I'm not clear why you call it an ethical standard — Ludwig V

Well I’m not sure it’s going too far to say being contextual, not forcing conclusions, etc., are virtues. Calling it best practices, or a code of conduct seems fine but it also seems to remove the self-awareness of how those actions reflect on our character, as Socrates was trying to make his students better, not just more knowledgeable. Also, I think the list of these practices could be continued by us, but his “method” is, as it were, proprietary, in that he is revolutionizing philosophy in a specific way (by looking at the kinds of things we would say, as evidence of what has importance, merit) although I realize I’ve been classifying these together so far as well.

What I'm suggesting is that W here is starting from philosophy as he finds it, and not paying enough attention to what gets philosophy started - which must be muddles that arise from common sense - or perhaps from science's search for causes. — Ludwig V

It does seem like he starts mid-staircase (as with Emerson), and so it is maybe not so much a matter of where the muddle starts but why, and I think he would lay the blame on our desire for philosophy to be like science, to have the same kind of results, or that everything else be judged in that shadow. And this is not so much against common sense, or the results of our ordinary judgments, as removed from all our varied reasons for making judgments at all except scientific certainty.

I haven’t gotten as far as your quote from the end of the book, but I think I’ve shown sufficient evidence in the text that the vehicle of confusion may be things like: that words can still have meaning imposed on them despite being removed from context, and that analogy can force a conclusion simply because of shared premises, which are both logical errors, but that the cause, more motivation, which “results” in solipsism is the desire for certainty (e.g., wanting everything to have a reference like objects). The common reading that normally we misuse language or get tricked by it is usually followed by the conclusion that philosophy simply needs to impose its own, better, more logical, clearer, more certain, etc., criteria (though distinctions sometimes must be made). I think this argument plays out through the work. — Antony Nickles

Oh, I agree that that argument plays out through the work and beyond!
1. But it seems to me that further clarification is needed about "more logical, clearer, more certain .. criteria". These all have an application as psychological (hence subjective) terms as well as an objective sense - and there's that troublesome concept of self-evidence lurking here. There does seem to be wide agreement, at least amongst analytic philosophers, about their application, but that might be due to acculturation - training.
2. I can agree that the desire for certainty is a plausible motivation for solipsism. But I don't see any reason to suppose that's the motivation in every case. Why could it not be fear of transparent relationships with other people? Or a feeling of isolation from other people? Once one has started looking for psychological motivations, one has to contend with a pandora's box of them. In addition, we might start looking for a motivation for rejecting solipsism as well. At that point, whether we accept or reject, it seems that we are doing psychiatry rather than philosophy. Or could it be classified as phenomenology?

Calling it best practices, or a code of conduct seems fine but it also seems to remove the reflection on how those actions reflect on our character, as Socrates was trying to make his students better, not just more knowledgeable. — Antony Nickles

There is a difference between a character trait being of particular importance in some activities and it being important in life in general. The virtues required to acquire knowledge may not particularly relevant to those required to do good business or create good art.

It does seem like he starts mid-staircase (as with Emerson), and so it is maybe not so much a matter of where the muddle starts but why, and I think he would lay the blame on our desire for philosophy to be like science, to have the same kind of results, or that everything else be judged in that shadow. And this is not so much against common sense, or the results of our ordinary judgments, as removed from all our varied reasons for making judgments at all except scientific certainty. — Antony Nickles

I think I agree with this, and yes, if one remembers the context of logical positivism (with its links to the TLP), it seems very likely.
There is an irony here, isn't there? The desire to be scientific is in direct conflict with the desire for certainty - at least in the context of philosophy.

further clarification is needed about "more logical, clearer, more certain .. criteria". — Ludwig V

I only point it out as the placeholder for the alternative to our ordinary criteria that we uncover by self-reflection rather than impose. By “certain” I just mean the desire for mathematical/scientific answers—that are universal, predictable, generalized, free from context, “objective”, complete, conclusive, etc. I take these as the opposite of the time/place-dependent, partial, categorical, open-ended, etc. ordinary criteria that we uncover in looking at examples of our expressions regarding a practice, which I don’t take as “subjective” or “self-evident” so much as particular to each activity (thinking, pointing, rule-following, apologizing, identifying, etc.)

