I didn't, but reading back I can see exactly hot it comes across that way. Just had more to say about it, because a rejection would intimate i accepted the premise. Which was a bit shaky. Sorry for that. Should've been much clearer in what I was tryign to convey. I reject it. — AmadeusD

Okay, understood. I think I see what you are saying.

I think I'm judging myself in making that decision. What do my values purport to press me into? If I value the Hard Problem over the problem of Infinite Regress, I may go to speaker 2's lecture because I think my existing levels of value are secure and worth maintaining (i'm sure the implicature is clear here). That's a judgement on my own notions of what's worth my time.
Lecture 1 may have pushed me out of that, by being more interesting that my existing judgement and thus creating a new judgement about only that speaker (well, their speaking rather than the speaker). I'm not convinced this is right. But it gets me around the idea that I actually care what either speaker is doing in their respective rooms. I already care about X or Y in varying degrees. The efficient cause might be the literal speaking, but the final cause of any decision of that kind is one about myself, I think. Where I want to be, and what do I want to be doing? — AmadeusD

But when you say that the efficient cause is their speaking, you are getting at my point. Namely:

So if we consider both speakers as causes, then you judged the two causes and judged one better than the other (i.e. more interesting or time-worthy). I am not here supposing that you have morally judged either of the speakers. — Leontiskos

If you were merely "judging yourself" while making the decision, then you would have made the same decision even if you were entirely deaf. But that can't be right, and this is because you are also judging the audible content coming from the speakers' mouths (and this audible content is not coming from yourself). That is what I mean when I say that you judged the two causes (e.g. causes of sound waves) and judged one to be better than the other. Your own predilections also come into play, but they are not sufficient for the decision apart from the speakers.

I'm not gaining any new position on either comedian in making that decision. — AmadeusD

I agree, and I am not claiming that you are gaining new positions with the comedians or with the philosophy lecturers.

Whether or not I like Comedian A better than Comedian B is not moral.

Now you've entered the issue of conflicting elements of these comedians. Interesting... — AmadeusD

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to.

It's based on an assessment as against a rubric, and so I'm not actually making any judgement. Just looking at whether it fits the rubric. A does, B doesn't. — AmadeusD

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no?

I get the distinct feeling this is missing your point though. Either way, I agree its less clear. I currently am comfortable with the above, but its an immature response to your TE so I might realise its nonsense. — AmadeusD

Okay.

I suspect that what you are really doing is trying to deny that such a moral judgment is objective. I have said that when you decide between the two philosophers you have judged them, but perhaps not morally (we could investigate whether that judgment is moral). And I have said that when you decide between the two comedians you have morally judged them. But I haven't said that either of the two judgments is objective.

I am married. — AmadeusD

Okay, good work. :smile:

It's possible I am somewhat unique in not using the phrase that way. — AmadeusD

I certainly agree that the phrase can be used/intended in different ways.

Therefore, the moral judgement (which seems to be there, i admit) is certainly not about it being a waste of time. — AmadeusD

Good - I agree.

The moral judgement you're talking about I think is just misplaced but it is moral.

...

Again, not entirely sure here but it looks like there is a moral judgement which is not about time-wasting. — AmadeusD

Let me expand on this idea of morally judging another:

It seems that to morally judge someone else is really just to judge their culpability. I would say that judgments of culpability are eminently rational—at least some of the time. If these three jointly sufficient conditions are fulfilled then a person is culpable:

1. They were able to act otherwise (and better) than they did act
2. They should have acted better
3. They know that they should have acted better

Similarly, for a praiseworthy or morally appropriate act:

1p. They were able to act otherwise (and worse) than they did act
2p. They should have acted as they did
3p. They know that they should have acted as they did

If it ever happens that 1, 2, and 3 are all true at the same time, then at least one culpable act has occurred. Do you agree with this, and if so, do you think it ever happens that all three are true at the same time?

