Well, he didn't say exactly that. But the point that is usually made is that inductive reasoning can be wrong - which doesn't necessarily mean that it is irrational. Hume made two points in the light of his argument. The first was that we are going to go on using it even though it may be wrong and the second was that it was as much of a proof as you will ever get of how the world works, and even ends up (in the section on miracles) calling it a "proof, whole and entire". — Ludwig V

You got it wrong again. Hume was not concerned on the fact that inductive reasoning can be wrong. What he was saying was that, "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience." (A Treatise, Hume).

You have been seeing the train arriving at the train station at 7:00 every morning for last x number of years. That does not logically warrants you to expect the train will arrive at 7:00 next morning. There is "no demonstrative arguments to prove."

It is not about right or wrong on the inductive reasoning, but isn't it about lack of logical or rational ground in the reasoning Hume was pointing out?

Hume was not concerned on the fact that inductive reasoning can be wrong. What he was saying was that, "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience." (A Treatise, Hume). — Corvus

Oh, so now we are classifying as rational only what is proof against philosophical scepticism.

As to Hume, I suggest that the implication of there being no demonstrative argument is that one might be wrong - that's why everybody prefers demonstrative arguments. (Though it is possible to be wrong about even those.You are right, however, to interpret "demonstrative" as meaning conclusive and hence logical, in the strict sense. This is usually taken to mean sound by the standards of formal logic. Which makes almost the whole of humanity irrational.

But the devil is in the detail:-

Those philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability, and have defin'd the first to be thaf evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas, are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But tho' every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have follow'd this method of expression; 'tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence. One wou'd appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho' 'tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For this reason, 'twould perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities. By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty — Hume, Treatise, Pt II, Section XI, pg 124

Later on, in his "Enquiry" he says:-

Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition. — Hume, Enquiry, Section VI, footnote 1

You have been seeing the train arriving at the train station at 7:00 every morning for last x number of years. That does not logically warrants you to expect the train will arrive at 7:00 next morning. There is "no demonstrative arguments to prove." — Corvus

I don't think I ever suggested that I had logically conclusive evidence.

however, to interpret "demonstrative" as meaning conclusive and hence logical, in the strict sense. This is usually taken to mean sound by the standards of formal logic. Which makes almost the whole of humanity irrational. — Ludwig V

Scientific principles and theories require justification and proofs backed by demonstrative argument. I am not sure what you mean by the standards of formal logic, which makes the whole humanity irrational. Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational? Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational.

Scientific principles and theories require justification and proofs backed by demonstrative argument. I am not sure what you mean by the standards of formal logic, which makes the whole humanity irrational. Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational? Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational. — Corvus

It is not desirable to be 100% formal logic because what is so may not be so tomorrow and our thinking needs to be flexible. We need to be creative. We need to think about what is and what can be. Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do.

Even when the river has cement banks... Yes. There have always been movements in civilized societies, of a small number of people who lived, or attempted to live, a more genuine, nature-grounded lifestyle.
I wouldn't call the fugitive subsistence of the Mashco Piro Eden, exactly, though they look pretty healthy. I see no reason we couldn't strike a compromise between the destruction of nature and our own needs. But humans tend to run at everything at full tilt. — Vera Mont

People around the world live as they did at the beginning of humanity. They can use nature to meet their needs, as animals do, but they did not advance as people in the modern world did. Why? Why don't all humans advance?

Why don't all humans advance? — Athena

Maybe we don't all have the same definition of 'advance'. Maybe some territories were too remote and poor for conquest, and therefore the inhabitants of those undesirable lands didn't have their traditional lifestyle ripped away and destroyed, as so many others did. By the same token, having territory with scant resources means there is not much leisure time for contemplation or extra material for development.

But if you mean, what caused civilization where it did happen, that's a more complex answer. It probably doesn't belong here, but I can point you to a source for the basics. Fundamental difference: enough surplus (of food, natural resources and labour) to support specialized unproductive classes of people, such as administration, priesthood, judiciary and law enforcement, military and clerical, thus stratifying the society and perpetuating a power structure. The influential classes can then patronize artisans and inventors and allocate resources to their own comfort, enrichment, armaments/fortification and glorification through ritual, spectacles, monuments and elaborate burials.

