by third parties as erroneous or incorrect inappropriately.

The problem which I see with the idea of 'beyond the pale' is that it is culturally and historically relative. Also, it may depend on situational contexts.

For example, I am aware of how what is considered appropriate or not varies on a written forum to face to face groups which I attend. On the forum, certain remarks are unacceptable, such as racism but in philosophy discussion poor or low quality argument are key issues. In face to face interaction, factors like racism and sexism are also unacceptable but the focus is more about sensitivity rather than formulation of arguments.

While there are unclear markers of ''beyond the pale' vs 'the unacceptable', one possible measure which holds up to rationality is the idea of respect for others in general.

one possible measure which holds up to rationality is the idea of respect for others in general. — Jack Cummins

It's also possible to rationalize disrespect for others in general. I think that's why morality isn't based on rationality. People naturally rationalize whatever they're doing. Rationality is kind of like fashion.

I see your argument as possible logical but questionable from a deeper philosophical point of view. Here, I am wondering about philosophy as being about the pursuit of wisdom for living. After cultural relativism and postmodernism there has been a shift to philosophy as rhetoric, alongside a fragmentation of values.

Here, I am wondering about philosophy as being about the pursuit of wisdom for living. — Jack Cummins

This is the crux of the matter. There isn't just one kind of life. In some environments, you'll have to be racist to thrive. In other environments, racism will get you ostracized. As Nietzsche pointed out, your tribe's morality is relative to the kind of society they have created.

What are the rational grounds for deeming someone or something beyond the pale and dismissing them or writing them off? — Leontiskos

Why does it have to be discussed as if there's a universal truth behind the will to ignorance? I dismiss people when I know they're an absolute waste of time.

Like discussing the Bible with people who aren't familiar with it. They've never taken a discerning eye to it. It's why most Christians dont know wtf they even believe. It's why they follow the apostles rather than the most Christian of Christians: Christ. If you follow Christ, then you don't get to see others as sinners or as beneath you, which is what most Xtians bank on. The objective slave morality that allows them to deny the lives of others is their poppy and poison... but all these quacks don't realize:

 11 Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake.

These idolaters of the apostles end up blessing us, as the Beatitude goes.

Dissing the obstinate as beyond the pale is fine because they're only looking for the answers the satify their confirmation bias. Thus they're not actually here to learn anything, and thus a waste of time in general.

I do not deny Nietzsche's argument or the issues of relativism. Nevertheless, what may be happening is a 'fashion' or slippery rope argument whereby the right to express hatred is being justified.

I do not deny Nietzsche's argument or the issues of relativism. Nevertheless, what may be happening is a 'fashion' or slippery rope argument whereby the right to express hatred is being justified. — Jack Cummins

That may be true, but such justifications tend to be supremely rational. Rationality is not a guide to moral behavior. If anything, rationality is something to be wary of.

2
A sound bridge between rationality and emotive morality may be useful. That is because without the rational, we may end up with 'herd instinct'. Morality based on rationality or emotion alone may too narrow in scope.

A sound bridge between rationality and emotive morality may be useful. That is because without the rational, we may end up with 'herd instinct'. Morality based on rationality or emotion alone may too narrow in scope. — Jack Cummins

I agree. Maybe a person works better as a whole: letting the mind temper the heart.

(This post functions as a kind of addendum to the OP)

's example of dismissing the flat Earther is very helpful in getting at the sense of the OP. Now RogueAI used the notion of "fun" to dismiss the flat Earther in a non-moral way, but I want to look at a different way in which one might dismiss the flat Earther:

1. Stupid people are to be dismissed/ignored
2. The flat Earther is stupid
3. Therefore the flat Earther is to be dismissed/ignored

This is largely descriptive, as it is a very common experience. If someone asks, "Why did you walk away when he started claiming that the Earth is flat?," a common response would be, "I don't engage that level of stupidity."

Now the judgment of stupidity could be moral or non-moral, but I think it is often a moral judgment with the flat Earther. It is something like, "Shame on you. You should know better" (negligence). Or after talking to them for hours the stupidity is thought to become culpable via obstinacy. Or perhaps we might begin to suspect that they have an ulterior motive, and are intentionally at cross purposes with us—we might begin to suspect that they are trolling us or goofing around.

At this point 's notion of instrumental rationality and morality as a set of hypothetical imperatives comes into play. It seems to me that moral indignation is not instrumental, and this is because it involves a "non-hypothetical ought judgment." Thus to dismiss someone or judge them beyond the pale also involves such a (moral) judgment. Kevin Flannery's, "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds," is a good entry point into this issue from an Aristotelian angle.

(An ambiguity arises here, where the moral judgment could be seen to undergird one's own act of walking away (i.e. "At this point it is better for me to walk away"). That is a non-hypothetical ought judgment, after all. But when I call dismissal a moral act what I mean is something else. What I mean is that we are entering into moral judgment upon someone else. The question of whether a dismissal is a moral dismissal depends on this question of whether we are entering into moral judgment upon someone other than ourselves.)

Nevertheless, this thread is not primarily a speculative debate about hypothetical vs non-hypothetical moral systems. Instead it is rooted in experiences we commonly have, experiences of dismissing, excluding, or judging someone to be beyond the pale. We can approach these experiences both descriptively and normatively. That is, we can ask why people tend to think their dismissals are (rationally) justified, and we can ask what is required in order for a dismissal to be (rationally) justified. Of course someone might also argue that we are never rationally justified in dismissing someone on grounds of morality or culpability.

The interesting thing about the dismissal of the flat Earther is that it appeals directly to rationality, for stupidity is a synonym for irrationality. , "All of our various pejoratives seem to signal irrationality, but we do not deem all forms of irrationality to be immoral." In much the same way, we might call the racist or the bigot stupid. Nevertheless, the uncertainty often comes home to roost with the flat Earther, given that there are always portions of the conversation when one begins to question one's presumption of stupidity.