Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. — creativesoul

Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
— Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first. — creativesoul

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done. — creativesoul

So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Why imagine an impossibility? Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. He trembled as a result. Involuntarily.

Ockham's razor applies.

...why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs? — Ludwig V

Who said she couldn't?

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? — Ludwig V

I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.

I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd. — Ludwig V

Metacognition returns answers to you? Does it understand requests all by itself?

I'm confused.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
— creativesoul
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, — Ludwig V

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Irrelevant. The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.

Ockham's razor applies.

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do).
— creativesoul

Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point... — Janus

That does not follow...

May I suggest you reread that post?

Yes, this is a great place to come. Your words made me smile. :flower:

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
— Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
— creativesoul
Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought? — Patterner

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
— creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. — Ludwig V

The behaviour increased the likelihood of reproduction and mating.

I personally wonder if a male isolated from 'birth' would display the same behaviour as an adult, if it were placed in an aviary with a female for the first time in its life. That would tell us something about whether or not it is innate or learned.

"Trying to impress" another presupposes a candidate with a concept of mind(belief about what will impress another). That's a bit of a stretch. Although, I've been quite impressed by any number of different bird documentaries, in addition to my own personal experiences with both domesticated and 'wild' birds.

Wonderfully interesting animals.

We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves. — Ludwig V

We're in agreement with the following caveat; not all things that affect how creatures behave are meaningful to the creature.

Gravity. So... just to be clear.

To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. — Ludwig V

Indeed. I am. I could be confidently wrong. :wink:

It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal. — Ludwig V

Sure, but it depends upon the situation and/or the specific thought and/or belief attribution(in this discussion). If having a concept of time requires thinking about it and thinking about it requires using naming and descriptive practices, then any and all creatures incapable of using naming and descriptive practices are incapable of having a concept of time. That's pretty cut and dry to me. Substitute "thinking about it" with "time be meaningful to the candidate" as well as "forming, having, and/or holding belief about time", and the same holds good...

Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that.

I want to ask...

Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you?

If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that. — Ludwig V

Yes, clearly our standard measurements of time are meaningless to the dog.

Does it follow from the fact that the dog shows up at mealtime that it has a concept of time? I don't see how. That does not seem to be enough evidence/reason to warrant the conclusion. Does waking up at the same time count as having a concept of time? I suppose I wonder what the difference between any and all regularly occurring behaviours is regarding this matter? I mean, does all routine and/or habitual behaviour equally count as adequate evidence for drawing that same conclusion? If not what's the difference such that we're not special pleading? All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).

Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?

Here's what I'd ask: Can or do dogs think about time? Can or do they form, have, and/or hold any beliefs about time? Is time meaningful to dogs? By my lights, the answer is "no". I'm open to being convinced otherwise though. So, if anyone here thinks the answer to any of the three questions is "yes", then I would only ask how?

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
— creativesoul
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. — Ludwig V

Understandable. It's unconventional, and as such it goes against some long standing practices, or at least it seems to. It is commensurate with many, dovetails nicely with some, but certainly turns a number of practices on their head. I've been fleshing the application out and working through the problems for over a decade. Not alone, mind you. I'm very grateful to this site and many regulars here, for it has allowed me to do some things that cannot be done any other way that I'm aware of.

Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language?

Excellent question. Could not have imagined a better one at this juncture. Thank you for asking.

Banno and I have had any number of conversations in past talking about just such things. That tells me there's a bit of W underlying this avenue. It is only as a result of those discussions and others that I've been able to identify certain issues with saying certain things in certain ways. I know that that's vague, so I'll just say that I've adjusted and tweaked my position after being made aware of issues. This question allows me to put some of those to good use. There are several members here on this site who've helped me tremendously along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. Banno is one, but not the only one. Okay, enough blather. Back to the question...

Beer is existentially dependent upon language. Fridges are as well. Where there has never been beer, there could never have been belief about beer. The same is true of the fridge. So, the content of the belief(things correlations are being drawn between) is existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, so too is the belief.

Here we must tread carefully however, for it would be easy to apply unhelpful labels to this belief. Calling it a "linguistic" belief would be misleading and/or a bit confusing, because any and all candidates capable of drawing correlations(spatial reasoning/relationships in this case) between the beer and the fridge are most certainly capable of believing that there is beer in the fridge. This includes candidates who do not know that one is called "beer" and the other a "fridge". It does not make much sense to say that creatures without naming and descriptive practices could form, have, and/or hold linguistic beliefs. That would be a consequence of such labeling practices.

There's more to this than it seems at first blush...

Imagine a recently abandoned house with open beers in the fridge. Say that some teenagers were rummaging around in the house and left the fridge door wide open. They did not want the warm stale beer. They leave soon enough, and later on one of the mice living in the house comes out searching for food. It finds the beer in the fridge. Some mice really like beer! That mouse believed that beer was in that fridge. It shows(as compared/contrasted to 'expresses') that belief by virtue of climbing into that fridge and getting at that beer.

