Your recipe for beer and your recipe for knowledge suffer the same difficulty: they are too restrictive. In both cases, it's more about the process than the ingredients. — Banno

I would say it's about the results. Clues about which might be ingredients and process.

I would say it's about the results. — tim wood

And as a result you include too little in your definition.

A question I have asked before: a stick of dynamite explodes: what caused it to explode? — tim wood

That it was lit. That the chemical compounds which comprise dynamite explode when lit.

Maybe I'm not understanding the language, or context is omitted, but pretty clearly for the Greeks what ought to be was manifestly not in nature. — tim wood

It varied between philosophers and schools. Some of them were much nearer to naturalism than others, but platonism did not operate from naturalist presuppositions.

There is no "final cause" because the end of the universe hasn't happened. — Gregory

The final cause of a match is fire. This is because matches are made so as to light fires, so that is the reason for their existence. A final cause not final as in 'the end of everything' but simply as 'the end towards which something is directed'.

I'm emphasizing that not everyone expresses their inner experience the same. So the ends of one person may seem different from someone else. We don't really know how others experience life. But the material ends in nature do not point to a reason in nature that is discernable. Fatalism has causes without reasons, for example, because those are different concepts

I'm emphasizing that not everyone expresses their inner experience the same. — Gregory

This is a philosophy forum. The aim is to try and express ideas coherently, and preferably with some connection to the recognised problems of philosophy.

Some of them were much nearer to naturalism than others, but platonism did not operate from naturalist presuppositions. — Wayfarer

Hey. Just to know, what is it that you have in mind when you speak of naturalism?

The ends of life are interior but you mention Aristotle who put ends in everything and who is always incoherent.

Hey. Just to know, what is it that you have in mind when you speak of naturalism? — Manuel

Pretty much 'post Enlightenment philosophy'. A strict division between what can be known by the natural sciences and what is deemed not to be thus knowable. Closely intertwined with empiricism, the view that only what can be detected by the senses (and instruments) is to be considered real. The other component is 'positivism'.

The term ‘positivism’ was coined in the 1830s by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, to distinguish the empirical and natural sciences from religious and metaphysical accounts of the world. Comte saw a progression in the development of society from the ‘theological’ to the ‘scientific’ phase, in which data derived from empirical experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, provide the exclusive source of all authentic knowledge. Even though Comte’s influence has waned in the intervening centuries, his conception of the evolution of society from theological to scientific - a model which might be called ‘historical positivism’ - has remained an important component of the modern outlook.

Pretty much 'post Enlightenment philosophy'. A strict division between what can be known by the natural sciences and what is deemed not to be thus knowable. Closely intertwined with empiricism, the view that only what can be detected by the senses (and instruments) is to be considered real. The other component is 'positivism'. — Wayfarer

Ah, gatcha. Thanks.

As thus stated, this leaves out a lot of stuff concerning the mental. Unless one takes the mental to be fundamental in interpreting sense data...

Of course. Hence, one of my favourite boilerplate quotations.

Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.

This place is full of it. ;-)

This place is full of it. ;-) — Wayfarer

Then there's a lot of stuff to argue about. But I don't think arguing with people who agree with Dennett or Churchland(s) to be fruitful in any way. Other things, sure, but not eliminitavism.

We cannot fully separate ourselves from the world, it's not possible. We can retreat from view to an extent, but in the end it comes back to the cash value we make of the stuff we interpret, not a "view from nowhere."

But, this is philosophy. If 3 people agree, there's a problem. Heck, if one person agrees with himself on everything, that's probably bad too. :razz:

There is no way to prove purpose in Nature fom science so if natural explanations work for someone then you can't reasonably talk of "reasons" for Nature with him. I believe in Kant and Hegel's philosophies, which are very intricate or at least specific. I understand how science makes sense of the universe on it's own terms and i work with philosophy on top of that foundation. This dialectic reveals subjective truth and is the best psychology ive come across (regular psychology books i dont really get).

But trying to force "cause" and "reason for something" into a single idea is a sophistry and that's why I pointed this out

I don't think arguing with people who agree with Dennett or Churchland(s) to be fruitful in any way. — Manuel

I can't help but take the bait sometimes. Mainly because I'm incredulous that they are taken seriously.