I can agree that the desire for certainty is a plausible motivation for solipsism. But I don't see any reason to suppose that's the motivation in every case. — Ludwig V

I agree; I only come back to it because I think here he is focusing on that desire for scientific/certain outcomes. I do think it is the basic reaction that drives other desires. The desire of the solipsist for an “object” inside themselves (perception, appearance, sense-data) could be argued to come from wanting to be special, individual in a way that is fixed and innate rather than accomplished.

Once one has started looking for psychological motivations, one has to contend with a pandora's box of them. — Ludwig V

“Psychological” to me is a term for individual motivations, and I think he is uncovering traits along a more generalized, human scale—the fear of uncertainty, etc. Cavell points to the fact of our being separate from each other (unknown, hidden) and our fear of not being able to know the world with the completeness that we desire ahead of time. These are conditions of being human, and thus separate I would argue from psychological motivations.

The desire to be scientific is in direct conflict with the desire for certainty - at least in the context of philosophy. — Ludwig V

As I am using “certainty”, I mean it to be the same as the desire for scientific outcomes; what he calls “logical purity” in the PI.

By “certain” I just mean the desire for mathematical/scientific answers—that are universal, predictable, generalized, free from context, “objective”, complete, conclusive, etc. I take these as the opposite of the time/place-dependent, partial, categorical, open-ended, etc. ordinary criteria that we uncover in looking at examples of our expressions regarding a practice, which I don’t take as “subjective” or “self-evident” so much as particular to each activity (thinking, pointing, rule-following, apologizing, identifying, etc.) — Antony Nickles

Aren't you are citing the ideals that science tries to achieve? In practice science is always provisional and restricted in its scope, not certain at all.

These are conditions of being human, and thus separate I would argue from psychological motivations. — Antony Nickles

So solipsism is part of the human condition? Then how can philosophy free us from it? But then, if solipsism is part of the human condition, what does it mean to say that it is only an illusion of language?

Aren't you are citing the ideals that science tries to achieve? In practice science is always provisional and restricted in its scope, not certain at all. — Ludwig V

Well, to the extent it has done its work, the method of science is based on ensuring repeatable, predictability, and removing our (individual) part in its results. But yes, it is in a sense always open to correction and restricted to what it can apply its method. Philosophy has always used math as its actual ideal for knowledge (Descartes, Socrates, etc.). But here we are focused on the desire for the ideal, and not justifying it or achieving it.

So solipsism is part of the human condition? Then how can philosophy free us from it? But then, if solipsism is part of the human condition, what does it mean to say that it is only an illusion of language? — Ludwig V

Veering outside the scope of the text, Cavell will say that in the PI Wittgenstein is showing that there is a truth to skepticism (it is not a confusion or problem) in that knowledge is only part of our relation to the world and there is no fact that ensures it so we fill the gap with/in our actions (to each other and in trusting/questioning the world and our culture).

@Banno @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Shawn

Section 3 (pp. 10-14) Acting without Rules

As an aside, he finds another logical error, mixing contexts, or thinking we understand a word because we have a definition for it in isolation but that offers up no particular rationale for the specific case. So we do not explain meaning generally; only a particular statement has “neither more, nor less, meaning than your explanation has given it.” (p.10) The idea has temporality to it (which becomes a theme); like we cannot be certain of the meaning of language beforehand, and we may not at first understand after an expression (even knowing the words, and other contexts in which it has sense), so it is not a matter of knowledge but being accustomed to (or learning) how to judge by what is important to us in that case. This is the ability of language to extend into new contexts (discussed in the PI as: continuing a series) because at times how it matters is, as yet, to be determined.

Mid-page 9, once we have finally settled there can be a sense of a “place” for thought in the brain (corresponding activity), he brings up water diviners who “feel” a fact, and those who defy even the logic of a described sense we can acknowledge, which I take as a reassertion that skepticism nevertheless can be endless, and to begin to investigate the individual attempting to retain a standard for his ‘own’ thought, as if my “feelings” fall back onto my ‘perception’ which is a claim of an “object” (sense data) in me that is irrefutable, casual (the feeling we need/want a yellow image to find a yellow ball).

