Good to know. Thanks. Here is one of those times when someone(me) falsely assumes their own personal experience is shared by everyone else far more than it is/was.

I'll need to read through this thread.

Seems to me that the history of 'civilization' has always treated those with disabilities as if they did not belong in the same places as 'normal' people. Rather, they've been historically ridiculed and shunned for being different. As if any of us have a choice in the way we're born. There were little to no accommodations for them. This simply exacerbated the difficulties with day-to-day routines as well as helped perpetuate and/or compound the negative mindset towards such people.

Well put. The context makes it crystal clear.

You sure about that?
— creativesoul

I'm not sure which part you mean, but yes, our well-developed theory of mind separates us from other primates. — Questioner

Yes. The key element being "well-developed". However, some other animals have a theory of mind, just not nearly as well-developed as ours. Ours is one of the things that separates us from other creatures, other primates notwithstanding. I took it that you were denying that any other primate(creature) had the ability to think about other animals' feeling, thought, and/or belief. That's what I was questioning.

...here's a fascinating book called Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, by Cheney and Seyfarth, that makes a strong case that baboons have a more-than-rudimentary "theory of mind" which allows them to make predictions based on what they believe other baboons are thinking.
— J

Sounds like a fascinating book, thanks for the recommendation. Yes, I have read that other primates do have at least some capacity to develop theories of mind, but that they are not anywhere near as developed as the human capacity.

For example, only the human capacity for theory of mind led us to apply this ability to supernatural beings (gods) - paving the way for the development of religion.

And even to objects - like Wilson the volleyball in the Tom Hanks movie Cast Away — Questioner

Yup. We're probably the only creatures capable of (mistakenly)projecting our own thought/belief onto things incapable of it. On my view, anthropomorphism is a mistake to be avoided at all costs.

Yup. It's fairly clear that some pack mammals have some thought about what other members are feeling/thinking.

You sure about that?

Assume for a moment that all humans perish but cats and mats persist. There's no "matness" in this world. It dies with humans. Yet, the mat remains. Now, if there are two juvenile mice engrossed in play - wrestling around while chittering at one another like they often do - and the sounds draw the attention of a cat who begins peering around the corner at the two mice, who just so happened to have paused for a rest on top of a mat, I have no issue at all with claiming that the cat believes that the mice are on the mat.
— creativesoul

What raises the mat from the background of "over there" such that it is relevant? Are the mice easier to catch while on the mat? Are there territorial considerations (I sleep on this mat, as it's warmer than the bare floor)? We're re-constructing matness from a feline point-of-view here. — Dawnstorm

Okay. I think what you're calling "matness from a feline point-of-view" is what I talk about in terms of the meaningfulness of the mat to the cat(how and why the mat is and/or becomes meaningful to the cat). In this example, in was just a matter of where the mice were located.

Let's say this is my mat, and my cat, and we've been sleeping on it together. That'd have been shared practical behaviour. In how far does that create meaning for the cat? — Dawnstorm

On my view things become meaningful to a creature by virtue of being part of the creatures' thought and/or beliefs(correlations). The cat's behaviour can be included in these correlations(part of the content of the cat's thought/belief), for the cat - that is. The cat can draw correlations between their sleeping on the mat, the mat itself, you, their own sense of contentment, the smell of the mat, of you, the sound of stepping onto the mat, of moving around on the mat, etc. All of those things can be and/or become thought and/or belief content of the cat; as compared/contrasted to propositional content of belief as propositional attitude(belief that some proposition is true).

I only have access to my own perspective.

I disagree. Perhaps if you'll think about that a bit differently, you'll reassess?

The very same means that allows you access to your own perspective allows you access to others'. We are sharing our own perspectives with each other via common language, replete with the ability to talk about our own worldview/perspective as a subject matter in and of itself. Seems to me that our language use is an integral part of all that allows us access to our own and others'. Seems there's a bunch of biological machinery involved too. :wink:

For me, the degree of importance of language is not a settled matter. And my hunch is that I grant language less importance than you do. Instead I priviledge behaviour (well, that's not quite as helpful as I hoped it would be, given that language is behaviour, too....) — Dawnstorm

The degree of the importance of language is not an entirely settled matter for me either. However, it has been extremely helpful for drawing and maintaining the distinctions between thought and/or belief that only humans are capable of and thought and/or belief that other creatures are capable of. Hence, understanding the role that common language plays in thought and belief has been extremely useful in avoiding anthropomorphism.

How do we know what a mammal-centered perspective is(consists of)?

