Okay, thanks for answering.

The idea here is apparently that we should ban, imprison, or deport someone whose ideas and views will cause a sufficient level of harm, such as a terrorist or someone who aids and abets terrorists. This is similar to this option:

I dismiss KK because entertaining them and their viewpoint will lead to harm.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Yes, exactly.

We should put the bar very high. Naturally there is a lower bar, typically dealt with civil lawsuits, exist where for example I ridicule you and you go to court because of slander. But it's still the same reason.

We should notice from the terrorism example just how extremely rare this should be. There are huge numbers of people that are suicidal, but only a minimal amount who would harm people when killing themselves or take on such lunatic ideas that terrorists in Western countries promote. However, if we want to keep these rare events at a minimum, then government do check what basically is otherwise "free speech".

Now, do you see this as a moral or non-moral move? — Leontiskos

Preventing harm to others is a moral move. How could it be non-moral?

Or in other words, we are going to deport the terrorist, and we need to undertake no moral evaluation of their intentions before doing so. Maybe the terrorist was acting in good faith or was a victim of poor education - it makes no difference to the decision. The police and the terrorist are not at cross purposes in that deeper sense. They are playing the same game, in different directions. If this is right then they are deported but not excluded in the deeper sense, and I will say more about this below. — Leontiskos

Laws have to have a moral basis, don't you think?

Terrorist see themselves as having a just moral cause, naturally.

The terrorists might be non-legal combatants, but they truly feel their cause is justified. For example, the West German RAF (Red Army Fraction) thought that West Germany was still a successor state of the Nazi Germany, and they had total reason to fight it. Their objective was to "wake up" the real Proletariat, which would be woken up when the workers would feel how the German (Nazi) government would attack them. With the Islamic State the dedication is even more convinced as they see themselves fighting for God and the Ummah.

In the end, the morality is just a numbers game. If you and me believe that the state of Switzerland is actually the reincarnate of Nazi Germany and we should join a fight to liberate the Swiss from nazism, then we are seen as lunatics. If millions of people, including many Swiss people and foreigners would think that present Switzerland is this reincarnate, it wouldn't be just lunacy. Usually when millions of people think somehow of reality, then we have to respect that view.

There are different legitimate (in my opinion) reasons for not entering into discussion with an individual. The first would be what you have described as "moral" disagreement (the Nazi example). However, to my mind the reason to not engage is solely to not give the individual a platform to broadcast to other third persons... — LuckyR

Sure. Among the many things that occasioned this OP, one thing was an old dustup between Sam Harris and Ezra Klein in which Klein is critiquing Harris for platforming Charles Murray, who is involved in racial IQ research for the sake of policy proposals.

That exchange is highly complicated, but Ezra doesn't think Harris is a racist. I don't know that he even thinks Murray is a racist. But in a build-up to that discussion he called Harris a "racialist." I'm not really sure what he meant by that, but it might mean something like, "Someone who provides a platform to people who are espousing ideas that could be used as fuel for racism." A simplified version of Ezra's position would be <No one is allowed to do racial IQ research or platform anyone who does racial IQ research, because that research involves the possibility of giving rise to racism, even if the researcher and platformer are not themselves racist>.

Questions of platforming and of "the possibility of this being read in the wrong way by other parties" are interesting because they subordinate speculative reason to practical reason. It's like saying, "You aren't allowed to discuss that topic, because something bad might happen," or, "You aren't allowed to perform that scientific research, because something bad might happen." If moral non-cognitivism is true and there is no ultimate connection between speculative and practical reason, then there can be nothing wrong with this approach.

On Harris' view Ezra is involved in a highly irrational and unrealistic form of political correctness. At 1:45:11 Harris says that every single male finalist of the Olympic 100m dash since 1980 has been of West-African descent. In effect he asks, "Are we racists or 'racialists' if we notice such a fact? Or do we have to avoid noticing such facts for the sake of political correctness?"

Platforming is a complicated debate, but one way of approaching the OP would be as a search for a rational basis for eschewing racism. This rational basis would provide a way for us to both eschew racism while also being intellectually honest about the 100m dash finalists.

But the broader issue is rational justification for dismissal/exclusion in general, as highlighted in cases like the flat Earther.

