Thanks. Looking forward to it.

As mentioned, I am going to put together a reading of the first section that I will post after Nov 5.

Thanks for setting this up. I'm looking forward to it.

That may well be interesting. I'll be sure to read some and give my opinion and/or ask for feedback, etc.

I won't participate, probably, but I will watch the thread like a hawk to ensure it stays textual if you like @Antony Nickles. If you're leading the group and want assistance keeping this on topic, please PM me regarding any poster who isn't being sufficiently textual/exegetical and I'll come in and examine. Any actions I take to keep things on topic wouldn't be seen as formal mod actions or warnings etc, it would just be to keep something that could be very excellent indeed very on topic.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner

Since sense data (what Witt takes as “feeling, hearing, seeing” p.1) is not a simple philosophy-101 idea, I feel I should offer a brief overview (outside the text, so without defense, to be taken or left).

The idea and framework come from something very old and fundamental in philosophy: skepticism.

For Descartes it came from doubt; in response he divided everything into reality and ‘representation’. “…the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true…” (1st Med, p.7)

Plato pictured a “shadow” (Republic ln. 515) to save the possibility of something true in comparison.

Ayer’s idea of ‘perception’ is that the world always appears different (we read Austin's response here).

and Kant internalized into each of us the paranoia that ‘appearances’ “to every different eye, in respect of its colour, …may appear different.” (Crit. Of Pure Reason §§4).

‘Sense data’ is an amalgamation of all these constructions.

‘Sense data’ is an amalgamation of all these constructions. — Antony Nickles

Where would one place the notion of a "concept" with the above about "sense-data" in mind?

Where would one place the notion of a "concept" with the above about "sense-data" in mind? — Shawn

Well that’s a pretty fuzzy word**, but if we are dealing with “feeling, hearing, seeing”, and so tangential to ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, ‘thinking’, where ‘thought’ is considered like an object as well, then there is a traditional interpretation of ‘concept’ as an ‘idea’, then an ‘idea’ is in the same placeholder as ‘appearance’ or ‘representation’.

Witt uses the word ‘concept’ but it is an individually-defined term for him, which is just a grouping of activities and practices, like: pointing, or following a rule, or identifying pain, etc. So he will talk about the concept of playing a game, but he does not mean: the ‘idea’ of playing, but the criteria and steps etc. that fall under the umbrella of that activity.

**Idea could also be an image for, or speaking to, yourself.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner @Shawn

Section 1 pp. 1-3 Mental objects & Use (cut the first section a little short; and not waiting until after U.S. election).

Wittgenstein starts with claiming that we are incorrectly structuring ‘sense data’ (feelings, visions, thoughts) after an object, as when he says “a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.” (p.1, emphasis added) (“A substantive” is defined as something that has importance to us, is meaningful.) He refers to this desire for correspondence as a “temptation”—which will be a theme—as if we are compelled to turn something that matters, into ‘matter’, compared to insubstantial ‘mind’ or ‘idea’, to avoid it being unstable and ensure its importance to us. (He will draw the skeptical picture of mind and its mechanisms—which have something “queer” about them—at the end of page 3.)

One other point is his discussion of method, which a lot of this book introduces and explains. He says we can be “cured” of the temptation (to need objectivity) by “studying the grammar [ workings ] of the [ an ]expression”. As if, when we saw each things’ different rationality, we would let go of the desire to impose the framework (and standard) of an object.

Now a “verbal” definition sets the terms of our words (“attributing” and “predicating” it, he says (p.2)—where the idea that we ‘agree’ to language comes from), which is why he prefers an “ostensive” definition, which is a demonstration by pointing out examples. (I leave the questions he asks to others; we can’t all be interested in the same things—thus why we may have multiple, non-conflicting readings.)

It would seem he is doing the exact opposite when he says it is the job of the O.D. “to give it a meaning”, but he means giving an expression a context of different relevances (fleshing out the “this-ness” as it were, I will take it, in contrast). “This is a pencil” can be taken, or seen, or said, as: its being “round” in that it is not shaped like a carpenter’s marker; or “wood” in that it is not just charcoal; or “one” in that it is “a pencil” (not two pencils), or “hard” (which ?? maybe you can find the circumstance that fits). A “ostensive definition” here is what in the PI he calls a “description” (PI #496, #665).