Now we must examine the relation of the process of learning to estimate with the act of estimating. The importance of this examination lies in this, that it applies to the relation between learning the meaning of a word and making use of the word — (p.11)

Yes, he will be externalizing our “feelings” by looking at how we learn to act, but I wanted to focus on the connection between “learning” and “making use of the word” only to point out that this clarifies the meaning of his term “use” in the PI. Many take it that he is pointing out that we “use” words (that we are the cause of their meaning). But I take the term to mean the externalized possibilities (“uses”) of a word (not that we can’t choose our words though)—here he calls it their (rule’s) “application”. If we are learning how a word works (its criteria and grammar) we are learning the different options for the word. So his point is not that we “use” words, it is which use (option) one would make of them (interpret them to be). He interchangeably will say “sense”, so it would be which sense (or “use”) applies in a given situation.

He breaks down learning into cause and rule. I took the “cause” to show the authority that I take, which can be the trust in the teacher’s authority, or, without reason, based on the authority I have for my own acts (example 4 “‘I don’t know, it just looks like a yard’”), which is to externalize some ‘internal’ cause for speech into taking responsibility for what I say (wanting to be certain beforehand vs. continuing to be resolved to what I say afterwards).

When he differentiates between being “in accordance” with a rule or “involving” a rule (p. 13), I take it to be the basis of the PI’s conclusion that meaning/action is not based on rules. “201. This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” Here he talks of a rule of squaring but comes short of saying the rule causes the conclusion, but that “What I wrote is in accordance with the general rule of squaring; but it obviously is also in accordance with any number of other rules; and amongst these it is not more in accordance with one than with another. In the sense in which before we talked about a rule being involved in a process, no rule was involved in this.” (Emphasis in original) He points out that the exception is when we actually consciously rely on a rule in taking an action, but, of course, the exception is to prove that rules do not dictate (or are the cause of) our actions—it does not “act at a distance” (p.14). Again, we can follow a rule or we can go “the way one has gone oneself”, even though we were taught by rules, the teaching “drops out of our considerations”. We may or may not explain by rules afterwards (“post hoc”).

But here we are focused on the desire for the ideal, and not justifying it or achieving it. — Antony Nickles

Well, those are indeed different questions, though they are also related.

Cavell will say that in the PI Wittgenstein is showing that there is a truth to skepticism (it is not a confusion or problem) in that knowledge is only part of our relation to the world and there is no fact that ensures it so we fill the gap with/in our actions (to each other and in trusting/questioning the world and our culture). — Antony Nickles

Yes, I've a lot of time for Cavell. But doesn't he also raise the question of why sceptics cling to their view? Something about being acknowledged (and seeking safety).

He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is. — Blue Book, 59

That's the question that I don't understand. If the whole thing is a conjuring trick, there is no answer to it, or rather, the only answer is to the question how the trick is pulled off.

But I agree that we are veering outside the text, so I'll leave this there.

So solipsism is part of the human condition? Then how can philosophy free us from it? But then, if solipsism is part of the human condition, what does it mean to say that it is only an illusion of language? — Ludwig V

I don't get the sense that the condition is explained away. The "illusion of language" seems like a complete explanation in a work that questions "general explanations."

If completely general explanations work for establishing human conditions, then Wittgenstein is hoisted by his own petard.

I don't get the sense that the condition is explained away. The "illusion of language" seems like a complete explanation in a work that questions "general explanations." — Paine

But I don't think anyone is trying to explain the human condition away. The only thing that might be in dispute is what is and what is not a part of it. Remember, the role of the human condition (well, human ways of life) is to be the ground of all our justifications - not that that appears in this text.

If completely general explanations work for establishing human conditions, then Wittgenstein is hoisted by his own petard. — Paine

"Hoist with this own petard" is always satisfying when it works. But I'm not sure what you are saying here. Explanations of human ways of life are not part of W's arguments. For W, human ways of life are the ultimate ground for all other justifications and explanations. The tricky bit is whether we can go further - or rather whether philosophy can (or needs to) go further (deeper?). There's a temptation there - but is it an illusion (of language, perhaps)?