It seems to me that sometimes when a spouse tells their partner that the partner is not listening, it is a moral judgment, and therefore the spouse holds 1, 2, and 3. Your suggestion of "willful misinterpretation" is a great example. We could substitute that term into the three conditions: <You were able to not willfully misinterpret me; you should not have willfully misinterpreted me; you know that you should not have willfully misinterpreted me>. When these three conditions are met then the complaint is just.

(On my view in order to say that (some) moral judgments are rational, we need only say that this sort of common and mundane phenomenon is rational.)

This is also why, for example, the comedian who can read the room is better and more praiseworthy (ceteris paribus). He knows that he ought to be reflexively attentive to his audience, he has developed the capabilities to be reflexively attentive to his audience, and he fulfills the requirement when necessary.

"How could someone, in principle, come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a claim that contradicts your theory?" His answer is really nothing more than, "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified." Of course. But we are asking how that might be done in principle.

For example, suppose someone proposes the thesis, "The Earth is flat." I then ask, "What could falsify your thesis?" Now consider two answers to that question:

Answer 1: "Go into orbit, take a photograph of the Earth, and if the photograph reveals a sphere then my thesis has been falsified."
Answer 2: "If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a non-flat Earth claim."

Do you see how Answer 2 is not an answer to the question at all? — Leontiskos

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. So it is not a matter of scientific theories being true or false, but of their being coherent with the observed facts, and useful insofar as what they predict obtains.

So your points actually support the idea that there is no way to confirm or falsify a racist claim since there is no imaginable way to falsify or confirm it because it is simply not amenable to either logical proof or empirical evidence, and that is essentially what I've been saying. It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable, but that is simply an observation, which in principle could be falsified if the racist could indeed come up with either a logical proof or definitive empirical evidence to support their racism. But we know they can't do that because it is impossible in principle anyway.

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. — Janus

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route.

It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable — Janus

If you are making an unfalsifiable claim, then I would say that is a problem. On your view such a claim would seem to be "metaphysics."

If the racist mirrors your claim then this is what they would say:

• Janus: "No race is, tout court, inferior to another."
• Racist: "Some race is, tout court, inferior to another."

Is the racist's claim falsifiable? Here is what a historical U.S. racist might have argued:

1. Black people are not intellectually capable
2. Those who are not intellectually capable are, tout court, inferior to those who are intellectually capable
3. Therefore, Some race is, tout court, inferior to another

Now even if this is invalid it still looks to be falsifiable. Specifically, (1) could be falsified by producing evidence of black people who are intellectually capable (and this is precisely how opponents answered and eventually persuaded many of these racists or their progeny).

But the invalidity issue is the crux, and it is what makes your claim unfalsifiable.* The invalidity issue arises from the ambiguity of the qualification "tout court." If you don't know what it means for some race to be tout court inferior to another, then the reason the claim is unfalsifiable is because it lacks a real sense or meaning. In order to claim that such an assertion is falsifiable one must explain what it would mean for one race to be tout court inferior to another, and how we could ever come to know such a thing.

(Note too that one could choose to question the racist's claim without asserting the contradictory claim. They would do this by saying, "What you say lacks coherence," or, "I don't know what you mean by tout court." If one wanted to take a "burden of proof" stance, that would be the way to do it, but I think that approach will fail. In short, it fails because the anti-racist is more committed to the tout court claim than the racist is. For example, a strong Darwinian could be a racist without a care in the world about any tout court claims.)


* At least given secular premises.

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route. — Leontiskos

You seem to be distorting what I said. I said some think that scientific theories are not falsifiable, I didn't say I endorse that view. Simple observations are definitively falsifiable—you just need to look—you gave the 'flat earth' example. Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. That claim is falsifiable—someone would just need to come up with an empirical or logical proof.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. — Janus

That's just a burden of proof claim, as I mentioned <here>. And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. said that it is irrational to "give air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

That claim is falsifiable — Janus

It is only falsifiable in the sense that the , "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified," shows something to be falsifiable. But this is a vacuous sense of falsifiability, as I explained. The racist could say the exact same thing to you, "My claim is that Janus cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident."

