It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. — Michael

Are you claiming my mom is to my dad as perception is to reality(as Kant's Noumena/phenomena distinction)?

Which one is the parent in itself?

:wink:

Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (“considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. — Bob Ross

Where do I start? Sigh...



All practiced usage of a term, any term, counts as a 'meaningful' sense(scarequotes intentional) of that particular term. Oddly enough, the term "meaningful" is superfluous here. All senses of all terms are meaningful to the practitioners.

I'm not alone in holding that events are facts. You insist that in order for me to be arguing in the affirmative for moral realism I must use the subjective/objective dichotomy as well as the mind dependent/independent dichotomy. That's not true.

"Being in the event of making moral judgements" is not something I would condone writing. That just IS categorizing thought, belief and/or behaviour as acceptable/unacceptable in some set of specific circumstances. It just IS practicing the application of one's moral belief/code. Moral judgments are not equivalent to moral facts. All moral judgments are acts. Not all moral events/facts are acts of moral judgment.

Hence, in short summary, the quote directly above contains a non sequitur followed by a textbook demonstrable falsehood.



True to a strong methodological naturalist bent, on my view, the simplest moral facts existed in their entirety - they emerged onto the world stage - long before our picking them out to the exclusion of all else with our naming and descriptive practices. They do not consist of language use.

Some events count as moral because they share the same basic common denominator that all moral things include. Morality, after all, boils down to coded of conduct. Ethical considerations, after all, are always about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. All things moral include that. There are no exceptions. There is no stronger justificatory ground. That all serves as more than adequate ground to discriminate between facts. Moral facts involve what I've been setting out. Non moral ones do not. That commonality makes all ethical considerations and all moral discourse count as moral.

What grounds your rejection of using the same common denominator to discriminate between kinds of events/facts/states of affairs/happenings?

Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion....

I get that you define ‘moral fact’ in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue... is that promise, or that “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, about something objective? It seems as though your use of ‘moral facticity’ just doesn’t find this question relevant...

It's irrelevant for different reasons. I've not used "moral fscticity". May I suggest you reread our exchange?

What you characterize as "sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion" I see as dissolving the issue by virtue of realizing that the problem is and always was the language use itself. The inherent inadequacy of the objective/subjective distinction seems like a novel consideration here.

You seem to find considerable difficulty accepting the facts for what they are when I'm saying stuff that you agree with. That's quite strange to me. What's the title of the thread again? What would a solution be like if not at least somewhat agreeable?

If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isn’t necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that ‘moral facts’ exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.

The last statement is phrased as though it is a conclusion. It does not follow what preceded it. It does not follow from the fact that I'm not using your preferred terminological framework that what I'm arguing does not make sense.

↪hypericin Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun. — Banno

I agree.

I, too, strongly suspect that morality is inevitable as an evolutionary feature/consequence of our being interdependent social creatures.

Don't thank me, thank the one I adopted that from... probably A.J. Ayer.

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.
— creativesoul

Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable? — AmadeusD

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them.

i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

That's up... out of the bottle. Not down.

:wink:

Well, I reject Kant's Noumena as well as phenomenalist approaches on the obvious grounds that drawing the distinction between the world and perception of it requires a comparitive analysis of both. By definition, we have no access to Noumena. By definition, all we have are our perceptions(Stove's gem). Hence, if that is the case, there is no way to know that our perceptions do not match up to the world, so...

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.

Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise expressed/uttered is strictly objective. The dichotomy also fails in all the same ways as the internal/external dichotomy fails. That is, they are both inherently incapable of taking account of that which consists of both, and thus is neither one or the other. Truth, thought, belief, and meaning are all precisely such things. But I digress... that's another topic altogether.

Those dichotomies as well as a few others add nothing but unnecessary confusion/overcomplication to philosophy.

...nothing is objective. — AmadeusD

If that's the case, then the term "subjective" loses all its meaning and use because it loses the ability to discriminate between different kinds of things. Hence, it is best to abandon the dichotomy altogether, which is what I've done...

My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period. — Bob Ross

Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?

So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above). — Bob Ross

Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

No, that’s fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?

Yes, I am denying that.

By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.

Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.

What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual?

No.

Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?

Yes, and I have repeatedly done so from the very beginning of this exchange.

