Trump is the first president (as far as I can tell) to take such a bold move on the national debt, — NOS4A2
Her belief, though still justified based on past data, is no longer true. — DasGegenmittel
If it is not necessary and sufficient to be the assertion it defines... — DasGegenmittel
Time in the Car Case:
T1: At the moment Smith forms his belief, he is justified in thinking that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is true because he believes that Jones owns a Ford. His evidence and reasoning at this time are entirely centered on the assumption regarding Jones, which forms the basis of his justification.
T2: However, when we consider the truth of the proposition at a later point, it turns out that the disjunction is actually true solely because Brown is in Barcelona—a fact completely independent of Smith’s initial evidence. Thus, while at T1 Smith’s belief was justified by his reasoning about Jones, at T2 the truth of the statement is secured by an unrelated, coincidental circumstance. — DasGegenmittel
What if the individual under our consideration while pointing towards the broken clock said something like, "Hey guys! Yesterday, at exactly 2 o'clock, do you know that I believed that that broken clock was working. Yeah. Isn't that crazy? I just looked at it like I normally do and then went on about my business as usual. :lol: I even made it home on time!"
I don't see the nonsense in this, or my account of it. If it's there, could you set it out and show it to me?
— creativesoul
He didn’t know it, but if we assume that, then he would be surprised—and according to the currently prevailing view of JTB, would have had knowledge by accident. And that’s exactly what you're describing. — DasGegenmittel
On my view, predictions of future events (belief about what will happen later) are capable of neither being true or false at the time they're made.
— creativesoul
Exactly. And what does that mean? — DasGegenmittel
There can be no such thing as knowledge in cases involving temporality and change — DasGegenmittel
If his cases are examples of justified false belief, then his challenge to those formulations fails to hit the target. <-------Can we agree on that much, for now?
— creativesoul
Since these are statements about future events, they do not constitute knowledge but rather speculation (credence), and the result is not knowledge either, as it does not necessarily and sufficiently follow from the premises. Luck is a temporal phenomenon; the outcome could have been different: good luck (JTB) & bad luck (JFB) — DasGegenmittel
This is precisely where the JTB concept fails: it assumes that truth is already determined, that it is static. — DasGegenmittel
But it is not unfair to say that they turn on a proposition (belief) which is ambiguous and is interpreted (applied) differently in two different contexts - the subject's belief/knowledge and the context of what we might call objectivity. — Ludwig V
The fatal weakness of JTB is its lack of temporal precision. — DasGegenmittel
Smith obviously cannot possibly be describing (thinking of) the clock as broken and it makes nonsense of the story to attribute such a belief to them. — Ludwig V
we must respect the believer's description of their own belief. — Ludwig V
What we have are competing explanations for the Gettier problem. One grants that Gettier has showed a problem with the justification aspect of JTB. That is the basis of the project. Another argues that both Gettier cases are examples of justified false belief, and thus pose no problem for JTB; case closed. You're arguing in the vein of the former, and I, the latter.
— creativesoul
I accept your suggestion—if indeed there is a way back to actual arguments—and I welcome it.
Please take another careful look at what the Gettier problem entails according to my position, and what must be concluded from it.
In brief: in contingent scenarios—such as our dynamic reality—there is no fixed truth. We are subject to possible perceptual errors, and the concepts that underpin our assertions are therefore not absolute. Dynamic reality is an infinite game played with incomplete information.
This is precisely where the JTB concept fails: it assumes that truth is already determined, that it is static. But in dynamic contexts, truth can change unexpectedly—due to what we might call epistemic good or bad luck. JTB presumes one can reliably assert truths about the future based on current justification and belief. Crude as it may sound, this becomes evident in everyday application scenarios.
Moreover, there are at least two epistemically relevant time points: (1) the moment of justification and belief, and (2) the moment when the truth value of the proposition becomes (retrospectively) evident. The failure of JTB lies in its temporal indifference—it does not account for the possibility that a justified belief at t₁ might turn out to be false at t₂, even though no irrationality occurred.