This is good progress, though. First, note that no one else even tried to rationally defend their opposition to things like racism. Everyone else said that is has nothing to do with rationality. So I think your attempt is more than anyone else has done. But you've run up against a wall. You aren't giving legitimate reasons for why your claim is falsifiable, or rationally justified. I think that's normal, namely that we forget how to rationally justify our societal taboos. It is much harder to remember how to justify something that has come to be taken for granted, than something which is an object of discourse.

My suggestion would be to think about a vegetarian who confronts you, "No species is, tout court, inferior to another." Do you have to stop eating meat? Is their claim falsifiable? Does "tout court" have a discernible meaning in that context? If we cannot enslave those of a certain race, can we enslave those of a certain species?

(Of course it is possible that this suggestion will only confuse you - haha. Still, if natural reason can make these sorts of judgments about species, then at least some "tout court inferior" claims are not nonsensical or unfalsifiable. Note too that racism only came to an end with substantive answers to the falsifiability question. Racism would never have come to an end if we just claimed that the racist had the burden of proof (because the burden of proof is culture- and time-relative).)

The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.

Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable. — Leontiskos

I think you are reading what I said in a different way than intended. Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. It means that they are never definitvely falsified, or at least that they can never be definitively falsified is a defensible claim, and if you look at the literature this counter claim to Popper-s idea of falsification has indeed been made.

And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. — Leontiskos

I'm saying the claim that some races are inferior certainly seems to be unsupportable on the grounds that no one has been able to show any cogent evidence for it, and it seems impossible to imagine what cogent evidence would even look like.

I don't have time to say more right now.

The trouble with divine commands is that they are local to a subset of people. A divine command can be used to dismiss someone who accepts the divine command, but it has no force over someone who does not accept the divine command. It does no good to tell a would-be murderer about God’s command against murder if he doesn’t believe in God. — Leontiskos

Sure, we can use other reasons to try to convince the non-believer. We could even appeal to his moral system, assuming he has one. Even in that best-case scenario (where the nonbeliever has a secular system that he follows), he might not care or have some other overriding concern that trumps the system. The question of moral motivation is a different matter from moral philosophy.

I heard a statistic yesterday that around 1 in 5 young people condone stealing from large corporations, depending on the circumstances. We can use non-religious reasons to try to deter them. For instance, we can tell them that stealing from grocery stores leads to higher prices for everyone. There will always be those who just aren't motivated, though, and for those, we unfortunately need to lay down the law and ensure this type of behavior is disincentivized.

Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

We are talking about falsifiability, not falsification. Scientific theories can be falsifiable even if they are not falsified.

I'm saying the claim that some races are inferior certainly seems to be unsupportable on the grounds that no one has been able to show any cogent evidence for it, and it seems impossible to imagine what cogent evidence would even look like. — Janus

Again, in that case it sounds like both you and your interlocutor are making unfalsifiable claims.

Again, "No one has been able to show evidence for it," is not a real argument. It is a kind of burden of proof claim. You and your interlocutor can keep telling each other that for all eternity. It goes nowhere. It is not a rational justification in any substantial sense. A good rule of thumb is to note that if your interlocutor can justly mirror back to you your "argument," then it isn't a substantial argument. See also:

(Note too that one could choose to question the racist's claim without asserting the contradictory claim. They would do this by saying, "What you say lacks coherence," or, "I don't know what you mean by tout court." If one wanted to take a "burden of proof" stance, that would be the way to do it, but I think that approach will fail. In short, it fails because the anti-racist is more committed to the tout court claim than the racist is. For example, a strong Darwinian could be a racist without a care in the world about any tout court claims.) — Leontiskos

In other words, if you really wanted to limit yourself to burden of proof jockeying then you would need to give up your claim, "No race is, tout court, inferior to another" (paraphrased). You would need to stop asserting it, believing it, thinking it, defending it, etc. But I think the most honest way forward is to simply admit that you/we do believe that claim, and then to ask whether we have any rational justification for the belief (and burden of proof jockeying does not really count as rational justification).