These are different possible ‘senses’ of the expression “This is a pencil”; he will also call these the ‘uses’—which is not meant to point out that we ‘use’ words—they reflect our interests, the reason to say it (then), and its possibilities, etc. (what he calls “criterion”) along with the circumstances, and practices, say, of picking out things, like instruments. He calls them here “interpretations”, not meant as ‘perceived’ differently, but taken to apply to a different context, under the associated kinds of facts that matter (to the related criterion) in that circumstance.

The already-established associations (criteria, practices) are the reason why we do not usually make a separate decision (unless and until we do; his example: “interpreting before obeying” (p.3)). The example of getting the red flower is evidence that with “the usual way” we don’t have any reason to deviate from or reflect on our life-long patterns (like searching, and matching colors), as we do in politics, and philosophy.

I'm doing this to show an actual involvement, to not lazy my way out of at least some of this.

1) I am foggy brained right now but will attempt to reply to what I think is interesting.

2) I am assuming that the pages you mentioned are the ones that show up in the document you shared.

First, a comment on a few things you said, then a quote I take form him, to see what I end up with.

One other point is his discussion of method, which a lot of this book introduces and explains. He says we can be “cured” of the temptation (to need objectivity) by “studying the grammar [ workings ] of the [ an ]expression”. As if, when we saw each things’ different rationality, we would let go of the desire to impose the framework (and standard) of an object. — Antony Nickles

My question is, who is the one who is looking for this "objectivity"? Philosophers? Ordinary people?

Maybe if someone holds on to a variety of a referential doctrine in which a word "flower" literally "means" that thing we see in our garden, then I can see his point of this being a misleading way of thinking about words.

Do ordinary people think this? It's not clear to me.

He calls them here “interpretations”, not meant as ‘perceived’ differently, but taken to apply to a different context, under the associated kinds of facts that matter (to the related criterion) in that circumstance.

The already-established associations (criteria, practices) are the reason why we do not usually make a separate decision (unless and until we do; his example: “interpreting before obeying” (p.3)). The example of getting the red flower is evidence that with “the usual way” we don’t have any reason to deviate from or reflect on our life-long patterns (like searching, and matching colors), as we do in politics, and philosophy. — Antony Nickles

If you have a different interpretation of what is ostensibly the same thing, say, these words you are reading right now, or maybe the crying tree outside my window, how is this not a different perception?

I don't see a difference between interpretation and perception, in so far as differing interpretations lead to different perceptions.

This is how I am reading you now and is just to see if we are on similar pages of thought or not.

Ok, on to what he says that I find interesting:

" ... he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of searching, and it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one. ...

[an option is] ...We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to anything. To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, consider the order "imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine."

Not essential, the image? Hmmm. Perhaps it is not this way exactly. It's not as if "red flower" produces an extremely intense red image in my mind. It's relatively weak (in terms of intensity at this moment), but if I lacked it, I'm not sure I'd get a "red" flower, rather than some other flower (yellow, blue, etc.).

Yes, we can go in a non-reflexive mode, as we do when we get into a routine in which we do things without explicit thinking, and here you can do all kinds of things. But I think these are moments in which we are already familiar with what we are doing. If I get a red flower without explicitly thinking about the red, then in all likelihood I did it unconsciously, because I am accustomed to getting red flowers all the time.

I can't see removing all mental content being useful here at all, IF that's even what the issue may be.

I'll do better next time.

My question is, who is the one who is looking for this "objectivity"? Philosophers? Ordinary people? — Manuel

Here I think Witt means those who are tempted by a desire for something sure. Definitely traditional philosophy, but I would argue our larger modern culture. But I would point out that there actually is a way to how identifying and naming objects works, and that is word—thing (flower; though yes the word is not the flower), but that is exactly why we want it to work that way in every case. It is so certain and clear and simple and predictable; the evidence of our senses is so immediate and convincing to us that the idea of seeing something with our eyes is our best-case scenario in the face of doubt about our world (as is ‘pain’ about our feelings).