If I were to ask you to give your fundamental reason why murder is wrong, what would you say? For me, it's probably because God/the Bible/the universal lawgiver says so. I'm inclined toward divine command theory, and my outlook is fundamentally biblical. — BitconnectCarlos

I am not a divine command theorist. I think murder is wrong because it involves killing the (legally) innocent. On this view the prohibition against murder is just a particular variety of the prohibition on killing the innocent.

So with reference to the OP, we might exclude someone who kills the innocent. You yourself claimed that this is beyond the pale. We might ask the OP's question, "Why?" I gave a general answer <here>. A more fine-grained answer would delve into the notions of guilt, innocence, and desert. To kill an innocent person is to give what is not due; what is not deserved. The irrationality arises from this disproportion of desert.

Interesting question! Let's take racism; if someone thinks a person is to be shunned, dismissed as inferior or even vilified on account of their skin colour, it is obvious that there is no rational justification for such an attitude because there is no logical or empirically determinable connection between skin colour and personal worth, intelligence or moral rectitude.

So, shall we say their attitude is irrational or simply non-rational? I'd say that if they concocted some completely bogus supposed connection between skin colour and personal worth or intelligence then their attitude would be based on illogical or erroneous thinking, and it would then be fair to say they are being irrational.

If on the other hand, they said they just don't like people of whatever skin colour then perhaps we could say their attitude was simply non-rational or emotionally driven. Then again it seems unlikely that their emotional attitude would not be bolstered if not entirely based on some kind of erroneous thinking, — Janus

Okay, and I am wondering if we can simplify this a bit. I would want to say that if someone asserts a proposition then their assertion can be either true or false. If someone provides reasoning for a proposition their argument can be sound or unsound, and valid or invalid. So there are two basic categories: true/false and sound/unsound, where validity is presupposed by soundness and invalidity is a particular form of unsoundness. Everyone will agree that an invalid argument is irrational, but there are disagreements about whether things like false assertions or unsound yet valid arguments are irrational.

In any case, I think we are on the same page with this.

For example, in regard to justice, to the idea of all people being equal before the law and being equally subject to it and equally deserving of rights. I think this is not so much positively rationally justified as it is negatively, and by that, I mean that there is no purely rational justification for treating one person differently than another tout court. — Janus

Okay, interesting. It's as if we are open to the possibility that one person ought to be treated differently than every other person, but it would have to be shown that this is true, and we doubt that it will ever be shown.

So, murder is objectively wrong because it is not something a functional community could condone ( at least when it comes to its own members). — Janus

Yes, I tried to say something similar <here>.

There is a live question in this thread about whether self-defense—both personal and communal—is rational. It is instrumentally rational in that it preserves a need, but many are undecided on the question of whether someone who decides to die for no reason is being irrational.

Okay, but "cruel and unusual" is a non-procedural constraint. I mean, if there is a cruel and unusual rule that is applied equally to all, would you have a complaint? Would there be something wrong or irrational about the rule? — Leontiskos

Let's use a different example. Let's say agents of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency detained and deported a legal US resident without due process of law. I would call that unreasonable, procedural, and cruel and unusual.

As I said, let's leave this here. I don't want to distract from where you want the discussion to go.

We should notice from the terrorism example just how extremely rare this should be. There are huge numbers of people that are suicidal, but only a minimal amount who would harm people when killing themselves or take on such lunatic ideas that terrorists in Western countries promote. However, if we want to keep these rare events at a minimum, then government do check what basically is otherwise "free speech". — ssu

Okay. Incidentally, how do you see the issue of speech impinging on the question of terrorism? Are you thinking of cases where we inhibit a terrorist's forms of expression?

Preventing harm to others is a moral move. How could it be non-moral? — ssu

I added this to a previous post after I saw your question:

(An ambiguity arises here, where the moral judgment could be seen to undergird one's own act of walking away (i.e. "At this point it is better for me to walk away"). That is a non-hypothetical ought judgment, after all. But when I call dismissal a moral act what I mean is something else. What I mean is that we are entering into moral judgment upon someone else. The question of whether a dismissal is a moral dismissal depends on this question of whether we are entering into moral judgment upon someone other than ourselves.) — Leontiskos

Laws have to have a moral basis, don't you think? — ssu

Yes, but the question here is whether there is an specific need to evaluate the perpetrator's culpability. If we do that, then we are involved in a moral judgment of the person, and we don't always do that. In the case of the terrorist I don't think we really care about their culpability. We don't care if they acted in "good faith" or "bad faith."