It's not that I've been arguing that symbols are important but rather that there is an important distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. I don't think it is controversial that one thing we possess that other animals don't seem to is symbolic language.
Also if you've been reading what I've been writing you should know that I agree with you that human exceptionalism is a mistake.

For me, a generalization is a statement or proposition of the logical form I described. So you are missing the point.I am indeed "treating" abstract objects as particulars. So are you when you describe them as abstract objects. — Ludwig V

So you think I am missing the point when I describe abstract objects as abstract objects? :roll:

I don't think I am missing any point. Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that.

That's why I think it is a mistake to think that explaining animal actions has much to do with divining the inner workings of their minds. Mind you, I don't think that it is a determining factor in explaining human actions, either. It's more like interpreting a picture. Yes, sometimes we set out to divine the intentions of the artist, but not always. Sometimes it is just a question of seeing what is in the picture. (Puzzle pictures). — Ludwig V

It seems to me that you have missing the point of what I've been saying and not the other way around since I have said that whatever we know about animal minds is derived from observing their behavior and body language and I have not been concerned at all with explaining their behavior by purportedly
somehow knowing what is going on in their minds. The same goes for humans except that they can also explain themselves linguistically. Of course the verity of those explanations relies on the one doing the explaining being both correct and honest.

I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger.
— Janus
Sorry, I don't understand what that difference is. — Ludwig V

A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of.

It's not that I've been arguing that symbols are important but rather that there is an important distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. don't think it is controversial that one thing we possess that other animals don't seem to is symbolic language. — Janus

When you don't have access to the other entity's mind, I'm not sure you're justified in assuming they have no symbolic communication. You're probably correct in that symbolic language is a uniquely human achievement. What I don't see in practice or agree with in theory is that symbolic language is a prerequisite of rational thought.

Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational?. Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational. — Corvus

That's not quite what I said. I'm sorry if I was not clear. I left out the conditional "if formal logic is your standard of rationality" and qualified "the whole of humanity" to "almost the whole of humanity". As you say, formal logic is something that helps us to be more rational, which means that almost all of us have some level of rationality. Since very few of us know any formal logic, it follows that the rationality of most of us does not lie in our ability to do formal logic. That seems about right.

It is not about right or wrong on the inductive reasoning, but isn't it about lack of logical or rational ground in the reasoning Hume was pointing out? — Corvus

Hume's criticism was aimed at the scholastic concept of some power, hidden from our experience, was what enable to first billiard ball to make the second billiard ball move. Many people have believed that the conclusion is simply that induction is invalid. However, Hume was not saying that we should or could just give up on it, in the way that one would simply give up on an invalid form of argument. There's room for debate about exactly what he was saying, but it was not that.
Induction is not deduction. It is better thought of as a trial and error process, which can never get us to deductive truth, but can get us nearer to it. Popper's version of this was conjecture and refutation, now often described as hypothesis and falsification. Neither of those formulations is really satisfactory. recognizes that hypotheses/conjectures that have been tested but not falsified are what we rely on pragmatically. Asking what rational ground we have for that is asking for a rational ground for relying on rational grounds.
Compare what happens when you ask for a rational ground for relying on sound deductive arguments. I refer you to C.L. Dodgson's article about the dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise after their race.

I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard. — Corvus

You said this earlier. It is another example of a situation in which asking for a rational ground (for believing that I saw what I saw, is not a question that has a rational answer. Yet believing that I saw what I saw is not irrational. For it can serve as a premiss in a sound deductive argument.

Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do. — Athena

"Creative" is a troublesome idea. There seems to be no clear boundary between creative and non-creative thinking. For example, I would say that the crow that we saw earlier in this thread was thinking creatively, when It realizes that a stick can serve as a way of getting the goodies.


I agree with everything you say.
People often regard improvements in technology and in their own prosperity as advances, when they are usually double-edged swords.

A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of. — Janus

Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"

Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that. — Janus

H'm. That's a large and tempting rabbit-hole, but I'm thinking that diving down it would be a distraction.

If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'. — Janus

I'm not at all sure that's a helpful way to think of them, but we would have to dive down the rabbit-hole to clarify that.

It seems to me that you have missing the point of what I've been saying and not the other way around since I have said that whatever we know about animal minds is derived from observing their behaviour and body language and I have not been concerned at all with explaining their behaviour by purportedly somehow knowing what is going on in their minds. The same goes for humans except that they can also explain themselves linguistically. Of course the verity of those explanations relies on the one doing the explaining being both correct and honest. — Janus

That's all fine by me.