If you have a different interpretation of what is ostensibly the same thing, say, these words you are reading right now, or maybe the crying tree outside my window, how is this not a different perception? — Manuel

The interpretation is possible because of the criteria and circumstances, not how we see the world (in each of the above pencil cases, they are NOT “ostensibly the same thing”, though the words are). Though, of course, if the circumstances are looser, you still play some part: in identifying a banjo or grouping it as a general string instrument (p.2 (though not in interpreting what identifying is, or how it goes wrong). I can miss the point, can be mistaken, disagree (matters of… responsibility?). But when I say, “THIS is a pencil” after you show me your new mechanical pencil, and as I bring out what I take to be the ultimate pencil, you may take this as condescending or true, but how are the underlying facts and how this situation does what it does here dependent on us?

‘it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one.’ P.3

Not essential, the image? …if I lacked it, I'm not sure I'd get a "red" flower, rather than some other flower (yellow, blue, etc.). — Manuel

What he is saying is that the image could be mental or physical, like a patch of the color. That the physical patch of color serves the same purpose as the “mental” image of color (that it is mental is inessential). Also, it is this wanting to be “sure” at all times that you express which Witt is saying creates the need for the object (fears its “lack”). But, as he demonstrates, let’s create a scenario where you have to be sure. Then you would absolutely carry a patch and match the colors of red to each other. Or, if there was a field of different flowers and we definitely wanted red, we would take care not to have a mistake happen (as I describe below). But unless we have some special circumstance, usually, I would neither need the image nor the patch. As you say, we are accustomed to it.

If I get a red flower without explicitly thinking about the red, then in all likelihood I did it unconsciously, because I am accustomed to getting red flowers all the time. — Manuel

He will address “unconscious thinking” later, but doing it “unconsciously” is different than doing it because you are “accustomed”. You could do it without thinking of the consequences (“thoughtlessly”), inadvertently, or by mistake, but the opposite of “explicitly thinking” is not “unconscious”, but, perhaps, unaware.

I can't see removing all mental content being useful here at all, IF that's even what the issue may be. — Manuel

He is not “removing” mental content; he is beginning to show that we unnecessarily picture it in the framework of an object (as a thing we can be as sure of as seeing a flower), while pointing out there is a larger, pre-existing world out there than us, and also picking at the feeling that we must have it or we “lack” something, which he says later turns into something we feel we “cannot” do.

But I would point out that there actually is a way to how identifying and naming objects works, and that is word—thing (flower; though yes the word is not the flower), but that is exactly why we want it to work that way in every case. — Antony Nickles

Is this a factual claim?

(in each of the above pencil cases, they are NOT “ostensibly the same thing”, though the words are). Though, of course, if the circumstances are looser, you still play some part: in identifying a banjo or grouping it as a general string instrument (p.2 (though not in interpreting what identifying is, or how it goes wrong). — Antony Nickles

Yes, in the example he uses, different aspects of a pencil are being examined or looked at.

But when I say, “THIS is a pencil” after you show me your new mechanical pencil, and as I bring out what I take to be the ultimate pencil, you may take this as condescending or true, but how are the underlying facts and how this situation does what it does here dependent on us? — Antony Nickles

I take it that pencils don't exist in the extra-mental world. So, if I show you a mechanical pencil or you show me an ultimate pencil, the issue remains similar to my mind, we are speaking about pencils.

What he is saying is that the image could be mental or physical, like a patch of the color. That the physical patch of color serves the same purpose as the “mental” image of color (that it is mental is inessential). — Antony Nickles

I am not seeing the difference in terms of mental or physical terms. If the framework is presented as ostensive vs non-ostensive, then that makes sense.

Also, it is this wanting to be “sure” at all times that you express which Witt is saying creates the need for the object (fears its “lack”). — Antony Nickles

This is fine. I think he is correct if he is arguing that this "certainty" cannot be attained, which is what I think he is getting at.