Terrorist see themselves as having a just moral cause, naturally. — ssu

Is there a moral difference between a terrorist who believes he has a just moral cause and one who is acting in bad faith, say, by desiring excessive and disproportionate revenge?

Is there a moral difference between a terrorist and a traitor?

I would call that unreasonable, procedural, and cruel and unusual. — T Clark

Well we were discussing procedural vs. cruel and unusual by separating the two, so that we can see each in its own light. When you combine them all together and decline to consider them separately there is no possible way to have a philosophical discussion about whether the "cruel and unusual" value judgment possess a non-procedural nature.

As I said, let's leave this here. I don't want to distract from where you want the discussion to go. — T Clark

I don't see that procedural vs evaluative is off topic.

It's also possible to rationalize disrespect for others in general. I think that's why morality isn't based on rationality. People naturally rationalize whatever they're doing. Rationality is kind of like fashion. — frank

The age-old answer to this claim is that rationality can be used or misused, much like a gun. "Rationality can be used for rationalization, therefore it is not normative," is a lot like saying, "Guns can be used for murder, therefore they are not good." There are accountants who use their accounting skills to embezzle funds, and there are accountants who use their accounting skills to account. Using the art of accounting to ensure that others make accounting mistakes (and overlook your embezzlement) is a perversion of the art of accounting.

Else, if rationality was nothing more than rationalization, then different levels of rationality would have no non-social effect. But that's obviously false. The person who is more rational will be much more skillful at navigating nature, and nature doesn't care a whit about rationalizations. Similarly, cultures that are more rational will succeed vis-a-vis nature in ways that cultures which are less rational will not.

The age-old answer to this claim is that rationality can be used or misused, much like a gun. " — Leontiskos

What tells you if it's being used or misused? A rational argument?

Okay. Incidentally, how do you see the issue of speech impinging on the question of terrorism? Are you thinking of cases where we inhibit a terrorist's forms of expression? — Leontiskos

To inhibit the expressions of terrorist should be understandable.

Yes, but the question here is whether there is an specific need to evaluate the perpetrator's culpability. If we do that, then we are involved in a moral judgment of the person, and we don't always do that. In the case of the terrorist I don't think we really care about their culpability. We don't care if they acted in "good faith" or "bad faith." — Leontiskos

I think we should always evaluate the perpetrators culpability. Many times it can be easy, when it's someone that uses violence to instill fear. Sometimes it's difficult. I'm not sure why you insist that we wouldn't care about the culpability of someone. In politics and legislation there are always moral question that we try to answer to the best of our knowledge.

To inhibit the expressions of terrorist should be understandable. — ssu

Not really. "Terrorist organization sues Finland over free speech rights," isn't exactly a common headline.

I think we should always evaluate the perpetrators culpability. — ssu

For example, the law distinguishes manslaughter from murder, but with terrorism there is no such distinction. The law does not distinguish terrorists who were acting in good faith from terrorists who were acting in bad faith.

You've ignored the question about the traitor twice now.

What tells you if it's being used or misused? A rational argument? — frank

Why do you ask questions or post on TPF at all if the only answers you will get are rationalizations? If you didn't think your interlocutor would answer honestly rather than rationalize, you wouldn't ask them a question at all, and you wouldn't log in to TPF.

I said morality isn't based on rationality because it supports both good and evil.

You said that if it supports evil it's being misused.

I asked how you know when rationality is being misused. You don't have an answer.

To inhibit the expressions of terrorist should be understandable.
— ssu

Not really. "Terrorist organization sues Finland over free speech rights," isn't exactly a common headline. — Leontiskos

Sorry, I don't understand your point. :sad:

For example, the law distinguishes manslaughter from murder, but with terrorism there is no such distinction. The law does not distinguish terrorists who were acting in good faith from terrorists who were acting in bad faith. — Leontiskos

OK, now I understand what you were after.

