You should try and set a better example, as you’re a moderator.

..you’re a moderator. — Wayfarer

Not I. Not openly, anyway.

One salient fact about your square example is that there is a criteria for success. — Banno

It's an analogy. In the analogy, positivism, which you're espousing here, wouldn't allow an extension of the line outside the square, hence success would be impossible.

positivism, which you're espousing here, — Wayfarer

How rude.

The point is that not just any line outside the square will do. So which will you choose, and why?

Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought. — Wayfarer

Taking this to be a line outside the box... How might we understand this? Is it supposed to be true? What difference does saying this make to what we ought to do?

What is the criteria for success?

Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought.
— Wayfarer

How might we understand this? Is it supposed to be true? What difference does saying this make to what we ought to do?

What is the criteria for success? — Banno

I know it is a sweeping statement, but I take it to be important to the study of philosophy.

The appeal to 'objectivity' is characteristic of modern philosophy, within which it provides the criterion of what is measurably so, what which is true independent of opinion. But objectivity has its limits, specifically, it is limited to what is measurable and quantifiable. So that is why it suggests something like 'verificationism', which in turn suggest positivism. How can it not? All I'm doing in saying that, is making explicit an assumption. I'm not accusing anyone of anything. But positivism, in at least a vague sense, is probably the default position for a large number of contributors here. I see it cited, often unknowingly, on a daily basis, in appeals to science in support of some philosophical proposition.

So the first paragraph harks back to 'the forms', which are only known to a rational intelligence, but are not the property of a particular mind. They're not your ideas or mine, but the common property of rational minds in general (for which, see the Wikipedia entry on nous.) As I said in my first post, this is the significance of mathematical platonism. But such ideas are also found in neo-thomism. Of course, that means they will be rejected because of their association with religion, specifically, Catholicism. Outside the square, see? 'The square' being liberal individualism and scientific naturalism.

In any case, appeals to transcendental arguments are not unique to Thomist and religious philosophy, as they're also central to Kant, but I know that introducing Kant to a thread makes for a very complicated argument. Suffice to say, the classical 'appeal to the transcendent' found in all philosophy up until the advent of modernism, provides a sense of a larger criterion for truth than 'objectivity'.

I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false? — Banno

I think hierarchy of understanding vs truth. Truth is binary and can't be understood, while understanding can be more or less...understood, but isn't true.

The appeal to 'objectivity' is characteristic of modern philosophy... — Wayfarer

But you and I know better.

I'll vote for mathematics as a construction rather than Platonism, since I have no clear notion of what a form might be. Cubes and the number three exist in a way not entirely dissimilar to mortgages and property.

But we are wandering.

And yet we know that this thread is in English. — Banno

By your definition of “is not wrong about” (which is the same as “cannot be wrong about”) no I don’t. It could be the case that the google translate plugin I have had been translating French this whole time without me noticing for example.

I know the thread is in English in the sense that I have very good reason for believing it is.

We talk about stuff we know all the time, but khaled would have us not do so — Banno

Well no, I’d change what “know” means instead of proposing that what we know cannot be false by definition. I asked you what the point of that move was countless times now and you haven’t answered. It doesn’t give any extra certainty, it doesn’t even sound better (not to me anyways).

replacing knowledge with mere belief. — Banno

Belief is what matters. I see no point in proposing the existence of knowledge you can’t be wrong about, with the side effect of not being able to confirm when you have it. It grants no new certainty. And your claims about knowledge are still doubtable as ever.

Again, what’s the difference between “If I know X I cannot be wrong about X, but I can’t actually tell whether or not I know X” and “I can’t tell whether or not X is true”. The loop de loop seems pointless.

There's a reason we have the word "know" and use it sometimes rather than "belief". — Banno

The reason being that “know” implies more certainty. It’s a quantitative not a qualitative difference. For instance: “England is gonna lose, I just know it”. Obviously the speaker cannot see the future, so they don’t “know” it by your definition. The word is used just to express a higher level of certainty than “I believe England will lose”.

Mandating that we not do so. — Banno

When did anyone say that?

Oddly, notifications from you are not appearing in my mentions list.