He is not “removing” mental content; he is beginning to show that we unnecessarily picture it in the framework of an object (as a thing we can be as sure of as seeing a flower), while pointing out there is a larger, pre-existing world out there than us, and also picking at the feeling that we must have it or we “lack” something, which he says later turns into something we feel we “cannot” do. — Antony Nickles

I look forward to that part. It sounds like a critique of the given in experience, which I agree with and makes sense.

Is this a factual claim? — Manuel

Yes, with “this” being: “there actually is a way to how identifying and naming objects works”, though it does not create a “factual” (unassailable) relationship between word and object (good enough though “usually” as Witt says). What I am trying to point out is that here there is a direct reference (or best case), which is what we desire elsewhere, so we transpose the model.

different aspects of a pencil are being examined or looked at. — Manuel

It is not our “looking” at, nor examining the aspects of, the pencil; different things are important (have greater significance) to us in the different situations. What criteria are used for judgment depends on what matters to us (and the possibilities of the situation; yes, including, the pencil).

I am not seeing the difference in terms of mental or physical terms. If the framework is presented as ostensive vs non-ostensive, then that makes sense. — Manuel

Yes, the point is that there is no difference; the physical patch serves the same purpose as the mental image; it is our process of checking the object against a standard that matters. The ultimate point being that we want the standard to be an object: ever-present, backing up every interaction, not just picking flowers.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner @Shawn

Section 1B pp. 3-5: a “queer” mechanism of the mind

At the bottom of page 3, Witt sketches a picture from what it “seems” like “we ought really to be interested in.” I take this to be the “temptation” for an object-like framework; here, “certain definite mental” processes (perhaps in order to give us something fixed in ourselves). He says we want these mechanisms to associate a word with the world, though he intimates there is something wrong (“queer”, “don’t quite understand”, ”occult”(p.4)) that allows the space for error (to “agree or disagree with reality”), which opens the world to doubt.

Another moment on method as he again discusses transferring an internal mechanism to an analogous external process. This makes the process public, all out in the open, but also not personal, not individual, taking out me (which is also a theme), which feels like a loss I don’t know how to record yet. I take it he is playing off the picture of thought as an “object” and a mechanism that has “properties different from” signs, that makes signs come alive (or be ‘present’ as Derrida might critique it? @Joshs), when he contrasts that to “use”. Here I believe we should not jump to assuming we know what this term means yet, but let it take shape based on the role it plays going forward.

But he says, pulled externally it “ceases to seem to impart any life”, which I take it as less than ‘ceases to live’ but that it does no longer “seem to impart” perhaps the “queer” “association” that “you needed for your purposes”. (P.5) I take this purpose to be the desire for an internal mechanism (as object), and so perhaps the death is of the idea of the self as controlling that mechanism, creating meaning. The looked-for object “co-existing” with the sign was then a special vision of us.

He then flat out claims that what gives life to a sign is not us, but a system of signs. And not just that, but its “part” in that system, its “belong[ing]” in it, which shows the “significance” or meaning. I will also point out that time becomes a factor here—that instead of a mechanism occurring at the same time as the sign, “co-existing” with it, there is a system already, pre-existing.

Sorry, but I'm a bit burnt out when it comes to Wittgenstein. Good luck with your thread.

I am not reading it as closely as you are, I am reading, but somewhat more akin to a hard novel than a proper reading of a philosopher due to having to save that mental energy for other material. So, take my comments with a grain of salt, or several of them.

As I read what he is saying, it's that we likely make a mistake when we take a word to necessarily refer or signify necessarily to an object of some kind.

There seems to be a lack of necessity between our using words like "red", "book" and so on, and assuming there has to be something in the world which is "captured" by these words. But we seem to act as if this does happen; that a "book" is necessarily means that thing made of think wooden pulp with letter in it.

If this is part of what he is saying, then I think that's correct.

What's unclear to me is why this would be particularly "queer", to think or use some mental process of some kind. I say this because it's just as queer to think that we need mental content as to say that we don't need it, or that we can see the world without eyes, and rely on echolocation instead.

In short, anything I can think is bound to be "queer" by those standards. And in a sense, it is queer.

I hear ya. I just needed to properly read it at some point, thought this would help. We’ll have to come up with a good (short) one again though some time.