Belief as propositional attitude fails here. The mouse's belief does not consist of propositions. There is no propositional content within the mouse's belief. The mouse's belief consists of correlations drawn between the beer, the fridge, its own hunger/thirst, etc.. Such belief is existentially dependent upon language(because beers and fridges are), but not existentially dependent upon the ability of the believing creature to be capable of either naming and descriptive practices or metacognition. This reminds me of past experience...

At my own house, long ago, we were all at the dining table eating breakfast after a long birthday celebration the night before when a strange unfamiliar sound was heard by us all. It was written all over our faces. We looked at each other using each other as a means to double check our own ears. Someone spoke up and expressed what our faces had already... Did you hear that? Then we heard it again... a continuous faint but distinct scratching sound captured our attention. We were all like... what on earth is that??? It stopped. It started. Stopped again. Started. It did not take us too long to find the drunken culprit in the trash; a drunken mouse had unwittingly trapped itself at the bottom of an extra tall beer can deep inside a trash bag lining the can. Here, I'll give a nod to some things you mentioned earlier regarding our ability to locate the source of a sound.

Hilarious. Drunken mice. Of all things.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them. — Ludwig V

Care to elaborate?

I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true. — Ludwig V

The abandoned house mouse places all this in question. Although, it seems you admit that not all thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of that belief.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.

There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding.
— creativesoul
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.

The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.

It is our behaviour that clearly shows us - beyond all reasonable doubt - what thinking about one's own thought and belief(metacognition) requires: Naming and descriptive practices; picking one's own thought and belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else. That is the only means. That crucial bit of knowledge is part of the standard used to assess/judge any and all belief attribution by any and all authors/speakers to any and all creatures, human to human attribution notwithstanding. It's not the only one, but it's the one in consideration at the moment, and some others are irrelevant to the topic at hand. I digress...

So, it seems clear to me that what the dog does, and the subsequent attribution(s) of thought and/or belief to the dog because of what the dog does, all need to be considered in light of what metacognition requires(what metacognition is existentially dependent upon). The dog cannot consider its own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. Thus, any and all sorts of thinking that require a creature capable of doing so are sorts that dogs cannot form, have, and/or hold. It's that simple. Easy to say. Much more difficult to clearly set out, but I am getting a bit better at it, I think...

Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm unsure about the relevance of the opening statement above. I've certainly never made such a claim. Nor would I. Actually, I agree with that claim, as it is written. However, the second claim seems too vague to be of much use. I also cannot see how the rest counts as support for the idea that meaning governs behaviour. I would agree that meaning governs behaviour, but I suspect that our viewpoints, notions, and/or approaches towards meaning are very different. Hence, I suspect that our explanations of how meaning governs behaviour are quite different as a result.

To the example...

Sure, there are certain thoughts and beliefs one cannot possibly form, have, and/or hold if they have not learned, articulated, understood, and/or used the right sorts of language. Substituting that reason(ing) with "they have not learnt the relevant behaviours" is stretching behaviour beyond sensible use. I mean, sure learning maths and coding and programming are all behaviors. However, that completely misses what underwrites the topic at hand: thought and belief. Behaviour is not thought and belief. Behaviour alone is... ...there's a technical term/bit of jargon that applies here, but I cannot recall... ..."indeterminate" maybe?

There's quite a bit more that is of interest, but it'll have to wait. Until then, be well...

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply. — Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.

There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some(arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.


It's the difference that you're neglecting and/or glossing over.

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

As set out above, I would say that they cannot even know they have done something they should not have done, let alone 'just like humans can'.

Do you have an argument/justification/reasons for claiming that, aside from Jimi's behaviour?

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.

That's why. — creativesoul

That's equally true of your theories. — Vera Mont

Sure. It's true of any ToM.

If the ToM being fleshed out by myself were incapable of drawing and maintaining those distinctions, then it too would inevitably result in conflating between non human thought and belief and human thought and belief. Hence, the importance of the endeavor.

I/we do not have all the answers, nor do I think it's possible to acquire them. We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?
— creativesoul
I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking. — Vera Mont

Which inevitably results in personification(anthropomorphism). That's unacceptable by my standards.

what was the purpose of
What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
— creativesoul
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, — Vera Mont

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims. — creativesoul

That's why.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

Can dogs compare their own behaviour with a set of rules governing that behaviour? Can they thik about the rules placed on their behaviour?

If not, then how can they know what you claim they can know?

A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. — Vera Mont

I'm guessing this refers to the earlier examples of tool use and learning how to open gates. I agree that those are cases of rational thinking in non human animals. None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.

On the contrary...

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.

you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough. — Vera Mont

That's not true.