To see how weak the burden of proof claim is, one can simply place it in a syllogism and recognize the logical invalidity: <No one has been able to show me evidence for X; therefore X is false>. The only time that first premise has any bite is when the person is sincerely and even desperately seeking evidence for X, which is the exact opposite of what tends to happen. E.g. "I was raised Mormon. I really wanted it to be true. But I couldn't find any good evidence for it, and this threw me into depression."

But why isn't it moral? — Leontiskos

It doesn't require a moral judgment. I am at pains to understand how this question arose.

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. — Leontiskos

Feel free. I don't consider that judgment. If i'm marking a student's exam against a rubric of which out of A, B, C or D is 'correct' for each question, i'm doing no judgement at all. I feel the same applies here.

I suspect that what you are really doing is trying to deny that such a moral judgment is objective — Leontiskos

AS above, it should be clear I am not. Though, I agree, It couldn't be even if it were moral/ethical.

It seems that to morally judge someone else is really just to judge their culpability. — Leontiskos

That would be judging their moral culpability. Again, finding it hard to understand how these sorts of things arise. Do you not see that there are any other kinds of judgements going on in life?

Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

We are talking about falsifiability, not falsification. Scientific theories can be falsifiable even if they are not falsified. — Leontiskos

"Scientific theories can be falsified insofar" means "scientific theories are falsifiable insofar" so I am talking about falsification. We won't get far if you keep presenting distorted readings of my posts.

Again, in that case it sounds like both you and your interlocutor are making unfalsifiable claims. — Leontiskos

The claim that no evidence for or logical proof of a racist claim is falsifiable if such proof or evidence is possible. It would be falsified if someone produced such empirical evidence or logical proof. The further point is that no such evidence or proof is even imaginable, and I think that's why you keep saying my claim is unfalsifiable. But the fact that no such proof or evidence is imaginable only strengthens my position.

"Scientific theories can be falsified insofar" means "scientific theories are falsifiable insofar" so I am talking about falsification. We won't get far if you keep presenting distorted readings of my posts. — Janus

Why did you switch to talking about falsification rather than falsifiability? Here is what you said earlier, when you were still on topic:

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

(Again, this claim is simply false. Accurate theories can still be falsifiable even when they have not been falsified.)

Remember that the topic has always been falsifiability:

Specifically I want to explore the question of whether this claim is empirically or logically falsifiable. — Leontiskos

The attempt to discuss falsification apart from falsifiability is a kind of red herring, one which helps your case but which is in fact beside the point. (Note that one can discuss falsifiability via notions of falsification, or they can discuss falsification as a way of avoiding the question of falsifiability. You seem to be engaged in the latter.)

The further point is that no such evidence or proof is even imaginable, and I think that's why you keep saying my claim is unfalsifiable. — Janus

Well yes, if there is no imaginable evidence for your claim or the racist's claim, then both claims are unfalsifiable, are they not? It seems like you are on the verge of simply admitting that your claim is unfalsifiable, and such an admission would not imply that the racist does not have the same problem. If I just look at the two claims it seems obvious that both claims are unfalsifiable.*

* At least on your conception of reason

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

(Again, this claim is simply false. Accurate theories can still be falsifiable even when they have not been falsified.) — Leontiskos

I've already addressed your misinterpretation of the intended meaning of this sentence. Perhaps it wasn't expressed in the clearest of ways. Why bring it up again?

Well yes, if there is no imaginable evidence for your claim or the racist's claim, then both claims are unfalsifiable, are they not? It seems like you are on the verge of simply admitting that your claim is unfalsifiable, and such an admission would not imply that the racist does not have the same problem. If I just look at the two claims it seems obvious that both claims are unfalsifiable.* — Leontiskos

My claim really just consists in the observation that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims, and that they should thus be considered to be irrational. If you agree that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims then why are you continuing to argue with me?

Perhaps it wasn't expressed in the clearest of ways. — Janus

Isn't it just false?

Why bring it up again? — Janus

Because it seems to me to be the last point in the conversation when you were clearly on topic, namely the topic of falsifiability.