Any JTB that is currently accepted in a dynamic scenario may turn out to be false. This is epistemologically paradoxical: JTB is meant to define knowledge strictly—but definitions, by their nature, must offer consistent and temporally robust criteria. They should fix what something is once and for all. But that doesn’t happen here.
This implies: any dynamic scenario in which one makes a justified assertion according to JTB—and in which the circumstances then change—produces a counterexample: a “justified false belief,” such as in the broken bottle or the “fastest way to work” cases. These are not marginal exceptions; they are systematic results of a conceptual flaw.
The fatal weakness of JTB is its lack of temporal precision. If it were to incorporate temporal dimensions, it would have to make them explicit. It does not. Thus, at the very least, it is imprecise—and for a definition, this imprecision is fatal, because definitions are meant to offer definitive and stable characterizations of the concept they define.
I simply wanted to highlight these core issues once more. — DasGegenmittel
If we treat Smith’s belief as a justified false belief (because at the point of justification, the actual truthmaker is not in view), JTC interprets this as a prime example of epistemic fragility. The justification is disconnected from the actual truth conditions — and once the fuller context is revealed (i.e., the crisis occurs), the belief’s epistemic validity collapses. — DasGegenmittel
I don't usually think of the Gettier cases as all alike. — Ludwig V
If your reliable boss says to you that a person with brown hairs, in this room will get a higher salary tomorrow. Are you justified in believing so that a person in this room with brown hair, you, will get a higher salary tomorrows? Would you "know" that you will get the higher salary? — DasGegenmittel
Yes. I don't usually think of the Gettier cases as all alike. Most of the later ones avoid the (rather obvious) mistakes that the actual Gettier cases make. But it is not unfair to say that they turn on a proposition (belief) which is ambigous and is interpreted (applied) differently in two different contexts - the subject's belief/knowledge and the context of what we might call objectivity. — Ludwig V
Is Smith's belief accidentally true or is it false? It cannot be both. It is a problem for JTB, only if it's true.
If it is justified false belief, then it is not JTB and the problem dissolves completely.
— creativesoul
The Problem is not only present "if it's true". — DasGegenmittel
Consider the classic Gettier case: Smith believes “the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket,” based on strong evidence that Jones will get the job and that Jones has ten coins. Unbeknownst to Smith, he will get the job — and he, too, has ten coins. The belief is accidentally true but justified on false premises.
If we treat Smith’s belief as a justified false belief... — DasGegenmittel
On your view, are Gettier cases, in both the actual paper and the various cottage industry cases, examples of justified true belief? — creativesoul
Formally, yes — Gettier cases do fulfill the traditional criteria of JTB... — DasGegenmittel
I see a shattered ego, but no stable argument.
It’s a pity you lack the integrity to present counterarguments rigorously.
If you were serious, you would’ve brought something to the table.
I’m well aware of the matter at hand, and I’ve made that abundantly clear.
Unlike you, at least I don’t need to put others down to make a point. — DasGegenmittel
I can readily accept that we don’t share the same conviction. — DasGegenmittel
I don’t find your argument convincing — DasGegenmittel
it’s perfectly fine with me if you don’t share my position. — DasGegenmittel
So far, I haven’t had the impression that you’ve taken the underlying dualism seriously (or at least contingency); instead, you seem to stick to your line of thinking which is inevitably paradoxical. — DasGegenmittel
I don’t have the time right now to go into detail, and I don’t believe you’ve thoroughly examined the arguments I’ve presented. For further questions read the introduction piece, my comments or the essay with which I made my case and lost any burden whatsoever.
I don’t find your argument convincing — DasGegenmittel
We can never be certain any particular thing is true except that, perhaps, we exist. — T Clark
It means really, actually, for real true, which, of course, nothing ever is. That's why JTB is such a bonehead definition. — T Clark
Indexing or timestamping can document this shift, but they do not prevent it. — DasGegenmittel