Well, do notice that when "terrorism" isn't confined to a tiny cabal of people who we would call homicidal maniacs, it becomes a totally different thing. I already mentioned here the power of numbers. Just think of an insurgency: the insurgents are still terrorists, criminals, but an insurgency isn't just a string of terrorist attacks. Then the case is that the terrorists are "illegal combatants", but usually insurgencies eithers succeed to win the war or there is a political settlement, and the terrorist become people who you can negotiate with (even if at the start this was an impossibility). In a political settlement the terrorists become politicians themselves. There are so many examples of this in history that I don't know where to start.

Traitor and a terrorist are quite different things. To be prosecuted about treason is really different from terrorism, so here I'm not sure what you are thinking about.

I am not a divine command theorist. I think murder is wrong because it involves killing the (legally) innocent. On this view the prohibition against murder is just a particular variety of the prohibition on killing the innocent.

So with reference to the OP, we might exclude someone who kills the innocent. You yourself claimed that this is beyond the pale. We might ask the OP's question, "Why?" I gave a general answer <here>. A more fine-grained answer would delve into the notions of guilt, innocence, and desert. To kill an innocent person is to give what is not due; what is not deserved. The irrationality arises from this disproportion of desert. — Leontiskos

I think one could kill the innocent and not be wrong. Anscombe's paper on the doctrine of double effect really hammered home this point for me. She'll use an example, e.g., a bomber flying a mission against a weapons factory who incidentally ends up killing innocents.

Bombing ports or weapons factories is necessary for war, and Anscombe holds that what is necessary cannot be evil.

Murder is a specific type of killing, one that is uniquely wrong. It involves making the innocent one's target.

Murder is a specific type of killing, one that is uniquely wrong. It involves making the innocent one's target. — BitconnectCarlos

What about Trolley Car? The innocent is the target (or, you're slapping a big target on the innocent when you throw the switch which seems like a distinction without a difference)

Okay, and I am wondering if we can simplify this a bit. I would want to say that if someone asserts a proposition then their assertion can be either true or false. If someone provides reasoning for a proposition their argument can be sound or unsound, and valid or invalid. So there are two basic categories: true/false and sound/unsound, where validity is presupposed by soundness and invalidity is a particular form of unsoundness. Everyone will agree that an invalid argument is irrational, but there are disagreements about whether things like false assertions or unsound yet valid arguments are irrational. — Leontiskos

Right, 'rational' is not strictly definable. You could say a rational argument is an argument consistent with its premises, in other words a valid argument. On the other hand, valid arguments can be utter nonsense. So, then we might want to say an argument needs to be valid and sound to count as rational. The problem is that premises are never justified by the arguments they justify, assuming the argument is valid. I think there is a normativity at play. Premises must be consistent with human experience and the overall human understanding of reality. Maybe they must be supported by either empirical observations or logical self-evidence, as with mathematics. But now we've ruled out much of metaphysics, at least as it is traditionally understood. We can thank Kant for that. But then his own purported synthetic a priori knowledge is not immune to critique.

- I think I agree with most of that except the idea that traditional metaphysics departs from empirical knowledge and logic.

But to the earlier point:

I think there is a normativity at play. Premises must be consistent with human experience and the overall human understanding of reality. — Janus

...One can do an intersubjective thing and call that rational, even with respect to morality. So one might say that racism is not objectively irrational but it is intersubjectively irrational. That could perhaps constitute a point of more general agreement within the thread.

I myself think racism is objectively irrational, in much the same way that "3 > 3" is irrational. Or as you imply, any implicit argument for racism will seem to be unsound, given that the conclusion is in fact false. This doesn't mean that we can beg the question and assume ahead of time that everyone's argument is unsound, but it is a basis for a judgment that the position is irrational.

I think one could kill the innocent and not be wrong. Anscombe's paper on the doctrine of double effect really hammered home this point for me. She'll use an example, e.g., a bomber flying a mission against a weapons factory who incidentally ends up killing innocents.

Bombing ports or weapons factories is necessary for war, and Anscombe holds that what is necessary cannot be evil.

Murder is a specific type of killing, one that is uniquely wrong. It involves making the innocent one's target. — BitconnectCarlos

Nothing that one does by accident is wrong per se, and this of course includes accidentally dropping bombs on the wrong people. Whether or not we call such an accident an act of killing is arguable, but it doesn't much matter.