On my view, that's not up us. A mammal centered perspective, if there is such a thing, is not determined by our language use.
— creativesoul

In my view that's just climbing up and down the abstraction ladder: an anthropocentric view is a version of mammal-centered view. When we go up the abstraction ladder we lose specifity, and when we go down the abstraction ladder we narrow down applicability. — Dawnstorm

Understood. Abstraction is necessary here. I would say uniquely human as well. I was skirting around something that is better stated outright. Avoiding anthropomorphism requires knowing which sorts of thoughts and/or beliefs only humans are capable of forming, having, and/or holding and which sorts other creatures are capable of.

I think that mammals are capable of having thought and belief. That said, what is the criterion, which when met by some candidate or another, allows us to sensibly call that perspective a mammalian one?

We're in dire need of a criterion.

How does behavioural implication help us here?

I've never been able to quite pin down my point here, but I think it's something like this: There's some kind of vague analogy in how practical knowledge doesn't scale 1:1 onto theoretical knowledge and how the pre-linguistic aspect of thought maps onto propositions. But I'm not sure.

I really do wish I could explain myself better, here. It's familiar terrain for me, but terrain that's difficult to map (if the metaphor makes sense). — Dawnstorm

I am uneasy with the mapping of propositions onto language less creatures' thought. Propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures. Their thought/belief is not. Hence, their thought/belief is not propositions.

Knowing how to use a nominative-accusative language is different than knowing that a language counts as one.

However, I do not think it adds anything beyond unnecessarily confusing rhetoric to claim that we "act is if English is a nominative accusative language", because there's no other way to act when using English.
— creativesoul

But the borders between languages are porous. Non-native speakers might "get it wrong," and still be understood. If you disregard notions of correctness, what language do they speak? You can get a lot wrong and still be understood. A native speaker of Basque might consistently produce "I eat cake," and "Me sleep." (I hasitate to claim "Me eat," because I don't speak Basque and verbs like "eat" that can sometime not take an object might be treated as transitive with object deletion? I never learned a single ergative-absolutive language.) It's actually a fascinating topic, when such usage would cause problems with communication. You can speak some form of English even if you don't fully grasp how a nominative-accusative language works. And a native speaker would likely recognise this as English, but "something's wrong". — Dawnstorm

I'm reminded of Davidson's paper "A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs". If you're not familiar, it may interest you. There's also an older thread on this site by the same name. Interesting thread.

Sure, sometimes nonnative and English speakers alike misuse English, but a native speaker often understands the speaker regardless. I don't see how an example of misusing English addresses the criticism of claiming that using English is to "act as if English is a nominative-accusative language".

If one is using English, then one is using a nominative-accusative language. If using a nominative-accusative language counts as acting like the language one is using is a nominative-accusative language, then there's no other way to act when using English. That's what I was getting at. I just do not see how the bit about "acting as if" helps.

1.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is necessary for knowing that English counts as one.
— creativesoul

Yes.

2.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is not necessary for learning and/or successfully using English

Yes.

3.) One need not know that English is a nominative-accusative language in order to use it.

Almost. To eliminate any ambiguities (which I should have done much earlier), I'd suggest a minor re-wording: "is a nominative-accusative language" --> "is classified as a nominative-accusative language".

This would rule out practical knowledge and make the wording clearer, I feel. — Dawnstorm

I do not necessarily disagree. Nice.

The suggestion makes 3 follow from 1 and 2(assuming "counts as" and "is classified as" mean the same thing). As it was written, there was a hidden presupposition/premise. Second, it tells me that you may not agree with that hidden premise, which was that knowing English is a nominative-accusative language and knowing English counts as(is classified as) a nominative-accusative is the exact same bit of knowledge.

So, now I'm curious about something. Do you believe we discovered that English is a nominative-accusative language?

There's so much more to cover. No time. Until next time! :smile:

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.
— creativesoul

I think perspectival bias is inevitable; without it things stop making sense. So, yes, that's what I'm pretty much saying. I, too, would like to avoid anthropomorphism... — Dawnstorm

Nice recent additions. I think we're doing just fine. Well, you're doing way better than just fine. I say this in light of a few self-doubts you've expressed thus far regarding your contributions/explanations. We're beginning to understand one another.

Some bias may be inevitable, but not all bias renders us incapable of acquiring knowledge of language less thought/belief. I don't find human perspective to be problematic; at least not in and of itself, as a matter of universal fact. Rather, I find that our human perspective may just be exactly what facilitates our ability to acquire knowledge regarding the thought/belief and/or 'mental ongoings'(scare-quotes intentional) of not only ourselves but of any creature capable of forming, having, holding thought and/or belief.