My claim really just consists in the observation that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims — Janus

Well let's look at some of your claims:

1. "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." ()
2. "No race is, tout court, inferior to another." (my paraphrase)
3. "there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims" ()

Since we are talking about falsifiability, what is your opinion? Is (1) falsifiable? Is (2) falsifiable? Is (3) falsifiable? The claims are all laid out in front of us; this should be a simple matter.

I think we agree that if some proposition is falsifiable then there must be a concrete possibility which would falsify it, such as the concrete possibility provided in <this post> by the flat Earther. So if you think any of these claims are falsifiable, then I would ask you to provide that "imaginative" possibility.

I think (2) is much clearer and easier to assess, but if you really want to look at (1) then I would say that (1) implies that there are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, equal to another. It precludes rational opposition to racism just as much as it precludes rational support of racism. It functions as a kind of nuclear option, and I don't see how that nuclear option could possibly help repel racism if it places the racist claim and the anti-racist claim on a par, as both being irrational (and ultimately unfalsifiable).

If you agree that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims then why are you continuing to argue with me? — Janus

Because I want to see if you are, "giving air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

I don't think the whole racist debate is just a sinkhole of unfalsifiable claims on both sides, akin to an astrological debate.* I agree with (2), but I don't think (2) or its mirror contradiction are unfalsifiable. In particular, I would not use a term like "tout court inferior" if I did not know what I meant by it.

* Feel free to substitute some other pseudoscientific candidate for 'astrology' if you like

1. "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." (↪Janus)
2. "No race is, tout court, inferior to another." (my paraphrase)
3. "there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims" (↪Janus)

Since we are talking about falsifiability, what is your opinion? Is (1) falsifiable? Is (2) falsifiable? Is (3) falsifiable? The claims are all laid out in front of us; this should be a simple matter. — Leontiskos

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds.

I agree with (2), but I don't think (2) or its mirror contradiction are unfalsifiable. — Leontiskos

It seems you do agree that 2. is falsifiable. So how about you tell me you tell me what such falsification evidence could look like? And then tell why it would not also falsify 1. and 2.

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

Yes, the same old disingenuous answer, "It would be falsified if it were falsified."* Your intellectual honesty dried up many posts ago. I guess we're done here, Janus. Good luck with these unfalsifiable, "metaphysical" claims of yours. :roll:

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified, and is therefore falsifiable.

I see you have no argument, so your only strategy is to question my intellectual honesty. I told you exactly how those claims could be falsified if it were indeed possible to falsify them, and asked if you disagreed and if so, why. How is that intellectual dishonest? The intellectual dishonesty seems to be yours, and I say that because you keep trying to distort what I have been saying.

Also, you say you agree that 2. is falsifiable, and yet won't say how it could be falsified, presumably because there is no imaginable way other than the way I have laid out.

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified and is therefore falsifiable. — Leontiskos

No the logical conclusion is that a claim would be at least possibly if not actually falsifiable if we can imagine how it could be falsified, if we can say what falsification would look like, which is what I have done.

What you are missing is that the general criterion for falsification is the possibility of either empirical evidence or logical self-evidence (as in mathematics, for example). Now it obviously is not logically self-evident that any racist claims are true, so we can rule that out as a possibility. So we are left with the possibility of some new empirical evidence for the claim that some races are superior to others. As far as I can tell it is impossible to imagine how empirical evidence could support a general claim of superiority, even though it might support a contextual claim, for example that some race is generally physically stronger than another. But the problem is that any evidence of particular superiority cannot support a claim of general superiority as far as I can tell.

So, when I said those 3 claims as you set them out could be falsified if definite proof or evidence of superiority could be found I was not claiming that such would be possible. In fact, I don't believe it is possible for the reasons I've outlined, and that impossibility does seem to be logically self-evident to me.

It doesn't require a moral judgment. I am at pains to understand how this question arose. — AmadeusD

with the way I described a moral judgment, namely:

Nevertheless, let's save the term "moral dismissal" for the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior. Ergo: "I am dismissing you because of such-and-such an action of yours, or such-and-such a behavior of yours, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you." — Leontiskos

I elaborated on this idea <here>.