For example, if you and I are running a race and our legs get tangled up as we round the corner you might claim that I have tripped you. Whether or not we want to say that <Leontiskos tripped Carlos>, everyone knows that I did not really trip you, in the culpable and intentional sense. If these were proper acts of killing and tripping, then a baby playing with a gun would be tried for murder if the gun went off and someone died. Any intentional (non-accidental) killing that is unlawful is murder. What is key in distinguishing murder from some variety of manslaughter is not the target, but rather the intentional nature of the act.

But coming back to the point, do you think that intentionally killing the innocent can only be seen to be wrong via divine commands? Or do you think that one can understand that intentionally killing the innocent is wrong even without the help of divine commands?

- If you think that every insurgent is a terrorist, then I think you must have an idiosyncratic definition of 'terrorist,' no? I am starting to wonder if you do have some tensions with free speech if you are trying to do things like label all insurgents terrorists, and then restrict speech based on that extension of the term. But it's hard to see how any of this is related to the OP, or where it is going.

Yes, I understand an individual (myself, for example) choosing not to engage with a racist or even a "racialist" in mixed company (because "something bad might happen"), especially since I'm not a professional broadcaster or journalist or influencer. Yet at the same time having a robust, but private discussion with the same "racialist", since I'm certain nothing bad will happen. However, are the "rules" different for a professional journalist, whose reason for existance is the dissemination of information?

If you think that every insurgent is a terrorist, then I think you must have an idiosyncratic definition of 'terrorist,' no? — Leontiskos

No, I think you misunderstood my point here.

Naturally those who fight the insurgents will likely call them terrorists. Even to admit that there is an insurgency is an admittance that give the other side justification of being an "enemy combatant". Enemy combatant isn't your ordinary criminal. Best example of this is Northern Ireland. In the UK the time is simply called "The Troubles". Yet in fact in it's official history the British military has written that what happened in Northern Ireland was an insurgency.

Yet naturally this wasn't ever acknowledged during the time. Hence the provincial IRA members fighting the British and the Unionists were treated as criminals, not enemy combatants. This lead to IRA members holding hunger strikes in prison.

In the end the British did seek and get a political solution, and people like Gerry Adams became a politician, even if he was in his earlier life the Officer commanding (OC) of the 2nd battalion of the Belfast Brigade from 1971-1972, became the adjutant for the brigade in 1972, and had become the OC of the brigade by 1973. So here you have a leader of a terrorist organization becoming a respected politician.

Best example how "terrorists" can become accepted politicians is the case of the friendship of Winston Churchill and the South African president Jan Smuts. When they first met, Churchill was a British prisoner-of-war and Smuts his Boer interrogator during the Boer war. (This friendship also shows that a good interrogator doesn't torture, but creates a confidential and trusting relationship at best with whom he interrogates.)

But it's hard to see how any of this is related to the OP, or where it is going. — Leontiskos

It is related to the OP in the way that just what is accepted and what isn't changes. I assume that you are thinking of the question from a philosophical perspective and assume there would be a fit for all occasions answer. Yet the simple fact is that when issues are political (as they usually are), just what is acceptable and what isn't changes through time.

Nothing that one does by accident is wrong per se, and this of course includes accidentally dropping bombs on the wrong people. — Leontiskos

Even if the bomb is dropped intentionally on a legitimate target with the knowledge that innocents are inside and that death will likely result, it is permissible under double effect. It is not the same as murder.

But coming back to the point, do you think that intentionally killing the innocent can only be seen to be wrong via divine commands? Or do you think that one can understand that intentionally killing the innocent is wrong even without the help of divine commands? — Leontiskos

For me, the overriding force behind the prohibition is DCT. I agree with you that the murderer does not belong in society (so I do see merit in other reasons). Perhaps the murder occurs where there is no society, though.

All I'm saying is that if I had to pick the main reason, it would be DCT although I do see merit in others. I'm sympathetic to the idea that murder really damages the psyche or soul of the murderer. And as mentioned, I agree that the murderer is unfit for society.

What are the rational grounds for deeming someone or something beyond the pale and dismissing them or writing them off? — Leontiskos

An unwillingness to engage in a rational discussion.

I'd say the fact that a person is being irrational is grounds to write off their views, their arguments, their thought processes, their senses of the facts. You may get the the point that conversation is impossible.
But this still is never grounds to write off the whole person. No grounds for any basket of deplorables, or any other simplistic caricature of something less than a person.