The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational. — Vera Mont

How did sorts of thought become the central issue? — Vera Mont

Not all rational thought is the same. Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. Hence, any and all thought that is existentially dependent upon metacognition is of the sort that non human creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold.

There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.

What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here.
— creativesoul
I thought the question was whether other species are capable of rational thought. The language boondoggle was introduced later. — Vera Mont

Of course the question is whether or not other species are capable of rational thought. You and I agree that they are.

Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well.

I use the method I've been employing to discriminate between those that only we can form, have, and/or hold and those that other species can as well. One glaringly obvious distinction is that other species are incapable of having thoughts that are existentially dependent upon using language(naming and descriptive practices).

By what standard do you discriminate?

I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are.

There are some things that are verifiable, others that are not.

Nor have I claimed that.

:yikes:

There is no method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are — Vera Mont

That's not true.

My Thanksgiving blew up into an emotional drama and I feel very fragile this morning... — Athena

Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.

You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve.

There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
— creativesoul
No kidding! What's the point of a brain, if it's not to generate a mind? But if the word troubles you, turn off the sound and watch the action. — Vera Mont

It's not that the word troubles me. It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitable conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
— creativesoul
Why is that so important to you, and by what method - other than philosophizing - do you propose to discriminate? — Vera Mont

There is no other method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. We can then check and see how well our notion explains the experiment. It matters because getting it right matters.

Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
— creativesoul
I agree. But behaviour (including linguistic behaviour, and behaviours like talking to oneself silently) does express one's thought, beliefs and experiences. — Ludwig V

Indeed, but language less creatures cannot do that.

What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
— creativesoul
What else, apart from behaviour, could meaningful experience consist of?

A process.

Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature.

Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better. — creativesoul

Other creatures capable of thought…..
— creativesoul

IN-capable? — Mww

:wink:

I mentioned what they were incapable of. It's not all thought, or all belief, or all experience. Just some.

This is from Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, by Antonio Damasio:
Sensing is not perceiving, and it is not constructing a “pattern” based on something else to create a “representation” of that something else and produce an “image” in mind. On the other hand, sensing is the most elementary variety of cognition.
— Damasio — Patterner

This looks like a comparison between rudimentary sensory perception and Cartesian notion of perception, or perhaps a phenomenological account of perception. I agree with the rejection of both "representation" and "image". I'm also in complete agreement that physiological sensory perception is at the root, the basis, of thinking. However, sensory perception is not equivalent to thinking. That conflation blurs the entire timeline of evolutionary progression between moving towards light and our thinking about how they do that. I think the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around.

This is from Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment

Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the body’s health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.
— Ogas and Gaddam


Ogas and Gaddam soon talk about the roundworm. In addition to sensors and doers, the roundworm has two thinking elements. One neuron connects the sensors and the forward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is food ahead. Another neuron connects the sensors to the backward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is poison ahead. The stronger the signal a neuron gets from the sensor, the stronger the signal it sends to its mover.

Also, the two neurons inhibit each other. The stronger the signal a neuron receives from the sensor, the stronger it inhibits the other neuron.


The authors of these two books are calling it 'thinking' from the beginning. The roundworm is a step up. It is judging conflicting inputs, and choosing. It might be stretching the definitions of 'judging' and 'choosing'. And maybe it's stretching the definition to say "This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking. The sensors could evolve into eyes, or nose, or whatever. The movers could evolve into a tail, or legs, or whatever. But what connected them in the first ancient life evolved into our thinking. And, even if in only the most primitive sense, they are performing the same functions.

I agree in large part. I think they're on the right track. The notions of "mind" and "thinking" seem far too diluted for my tastes, and I suspect the account falls victim to reductio.

Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
What's the problem?
— creativesoul
My problem is the transition from apple pies to meaningful experiences. — Ludwig V

Yes, and understandably so, for they are very different kinds of things.

Apple pies are material, whereas thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences are neither material nor immaterial. Rather, they consist of material/physical and immaterial/non physical elements. In addition, apple pies could be classified as objects, whereas thought, belief, and meaningful experiences are not objects at all. Nor are they subjects. They are ongoing processes. I touched on this diversion from convention a few times earlier in the thread and mentioned to you more recently that my position turns many a historical dichotomy on its head.

There are two slightly different senses of "thought". One makes it like "belief" in that I can believe that p and think that p; the other is an activity, so it is hard to see that experience can consist of thinking. — Ludwig V

Yes. There are times when the two terms "thought" and "belief" are not interchangeable. This is irrelevant however to the position I'm arguing for/from.

Riding a unicycle is an activity. Some experiences consist of riding a unicycle. That is the case for one who is watching another ride or riding themselves.

Perhaps a large part of the problem that makes it "hard to see" how experiences can consist of thought and belief is that the conventional approaches are ill-equipped for doing so.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. They also tend to equate belief with propositions and/or belief with attitudes towards that proposition, which is a huge mistake, despite the fact that we express much of our own beliefs via language use/propositions.