...my methodology would be strip back what's human about our perspective as much as we can so things still make sense. We need to peel back some of what we know until we go from anthropomorphism to a, maybe, mammal-centred perspective. I recognise this is hard. Me insisting that in a cat-human framework a mat isn't a mat is part of that. We need to strip back as much of the matness as we can and then bring back in as much as we think is warranted, with the bottom-line being what we think we have in common with cats. — Dawnstorm

I think I agree with the general aim here. Commonality is definitely important. Our terminological frameworks of choice differ tremendously. "Matness" is prima facie evidence. That's not what I want to focus on though. Hopefully, it's enough to mention this in passing. I suspect we will be reminded by consequences that result from our respective schemas/frameworks.

How do we know what a mammal-centered perspective is(consists of)?

On my view, that's not up us. A mammal centered perspective, if there is such a thing, is not determined by our language use. To quite the contrary, if it is the case that cats are capable of thought and belief, then it must be the case that the cat's thought and belief existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, those meant to take account of the cat's thought/belief notwithstanding.

On my view, a cat can see a mat. Furthermore, when a cat looks at a mat, it cannot see anything else(assuming a non-hallucinatory cat).

Assume for a moment that all humans perish but cats and mats persist. There's no "matness" in this world. It dies with humans. Yet, the mat remains. Now, if there are two juvenile mice engrossed in play - wrestling around while chittering at one another like they often do - and the sounds draw the attention of a cat who begins peering around the corner at the two mice, who just so happened to have paused for a rest on top of a mat, I have no issue at all with claiming that the cat believes that the mice are on the mat.

The mat is meaningful to the cat as a result of being part of the spatiotemporal location of the mice.

I'll address the rest of your last reply next time. I wish I would've skipped the bit above and went straight to the rest. :blush: Thank you for the interesting conversation.

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.
— creativesoul

I do apologise for the confusion, but I don't really know how to do better. I'll try, but I'm not confident I'll succeed in being clear here. First, when I said "there is none", what I meant is this:

If you become aware of the linguistic discouse around nominative-accusative languages, you've learned nothing new about using English. You now know that English is one type of language, and there are others. This is not knowledge included in using English. It might help you with learning other languages, such as Basque, but it won't have any impact on your using English. — Dawnstorm

Thank you for that. I appreciate the effort. I think it has been helpful. No need to apologize though. I'm not offended, and do not take this personally. I'm examining claims(arguments/reasoning), not you as an author. As I've mentioned, prior to this conversation, I was completely unaware of the jargon. A small amount of research provided more than adequate enough evidence to warrant my belief that the entire enterprise is very heavily theory laden. A good grasp of it is far beyond my current understanding.

That said, I want to say a few things and see if you agree. I think we agree on them, but I'd like to verify.


1.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is necessary for knowing that English counts as one.
2.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is not necessary for learning and/or successfully using English
3.) One need not know that English is a nominative-accusative language in order to use it.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?
— creativesoul

Almost. It's not necessarily a background belief, but it's definitely practical knowledge. That's what makes things difficult here. You act as if English is a nominative-accusative language and so do other native speakers, and that's why linguists can come up with the theory. When you learn English as a small child, you internalise the language as a nominative-accusative language. Everyone around you acts as if English is a nominative-accusative language, and so you learn to act like that, too.

As long as you're not aware that things could be different, you have no reason to theorise about what you're doing. Let's say you're Fench, and you have Basque neighbours, and you try to learn Basque. Basque will work in a highly un-intuitive way for you, so this is how you become aware that something you've taken for granted cannot be taken for granted. You now have the impetus to create a theoretical body of knowledge centred around that difference. Your focus is going to be what speakers of Basque are doing, but you'll need to approach this from within what you know about French: from the difference.

You create new practical knowledge about Basque; you don't create new practical knowledge about French. You create new theoretical knowledge that puts the two languages in relation. If you're an autodidact, here, you may never have heard the linguistic terms. Your take may be different from the linguists', so may not even have use for the terms. Who knows?

This is why I kept emphasising: "in the sense that they use it that way." — Dawnstorm

Okay. I think I better understand what you're saying. However, I do not think it adds anything beyond unnecessarily confusing rhetoric to claim that we "act is if English is a nominative accusative language", because there's no other way to act when using English. We also act as if gravity is acting upon us when we navigate the world, because there's no other way to act when navigating the world. If I were to say that everyone acts as if they know that gravity is acting upon them when they navigate the world, I would be doing much the same thing you've done here regarding using English "as if they know"...