“is not wrong about” (which is the same as “cannot be wrong about”) — khaled

No, it isn't. It might be wrong, but as things stand it isn't. So it doesn't follow that it cannot be wrong.

Might leave it at that. It kinda sums up the differences in our opinions neatly. Come back to me when you can see the distinction I've made.

Might leave it at that. It kinda sums up the differences in our opinions neatly. Come back to me when you can see the distinction I've made. — Banno

Is an approximation knowledge? If its understood to not quite be true, but informative enough to be useful. Can't call it a belief, because it isn't believed to be the actual if it is a known approximation. Also, can't call it true if it is a known approximation. It is very justified though, considering it's the basis for every load bearing structure built to a code. But, under your definition it isn't "justified" as in the justified to be the truth. Much like the roof over your head, if you didn't know whether or not it would collapse you wouldn't be sitting where you are at the moment. I recommend always looking for cracks in that bit of knowledge.

Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought. Not private or personal thinking but the way the mind operates on a more general, inter-subjective level. — Wayfarer

I think one way of looking at it is as a hierarchy of awareness or experience:

1. Consciousness (individual) perceives physical objects in sensory perception.

2. Consciousness (individual) conceives of objects or thoughts mentally.

3. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of the world as its own emanation.

4. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of itself.

The Ideas or Forms could exist in a latent state at level (4) after which they are activated in order to emanate the world.

It might be wrong, but as things stand it isn't. So it doesn't follow that it cannot be wrong. — Banno

So you can know something, and be wrong? But I thought you can’t know things that are false (from your about page)

I don’t get what you’re saying. Just seems self contradictory.

So you can know something, and be wrong? But I thought you can’t know things that are false (from your about page) — khaled

Under this system you can know true things and mislabel false things as known. But, nothing mislabeled is known; only incorrectly claimed to be known. The definition is self-consistent it just doesn't really describe the human experience from the perspective of the knower. It's the definition of knowledge from the perspective of God basically. Which is a good bit of irony.

Under this system you can know true things and mislabel false things as known. — Cheshire

So what's so different between this and a system where "knowledge" expresses a high degree of justification?

If what you know is true by definition, but you cannot know whether or not you know something (since you can always just be mislabeling), no extra certainty has been added.

Might as well just say that what you know is NOT true by definition, and that knowledge just means having a high degree of justification.

I'm not disagreeing with Banno I just wanna know why he defines things that way. What benefit does it bring?

I'm not disagreeing with Banno I just wanna know why he defines things that way. What benefit does it bring? — khaled

I'd conjecture it's the result of a flawed assumption that foundationalism is a workable model for reality. If knowledge was actually built from the ground up one true premise at a time it might be that way. But, it's not and the definition never changed. He's just repeating the technically "correct" answer for a couple thousand years definition from what I gather. It is arguably what people want when they seek knowledge. It's just not quite what they get.

,
Do you know things that are false?

All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question.

Do you know things that are false? — Banno

Probably.

All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question. — Banno

I don't see the consequences as being any different from answering "yes". That's what I keep asking you about. What is the problem with "yes" that makes you say "no"?

I've answered that, but you don't accept the answer.

Would you agree that there is a distinction to be made between the question "Do you know things that are false?" and "Do you think you know things that are false"?

I would agree that there are things that we think we know, but about which we are mistaken. But it is just poor expression to say you know something that is false.

A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief.

We can stipulate negative interest rates or announce a jubilee cancellation of all mortgage debt or cancel the validity of a currency at will. But we can't make the sum of a negative and an equal positive number come to anything but zero. There seems to be a tough, brutish, inflexible factishness about arithmetic that is not there in property or money or similar constructions.

Though I suppose we can see what happens if Euclid's 5th postulate is treated as false and then discover a whole new area of maths. But.... Well, I don't know.

Do you know things that are false?
All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question. — Banno

Knowledge is the product of humans
All human products are subject to human error
Knowledge is subject to human error

Anything subject to error contains parts that are true and parts that are false.

Similar to mathematics, the system is set up to produce only true answers. But, believing the output is always true or without error wouldn't be reasonable because of the source of the work.