But to try and get back to the OP - I see it as an attempt to ground epistemology in something other than 'mere belief'. It recognises the difficulty of doing that. There's a polemic against clinging to beliefs as an impediment to knowledge which is fair. Then the appeal to reason as 'presiding over all' - which is also fair, but somewhat undermined by the later claim that reason is 'itself a tool, like a 3/8ths-inch wrench, and with the same moral significance, which is to say none.' That seems to contradict the premisses of the OP, as I stated here. But that is not the fault of the person who wrote the OP - it's the zeigeist, the spirit of the times. Because, as I tried to show, the original conception of 'reason' was far more encompassing than it's modern use as 'an instrument'. It encompassed 'reason' in the grand sweep of things, 'the reason things exist', anchored against a metaphysic which saw reason as something that animated the Universe. A metaphysic which has since been found wanting, and rejected - but not replaced. Hence, 'the Cartesian anxiety'. It's a deep problem, not something to make light of.

Closely intertwined with empiricism, the view that only what can be detected by the senses (and instruments) is to be considered real. The other component is 'positivism'. — Wayfarer

That is one view. But I prefer a version of naturalism/physicalism that says this is all we know for now. It's not making proclamations about what is real (yes, I know, some are dogmatic) just what we we can reliable talk about.

That is the definition of empiricism, it's not 'one view'. One can have views of the implications of empiricism, but the principles are pretty non-negotiable.

I am rather persauded by Jacques Maritain's criticisms of it, however.

The tragedy of the great Empiricist philosophers came from the fact that not only did they deny the prime intellectual intuitions on which metaphysical knowledge depends, but they were actually lacking in these intuitions. They did not see (through the intellect's power of vision) when it came to the supra-empirical horizon of Being and essence brought out at the level of metaphysical intelligibility. And they did not know that they saw through the intellect's power of vision when it came to the scientific handling of the world of experience. Thus they indeed endeavored in a sincere and earnest fashion to build a comprehensive system giving account of all the human riches inherent in Western culture; no one was more generously attached to these human riches than a John Stuart Mill for instance: but they only succeeded in building cathedrals in paper and worlds in the air.

The modern man does not even feel such tragedy. Unaware of his own intellect's spiritual activity, which he cannot do without, but which he has repressed in his unconscious, he gladly enjoys a mental behavior in which human reason limits itself to the most clever and intelligent use and penetration of the animal field of sense-experience.

Maritain wasn't spiritual

That it was lit. That the chemical compounds which comprise dynamite explode when lit. — Wayfarer

Well, that's clear. What does that mean? We can be informal in description, and thereby imprecise, but what good is that? What I'm driving at is nothing original with me: If you insist on cause, then it is presumably separate from event, but if the cause is being lit, and it explodes when lit, then cause and effect are one, and if being lit isn't the cause, then what is? And that seems a problem for this sense of cause and effect. And of course there are other senses. The person caused it. The lighting of the fuse caused it, and so forth. There seem, then, many causes and no cause. And that's on the way to understanding why the idea of cause is no longer used in some sciences, replaced by fields.

It varied between philosophers and schools. Some of them were much nearer to naturalism than others, but platonism did not operate from naturalist presuppositions. — Wayfarer

Just so. The Greek view of nature was as a world of imprecision, for which no science is possible. That's why ideals and mathematics, but no natural science in any modern sense.

I'll all for the four causes - as a stimulus to thought, but for lots of reasons not really a basis for any science or ground for any reasoned argument that does not itself presuppose them.

The ends of life are interior but you mention Aristotle who put ends in everything and who is always incoherent. — Gregory

And for observations like this, what do expect in reply?

Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, ....should be able to lead us to afirm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us.

This longing for unchanging, certain knowledge seems to me to be associated with religion and old-fashioned metaphysics ('rationalized' religion). As I understand them, the scientific spirit and more recent philosophy understand our knowledge to be provisional & constantly evolving.

Where's the Cartesian anxiety in this?