I think this is a much more interesting issue to explore.

I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger. I have acknowledged that I believe animals sense danger. I'm not sure what you think we are disagreeing about. — Janus

A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of. — Janus

This is a much more pertinent, and illuminating, issue.
I think you are thinking of a distinction that was drawn quite a long time ago now to resolve a particular problem. "Clouds mean rain" and "'Cloud" means a mass of particles or droplets, as of dust, smoke, or steam, suspended in the atmosphere or existing in outer space". In other words, it was an attempt to distinguish what meaning means in the context of linguistic meaning and what it means in the context of drawing inferences from evidence. (I'm sorry I can't remember, and google doesn't find, any helpful reference)
I guess that if I must choose between the two, I would have to choose "sign", because the alternative "symbol" means attributing human-style language to the dog. But the catch with this is that if we say that a goose hissing is a sign of anger hostility or danger in your sense of sign, we are positing a purely causal relationship, which would be incompatible with attributing rationality, or even sentience, to the goose.
This means that we need to draw some more distinctions. Sign vs symbol is more complicated than ti seems. I don't have a neat account of the difference, just a few remarks towards a map. The same applies to the concept of action.

My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. — Patterner

This is a bit complicated. The question to ask what the difference is between a sign and a symbol in this context. For example, when the police or road workers cordon off a section of road - even close it - with a tape across the road, is that equivalent to the stop sign? I would say that it symbolizes a blockage - like a heap of rubble. Is a red light a sign or a symbol?

I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. — Patterner

Mini-pictures have become a very popular way of conveying information, partly because they are supposed to be language-independent. They may be helpful, but in my view, they constitute another language; they are not always intuitive, but need to be learnt. I think the technical term for these is "icon", but it is obviously different from the sense that some rock bands are said to be "iconic". (I'm not suggesting that icons are not useful). (There are echoes here of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I don't know whether that book influenced their popularity now. It seems possible, but unlikely).

But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is: for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP" — Patterner

"Sign" and "Symbol" don't seem to have a well-defined, technical, definition. The terms are applied differently in different contexts. One peculiarity of this specific example is that a stop sign is not merely reporting a situation, like the or a sign-post. It is giving an instruction.
So at a police road-block, when the officer holds up a hand, palm open and facing towards you (I think this is more or less universal), the officer is ordering you to stop in a non-verbal fashion. Is that gesture a sign or a symbol? Is it linguistic?

In the realm of actions, we have been mainly talking about actions that have a purpose, because that is where the question of rationality or not is clearest. But there are different kinds of action. Reflexes, habits, expressions (Ouch! I'm in pain!), are just the beginnings of a list.

When you don't have access to the other entity's mind, I'm not sure you're justified in assuming they have no symbolic communication. — Vera Mont

Its not an assumption but rather a conclusion based on what I think is most plausible given the evidence (or lack of evidence). I'm the first to admit that plausibility is more or less like beauty— somewhat in the eye of the beholder. In other words not a highly determinable or definitive criterion for justifying any assertion.

Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP" — Patterner

The word 'stop' in that context symbolizes the act of stopping but does not resemble anything to do with stopping. Ikons resemble what they signify. Some early written languages used pictographs—characters which resembled what they represented. As far as I know Chinese characters evolved from these early pictographic characters. The difference with a pure symbol is that it doesn't resemble what it signifies. Think of the numeral '5'. It doesn't resemble five of anything. 'IIIII' would be a pictographic representation or ikon of the quantity of five.

Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that.
— Janus
H'm. That's a large and tempting rabbit-hole, but I'm thinking that diving down it would be a distraction.

If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'.
— Janus
I'm not at all sure that's a helpful way to think of them, but we would have to dive down the rabbit-hole to clarify that. — Ludwig V

I'm sure there are nuances that could make it a much larger enquiry but all I have in mind is that an abstract object is abstract on account of the fact that it refers to no particular thing but ranges over a whole class of particulars thus qualifying it as a generalization.

So the word 'tree' is both a particular word and a symbol that represents the abstract generalization that is the class of objects we call trees.

I don't know what you have in mind with wondering about the "helpfulness" of looking at things this way. Its just one of the possible ways of thinking about it. I see the distinction between abstract objects as particulars and generalizations as a valid one. It makes perfect sense to me at least.