I guess that the "craving for generality" is a condition that we cannot escape. That is a psychological observation along with whatever it is that Wittgenstein sees as going beyond that.

The question I have is to what degree does the Blue Book discussion of solipsism argue with what the Tractatus says. In the latter, the condition is "manifest" but not "said". In the former, it is a problem that is not necessary after considering other means of expression. Is that another way to point to what cannot be said or is it a change of opinion about the grounds of talking about conditions?

The question I have is to what degree does the Blue Book discussion of solipsism argue with what the Tractatus says. In the latter, the condition is "manifest" but not "said". In the former, it is a problem that is not necessary after considering other means of expression. Is that another way to point to what cannot be said or is it a change of opinion about the grounds of talking about conditions? — Paine

I had not thought about the relationship with TLP. In that context, it is striking that he thinks that solipsism is a matter of "notation" - of how to represent/express the same facts. In neither work is solipsism (or, by extension, any other philosophical doctrine) thought of as a matter of truth vs falsity. There's that much in common.
That said, the TLP doesn't recognize the multifarious uses of language in the way that his later work does. What happened to showing, not saying? I'm not sure.

I guess that the "craving for generality" is a condition that we cannot escape. That is a psychological observation along with whatever it is that Wittgenstein sees as going beyond that. — Paine

I'm a bit torn about this. Philosophers often generalize beyond what seems appropriate to me. "Everything exists" would be one example (not that I could cite a case) and "A=A" is another. It does seem appropriate to describe the cases like these as the result of a "craving for generality".
However, generalizing is deeply embedded in our thinking. To call it a craving does not distinguish between generalizations that are very helpful - even essential - to our understanding and those that are that cause confusion and misunderstanding.
W often seems to talk/write as if all generalization was wrong (misleading), or at least that all generalization in philosophy is wrong (misleading). If we took him to mean that all scientific laws were wrong or all legislation is wrong, it would not (I think) stand up. We accept or at least take seriously what he says because we understand him to be talking in the context of the generalizations of the philosophies that he seeks to escape from because they are misleading and unhelpful.

Some questions:-

This is the ability of language to extend into new contexts (discussed in the PI as: continuing a series) because at times how it matters is, as yet, to be determined. — Antony Nickles

I don’t see continuing the series as at all the same thing as extending a word or concept into new contexts. In the former, we say that we are doing the same thing and that is determined by the rule. The latter is a quite different problem, in circumstances when the rule does not determine how it is to be applied. Thus, the rule “+1” means that we do the same thing, but to a different number at each step. You can call each step a new circumstance if you like, but the rule defines it as the same. But when, for example, we define “ω” we create a new circumstance and have to decide how to apply “+1”.

I took the “cause” to show the authority that I take, which can be the trust in the teacher’s authority, or, without reason, based on the authority I have for my own acts (example 4 “‘I don’t know, it just looks like a yard’”), which is to externalize some ‘internal’ cause for speech into taking responsibility for what I say (wanting to be certain beforehand vs. continuing to be resolved to what I say afterwards). — Antony Nickles

Do you mean that citing the fact that I have been taught to identify the depth of the water or to cite the feeling I get is to try to outsource the justification that should rest with me – sticking to my judgement? But what if I’m wrong? Don’t I have to accept responsibility whether I outsource my decision or not?
To put it another way, there’s a big difference between the referee whose decision defines what happened as a goal and the reporter whose story reports what happened as a goal.

I found this rather confusing. It is true that “cause” does not always mean what it means in philosophy, and I can see why W might want to call the teaching process a cause, but if the teaching has authority, it would be clearer to call it a reason, because part of the meaning of reason is justification. But that isn’t altogether satisfactory either.
Compare:-

Now if one thinks that there could be no understanding and obeying the order without a previous teaching, one thinks of the teaching as supplying a reason for doing what one did; as supplying the road one walks. — p.14

no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. — Antony Nickles

I don’t think that’s quite right. Should it not be “No course of action could be determined by any specific rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with it.”
Given any course of action, one can represent it as in accordance with a rule. But surely it does not follow that given a specific rule, one cannot determine the next step. That is what I learn when I learn to apply a rule.