To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. — hypericin

Moral facts, on Bob's view, cannot exist for they must be mind-independent(whatever they are), objective entities and given that all things moral directly involve unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and all unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is existentially dependent upon minds and contexts, then it only follows that there is no such thing as moral facts.

A large part of the problem involves the underlying dichotomies at work.

I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape. — Bob Ross

Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?

...you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events... — Bob Ross

No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises. — Bob Ross

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

From the SEP's article on moral realism...

It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide).

The debate between moral realists and anti-realists assumes, though, that there is a shared object of inquiry—in this case, a range of claims all involved are willing to recognize as moral claims—about which two questions can be raised and answered: Do these claims purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false? Are some of them true? Moral realists answer ‘yes’ to both, non-cognitivists answer ‘no’ to the first (and, by default, ‘no’ to the second) while error theorists answer ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second. (With the introduction of “minimalism” about truth and facts, things become a bit more complicated. See the section on semantics, below.) To note that some other, non-moral, claims do not (or do) purport to report facts or that none (or some) of them are true, is to change the subject. That said, it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate....

They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.
— creativesoul

Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.

But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such) — AmadeusD

Truth is correspondence between what's happened or is happening and thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. Facts are events(what's happened or is happening).

"Telling the truth" is actually a very misleading phrase or way of speaking, but it's for another thread. But yes, one could be telling the truth, if that means stating what one believes to be true, and say something that runs counter to what happened, is happening, or will happen but has yet to have done so.

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? — Bob Ross

No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.

I don’t have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do X—its not a moral fact that I ought to do X. — Bob Ross

I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here. Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot. Odd that you keep arguing against stuff I've not said nor does it only follow from what I have said.

A question...

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, so I wouldn't say they are even normative facts: it is a hypothetical imperative--i.e., it is a subjectively utterance of obligation. Moral facts are about obligations which are true independently of what a subject obligates themselves to do (viz., independently of what they decide to promise or not). What do you think? — Bob Ross

What you claimed to be your problem has nothing to do with what I wrote. I've no problem at all with the statement you focused on. I agree that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, nor do they need to be in order for there to be moral facts and true statements and/or sound judgments about those facts. Facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.

As I said, my position is that all facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.

When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).

You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics. — Michael

My apologies.

As is typical with me sometimes, I packed way too many things in that post without enough connective tissue, so to speak. I understand what you are saying. I understand the distinctions between kinds of ethics, and what academia categorizes as moral statements(utterances of ought). I also understand that current convention divides all theories of meaning into two categories, both of which presuppose symbolism.

Do you disagree with my saying that all meta ethical endeavors share the same basic elemental constitution... thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour?

The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?". — Michael

So what's the difference between metaethics and metalinguistics?

Ethics first. Metaethics second. Meta ethics endeavors to think about behavioural codes. Not all codes are on equal evolutionary footing. Not all metaethics precede language acqusition. Some does. Prior to the ability to take note of, bring attention to, and/or subsequently begin discussing ethics as a subject matter in and of itself, we're already figuring out how we're supposed to act by thinking about our own behaviours at the time as well as the events that immediately followed.. We're already taking part in meta ethical endeavors. We just do not know it at the time we're doing it. The question neglects to keep our early years in mind.

Some creatures begin drawing correlations between their own behaviours and what else is going on around them at that particular time. That's the basic connection from which all others diverge. All things metaethical involve thinking about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The question neglects the fact that we're already figuring out what's acceptable or not(acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) long before the ability to talk about and discuss things like the meaning of terms.

We're discussing that which existed in its entirety prior to our naming and describing it. We're thinking about the social norms, i.e., regularly practiced codes of conduct that influence each and every one of our worldviews, particularly during our early formative years. We were figuring out how we're supposed to act. We draw all sorts of correlations prior to and during language acquisition. Some are between our behaviours and what else was going on at the time(what immediately followed). Such experiences were and are meaningful to the language less creature under consideration.

Speaking of "meaning" and theories thereof...

All that to ground saying that there are better questions. What counts as "moral/ethical"?

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, — Bob Ross

That's not a problem for me. Why does it cause you pause?

Close. Promises are moral facts.