On my view, it is clear that language less creatures' beliefs cannot be understood using that method. Not all belief is propositional in content. Propositions are meaningless to language less creatures. Hence, they can have no attitude towards them.

Belief and (thought that) is more like a state, rather than something that happens or that I do, so again, it doesn't seem plausible to think of it as a constituent of experience. — Ludwig V

This seems to be alluding to belief as propositional attitude without saying so.

Our discussion is an experience, partly shared - at least - by all who've participated and/or have been following along. It would be very hard to make any sense of denying that each and every participant having the experience were thinking about what they were reading. They do so by virtue of drawing correlations between language use and other things. All of those correlations are part of the experiences. They are experiences that only we can have. Those correlations(that process of thinking) are(is an) elemental constituent(s). If we were to remove all those correlations being drawn between the language use and other things, if we were to remove all of the thoughtful consideration between the claims and what the claims are describing, what would be left of each individual experience such that it could still count as the experience of the reader/participant? It would be akin to removing the apples from the pie and still claiming it was an apple pie.

Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief, but I'm reluctant to say that a sentence/statement/proposition is a constituent of thought or belief (or knowledge), since thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition. This is why some people are so reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as thought/belief/knowledge without language. — Ludwig V

On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".

The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since".

I'm not sure what that means.
— creativesoul
I hope it helps if I write that sentence as "Surely, (thought that involves trees and cats) is involved in the (behaviour that involves trees and cats)" and explain (which I should have done) that when a dog approaches a tree in order to sniffs it, it is because it believes that there will be interesting smells around it, and so on. — Ludwig V

What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here. That sort of consideration relies upon notions of "thought" and "belief". Even the approach that you seem most fond of presupposes notions of "thought" and "belief". The idea that behaviour "expresses" belief has very little, if any, restrictions around it. There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding. There are other problems as well, as I'm sure you're aware.

Regarding this example, I see no reason, ground, or justification to claim what the dog will believe is or isn't interesting.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs
language less animals can and/or cannot have?

I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. .... One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
— creativesoul
I may be wrong to think that you are referring to something that I said. If you were, I am troubled by your impression that I would dismiss the philosophical import of evolutionary progression, let alone dismiss it flippantly. I would have thought that my general insistence that there is always continuity between what animals can do and what humans can do was evidence to the contrary. I must have said something to mislead you and I'm sorry about that. — Ludwig V

I went back to check on what it was that was said. No worries. I must have misinterpreted what you wrote. My apology seems more fitting than yours. That is... it seems that it is I who owes you an apology, not the other way around.

:yikes:

My apologies.

Other creatures capable of thought…..
— creativesoul

IN-capable? — Mww

Hey Mww.

You and I both know that "thought" to you means something very different than "thought" to me. On your view, and correct me if I'm wrong, there is no distinction between thought and thinking about thought. We would agree that other creatures are incapable of some kinds of thought(namely those existentially dependent upon metacognitive endeavors) if there were such a distinction/discrimination on your view.

Hence, they cannot know better.
— creativesoul

It seems you don't have much experience of dogs. — Janus

Not sure how you arrived at that conclusion, but it's false... if you care enough about whether or not your beliefs about my experience are true.

I suspect that there are behaviours that dogs display after doing something forbidden, or after being approached by the humans afterwards, that you claim shows us that they know better?

I'm wondering if you looked at the argument for the claim at the top of that post, or just at the conclusion.

It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention.
— creativesoul
It's getting plenty of attention from animal behaviorists. We're getting more and more studies of problem solving in both nature and laboratory conditions. — Vera Mont

Indeed, we are. I've watched a number of different 'documentaries' about animal minds and problem solving. What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.

Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.
— creativesoul
And a great many irrational ones, as well... — Vera Mont

Agreed. The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not. Those that are, cannot be formed, had, or held by language less creatures.

We are hard-wired to connect.
— Questioner
Well, no. There are examples of folk who have turned their back on society and walked away. Check out the biography of Mark May. Perhaps we ought fight the "hard wiring"...

The point being that whatever you offer as the way things are, it is open to us to ask if they ought be that way. — Banno

We do not necessarily have to remain connected. We must first connect though. That is the way things are. Asking if it ought be that way is out of place.

:wink:

I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves. — Patterner

That all depends upon what counts as proof.

To deny that humans are leaps and bounds above any other species in significant ways is willful ignorance.
— Patterner
Who's denying it? I'm well aware of all the things humans have accomplished and are capable of that no other species - indeed, not all the other species put together - could have done or can do.
Surely, having all those superior attainments, possessions and complexity of intellect are distinction enough. Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought. — Vera Mont

Yes. It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention. Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.

It's knowing language's role that matters.