There seems to be a lack of necessity between our using words like "red", "book" and so on, and assuming there has to be something in the world which is "captured" by these words. But we seem to act as if this does happen; that a "book" is necessarily means that thing made of think wooden pulp with letter in it — Manuel

That there is nothing in the world ‘caputured’ by a word doesn’t mean that the word’s meaning isnt of the world. We could instead say that the use of a word produces a kind of world, or form of life. Rather than thinking of words as inside the head (subjective feeling,etc) and things as in the world (neutral, value-free) and meaning as the fit between them, we can think of words as already of the world, as practices engaging interactively with it.

"doesn't mean that the word's meaning isn't of the world."

Not sure I follow. We construct the word, based on stimuli given by objects. We name it something, "apple". Is our word referring to what that stimulus is in the world (photons, reflection and absorption of light, etc.) or are we referring to the object?

We are referring to the object usually. Is the object part of the world? Parts of it, sure - other parts are constructions. It's not trivial to tease these apart for me.

we can think of words as already of the world, as practices engaging interactively with it. — Joshs

How does that account for differences in how languages have very different sounding, looking, written words for the same object?

The word varies, the object does not.

The word varies, the object does not. — Manuel

I’ll just say that the passages Antony had us read offers an alternative to the realist thinking implied by the idea of an object in itself.

There seems to be a lack of necessity between our using words like "red", "book" and so on, and assuming there has to be something in the world which is "captured" by these words. But we seem to act as if this does happen; that a "book" is necessarily means that thing made of think wooden pulp with letter in it. — Manuel

What makes it hard to parse I think is that he starts at the end first. What we are faced with is that “usually” we just pick flowers, but sometimes we are trying to point out a banjo and our friend takes us to be distinguishing stringed instruments. And in order to avoid that happening again, we catastrophize the situation (always, all cases the same). When we picked the wrong flower, you even skipped to:

if I lacked [the mental image], I'm not sure I'd get a "red" flower, rather than some other flower (yellow, blue, etc.). — Manuel

Instead of just saying ‘whoops’ and correcting our mistakes, we try to account for the error in our explanation to control the outcome (and also make sure somehow we don’t make mistakes ever again.)

As I read what he is saying, it's that we likely make a mistake when we take a word to necessarily refer or signify necessarily to an object of some kind. — Manuel

I think your instinct is right. I take it that the desire for wanting necessity causes us to reach for an explanation that has certainty, like: in the case of ‘seeing an object’. What I think we miss is that: in order to have an answer that is necessary, certain, we have to create a particular kind of answer. If we take identifying a rock as the pattern for ‘understanding a person’, the explanation becomes “queer” to see them as an object (or to see understanding as a mechanism).

What's unclear to me is why this would be particularly "queer", to think or use some mental process of some kind. I say this because it's just as queer to think that we need mental content as to say that we don't need it, or that we can see the world without eyes, and rely on echolocation instead. — Manuel

It is not that vision or memory or attention, etc. (processes of the brain) are “queer”. It could be “queer” mechanisms that are not mental: quantification of education, politics turned into “process”, etc. The “queer”-ness is that the nature of the issue has gotten twisted (to have necessity), so the kind of solution (like an object) creates a strange magic that must happen. Imagine “understanding” not as an agreement that allows us to carry on (with someone), but as an epiphany that happens inside your brain when you “know” what they know (the “object” of their understanding), then explaining that seems “queer” (as some modern neuroscience tries to).

I say this because it's just as queer to think that we need mental content as to say that we don't need it, — Manuel

That's true. It's a common problem with philosophical ideas, because, at least in logical positivism they are (supposed to be) logically analytic, which means to assert or deny them is either trivial or nonsense. But I don't think that's what Wittgenstein is after here. It's not whether we have or don't have something going on in our minds when we pick a flower or obey an order. He's pointing out that whatever is in our minds, it can't do what philosophers have supposed it does. There's a moment of arm-waving and hocus-pocus when we are told that a mental image tells us which flowers are red or an internal map that we follow when we are going to the shops. Whether the image is mental or physical, it has to be read - interpreted. That's his target.