Again, we can follow a rule or we can go “the way one has gone oneself”, even though we were taught by rules, the teaching “drops out of our considerations”. We may or may not explain by rules afterwards (“post hoc”). — Antony Nickles

`

Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a way which leads to this action. In some cases it means telling the way which one has gone oneself; in others it means describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules. — p.14

That’s true. Yet there is a difference between saying that the action is justified for the following reasons and saying that those reasons were the reasons why one did it.

He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is.
— Blue Book, 59
That's the question that I don't understand. If the whole thing is a conjuring trick, there is no answer to it, or rather, the only answer is to the question how the trick is pulled off. — Ludwig V

The irresistible temptation is not “to use a certain form of expression”. The temptation is for mathematical certainty. That desire forces the expression into a certain form (as forcing the analogy that everything has the framework of an object.)

The "illusion of language" seems like a complete explanation in a work that questions "general explanations." — Paine

It’s an oversimplification to say that he doesn’t do explanations, just not theoretical ones outside of any particular context and particular criteria and facts. A specific explanation about the human condition can have particular facts (we are separate, you are hidden from me, etc.) with a detailed context of our relation to the other.

The irresistible temptation is not “to use a certain form of expression”. The temptation is for mathematical certainty. That desire forces the expression into a certain form (as forcing the analogy that everything has the framework of an object.) — Antony Nickles

That looks like an idea that would explain why the temptation exists. No doubt there's more to say, but the desire for certainty would explain why the temptation exists. What I don't understand is why a change of notation would cure the desire. (I realize that the text itself doesn't explicitly get in to that question, but it stares us in the face.)

I don’t see continuing the series as at all the same thing as extending a word or concept into new contexts. In the former, we say that we are doing the same thing and thatility is determined by the rule. — Ludwig V

I meant to refer generally to the discussion of both, not to just the mathematical section (though, as the text here points out, even mathematically the rule does not “determine” anything; even the judgment (“wrong”) can be suspended, say, with children).

Don’t I have to accept responsibility whether I outsource my decision or not? — Ludwig V

Yes, but maybe that is exactly the motivation for following a rule based on someone else’s authority, or your own feeling as a “cause”: in order to abdicate not only our authority, but to thus try to sidestep responsibility for our acts and speech. Thus the thought we can say “well that was my perception, so…” to attempt to excuse ourselves.

But surely it does not follow that given a specific rule, one cannot determine the next step. — Ludwig V

We learn to take next steps, but in some cases that is more indeterminant than others, so one can definitely anticipate the next step, and with that expectation, say, judge with severity perhaps because there couldn’t be less room for interpretation, but we cannot “determine” a course of action, i.e., predict it, make it happen, or do it “correctly”. We do not apply the rule (or next step), until it is applied (taken). Thus why he makes the point of saying it can only be explained after the fact (not by a “cause”).

I meant to refer generally to the discussion of both, not to just the mathematical section (though, as the text here points out, even mathematically the rule does not “determine” anything; even the judgment (“wrong”) can be suspended, say, with children). — Antony Nickles

I agree it's not just about mathematics. I think W is quite right to point out that a rule has no magic powers and that we determine what it determines - the meaning of the rule is its use, that is, how we apply it.

Yes, but maybe that is exactly the motivation for following a rule based on someone else’s authority, or your own feeling as a “cause”: in order to abdicate not only our authority, but to thus try to sidestep responsibility for our acts and speech. Thus the thought we can say “well that was my perception, so…” to attempt to excuse ourselves. — Antony Nickles

I think you are over-thinking this. It is true that "I feel that..." is often (mis)used rhetorically to establish one's authority and establish immunity from criticism/disagreement . But I think that the water-diviner's case is different from that. It is comparable to cases in which we know and can assert things confidently without being able to explain why. There's no need to establish authority or frame an excuse, because we very often get these judgements right. The water diviner seems to me more like someone who tells you what the sign says, because they can read or because they speak English.

We do not apply the rule (or next step), until it is applied (taken). Thus why he makes the point of saying it can only be explained after the fact (not by a “cause”). — Antony Nickles

Yes. I can see that. I think, however, that there is a great deal more to be said about "embedded beliefs" as reasons for action.