I guess that if I must choose between the two, I would have to choose "sign", because the alternative "symbol" means attributing human-style language to the dog. But the catch with this is that if we say that a goose hissing is a sign of anger hostility or danger in your sense of sign, we are positing a purely causal relationship, which would be incompatible with attributing rationality, or even sentience, to the goose.
This means that we need to draw some more distinctions. Sign vs symbol is more complicated than ti seems. I don't have a neat account of the difference, just a few remarks towards a map. The same applies to the concept of action. — Ludwig V

I think we can attribute rationality and meaning to animals in the sense of feeling. The hissing of the goose is an expression and in that sense a sign of "anger hostility or danger". But it has not been converted by a linguistic culture into a symbol that stands by convention as signifying anger hostility or danger.

I admit I have only given a basic adumbration and that more subtleties and nuances in the relationship between the concepts of 'sign' and 'symbol' could be induced by a detailed investigation of usage and association.

I left out the conditional "if formal logic is your standard of rationality" and qualified "the whole of humanity" to "almost the whole of humanity". — Ludwig V

Formal logic deals with the propositions for their validities. Suggesting formal logic as your standard of rationality sounded very odd even as a conditional comment.

Hume's criticism was aimed at the scholastic concept of some power, hidden from our experience, was what enable to first billiard ball to make the second billiard ball move. — Ludwig V

Didn't he say, it is the constant conjunction of the one event followed by the other, which gives us the idea of cause effect?

Asking what rational ground we have for that is asking for a rational ground for relying on rational grounds. — Ludwig V

Really? Could you come up with an example? Much of the math, science and logic are based on formulating proofs from the valid premises based on the rational ground, and we do accept them when it makes sense.

It is not desirable to be 100% formal logic because what is so may not be so tomorrow and our thinking needs to be flexible. We need to be creative. We need to think about what is and what can be. Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do. — Athena

No one was suggesting to be 100% formal logic, Formal logic is a subject which studies propositional validities, which can aid human thoughts and scientific theories to be more rational.

In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Don’t Need Words to Think

That would mean children born deaf can think well enough to function, communicate and learn sign language. In fact, they begin to invent their own signals between 8 and 12 month, and can be taught the rudiments of ASL at that time, just as hearing babies begin to learn spoken language. They all do need sensory and intellectual stimulation. For non-verbal feral children the requirements of survival would provide plenty of stimulation, as it also does for fox kits and fledgling geese.

Maybe we don't all have the same definition of 'advance'. Maybe some territories were too remote and poor for conquest, and therefore the inhabitants of those undesirable lands didn't have their traditional lifestyle ripped away and destroyed, as so many others did. By the same token, having territory with scant resources means there is not much leisure time for contemplation or extra material for development.

But if you mean, what caused civilization where it did happen, that's a more complex answer. It probably doesn't belong here, but I can point you to a source for the basics. Fundamental difference: enough surplus (of food, natural resources and labour) to support specialized unproductive classes of people, such as administration, priesthood, judiciary and law enforcement, military and clerical, thus stratifying the society and perpetuating a power structure. The influential classes can then patronize artisans and inventors and allocate resources to their own comfort, enrichment, armaments/fortification and glorification through ritual, spectacles, monuments and elaborate burials. — Vera Mont

That is a good explanation. Now how about the Glory of Islam, 8th to 13th century, and the decline? How about China that was more advanced than all of Europe and its decline?

China's “Golden Age”: The Song, the Mongols, and the Ming Voyages
This period of Chinese history, from roughly 600-1600 C.E., is a period of stunning development in China.
From the Tang (discussed in the unit on the Tang Dynasty)
through the "pre-modern" commercial and urban development of the Song, ca. 1000,
to the Ming voyages of exploration (1405- 1433) with ships that reach the coast of Africa.
(The achievements of China under the Song are the subject of Marco Polo's "fantastic" reports when he journeys to China under the Mongols, who rule in China for eighty-nine years (1279- 1368) as the Yuan dynasty, between the Song and Ming) https://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_1000-1450ce.htm#:~:text=The%20Song%20dynasty%20(960%2D1279,called%20%22China's%20Golden%20Age.%22

What has caused advancing civilizations to decline and in some cases to totally distruct?