While I totally agree that English use is practical knowledge - quite literally - it makes no sense to me to say that everyone uses English as if they know that it is a nominative-accusative language.

There is a difference between using English as if one knows it is a nominative-accusative language and using English. It is only when one can use the terms "nominative-accusative language" in a sensible manner(consistent with it's formal use) that one can be sensibly said to be using English like they know it is a nominative-accusative language.

You claimed Reagan created stability. I'm calling utter bullshit
— creativesoul

I was talking about the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, which set the stage for the rise of Reaganomics, also called neoliberalism. — frank

Bullshit. You're too much.

As if minimizing the number of downtrodden while increasing the amount of Americans with plenty of spendable income somehow does not result in tremendous stability?
— creativesoul

That's an interesting question, and history answers that it definitely does not produce stability. When the general population is fat and happy, the labor market becomes costly and inflexible. If 1970s labor unions in the US and the UK would have had the ability to stop grandstanding and work with employers, it would have been harder for neoliberals like Reagan and Thatcher to take control. The neoliberal solution was to bring labor to its knees and make them beholden for every crumb. That produced stability. — frank

You claimed Reagan's policies produced stability. Again. I call bullshit. We must be measuring very different things. Now, you've taken it a step farther...

As if working class people are responsible for both, not increasing their own earnings and raising the price of essential goods and services.

I suppose on that account, they're still to blame - for today's stagflation - even when the wages remained stagnant for nearly 50 years.

The stability of everyday working-class American lives, generation after generation was never better than the period between Roosevelt and Kennedy/Nixon.
— creativesoul

I think you mean working-class white men. — frank

Well, no. I meant what I said. Although, your point is taken, and those years were definitely far more beneficial to whites than minorities. That's beside the point though, and irrelevant. The point was about the wealth distribution and the protections of working class Americans providing stability to the overall economic landscape. Stability was the point. You claimed Reagan created stability. I'm calling utter bullshit.

When those protections and the wealth distribution returns to becoming more in line with what's best for the overwhelming majority of Americans again, the racial and gender disparities between working class people will hopefully become more palatable with far more minorities and genders being able to reap the same benefits that mainly white men reaped back then.

As if minimizing the number of downtrodden while increasing the amount of Americans with plenty of spendable income somehow does not result in tremendous stability?
— creativesoul

That's an interesting question, and history answers that it definitely does not produce stability. When the general population is fat and happy, the labor market becomes costly and inflexible. If 1970s labor unions in the US and the UK would have had the ability to stop grandstanding and work with employers, it would have been harder for neoliberals like Reagan and Thatcher to take control. The neoliberal solution was to bring labor to its knees and make them beholden for every crumb. That produced stability. — frank

You think? Crashes and all, huh? Those are signs of stability? I think not.

Evidently, we're measuring different things. The stability of everyday working-class American lives, generation after generation was never better than the period between Roosevelt and Kennedy/Nixon. You must be talking about the stability of something else. The stock market was also far more stable when corporations had an expressed obligation to the livelihoods of employees rather than shareholders. In addition, the stability of that the same stock market and American lives in general was far more stable when antitrust laws were enacted and enforced.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.
— creativesoul

What sort of commonalities do we start off from here, each of us, to begin with? I mean, in this thread I'm not even quite clear yet what counts as a "thought". — Dawnstorm

Indeed. The underlying concept/notion/idea is hard at work in each of our contributions. Setting that out in a way that makes sense regarding of all the times we use the terms is key.

By my lights, all thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. The differences involve what those things are. As it pertains to our offshoot here, the thing that's in focus is language use and things that are existentially dependent upon language use.

... Part of the problem here is scope...

If you remove language what remains? — Dawnstorm

Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable.

What does it mean to say: "the cat believes there's a mouse on the mat"? — Dawnstorm

It's a question that's more about the speaker's terminological use. I've answered it already.

Any question, any answer, any puzzlement around this always comes from a particular perspective... — Dawnstorm

Yes. Understanding any given perspective requires accepting the speaker's definitions, and subsequently seeing how well they hold up to scrutiny, including how well they are able to articulate/explain the evolutionary progression of belief.