So, you've said a lot since I last posted. I wonder if you saw Hume's answer to the question you've posed?
— creativesoul
I posted 2x quotes from Treatise of Hume, and also added some explanations to them on how the belief arises on the existence of the External Word / Bodies. — Corvus

Was the answer to your question clearly stated in those quotes? If not, if not, then what's the point of qouting the question? Why answer like that? Normally when one quotes a question, they offer an answer.

I agree with you points, although personally I feel also our memory and inductive reasonings in some degree play part working with imagination for invoking beliefs in the existence of unperceived existence. — Corvus

Hume's problem of induction seems to apply here, if one places value upon it in this situation.

I'm not a Hume fan, so.

I certainly know that the universe existed long before me. I also know that there is no good reason to doubt by thinking that there will no longer be one after I cease to exist. If there are some words written by someone that - after reading them - cause you to doubt any of that, I suggest you use that fact as a reason to commit them to the flames.

Hi Bob.

Facts are what has already happened and/or what is currently happening. Sometimes people speak in terms of states of affairs, the way things were/are, the case at hand, etc. Moral facts, states of affairs, cases, etc. are events involving situations where we judge whether or not someone should or should not do something or another, given some specific set of circumstances. That someone can and often does include ourselves. These are moral facts, state of affairs, cases, situations, etc..

Note here that I'm not using the term "moral" as a synonym for what counts as acceptable or as a means of assent or acceptance, so its compliment is not "immoral" but amoral... meaning not moral in kind. "Right" and "wrong" are the terms are used to express assent/dissent(moral judgment).

When promises are made, at least one person voluntarily enters into and/or creates a moral scenario, situation, case, etc. Solely by virtue of meaning alone, if I promise to plant you a rose garden tomorrow, then you ought have a rose garden tomorrow. That last statement is true because it corresponds to the fact that I promised to plant you a rose garden, and that's exactly what my doing so means. When we make a promise, we voluntarily enter into an obligation to make the world match our words.

There are moral facts as well as true moral statements and sound moral judgments.

I think that qualifies me as a moral realist.

So, you've said a lot since I last posted. I wonder if you saw Hume's answer to the question you've posed?

You asked: What reason do we have to believe in the world(external objects/things) if and when we're not perceiving it(them)?

According to Hume, either our perception of fact and/or our memory thereof are reason to believe that the world exists even when we're not perceiving it.

More Hume pertaining to the OP...

But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact, which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages; yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude, that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the volumes, in which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eye-witnesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I ask, why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.

Hume's own words below. Granted, they are not the admission I was looking for, but they are spot on regarding the OP, and a difference between your report/dependency of/on Hume and Hume. I found that curious...

 

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.

E 12.24, SBN 161-2

There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection.

Hume's writing can be deceptive in Treatise, and it can be tricky to pinpoint what he was actually trying to say. — Corvus

Nah. He said it plainly. He said he had no idea and you say otherwise about him...

I'll take his word over yours.

...it is about how our mind and belief works... — Corvus

That's an 'interesting' thing to say, given the fact that Hume himself clearly admitted having no clue about belief...

...and he was right. He didn't.

You are correct in that you have no immediate reason a posteriori to believe in the existence of the world in the absence of perception. It is still the case you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff you’ve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions. And it is impossible that you do not insofar as you’re alive and functioning, so…..

The logical and epistemic arguments for a priori justifications has been done, and is in the public record. They serve as explanation for not having to re-learn your alphabet after waking up each morning, given that you already know it. — Mww

Yup. Folk use meaningful language not created by themselves to arrive at philosophical 'positions' that quite simply cannot take account of that much.

it would... ...involve you in a performative contradiction when you go on to council us unperceived beings... — Fooloso4

You're saying that to someone who I strongly suspect may not understand what a performative contradiction is. Indeed, that poster is being grilled by a few different people here for the absurdity of claiming to not believe in anything anytime unless that something is being perceived at the time. That sort of radical skepticism leads to a reductio in more ways than one could count quickly.

If I were as cruel as I once was, I would've grilled him(I suspect) myself, but this thread topic interests me too much and I just don't find that sort of 'discussion' appealing.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.
— creativesoul
It wasn't about other people sleeping. It was about the question, do I believe the world exists, when I am asleep? The point is not about the existence of the world. It is about the logical ground for believing in something when not perceiving. There is a clear difference. — Corvus

You seem to have missed the point.