In rejecting representationalism and the essentialism that it implies, Dewey abandons the Cartesian-inspired spectator account of knowledge, which radically separates the knowing subject from the object being studied. No longer considering that objectivity a result of a detachment from the material under study but rather as an ongoing interaction with that which is at hand, Dewey elevates practice over theory; better said, he puts theory in service to practice. From Rorty’s perspective, while Dewey had a great insight, he ought to have taken the next step and rejected scientism—the claim that scientific method allows humanity to gain a privileged insight into the structural processes of nature. His failure to reject the alleged epistemologically privileged stance is one main reason Rorty must re-imagine Dewey. Nevertheless, Dewey’s elevation of practice continues the movement away from the pre-Darwinian attachment to the belief in a non-human source of purpose and the immutability of natural kinds toward a contingent “world,” where humans define and redefine their social and material environments. It is within a social practice or a “language-game” that specific marks and sounds come to designate commonly accepted meanings. And, as Rorty states in “Feminism and Pragmatism,” (1995) no set of marks or sounds (memes) can ever bring cognitive clarity about the way the world is or the way we as humans are. Instead, memes compete with one another in an evolutionary struggle over cultural space, just as genes compete for survival in the natural environment. Unguided by an immanent or transcendent teleology, the memes’ replication is determined by their usefulness within a given social group. And it is through their utility for the continued existence and prospering of a social group that the group’s memes—like their genes—are carried forward and flourish. They establish their niche in the socio-ecological system. — link

https://iep.utm.edu/rorty/#SH3a

I think 'Cartesian anxiety' only works against an unworthy enemy and even doubles back to some degree. It's as if (static) religious thought and scientistic thought are two brothers fighting over the same inheritance, while 'dynamic' philosophers abandon that inheritance.

The Greek view of nature was as a world of imprecision, for which no science is possible. — tim wood

So, do you see why I characterise your approach as broadly positivist? Don't take that as an ad hominem, it's a description of a philosophical attitude or approach.

Maritain was a modern student of Aquinas whom more than all Catholics worshipped the sun. Aquinas relentlessly talked about natural light and color, and in his most famous portrait he wears a symbol of the sun God. When Popes took the place of Roman Emporers in the West they brought Roman sun worship with them.

Classic empiricism is indeed crude by today's standards (well demolished even by secular thinkers.) But it's as if you are criticizing a brand new Tesla by talking about a Model T.

I made a specific point about Aristotle: that "cause" and "reason" are not *necessarily* related. I thought it was connected to what you were saying, but you don't seem to ever say anything specific, so I'll go read and do something else tonight

I understand positivism as the claim, roughly and paraphrasing, if you can't eat it, f*** it, or kill it, then it's not real. I hold ideas are real as ideas, and their effects are real. So near as I can tell, you seem oddly unable to get both hands on my thinking, perhaps because at bottom we have a substantial disagreement. And my view of yours, that I'm glad to be corrected on if I'm mistaken, is that you believe in the extra-mental reality of non-material things. That is, me: no mind no God; you: no mind, God still there.

And the difficulty is that your view, that I call mere belief, being at best a claim, if allowed in argument, leads to conclusions with respect to the existence of things for which no evidence is possible.

That it was lit. That the chemical compounds which comprise dynamite explode when lit.
— Wayfarer

Well, that's clear. What does that mean? We can be informal in description, and thereby imprecise, but what good is that? What I'm driving at is nothing original with me: If you insist on cause, then it is presumably separate from event, but if the cause is being lit, and it explodes when lit, then cause and effect are one, and if being lit isn't the cause, then what is? And that seems a problem for this sense of cause and effect. — tim wood

I think you're referring here to David Hume's sceptical criticism of inductive reasoning. To which I can only offer Kant's 'answer to Hume' as a rejoinder - that the necessary connection of cause and effect is a presupposition for the possibility of knowledge.

This longing for unchanging, certain knowledge seems to me to be associated with religion and old-fashioned metaphysics ('rationalized' religion). As I understand them, the scientific spirit and more recent philosophy understand our knowledge to be constantly evolving. — j0e

Associated with metaphysics proper. Go back to the Parmenides, as I am currently doing, and reconsider what the object of that quest was - the attainment of certain knowledge of the real. The knowledge of the empirical world - the world which modern naturalism views as the only real realm - is not equated with true knowledge, because the objects within it constantly arise and pass away and are ephemeral. We're chasing shadows on the wall.