Sounds like the belief of the cat the mouse is behind the stove is as dependent on language as my belief that the milk is in the fridge is dependent on cows (if it's cowmilk) - as a cat-external factor (and one the cat might only dimly understand to begin with). Why, then, are we talking about language and not, say, gravity. The stove's existentially dependent on many, many things, few of which seem part of the present belief. — Dawnstorm

Well, I'm talking about the idea of existential dependency upon language use but not gravity because the former is relevant to our process of understanding and setting out the evolutionary progression of belief whereas the latter is utterly irrelevant for such an endeavor. Existential dependency upon language is a tool(factor) that helps establish the contours of evolutionary progression as it pertains to the emergence and evolution of belief over time, which in turn is relevant to whether or not one belief can cause another.

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?
— creativesoul

I didn't become aware of a false belief in that case... — Dawnstorm

Okay. I assumed that you believed what you wrote, as it was written. Afterwards you agreed that it wasn't true, and that statements using "all" do not typically reflect your beliefs. Understood. It now seems to me to have been a case of being loose with language. You've remarked on precision as well. That's fine. We can move beyond that tangent if you like. No problem here.

Truth, for me, tends to erode meaning — Dawnstorm

That's a statement worthy of a topic in its own right.

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?
— creativesoul

There is none. — Dawnstorm

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?

I'm still a bit unclear on what the point was, even though you reiterated that it's an important one. Could you set it out clearly as well as the relevance it has to our discussion?

This is what "behavioural implicature" means to me. A perspectival imputation. Basically: linguist:native speaker = human:cat. And since I'm a pretty staunch relativist, I'm fairly sure there's no way around behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.

This harks back to the pivotal role that language use has in some thought/belief formation, but not others. If there is some thought or belief that is existentially dependent upon the thinker/believer being capable of using language, then it cannot be the case that a language less creature is capable of having such belief, and hence imputing such belief onto a language less creature is a mistake. The same is true of imputing knowledge that English is a nominative accusative language to a speaker who doesn't know what counts as a nominative accusative language and hence has no clue what those words mean.

...

So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that?
— creativesoul

Via an iterative process of situational compatibility. Behavioural implicature is reinforced when our expectations are met. — Dawnstorm

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.
— creativesoul

Under behavioural implicature the question is: what sort of behaviour from a mouse would have you question this piece of "knowledge"? We're not coming at this from a neutral postion. We make working assumptions until they fail us. I mean, I certainly wouldn't assume that a mouse was reading this thread, just because I catch it looking at the screen... — Dawnstorm

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread?

You see the problem here?

There is an underlying notion of thought/belief at work.

Progressives feel comfortable stepping into the unknown. That comfort level is bolstered by moral conviction tied to a sense of righting old wrongs. The downtrodden are always in their sights, whereas the conservative says the downtrodden will always be with us and stability is the highest good. — frank

As if minimizing the number of downtrodden while increasing the amount of Americans with plenty of spendable income somehow does not result in tremendous stability?

:smirk:

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble.
— Dawnstorm

They display behavioural implicature that leads linguists to make the appropriate generalisations. — Dawnstorm

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?

I originally thought that this focus upon English was meant to be an example of a background belief that is brought to the foreground.

This bit is something I'm intrigued by.

I suppose it boils down to what it takes in order to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I mean, I didn't know that at all until this conversation, where you've brought it to my attention, and I've did a bit of reading about it.

By behavioural implicature, I simply mean that if we do X, that implies we believe Y, otherwise our behaviour would be random. On this level, "we" includes any creature capable of meaning. — Dawnstorm

I see. So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that? I mean, for example, shrugging one's shoulders can mean more than one thing as a result of having more than one vein of thought going through the individual's mind. For some it means they could not care less. For others, it means they have no clue.

These are the sort of ambiguities my position aims to lessen/minimize.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.

Agreeing to this feels like a conversation stopper: I no longer know what to say, and I don't feel anything has been accomplished either. I end up walking away feeling vaguely foolish. — Dawnstorm

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation.
— Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

Sure. To me that's just rephrasing the question. — Dawnstorm

And yet, it's an answer, not a question. The question was to what degree "language needs to be involved" in belief formation. I answered as clearly and concisely as I know how. Language needs to be involved in belief formation to the degree(extent) that the belief content is existentially dependent upon language. For instance, if one believes that there's milk in the fridge, then language needs to be involved in that belief in a number of ways. The milk and the fridge are both existentially dependent upon language. Thus, the belief cannot exist in a world that is completely absent of language.