I take it that the desire for wanting necessity causes us to reach for an explanation that has certainty, like: in the case of ‘seeing an object’. What I think we miss is that: in order to have an answer that is necessary, certain, we have to create a particular kind of answer. — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with you. But isn't there more to all this than radical certainty? For example, the insistence that it is the system that gives meaning to the word implies moving away from atomism (as in the Tractatus) towards a kind of holism or contextualism. Again, his claim that meaning is use directs us away from the pursuit of an abstract system in an abstract heaven back toward our everyday rule-governed behaviour.

The “queer”-ness is that the nature of the issue has gotten twisted (to have necessity), so the kind of solution (like an object) creates a strange magic that must happen. Imagine “understanding” not as an agreement that allows us to carry on (with someone), but as an epiphany that happens inside your brain when you “know” what they know (the “object” of their understanding), then explaining that seems “queer” (as some modern neuroscience tries to). — Antony Nickles

It seems like a natural(ish) way of thinking about this, assuming necessity, because in ordinary talk, why would it seem different?

People won't even think of necessity, but as soon as you ask them what is a tree?, or what is a car?, they will insist it's those things they can point to.

But once you think about this a bit more carefully, I think you discover, that no necessity is involved.

He's pointing out that whatever is in our minds, it can't do what philosophers have supposed it does. There's a moment of arm-waving and hocus-pocus when we are told that a mental image tells us which flowers are red or an internal map that we follow when we are going to the shops. Whether the image is mental or physical, it has to be read - interpreted. That's his target. — Ludwig V

It's hard to parse out, there is a lot of stuff going on when we speak about a "red flower", which includes not only the words, but the word order, any mental associations we may specifically have, assuming that what is asked for is a "real red flower" as opposed to a "plastic red flower", if you don't know the language and someone asks you for a red flower, you could end up buying a brand that is spelled "red flower", and on and on.

In short, there is a lot going on, and it is not evident to me that mental images don't play an important role. Also, what "mental images" specifically covers can be subtle.

It's hard to parse out, there is a lot of stuff going on when we speak about a "red flower", which includes not only the words, but the word order, any mental associations we may specifically have, assuming that what is asked for is a "real red flower" as opposed to a "plastic red flower", if you don't know the language and someone asks you for a red flower, you could end up buying a brand that is spelled "red flower", and on and on. — Manuel

I'm sorry, I don't see your point. Of course there are a lot of assumptions and background conditions. Of course, things go wrong sometimes. The point is that whatever is in my mind can't prevent those. More than that, there seems to be no guarantee that I have the right mental image or that I do not misinterpret the mental image that I do have. Whatever is going on in my mind, the test is whether I get it right and come up with the red flower I was asked for - and that is not settled in my mind.

In short, there is a lot going on, and it is not evident to me that mental images don't play an important role. Also, what "mental images" specifically covers can be subtle. — Manuel

Does that mean that it is evident to you that mental images do play an important role? What might that be?

More than that, there seems to be no guarantee that I have the right mental image or that I do not misinterpret the mental image that I do have. Whatever is going on in my mind, the test is whether I get it right and come up with the red flower I was asked for - and that is not settled in my mind. — Ludwig V

The point is that it is not entirely clear to me what the term "mental image" encapsulates. I don't know if it includes solely pictorial stuff, or if it includes semantic terms as well. I suspect it does play a role.

That last part "and that is not settled in my mind." is tricky. Sure, it's possible that I might bring you a flower that does not match the "red flower" you asked for.

But what actually settles the issue in this case are the criteria you asked for, not the flower itself.

If the flower I give you does not satisfy the conditions you have, then it does not match what you have in mind. The problem is not in the object, but our interpretation of it.

He then flat out claims that what gives life to a sign is not us, but a system of signs. — Antony Nickles

People using signs are alive. They give life to the signs through their use. Wittgenstein recognizes that a process must be happening organically that makes thinking, speaking, and listening possible but sees his work as something entirely different from investigating that:

We may find that such a mind-model would have to be very complicated and intricate in order to explain the observed mental activities; and on this ground we might call the mind a queer kind of medium. But this aspect of the mind does not interest us. The problems which it may set are psychological problems, and the method of their solution is that of natural science.