Classic empiricism is indeed crude by today's standards. — j0e

Maritain wrote in the 1920's and 30's, not 1700. I'm not highly conversant with him, and don't intend to become so. But the substance of his criticism rings true with me.

Personal note: I suppose I ought to lay something out here which is that I hold Christian Platonism in high regard. Had I been taught that subject properly earlier in life, or had I encountered it under different circumstances, I might self-identify as something more than a 'cultural Christian' (and Buddhist convert). Be that as it may, (neo)Thomism contains a strain of traditional metaphysics, the philosophia perennis, that I believe holds up perfectly well in today's cultural milieu. Of course, nearly all of its exponents are Catholic, and I am not Catholic nor likely to become so. However I am obliged to admit that I'd be a Catholic a long time before I was an atheist. (Fortunately, I don't have to be either :-) )

Maritain was a modern student of Aquinas whom more than all Catholics worshipped the sun. — Gregory

I don't share your animus towards Catholic culture. I might, had I been brought up in it, and had it beaten into me with a cane. As it was, I discovered it through the study of the history of ideas and philosophy, so I approached it rather differently to one who has had it thrust on them.

And my view of yours, that I'm glad to be corrected on if I'm mistaken, is that you believe in the extra-mental reality of non-material things. — tim wood

Correct, with the caveat that they're not 'things'. That the tendency to portray it in terms of 'things' arises from the genetic naturalism of modern culture, which orientates itself with respect to things.

And the difficulty is that your view, that I call mere belief, being at best a claim, if allowed in argument, leads to conclusions with respect to the existence of things for which no evidence is possible. — tim wood

I agree with the arguments of natural theology: that the sensory domain points to something beyond itself. And as one argument for that, I cite the tendency in modern cosmology and physics to posit multiple universes and parallel worlds; that nature seems to 'overflow its bounds', so to speak. The atom was supposedly simple; yet the largest and most expensive apparatus in history has been unable to determine its true nature. Maybe it's because it doesn't have a true nature, that it lacks intrinsic reality, that the reality it possesses is imputed to it. That we really are chasing shadows on a wall.

And that segways into (Buddhist) idealism, the insight into the 'mind-made world'.

That is the definition of empiricism, it's not 'one view'. One can have views of the implications of empiricism, but the principles are pretty non-negotiable. — Wayfarer

I hear you but I'm not sure we often encounter people who hold to such a rigid form of empiricism.

It's not so much that it's rigid, but that it's the assumed background of many other beliefs. On this forum, and others, I have always argued against materialism (obviously!) but I find many of those whom I think hold that view, don't actually know that they hold it! Which often makes debate pointless, because having to explain to them what they actually believe before you tell them what's wrong with it is like explaining a joke.

The knowledge of the empirical world ... is not equated with true knowledge, because the objects within it constantly arise and pass away and are ephemeral. — Wayfarer

On what corroborable grounds have you (Eleatics, Platonists & woo-ologists) determined "objects ... constantly arise and pass away and are ephemeral" do not constitute "true knowledge"?

Yeah :point:

:up: In my own terms, following on what you wrote and contra Wayfarer's anti-modern polemical definition: naturalism, since antiquity, denotes describing or explaining some aspect of nature only in terms of (an)other aspect(s) of nature. Questions like 'Is nature all that is real?' or 'Are supernaturalia real?' are speculations which are simply outside of naturalism's remit. Chinese daojia and Greek atomism, as examples, have always had this naturalistic approach, or stance, in common. A naturalist can be agnostic about 'the supernatural', methodologically not relying on it to build explanatory models, though, of course, many have become dogmatic to the point of scientism perhaps as a vestigial (institutionalized?) overreaction to Scholasticism, Romanticism and the Counter-Enlightenment.

The Greek view of nature was as a world of imprecision, for which no science is possible. That's why ideals and mathematics, but no natural science in any modern sense — tim wood

:100:

Beautifully put.

Which often makes debate pointless, because having to explain to them what they actually believe before you tell them what's wrong with it is like explaining a joke. — Wayfarer

That's a pretty good line.