We are all on the same earth, so if we find someone in our midst who is "beyond the pale" we should ask ourselves, "how is it that I am standing right next to them?"

What manner of dismissal is rationally justified or rationally justifiable? — Leontiskos

Ending the conversation is justified. Preventing them from causing harm in their irrationality is justified. Teaching others about the rational and the irrational, using the irrational opinion as an example of such irrationality is justified.

Is a material position sufficient for deeming someone beyond the pale and dismissing them? — Leontiskos

Never. We are mistaken every time we equate a whole person with any one thing they say or do, or even the many things they say or do. We are mistaken for identifying ourselves or others, with some group or ideology. It's is just not the case that people are so simple they can be known completely by other people. Personhood, is an ocean. Opinions, ideologies, life's work, these are rivers, creeks, puddles. (The only scenario where the simple identification of a person with something outside that person is someone who identifies with Christ, who lives in Christ, but this would not pose a question of writing them off - it would be more like they wrote the entire universe off and joined Christ, but I digress.)

In my view, if you think someone else is a person, but that person has immoral, destructive beliefs and behaviors, and that person is always irrational, then that person is beyond you. You are justified in refuting everything they say, disengaging in any conversation, telling them they should stop, stopping them when they assault or worse. Such irrational immoralists do not cease being persons because they are buried in confusion, irrationality, immorality and destruction. And it is the fact that they are always people that forecloses both the ability to truly write them off, and forecloses the possibility that it can be justified that I write them off. Such a person should be our goal to assist in their salvation.

In my view, anyone who writes off another human being is condemning themselves with them. How much better is a saint than a Hitler? Who among us can accurately measure the distance between them? Is there enough of a gap between them that would permit the saint to write Hitler off? Is that what saints ever do when faced with Hitlers?

___

I think the point of you posing these questions is to demonstrate just what I'm saying - writing off people is a mistake in itself. Judge not, lest ye be judged. Writing people off who are otherwise trying to be rational and discuss their views, whatever they are, is weakness. Once we identify another person as a person at all, it is too late for us to be in a position to write them off.

When we have to shake the dust off of our sandals and turn our backs on people, we shouldn't think of this as foreclosing all hope for such people. We just foreclose our individual ability to reach them, today. Who knows how and whether reason and truth will penetrate their hard hearts some other way, some other time? They are people, just like me, who grow. We should hope and pray hardest for those people who we cannot even fathom how they think and do what they do.

So my short answer is, there is no criteria for ever writing people off as beyond the pale. Perhaps only criteria for writing off my own ability to reach them. Perhaps criteria for writing off other people's ability to help themselves, but then, they only beg for more of my attention, not less of it.

Even if the bomb is dropped intentionally on a legitimate target with the knowledge that innocents are inside and that death will likely result, it is permissible under double effect. It is not the same as murder. — BitconnectCarlos

I'm fairly confident you're misreading Anscombe, as a side-effect is not intended. But Bob Ross and I beat this to death a year ago, and the topic will take us too far afield.

For me, the overriding force behind the prohibition is DCT. I agree with you that the murderer does not belong in society (so I do see merit in other reasons). Perhaps the murder occurs where there is no society, though. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, so then you don't think, "Do not kill the innocent," is a rational statement? There is no reason not to kill someone just because he is innocent?

All I'm saying is that if I had to pick the main reason, it would be DCT although I do see merit in others. I'm sympathetic to the idea that murder really damages the psyche or soul of the murderer. And as mentioned, I agree that the murderer is unfit for society. — BitconnectCarlos

Okay, so maybe you think the statement is rational because it harms the murderer.

However, are the "rules" different for a professional journalist, whose reason for existance is the dissemination of information? — LuckyR

Sure, but I think we want to talk about philosophers, scientists, sociologists, etc., rather than journalists. Journalists are constrained by the Overton window in a special way.

Okay, so then you don't think, "Do not kill the innocent," is a rational statement? — Leontiskos

I don't think rational is a property of statements. It's about the way a person believes or behaves. You believe P rationally if you have a decent reason to believe it. But the bar doesn't have to be particularly high. If you believe P because experts agree that P, then you're behaving rationally, and your belief is rational.