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. And when we are worried about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language. This kind of mistake recurs again and again in philosophy; e.g. when we are puzzled about the nature of time, when time seems to us a queer thing. We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we can't look into. And yet nothing of the sort is the case. It is not new facts about time which we want to know. All the facts that concern us lie open before us. But it is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies us. If we look into the grammar of that word, we shall feel that it is no less astounding that man should have conceived of a deity of time than it would be to conceive of a deity of negation or disjunction — Blue Book, page 6

That is a bold statement that separates his interests from the skepticism of Hume considered by Kant. Perhaps those different agendas cannot be completely separated as Wittgenstein put forth. It would be a mistake, however, to ignore his efforts to do just that.

But isn't there more to all this than radical certainty? …towards contextualism… toward our everyday rule-governed behavior. — Ludwig V

Yes, but the position he is sketching out is like the counter-voice of the interlocutor in the PI. It is also his own experience from the Tractatus (claiming all “state of affairs” are objects Tract 4.2211). There is, of course, the other side of the coin, but he is sketching out the negative case of sense data to cast it in relief.

It seems like a natural(ish) way of thinking about this, assuming necessity, because in ordinary talk, why would it seem different? — Manuel

Well I think wanting necessity is different than just going along with what you’re accustomed to (the “ordinary”) without reflecting. But yes the most necessary relation for anyone is the objects they see (or their own “existence”—or, sense as an object—which we call a “subject”).

But once you think about this a bit more carefully, I think you discover, that no necessity is involved. — Manuel

Yes, Descartes thought his way through to radical skepticism, but what we are dealing with here is the first part, which is wanting certainty (thinking of the whole world as objects we should be able to “see”, or know, as we do trees, etc.), which is the desire that starts the spinning.

In short, there is a lot going on, and it is not evident to me that mental images don't play an important role. Also, what "mental images" specifically covers can be subtle. — Manuel

Well, yes, there can be a lot going on, but most of the time we get along fine, which is only to say that the odd example is not evidence of the need to retreat to always having some thing certain in your brain that controls our relation to the world. By “mental image” he just means picturing something in your head, but a lot gets added onto it when we want that to be an object, of certainty, of knowledge, that a “queer mechanism” “associates”—in terms of necessarily equates—it to the world; that there is a mechanism in us that accomplishes that.

Yes, but the position he is sketching out is like the counter-voice of the interlocutor in the PI. It is also his own experience from the Tractatus (claiming all “state of affairs” are objects Tract 4.2211). — Antony Nickles

Yes, that's why I'm suggesting that scepticism/certainty is not the only issue in play in this text. BTW, I'm a bit puzzled by "all states of affairs" are objects. I thought one of the main planks of the TLP was that the world is all that is the case - facts, states of affairs - and not objects. It follows from the idea that the atoms are propositions, since a word only has meaning in the context of a sentence.

Yes, Descartes thought his way through to radical skepticism, but what we are dealing with here is the first part, which is wanting certainty (thinking of the whole world as objects we should be able to “see”, or know, as we do trees, etc.), which is the desire that starts the spinning. — Antony Nickles

OK. One can see it that way. But I don't see a lot in the text that suggests that this was explicitly on W's agenda here. Whereas we know that at this time he had found his way out of the TLP and was developing his next steps.

a lot gets added onto it when we want that to be an object, of certainty, of knowledge, that a “queer mechanism” “associates”—in terms of necessarily equates—it to the world; that there is a mechanism in us that accomplishes that. — Antony Nickles

But he doesn't want to deny that "red" is associated with red things in the world. What he's after is that the meaning is the use. "But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use." (p. 4)

The point is that it is not entirely clear to me what the term "mental image" encapsulates. I don't know if it includes solely pictorial stuff, or if it includes semantic terms as well. I suspect it does play a role. — Manuel

For me "mental image" is just pictorial stuff. The semantic stuff is not inherent in the image, but is the use we make of it. I don't think he denies that there are such things or that we might make use of them. But he does insist that this is only one way that we might find the red flower.