When we sleep, we are not perceiving the world.

Now apply the example I offered. It is of a case where someone we're watching is sleeping, and the world still exists even though they are not perceiving the world. The same holds true of the world and you while you sleep.

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.
— creativesoul
X cannot do Y. That doesn't mean X cannot do Y? Is this not a contradiction?

You're mistaken here. "change the tree on the road with our words alone" is not equivalent to "change the world with our words". In other words, you've assigned the same variable "Y" to two different things and then treated them as the same thing. They're not.

See that word "alone"?

Words do not cut down trees. Words can instruct another to cut down trees... using language to do so.

What is the point trying to create a well with just Austin's linguistic analysis on Ayer?...

<snip>

...Wouldn't the water in the well go stale soon with the prejudice and narrow mindedness rejecting all the relating issues, analysis and criticisms? — Corvus

The well is Austin's criticism of Ayer's position. The conversation is based upon that. In the conversation, relevant replies dip from exactly that well. Germane points and subsequent conversation are not creating the well. They're using it; drawing it up from the depths... examining its contents.

Valid objection/criticism of Austin's critique of Ayer's position is perfectly fine. If the criticism is broad, and it somehow applies locally to this particular thread topic, then that connection ought be set out in as clear and concise language as possible.

There is no logical ground for me to believe the world exists during my sleep, because I no longer perceive the world until waking up to consciousness. Therefore perception is prior to language. — Corvus

The last claim above does not follow from the bit that precedes it.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.

Do we always change the world? With language?
Can you change the tree on the road with your words? — Corvus

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.

The point is that we do sometimes use language to do exactly what you said, but... and this is the important part...

We do other stuff with it too.

Thanks, but the bit you replied to ought not be further expounded or explicated. It's far too tangent.

...the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'.

Understanding what one possibly means, what they're talking about, or what they're picking out to the exclusion of all else when they utter "direct perception" or "indirect perception" is just a matter of looking at definitions and/or the way their using the words. With that much I'll readily agree.

But...

Whether "it" is direct or not is to question whether all perception is direct or not.

If it began happening long before we began thinking about it, then we're attempting to take account of something that existed in its entirety prior to our noticing it. If our notion of perception cannot admit this or dovetail with it, then it is wrong.

If all perception includes our thinking about it, then it would follow that only creatures capable of thinking about their own perception are capable of perceptions. We use language to acquire knowledge of that which preceded it. Such metacognitive endeavors emerge via language use replete with naming and descriptive practices. We have ancestors that were once in the cat's stage...

Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether.

Not all notions of perception are on equal footing.

Sorry for the interruption folks. :yikes:

During the time before language, all sorts of different creatures were perceiving all sorts of stuff. None of it was existentially dependent upon language. Not all of it was large enough to be seen with the naked eye. Optical advances grew our knowledge. If using a man-made optical device counts as indirectly perceiving what's on the other side of the glass, then directly perceiving the same things amounts to looking at the same scene after removing the tool.

Not all perception uses tools. If it is the case that all perception is indirect, and it is also the case that not all perception uses tools(Ayer knew this too!) then Ayer's notion of "perception" remains undisturbed by the comparison to optical tools such as telescopes/microscopes. That counts as indirect as well.

He means something different. He's drawing correlations between something other than optical tools.

I find that criticism toothless.

I think it worth mentioning here that early, basic, and/or rudimentary point of view invariant(universally applicable) perception was taking place long before we ever began noticing.

Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind.

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading... — Antony Nickles

Indeed.

In order to fully understand any position, the student must first grant some of it, at least. "The mark of an educated mind" and all that. Does Austin target Ayer's notion of "perception"? Did Ayer reply?

Nice thread. Good stuff.

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made.
— Janus

It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later. — Ludwig V

Hi Ludwig. Aside from this post, I'll likely not add much more. I am not attempting to disagree with anything you've said here. I just wanted to add a bit to what you wrote in response to the sentiment you're addressing above.

It does not follow from the fact that there is more than one notion of perception that all the different ones are on equal footing. It's also worth pointing out that a position, notion, or conception can be both, perfectly valid and false. Seems to me that in cases like this, we can further discriminate between the notions. As Banno and others have hinted at, the notion of perception is in dire need of being precisely put.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here.