Saying all generalizations are wrong would be another generalization. I don't read that as what is going on.

But I understand why that is a question that persists through a close reading of the work. If the intention is truly the end of perplexity, Deleuze was right in declaring the "Wittgenstenians" as the assassinators of philosophy.

Saying all generalizations are wrong would be another generalization. I don't read that as what is going on. — Paine

Quite so. It's a variant of the liar paradox. Most people seem to read it in the context of the analytic philosophy of his time. I think that must be right.
The argument that all philosophy is nonsense is based on a certain view of logic and truth. A true analytic statement is true under all circumstances. Hence it denies nothing. Hence it asserts nothing. A false analytic statement is not a statement at all, but a word salad - nonsense. If you compare him with, for example, Logical Positivism, W is quite moderate. (In the TLP, as I understand it) one of the things that shows as opposed to being said is the truths of logic. It makes sense, I think.
Anyway, that's the best explanation I can think of for the way that he starts on the basis that some statements are "occult" and suggesting a specific problem - that something in the statement is not properly defined.

But I understand why that is a question that persists through a close reading of the work. If the intention is truly the end of perplexity, Deleuze was right in declaring the "Wittgenstenians" as the assassinators of philosophy. — Paine

I think that the intention was precisely that. It was a revolution after all. So Deleuze's comment doesn't seem inappropriate. One person's assassination is another person's removal of a load of rubbish. Mind you, Heidegger thought the entire history of philosophy needed to be removed of abandoned as well. I wonder if Deleuze thought about that at all. The question "what next?" did get asked after a while, but I'm not sure that anyone has written about it. The only answer I ever heard was that people would go on making the same mistakes, so the cleansing process would go on. It wasn't particularly inspiring. In the end, of course, philosophy did manage to stagger on - though there are people who regard the persistence of analytic philosophy as a mistake.

Whoops

@Banno @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Shawn

Section 3B (pp.14-15) Causes vs. Reasons

Yet there is a difference between saying that the action is justified for the following reasons and saying that those reasons were the reasons why one did it. — Ludwig V

Yes but aren’t justifications just one kind of (prepared) reasons, as are principals (beliefs for action), mitigating circumstances, impulses, conformity or “embedded beliefs” and any number of practices for which we express to you (or are told) our interest for having done or said something. But, nevertheless, there are things common to reasoning (here compared to rules or causation or motivation).

In his terms, reasons aren’t prior to an act (a reason is not “for action”, as you word it); our responsibility for answering why we did something (after the fact) is why “actual reasons [have] a beginning” (p.15) Riceour says acts are an event (meaning: in time).

And again, we can have “no reason” (and there can appear none), as the apathetic have none for not acting (perhaps this is ‘privilege’), though we can hold them responsible nevertheless.

As an aside, I note we “are inclined” (p.16) to give an (impersonal) cause when we “come to an end” rather than explain our interests and commitments further, as we are “inclined” to turn the spade (PI #217) on the student rather than keep trying to give justifications for our continuing as we do. The inclination here seems the beginning of the temptation at the heart of the matter, so perhaps our desire for science is tied to our fear of exposing ourselves, relying on ourselves.

“No number of agreeing statements is necessary” because my reasons are my own (or yours given to me). Neither are we hypothesizing as to the mystery of me; we are making a “statement” of what we are standing for.

Also, a note on method. He will often try to get us to see a logical impossibility (thus necessary possibility) by pointing out what can and cannot be the case (usually based on what we say in a given situation). A “grammatical” point shows us the hard edge of a practice, but it is our acceptance of the description that creates the power of the distinction (rather than a logical argument trying to force us to accept it, which is what creates the temptation for an abstract predetermined criteria only to satisfy that goal). The mechanism is self-justification—for a cause to be considered a cause (and not a motive) it must meet its own criteria. (Cavell will draw out this “must” in his essay “Must We Mean what We Say”.)