If a cat watches a mouse run behind the stove and subsequently believes that the mouse is behind the stove, then that belief is existentially dependent upon language in the same way that the previous example is. The stove is existentially dependent upon language. So, language needs to be involved in those particular beliefs as an existential precondition for the possibility thereof.

However, if a cat watches a mouse run into a hole burrowed into the hillside and believes that the mouse will eventually come out of that hole, then that belief is not at all existentially dependent upon language. Hence, language does not need to be involved whatsoever in that belief formation.

This hints at two different existential dependency scenarios. It sheds light on the overlap between language less creatures' belief and language users'.

There are far more complex varieties of belief that language needs to be involved to a much greater degree/extent. Belief as propositional attitude fits here, as does believing that English is a nominative-accusative language, understanding and contemplating Gettier's paper, doing theoretical physics, philosophy, etc.

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Would you care to set this disjunct out a bit more?

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?
— creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably. — J

Okay. That's good.

I would think that any acceptable notion/conception/theory of "meaning" would be capable of setting out how things become meaningful, including how thought and/or belief becomes meaningful to thinking/believing creatures.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here. — Dawnstorm

Is that the only two options: Either native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way? Do all linguists hold that to be true? If they do, then I would say they are wrong in some way.

All I'm saying is that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires knowing how to use "nominative-accusative", whereas plenty of native English speakers have no clue what those words mean(how to use them). They are native English speakers nonetheless.

I suppose that if knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language could somehow be acquired without knowing what "nominative-accusative" means, then it could be possible for all native English speakers to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I cannot make much sense of what that would entail.

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them).
— creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.) — Dawnstorm

Hmmm. Is that something like a performative contradiction?

I'm fairly certain I do not quite understand the point being made here. I'm curious about this notion of behavioural implicature. Could you explain it more, please? Thank you.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".
— creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic. — Dawnstorm

Okay. So, it is not the case that beliefs might all be prelinguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.
— creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? — Dawnstorm

Propositional attitudes are beliefs.

I invoked belief as propositional attitude because it fit the situation. I do not deny that some belief amounts to an attitude/disposition towards some proposition such that the individual takes the proposition to be true(or not). I deny that all belief can be properly taken account of by virtue of using that framework. Notably, because i)all belief must be meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief, and ii)propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures, it only follows that belief as propositional attitude is found lacking in its ability to take proper account of language less belief.

I think we're in agreement there.

I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. — Dawnstorm

Indeed, it is not useful for taking account of language less belief, aside from setting out what it cannot consist of.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation. — Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language.

I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?
— creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't. — Dawnstorm

If I understand this correctly, I'd agree that the importance that the mat plays in the cat's thought and/or belief is determined by its relevance to the cat in the current situation(at that time). So, if I understand you correctly, I think you're saying something like the mouse can be on the mat, and the cat can have a belief about the mouse that doesn't include the mat. I would agree.

The mat is meaningful to the cat in the sense of being an integral part of where the mouse is located. That's about all I meant by claiming the cat can believe the mouse is on the mat. Although, as you've suggested and I've mentioned, the mat could be much more meaningful than just that to the cat.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison. — Dawnstorm

I agree and may put that a bit stronger. Whatever the mat means to the cat is never exactly the same as whatever the mat means to the human.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart? — Dawnstorm

No, I do not think we're so far apart in that we seem to both understand that there are differences and similarities between the cat's point of view and our own, in addition to recognizing the need of a terminological framework capable of setting those out.

I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned. — Dawnstorm

Yes. That sounds about right, but I do not find that any of this is inevitably contradictory to what I've been saying, although it could be in its underpinnings. I agree that sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and in doing so one may have cause to defend it - for the very first time. However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. — Dawnstorm

Well, in our case, the possibility under consideration was whether or not it was/is possible for all belief to be prelinguistic. It was formulated like this: "Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

While I agree that we act on our beliefs without formulating them all the time, that's not what was in question here, nor do those facts pose any issue with what I've been setting out. I now think that you may have meant something strikingly different than me when qualifying belief as "prelinguistic".

There's no doubt that most people hold all sorts of background(foundational) beliefs. I would further say that many people have never really identified, named, and/or talked about those background beliefs as subject matters in their own right. I think our views are commensurate regarding these matters.

I would further claim that these beliefs have efficacy(which returns to the OP's concerns).

I think that our views diverge when it comes to ontological concerns; what beliefs consist of.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think. — Dawnstorm

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language. Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

I do not find it at all helpful to say that all native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language. That's simply not true, even if it is the case that they'd assent to such a description after understanding what that means.