So let me quote the whole context of what you responded to when you merely asserted that it doesn't require a moral judgment:

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to. — Leontiskos

We are judging an action or behavior, and we agreed that such a judgment is a moral judgment, so it seems that the judgment of the comedian is a moral judgment. Do you have any argument to the contrary?

Feel free. I don't consider that judgment. If i'm marking a student's exam against a rubric of which out of A, B, C or D is 'correct' for each question, i'm doing no judgement at all. I feel the same applies here. — AmadeusD

Then give your definition of 'judgment.' It seems to me that looking at the rubric and determining which answer is correct will require a judgment, namely judging which answer is correct. Why is that not a judgment? It seems ad hoc to exclude that sort of act from being a judgment, just as it seems ad hoc to exclude the judgment of the comedian from being a moral judgment. What principled definitions are supposed to exclude such things?

More simply:

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified and is therefore falsifiable. — Leontiskos

No the logical conclusion is that a claim would be at least possibly if not actually falsifiable if we can imagine how it could be falsified, if we can say what falsification would look like, which is what I have done. — Janus

Do you think there is such a thing as an unfalsifiable claim? If so, try to show me one, and I will show you why my quote holds. I think you have used a clever trick to write the concept of unfalsifiability out of existence, in order to make your unfalsifiable claim falsifiable. I already explained the problems with that tactic earlier in the thread.

Racist claims seem unfalsifiable. As far as we can tell they are. I'm just allowing for the possibility that they might be falsifiable. If they are unfalsifiable, then there is no possibility of either logical proof or empirical evidence to disconfirm or confirm them.

My statement that they can have no logical proof or empirical evidence simply follows logically from the assumption that racist claims are unfalsifiable. If they are falsifiable then my claim that they are unfalsifiable would also be falsifiable, in fact it would be false. That's all I'm claiming. I don't think it's a trick.

You ask me to show you an unfalsifiable claim. If a claim can have no logical proof or empirical evidence to support or refute it then it would be unfalsifiable. We can never be one hundred percent sure that particular claims are unfalsifiable, though and that's why I allow for the possibility.

Two well-used examples of what are often characterized as unfalsifiable claims are the Multiple Worlds Interpretation in QM, and the Multiple Worlds hypothesis in cosmogony. They both certainly seem to be unfalsifiable because we have no access to those posited other universes or worlds.

You ask me to show you an unfalsifiable claim. — Janus

Yes, and I am still waiting for you to do that.

Two well-used examples of what are often characterized as unfalsifiable claims are the Multiple Worlds Interpretation in QM, and the Multiple Worlds hypothesis in cosmogony. — Janus

So what is the claim that you purport to be unfalsifiable? Give me an actual assertion/claim. I am trying not to put words in your mouth given that you keep accusing me of incorrect interpretations, but you need to provide some clarity. Here is Wikipedia:

The many-worlds interpretation implies that there are many parallel, non-interacting worlds. — Many-world Interpretation | Wikipedia

Is that the claim you hold to be unfalsifiable? If not, what is the claim?

Is that the claim you hold to be unfalsifiable? — Leontiskos

I said it is often criticized as being falsifiable and that, for the reasons I gave, it does seem to be unfalsifiable.

It's common knowledge that it is. — Janus

Argumentum ad populum?

Here we go:

4. "There are many parallel, non-interacting worlds."

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

"4. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that there are not many parallel, non-interacting words could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?"

So on your approach the many-worlds interpretation is falsifiable. As I said, on such a facile approach every proposition must be falsifiable. This approach says nothing more than, "It would be falsified if it were falsified, therefore it is falsifiable." The fact that you've been running with this facile approach for so many posts is rather crazy, and it's very hard to believe that you are being intellectually serious here.