If the intention is truly the end of perplexity… — Paine

The only answer I ever heard was that people would go on making the same mistakes, so the cleansing process would go on. — Ludwig V

The confusions so far appear to be motivated by the desire for a “crystalline purity of logic” (PI #107) like that misapplies the framework of objects to our feelings and sensations, or, most recently, that reasoning is thought to be causality. So there is no “end of perplexity” but there is a truth to our getting perplexed, which I take as the investigation and conclusion of the PI. This book lays the groundwork, not to ‘answer’ the confusion, but to ask what that says about us.

Sorry Anthony I can't participate at the moment. Don't have the capacity to focus too much on W now. But will return soon to this thread hopefully.

This book lays the groundwork, not to ‘answer’ the confusion, but to ask what that says about us. — Antony Nickles

Where, in that description, is an activity outside of psychology? Wittgenstein was the one who insisted upon an activity beyond that.

Duly noted.

Where, in that description, is an activity outside of psychology? Wittgenstein was the one who insisted upon an activity beyond that. — Paine

Yes, but his derogatory ideas of “psychology” (“mental processes”, compulsion, etc.) doesn’t eclipse his discussion of our human responses to philosophical issues.

So there is no “end of perplexity” but there is a truth to our getting perplexed, — Antony Nickles

Yes, that's true (!).
But I think my point is that W seems to start from our perplexity, which may be a good starting-point in one way. But in our actual situation, we are already in the middle of philosophy, and there are people around who think they have resolved them (or some of them). W thinks they are wrong about that, but that is a philosophical position, which needs to be demonstrated. I don't say he is wrong to do that - everybody needs to start from somewhere - but it seems to rely on a wholesale dismissal of the philosophical tradition(s), as in Russell's history of western philosophy. On the other hand, other philosophers have done the same thing. (Heidegger, Husserl, Hume, Descartes etc.)

The confusions so far appear to be motivated by the desire for a “crystalline purity of logic” (PI #107) like that misapplies the framework of objects to our feelings and sensations, or, most recently, that reasoning is thought to be causality. So there is no “end of perplexity” but there is a truth to our getting perplexed, which I take as the investigation and conclusion of the PI. This book lays the groundwork, not to ‘answer’ the confusion, but to ask what that says about us. — Antony Nickles

And, of course, that desire is, at least partly, based on the desire for certainty.
It occurs to me that there may be a different desire underlying scepticism, which is the desire to undermine baseless certainties. If we see Pyrrhonism in the context of its time, when the ideas that were traditional and conventional at the time were under increasing scrutiny, it may look more like a desire to prick bubbles of superstition and dogmatism. The same applies to Cartesian scepticism. Hume draws a distinction between what he calls judicious scepticism and Pyrrhonism - he ignores Descartes, so far as I can see, in favour of Pyrrho - and it seems to me that this is perfectly correct. However, he doesn't consider that it may be difficult to distinguish between judicious scepticism and Pyrrho.

Where, in that description, is an activity outside of psychology? Wittgenstein was the one who insisted upon an activity beyond that. — Paine

I agree that he seems to wander in the border country between the two. On the other hand, he may be relying on the common definition of his time - psychology as science and therefore limited to stimulus-response (causal) connections. I would have thought he would be justified in thinking that that methodolgy excludes what he is trying to do. But the failure to distinguish between psychological ("subjective") certainty and clarity and objective certainty and clarity is very common in analytic philosophy.

What I don't understand is why a change of notation would cure the desire. (I realize that the text itself doesn't explicitly get in to that question, but it stares us in the face.) — Ludwig V

On reflection, I want to add that what a notation can do is make us look at things differently, not in the sense of gathering new facts, but in the sense of interpreting the facts that we have differently. This takes us to "seeing as".

it seems to rely on a wholesale dismissal of the philosophical tradition(s), as in Russell's history of western philosophy. On the other hand, other philosophers have done the same thing. (Heidegger, Husserl, Hume, Descartes etc.) — Ludwig V

Heidegger was keenly attuned to the historical nature of philosophy, as reflected in his appreciation for etymology, but Wittgenstein tended to write at times in an ahistorical way , as though something like a ‘desire for certainty’ could be understood independently of the historical eras within which concepts like desire and certainty were used.