I'm currently working on a reply to the rest of that post. I wanted to address it separately, for it invoked meaning, and we both find it promising.

I'll address your response sometime tomorrow. Looks promising to me in many ways. :smile:

We have differences in, I think, terminology... — Dawnstorm

Yes, we certainly do. I think that those differences could be causal in nature in a certain sense similar to what the OP has been talking about. All of us share the pursuit to remain consistent in our respective positions. Hence, the differences themselves cause us to think a bit differently as a result.

What is interesting to me is that we share the same target. The thought and/or belief of non-human creatures. The key, it seems to me, is understanding what that target consists of.

The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s). — J

Indeed, it is. I've found that this particular pursuit can challenge one's basic ontological underpinnings in unfamiliar ways that can result in cognitive dissonance.

Methodological approach seems key here. I'm thinking that there are a few things we need to carefully consider, in addition to any inevitable consequences. This basics of this pursuit are incommensurate with many conventional positions. That explains the broadly held denial of language less creatures' having thought or belief, on pains of coherency alone.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?

What's important here is that the overlap between worldviews seems stronger when it comes to "mouse", then when it comes to "mat". Or not. Maybe the mat is the place where it's not cold in winter, so there's a sense of "territory" in the situational background that the human lacks specifically for the mat, as it's relevant for the entirety of the house? — Dawnstorm

All sounds fine with me.

As the above paragraphs show, I think that humans and cats have comparable "thoughts". Language isn't irrelevant, but it's not where I would draw the line (given relevance to thought). — Dawnstorm

All looks fine here as well. Hopefully "the line" is a bit better understood after the past couple posts.

I'd say result-based concepts are thing we interact with, but are largely ignorant about and thus don't think of as processes. The light-switch is a thing I use. I have limited process-awareness of it, compared to the electrician who fixes the circuit when the switch doesn't work. The light switch is a thing that works or doesn't. I'd say that's pretty much the relationship between the cat and the mat (except that it might serve less of a function in the current activity).

I see language as an activity, much like switching on the light (but much more complex). It's related to thought, because usually when we utter a sentence we mean something by it. It is possible, though, to utter a sentence in a language we don't understand, maybe focusing on the aspect of getting the pronunciation right. It's hard to get foreign pronunciations right because of acquired speech habits. That is: language itself isn't only a possible tool for thought, it also always a target of thought (we monitor for mistakes, for example).

So the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. But puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread.

It occurred to me, while reading the current discussion, that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. I grew up in Austria, with my mum being Austrian and my dad being Croatian (which would have been "Yugoslavian" when I was a kid). I'd almost exclusively talk German, even when spoken to in Croation by my dad. Maybe that's why I never associated words and thoughts quite as closely as others, and in turn why I also don't think language is quite as important a creature feature during species distinction. Maybe? (Just an aside.)

Sure. I've no problem with this.

:smile:

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is).
— creativesoul

To what degree does the "mat" feature? There are other questions: to what degree is the "mouse" a mouse? Is there a sequence of: movement over there; focus attention; prey; plan: pounce. Now? Now? Now? Now! — Dawnstorm

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?

I'm sure there's movement involved(part of the correlational content), physiological sensory perception is necessary, the autonomous drive to eat(hunger pangs could very well be part of the correlation content), possibly previous experiences with hunting mice, etc. that all play a potential role in the current correlational content. I'm not at all keen or fond of the idea that we can read non-human animals' mind with any amount of well-grounded accuracy or precision. We, generally speaking, have a difficult enough time reading the minds of other humans, unless we know them very well. To the contrary, I think we can only provide a well-grounded basic outline for all cases. There are some cases, depending upon specific circumstances that garner a narrower scope of greater detail, but it is on a case-by-case basis.

Some ducks used to have me as their source of food and water. They definitely drew correlations between me and getting fed and/or watered. Did they believe they were about to be fed when I opened the sliding glass doors at the downstairs portion of the back of the house? I think they did based upon all the past correlations. They exhibited behaviours unique to eating. Did they believe they were about to be fed after hearing the food container lid being opened and/or the rustling of the synthetic fabric just before the sound of the plastic food dispenser being plunged into the food? Seems to me that they did. They'd come from everywhere within earshot and exhibit the aforementioned eating behaviours.