An unwillingness to engage in a rational discussion.

I'd say the fact that a person is being irrational is grounds to write off their views, their arguments, their thought processes, their senses of the facts. You may get the the point that conversation is impossible. — Fire Ologist

Okay, good.

But this still is never grounds to write off the whole person. — Fire Ologist

Sure.

Ending the conversation is justified. Preventing them from causing harm in their irrationality is justified. Teaching others about the rational and the irrational, using the irrational opinion as an example of such irrationality is justified. — Fire Ologist

Agreed.

Never. We are mistaken every time we equate a whole person with any one thing they say or do, or even the many things they say or do. We are mistaken for identifying ourselves or others, with some group or ideology. It's is just not the case that people are so simple they can be known completely by other people. Personhood, is an ocean. Opinions, ideologies, life's work, these are rivers, creeks, puddles. — Fire Ologist

Okay, but is a material position sufficient to deem them irrational?

In my view, if you think someone else is a person, but that person has immoral, destructive beliefs and behaviors, and that person is always irrational, then that person is beyond you. You are justified in refuting everything they say, disengaging in any conversation, telling them they should stop, stopping them when they assault or worse. Such irrational immoralists do not cease being persons because they are buried in confusion, irrationality, immorality and destruction. And it is the fact that they are always people that forecloses both the ability to truly write them off, and forecloses the possibility that it can be justified that I write them off. Such a person should be our goal to assist in their salvation. — Fire Ologist

Okay, good points.

I think the point of you posing these questions is to demonstrate just what I'm saying - writing off people is a mistake in itself. — Fire Ologist

Maybe that's part of it, but another part is to provide sound criteria for different forms of dismissals, so that we do not shade too far into excessive dismissal. Dismissal of personhood would be an extreme example of that, but there are also ways in which we tend to dismiss someone as irrational when they haven't actually shown themselves to be so. Only if we know what it actually means to be irrational or racist will we have a starting point to make proper judgments regarding these matters.

When we have to shake the dust off of our sandals and turn our backs on people, we shouldn't think of this as foreclosing all hope for such people. We just foreclose our individual ability to reach them, today. Who knows how and whether reason and truth will penetrate their hard hearts some other way, some other time? They are people, just like me, who grow. We should hope and pray hardest for those people who we cannot even fathom how they think and do what they do. — Fire Ologist

This is sound advice. :up:

I don't think rational is a property of statements. It's about the way a person believes or behaves. You believe P rationally if you have a decent reason to believe it. But the bar doesn't have to be particularly high. If you believe P because experts agree that P, then you're behaving rationally, and your belief is rational. — frank

In your case the question would be: Okay, so then you don't think, "Do not kill the innocent," is the conclusion of a sound argument?

If you believe X because experts attest to it, but you simultaneously deny that the experts could have any sound arguments to hand, then you are being irrational. (This is precisely why faith is only rational if the guarantor is thought to have access to knowledge.)

Naturally those who fight the insurgents will likely call them terrorists. Even to admit that there is an insurgency is an admittance that give the other side justification of being an "enemy combatant". Enemy combatant isn't your ordinary criminal. — ssu

Is your definition of "terrorist" just "enemy combatant"? Do you disagree with the proposition that all insurgents are terrorists?

I assume that you are thinking of the question from a philosophical perspective... — ssu

I think political scientists also have to reckon with logical validity. Suppose, as seems reasonable, that a terrorist is not merely an enemy combatant; and it is not true that all insurgents are terrorists. If this is right, then it looks like your arguments are invalid.

Edit: This is the puzzle for me. You have wanted to talk about terrorism since your very first post. That’s fine, terrorism is obviously on topic. And we have talked about it in the intervening posts. I think we’ve hardly disagreed at all: terrorism should be opposed, terrorists can be dismissed, exported, censored, etc. So it doesn’t seem like a fruitful topic. What more is there to say about terrorism? But just because we have covered terrorism, that doesn’t mean we have covered the notion of dismissal. This is because there are all sorts of forms of dismissal unrelated to terrorism. I think the most interesting ones involve using a moral judgment of the dismissed as part of one’s rational grounds for dismissal. I suggested the topic of treason, since it is also related to international relations but gives a fresh, non-terrorism topic. Again, I'm not sure what else there is to say about terrorism.