But the failure to distinguish between psychological ("subjective") certainty and clarity and objective certainty and clarity is very common in analytic philosophy. — Ludwig V

I would have thought that, up till Wittgenstein’s later work, what was common within analytic philosophy was a failure to recognize the interdependence of subjective and objective certainty and clarity.

Heidegger was keenly attuned to the historical nature of philosophy, — Joshs

Yes. There's a difference between recognizing that one's own philosophy is historically conditioned and not. Much more could be said - the names I cited were off the top of my head.

I would have thought that, up till Wittgenstein’s later work, what was common within analytic philosophy was a failure to recognize the interdependence of subjective and objective certainty and clarity. — Joshs

That's certainly better put, because they are indeed interdependent.

If the intention is truly the end of perplexity, Deleuze was right in declaring the "Wittgenstenians" as the assassinators of philosophy. — Paine

The only answer I ever heard was that people would go on making the same mistakes, so the cleansing process would go on. — Ludwig V

Philosophy has never shown any inclination to roll over and die.

Of course there are two, and maybe three, senses of "philosophy" in Wittgenstein: there is what philosophers do, which is entrench an everyday misunderstanding into a "problem", and then offer "solutions"; and then there is the sort of work Wittgenstein is doing in The Blue Book, showing that the solutions are not solutions and the problem is not a problem but a muddle.

But there may be a third sort of philosophy, which is the more or less deliberate cultivation of perplexity so that it may ― one hopes! ― be resolved. And this is interesting because until you have the resolution, you are rather in the position of the moviegoer who doesn't really believe the main character is going to die but is scared for them anyway. This cannot be a real problem, you say to yourself, but for the moment it sure seems to be.

If I give someone the order "fetch me a red flower from that meadow", how is he to know what sort of flower to bring, as I have only given him a word? — p. 3

Where does this question come from? It's not an ordinary question, not the sort of problem people raise in everyday life.

If I give anyone an order I feel it to be quite enough to give him signs. And if I am given an order, I should never say: "this is only words, and I have got to get behind the words". And when I have asked someone something and he gives me an answer I am content ― that was just what I expected ― and I don't raise the objection: "but that's a mere answer." — Philosophical Grammar, p. 40

Getting behind the words is also in the early pages of The Blue Book:

Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important thing, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege's idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. — p. 4

Frege says that we have to get behind the signs to the meaning, precisely what Wittgenstein notes it never occurs to anyone to say about the signs we exchange in everyday life.

So this is where Wittgenstein's odd question in The Blue Book comes from. You might say he shows the folly of Frege's view by taking it seriously and imagining the consequences of it in everyday life ― but that's not quite right. In the philosophy of mathematics, there is debate, there is worry, about the nature of mathematical practice, insofar as it is the handling of mathematical signs; but in everyday life, there is no worry about this, and no complaining that we are just passing signs back and forth.

Wittgenstein's non-everyday question has this point then: why is there worry in the philosophy of mathematics but not in everyday life? To ask that question, he does indeed have to bring Frege's idea into the world of everyday behaviour and see what it would look like. But not as a refutation; to be a refutation, he would have to say we are formalists in our everyday lives and there has been no catastrophe. That is not quite what he says; instead he notes that these sorts of questions, and the concerns they would express, just never arise. They could, as they do in the philosophy of mathematics, but they don't. Why not?

Now we have something a bit like a problem to work on, philosophically. A deliberately induced perplexity. I think there's something characteristically philosophical about this sort of puzzle: "Why don't people ...?" It requires a particular sort of imagination to notice what people do not do and what they do not worry about, and a particular sort of imagination to make it plausible that they would.

Hume convincing you that if you knew nothing about the physical world, you would have no idea that the impact of one billiard ball on another would cause the second to move. The issue here is not why the second ball moves ― that's for physics to say ― but that we never wonder whether it will move, we never worry that it won't as we never worry that tomorrow the sun will not rise. And Hume asks himself, why not?

If that's right, then there are three sorts of perplexity: everyday muddles, many, but not all, of which can be addressed through logic and mathematics; philosophical muddles, which are sometimes based in everyday muddles and are sometimes due to habits characteristic of philosophers (generalizing and such); and then there are the oddball questions which lead either to science (why does the second ball move? is also a very good question) or to philosophy.