The act or state of knowing doesn't change based on whether what is known corresponds to the facts. The I think I thought I knew is a slight of hand to maintain an idealistic version of knowledge. Which is why you don't always believe people when they claim to know things.

But it is just poor expression to say you know something that is false. — Banno

That's where I disagree.

It seems poor expression to me to say that one doesn't know things that are false by definition.

A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief. — Banno

What's an example of a problem that occurs when one defines knowledge as a very high degree of justification? That's what I've been asking from the start!

What's an example of a problem that occurs when one defines knowledge as a very high degree of justification? — khaled

Technically, you end up with an infinite regress always trying to justify the thing that justified. While we're at it. Knowledge can exist in a book with the author dead and no one alive even aware of it. So, go ahead and toss out belief too.

I finally thought of a new way to assail this beast of yours. We each have conflicting theories of knowledge and we each have examples of knowledge that we use as analogs when discussing it. It stands to reason that if one of us has an incorrect theory; then the example we use will not actually be knowledge but instead serve as evidence that merely suits our description.

Which is a better example of knowledge? General relativity or "the fact you are reading this"
Which one implies useful inquiry and what is merely the description of sub-conscious process?

Actual knowledge isn't manifest; rather it is produced through an inquiry and/or observations of trials.
If I went into a job interview and they asked me; What do you have knowledge of? Would I tell them the color of the shirt they are wearing; no it is ad-hoc to the degree of absurd.

Your bedrock position is on the use of the term and your example is not one. The example you provide of undeniable knowledge disproves that JTB naturally constructs knowledge; as we know it. The definition is so restrictive that it limits examples of knowledge to near obvious to plainly obvious things. Knowledge as it's used in common practice is not the set of obvious things. Knowledge is not a goat.

Technically, you end up with an infinite regress always trying to justify the thing that justified. — Cheshire

Seems at most like a problem Banno’s system always shares.

“I know that it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not just mislabeling”
“I know that I know it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not mislabeling”
…..

And you don’t end up with infinite regress if you decided beforehand what constitutes good justification.

And you don’t end up with infinite regress if you decided beforehand what constitutes good justification. — khaled

I acknowledge your example is linguistically coherent, but generally we talk about justifying from a deductive point of view. What you are describing is induction and comes along with it's own bag of broken glass. Or if you rather, knowledge of the future isn't really a reasonable example for knowledge in the context of philosophical discussion. You are more than welcome to pursue it if you see otherwise, but it looks like the hard way.

You are correct it is a problem regarding Banno's defense of the JTB framework; in my bold assessment.

While I'm at it; what if all of space was made of tiny circles that expand and contract in the presence of matter causing gravity?

All human products are subject to human error — Cheshire

It might turn out that 1+2 does not equal 3? Or that the Bishop does not stay on its original colour? Or even that the earth is not roughly spherical?

Then I don't agree. These are things we know. And I think you misunderstand the perspective I am taking here. Sure, you can make up any definition fo "know" that you like.

The act or state of knowing doesn't change based on whether what is known corresponds to the facts. — Cheshire

So on your version you can know things that are not true. Fine. Time to shake my head and walk away.

It seems poor expression to me to say that one doesn't know things that are false by definition. — khaled

...talking about poor expression.

But in much of modern philosophy the naturalist attitude is taken for granted, not seeing how this limits the scope of philosophical conceivability to what is 'inside the square', what can be definitely known by means of sense and science. — Wayfarer

It's not the scope of conceivability, but the scope of determinate knowability which is limited. You don't want to admit that the scope of determinate knowability is limited to what can be known by means of sense and science (and you left out logic), and that metaphysics is merely an imaginative activity akin to poetry. That metaphysics is an imaginative activity that cannot yield determinate knowledge doesn't devalue it in the slightest in my opinion, just as it doesn't devalue poetry; in fact that is rather what it gives it value.

Though I suppose we can see what happens if Euclid's 5th postulate is treated as false and then discover a whole new area of maths. But.... Well, I don't know. — Cuthbert

Was this in reply to my mortgage comment? Curious, isn't it, that maths seems to be both discovered and constructed.

A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief. — Banno

An example?