I know that they learned how to get fed when they were hungry. They would approach me, come very close, sometimes nipping at my basketball shorts, and exhibit all the feeding behaviours. By my lights, if they drew connections between their own behaviour(approaching me with open mouths) and me getting them food, then that would count as shared meaning between them and myself. A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations/associations between the same things. They were telling me they wanted to eat.

Some thought, I do think, relies on language, as language supplies a retrievable label that stands in for a sub routine. If there isn't a word for something, we can still talk about it but it takes longer. If there's a word for it, we just say one word, but mean the same thing (wasting less time). And that process is iterative. "Hm, what do we call this reverse track ball? Kinda looks like a mouse, doesn't it?". There's grammatical crossreference that's quite common: the verb to marry, its participle form "married" ending up ambiguous between verbal and adjectival usage (an ambiguity striking in the analysis of passive voice...) — Dawnstorm

It seems to me that "Some thought relies on language" is undeniable. The content of some language less thought relies on language as well. Hence, such language less thought relies on language.

Cross referencing is a complex manner of drawing correlating/associating/connecting different things. As is naming. I'm curious if you'd agree with that?

What I'm ending up with in the current conversation is the question of what even is a "language-less creature"? — Dawnstorm

That's a great question. Thank you for asking it! A language less creature is one that has never drawn correlations/associations between language use and other things. In this discussion, I'm speaking a bit loosely as "language less creatures" are meant to denote those that do not draw correlations between our language use and other things.

Now, strictly speaking(and part of why I liked the question so much), if we were to begin talking about potential language use of creatures other than humans, I would definitely argue in the affirmative for the idea that some animals use language amongst themselves. Such language also consists of correlations/associations drawn between different things. While that language is starkly different than ours in many ways(all involving the complexity of the correlations and their consequences), it is also strikingly similar enough in its basic elemental constituency(what makes it a language) to ours.

One key point is that the candidates using language do so in precisely the same basic way that we do; language emergence/use by virtue of a plurality of individuals drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between the use(basic ostension/sounding of alarm/calling/warning all come immediately to mind) and other things.

With respect to thought language is some kind of mental activity. And it seems clear to me that there isn't a clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals to be found. At some point we arrive at complexity we don't see in other creatures, sure. But the basics seem to cut across species.

Indeed. The basics do seem to cut across capable creatures, which makes perfect evolutionary sense. It's the complexities that distinguish us and our thought/belief/language from other animals.

Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic...

I find that this quandary undermines itself. My attitude/disposition about the suggestion required first reading the suggestion. Hence, clearly not before it. I believe that the suggestion is not true. Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility. Again, clearly not before language, assuming you believe it to be true.

I would readily agree that prelinguistic beliefs are sometimes formed by creatures prior to their capabilities for language acquisition. I have argued that language is impossible without prelinguistic beliefs. Unlike what you've suggested may be the case, it seems to me that belief begins prior to language acquisition and continue afterwards.

...they might be about things that couldn't exist if we didn't trick our limited attention spans with shortcuts, and then embed those shortcuts in thoughts that again get short-cutted, until we've got a thought-habit no longer reliant on the original thought process. In other words, we can switch on the light without knowing how to fix the circuits in the wall should they break.

Here the difference between animals and humans seems to break down: it's not so much about being "language-less". It's about not being an expert in the origin and nature of the generative concept. I'd argue it's more about result-based perception vs. process-based perception.

I don't see how the last statement follows from what preceded it. Although, I agree that there's a difference between result based thought/belief and process based, I would argue that it's not a difference in kind, but rather it's a difference in the complexity level necessary for forming/having it. All result-based thought/belief is process based. Furthermore, it seems to me that avoiding danger and gathering resources is results based. So, I do not see the value in the distinction here.

I could be being swayed by all the baggage that comes with the notion of "perception" as well. I've yet to have witnessed an acceptable sense of "perception" other than when it picks out the autonomous abilities sometimes called "sense perception". (Physiological sensory)"perception" is much better used, on my view, to talk about the autonomous biological structures that are necessary preconditions for drawing certain kinds of correlations/associations between specific things as compared/contrasted to being used to pick out the correlations/associations themselves, which conflates necessary biological preconditions for thought/belief with thought/belief.

"Seeing an ant hill as an ant hill" is guilty of the latter. "That's how s/he/they perceive the situation, but I perceive it differently" is another.

Of course, this is what makes sense to me, given what I hold to be true about thought and belief. I'm certain that I'm missing something. I'm not certain that what's missing matters, but I'm certainly not beyond reproach.

I'm addressing the rest in a separate post. Thanks again for the interesting additions!