In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Don’t Need Words to Think — Patterner

Your link requires a subscription so I look for another. It is a fascinating subject and I am so glad you brought it up. Hellen Keller was deaf and blind and she did not have language until she was taught language. Young children are dependent on caregivers and function without language. And here is the link I found. Thank you for making us aware of such information.

The lack of an inner monologue has been linked to a condition called aphantasia — sometimes called "blindness of the mind's eye." People who experience aphantasia don't experience visualizations in their mind; they can't mentally picture their bedroom or their mother's face. Many times, those who don't experience visualizations don't experience clear inner speech, either, Lœvenbruck noted. You can participate in Lœvenbruck's research on aphantasia and inner speech via a survey starting this month.
https://www.livescience.com/does-everyone-have-inner-monologue.html

Now how about the Glory of Islam, 8th to 13th century, and the decline? How about China that was more advanced than all of Europe and its decline? — Athena

Ecclesiastes 3:1 To everything, there is a season, and a time to every purpose under Heaven.

Nations grow rich, then powerful and their rulers grow ambitious. They have the wealth to raise large, well-equipped armies, and the constant anxiety of being overlooked by envious neighbours and hostile rivals. So they go forth to conquer and build empires. The sons and grandsons of these war leaders may not be equal to the task of consolidating and maintaining their forebears' empires; they become complacent and self-indulgent. Factions form among the aristocracy, each group plotting to take over the reins if/when the legitimate ruler falters. The military is overstretched; too expensive to supply efficiently, unable to deliver enough booty from the colonies; the troops are fed up with occupation duties and replacements are harder to recruit, the farther from home they're expected to serve. There are too many subject peoples chafing under foreign domination, looking for a chance to revolt. Meanwhile, those hostile rivals haven't disappeared; they've been growing stronger and richer, forming alliances, perhaps amalgamating: a young, energetic empire is emerging to challenge the superpower of the day.

This historical pattern has nothing to do with human 'advancement', but during the period when each empire is near the top of its cycle, a great many cultural, scientific and technological innovations flourish, because the empire has access to untapped natural and human resources, is motivated to develop those resources and has the material wherewithal to support them.

What has caused advancing civilizations to decline and in some cases to totally distruct? — Athena

Shortage of funds, overreach, mismanagement, corruption, unsustainable disparity, internal unrest and ideological schism, external aggression, and sometimes climate change.

We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways if and when we're testing hypothesis. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more.
— creativesoul
Quite so. — Ludwig V

Testing hypothesis via observing behaviour is comparative assessment and as such presupposes testability.

There are some things at work here, beneath all our discourse/conversation about what counts as rational thought/minds. We're looking to further discriminate between different, sometimes and often conflicting conceptions, notions, sensible uses of "thought", "belief", "mind", etc. We're looking to set out all meaningful experience. In doing so, we go a long way towards acquiring knowledge of all minds to whom such experience is meaningful.

We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways if and when we're testing hypothesis. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more.
— creativesoul
Quite so.

How is that done if we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads?
— creativesoul
More than that, we also rely on observation of behaviour to know what's going on in each other's heads, as you suggest.
I'm afraid that there's a certain ambiguity going on here, and it's my fault. — Ludwig V

Do we or do we not have a way to know what's going on inside of the head of another thinking creature?

I think we do, and you've responded in kind. My issue with the phrase "what's going on in the heads" is that it presupposes a false equivalence. We can know plenty about what's going on inside the heads of ourselves and all other thinking creatures. It takes a little work to fill out.



 

We're in dire need of a criterion; a standard; a metric to be reached.

What counts as rational thought of another creature if that thought is not somehow meaningful to the creature? This entire thread topic rests upon actively working notions of meaningful thought.

Meaningful thought emerged long before naming and describing practices.

Meaningful experience preceded accounts of it. If any notion of "meaningful experience" contradicts that, then they are flat out wrong.

Prelinguistic meaningful experience(s) happened prior to being talked about.

Some smart animals can learn how to operate certain latches such that they can let themselves out, whenever they want, whenever they should so desire or if the need should ever arise.

Latches, wants, memories, desires, needs... a creature capable of drawing correlations between these things such that the endeavor connects the creature to the world.

Thought consists of much more than what goes on in the head. We can know some stuff about what's going inside the head of all thinking creatures by knowing about how thought and belief emerge and/or work.