Sure, we can use other reasons to try to convince the non-believer. We could even appeal to his moral system, assuming he has one. — BitconnectCarlos

The word "even" makes me think that such an appeal is not necessary, which makes me think that there are suitable reasons which do not specifically leverage the non-believer's moral system. If that is so, then the issue must be amenable to reason and not merely to divine commands. If it is not amenable to reason then we couldn't use other reasons, and there could be no .

If that's not right, then I think you need to replace, "We could even," with, "We could only."

This thread is meant to tease out exactly what is going on in that sort of phenomenon. If we had to break it down rationally, what is it about a racist, or a Nazi, or a bigot, or a liar, or a betrayer, or a troll (etc.) that rationally justifies some form of dismissal or exclusion? — Leontiskos

There are lots of people I would exclude or, perhaps more to the point, not invite into my life. I tend to avoid people whose views or behaviours limit conversation and commonality and I avoid people with views I find ugly or unpleasant. Betrayers, trolls and liars would seem to be fairly good to avoid as there's a good chance we (or others close to us) would become victim of their behaviours. I've generally avoided people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. Things I don't like I avoid.

I tend to avoid people whose views or behaviours limit conversation and commonality and I avoid people with views I find ugly or unpleasant. Betrayers, trolls and liars would seem to be fairly good to avoid as there's a good chance we (or others close to us) would become victim of their behaviours. I've generally avoided people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. Things I don't like I avoid. — Tom Storm

Okay, but it looks like you have two different categories. The first category has to do with commonalities and excludes people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. The second category has to do with behaviors that you do not want to fall victim to.

What would you say is the rational justification for excluding, dismissing, or avoiding victimizers? What precisely is it about the victimizer that makes you oppose them? A specific example may be helpful here, and it could even be one of the three you mentioned (betrayers, trolls, or liars).

What would you say is the rational justification for excluding, dismissing, or avoiding victimizers? What precisely is it about the victimizer that makes you oppose them? A specific example may be helpful here, and it could even be one of the three you mentioned (betrayers, trolls, or liars). — Leontiskos

I guess my angle here is that I exclude a range of people because of an intuitive feeling about them, and a range of preferences that I don't think I have conscious access to. Attraction and repulsion are not always easy to explain. In this way, I don't differentiate between the sports lover and, say, the proselytising Marxist—both of whom I would avoid, perhaps because to my taste, they seem unpleasant and dull.

At the more extreme end, I imagine I would avoid Nazis because I think their views are ugly and actively seek harm, and I don't want to contaminate my life with such malice. I also dislike totalising metanarratives like Nazism, which seek to dominate and eliminate others. I guess I prefer openness and less cruelty. Life is short, and I want to spend it with things worth caring about.

The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.

Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet. — NOS4A2

Sorry, I forgot about this reply.

For my part, I am not convinced that speech is an inconsequential act. This is why free speech always becomes a difficult issue. If speech were inconsequential then no one would worry about free speech and we would need no civil right to free speech.

To give a very blasé example, suppose the captain orders his troops to kill the women and children. That is a consequential speech act, albeit a command. Its causal power is manifest. Other acts of speech, such as persuasive speech, can also be consequential. If someone traveled back in time to kill Hitler, they may very well aim to off him before he starts giving his big speeches, given what a powerful orator he was.

Murder is a specific type of killing, one that is uniquely wrong. It involves making the innocent one's target. — BitconnectCarlos

What about Trolley Car? The innocent is the target (or, you're slapping a big target on the innocent when you throw the switch which seems like a distinction without a difference) — RogueAI

Sure, and the trolley problem is a fringe but interesting case. We can play around with the number saved. It leads us to other questions like: Is murder OK if there's a greater net benefit to the community? It's a thorny issue; no easy answers.

Q1: Nothing/anything.
Q2: Irrelevant due to first answer.

My point being rationality does not really have all that much to say about how to act. We simply act as we act and believe what we believe. Rational justification for what cannot be factually measured is to abscond from ownership of our actions.

At best rational analysis can guide our hand but at the end of the day we move it. Those paralyzed into thinking they need rational justification for past, present or future actions are looking for a way to avoid responsibility.