We can know that a language less creature cannot have all the exact same thoughts as a language user. For example, some creatures cannot think about their own worldview. Those missing such capabilities cannot think about other worldviews either. Such thoughts and beliefs require articulation<-------None of those are capable of being formed, held, and/or had by language less creatures.

All thought is the target. Articulated thought misses the mark. Propositional attitudes miss the mark. Belief statements miss the mark.

Meaningful experience does not. All meaningful experiences consist - in very large part - of thought and belief about the world and/or oneself(where possible). Internal and external elements. Spatiotemporal locations of thought/mind are a chimera. "In the head" presupposes such...

that an abstract object is abstract on account of the fact that it refers to no particular thing but ranges over a whole class of particulars thus qualifying it as a generalization. — Janus

You are quite right that that classes are abstract objects and that they range over particulars. But it doesn't follow that all abstract objects are classes.

I see the distinction between abstract objects as particulars and generalizations as a valid one. — Janus

Well, we can agree on that, though we may find complications if we looked more closely at the detail.

But it has not been converted by a linguistic culture into a symbol that stands by convention as signifying anger hostility or danger. — Janus

You are quite right, particularly about the hissing being an expression. The difference between that and a symbol would take some teasing out but set that aside. The lack of a convention does suggest that it is not. When we say that the goose is expressing anger and hostility, we are recognizing (and telling others) that one should expect a defensive reaction if you behave in certain ways. Recognizing that pattern of behaviour is recognising the meaning of the hiss. Our interpretation of, and talk about, the hiss is our application of our description.

Suggesting formal logic as your standard of rationality sounded very odd even as a conditional comment. — Corvus

You surprise me. I thought that was what you were suggesting. It's good to know that I was wrong.

That would mean children born deaf can think well enough to function, communicate and learn sign language. In fact, they begin to invent their own signals between 8 and 12 month, and can be taught the rudiments of ASL at that time, just as hearing babies begin to learn spoken language. They all do need sensory and intellectual stimulation. For non-verbal feral children the requirements of survival would provide plenty of stimulation, as it also does for fox kits and fledgling geese. — Vera Mont

Quite so.

Sorry. Premature posting. Fat thumbs.

There's a lot packed in to your comments of the last few days. Thanks. I've had to be selective in what I reply to. I hope I've identified the best places to focus.

My issue with the phrase "what's going on in the heads" is that it presupposes a false equivalence. — creativesoul

Do you mean false equivalence between human thinking and animal thinking? I was using the phrase to refer to what is often described as the phenomenology of thinking. Perhaps most helpful would be to talk about what people will report as their thinking.

Meaningful thought emerged long before naming and describing practices. — creativesoul

Quite so. But I don't think there's any reason to suppose that meaningful thought without name or describing has been banished from human life. The complication is that we often want to talk about, or at least express such thoughts or experiences, and then we often find ourselves struck dumb or confused.

There are some things at work here, beneath all our discourse/ conversation about what counts as rational thought/minds. — creativesoul

Yes, indeed. If we could identify what they are, we might make a leap forward in our understanding of what's going onin philosophical discussion of that topic. The question about animals is particularly useful because it is a specific application of those concepts in a particular context where we find it difficult to be sure how to apply them. Our paradigm of rational thinking is articulate thinking independent of action. But that depends on our language, and animals do not have that kind of language. So we disagree about how to apply them.

One of my difficulties here is that there is an almost irresistible temptation to think that what is at stake is a process that is independent of the action - a process that is referred to by "thinking" or "reasoning". I happen to have recently read Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds". In that book, he articulates an idea of rational reconstruction as a way of coming to understand what is happening when we attribute the application of reason where there does not appear to be any such process involved. He doesn't mention animals, but I think that it is also a good way to understand what is going on when we attribute reason to animals.

One way of explaining this is by means of an analogy. Aristotle developed the concept of the practical syllogism. He doesn't claim that When I eat my breakfast, I must have said to myself "This is food. Food is good for me. I should eat this." (Partly because he recognizes that that process doesn't necessarily result in action.) What he is doing here is exactly parallel to what he does when he formulates the idea of the theoretical syllogism - "All humans are mortal. Socrates is a human. Socrates is mortal." It is a formulation that helps us analyze and understand the actual ways that humans think. Theoretical and practical syllogisms are rational reconstructions of thinking, not empirical descriptions.