↪creativesoul
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity? — Patterner

I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality. Isn't that much the same as being able to tell the difference between what's true and what's not?

Words don't play games.
— creativesoul
Not sure what you are getting at here. If you think I'm just playing games here, better tell me. — Ludwig V

That was a reference to "chess", "checkers, "draughts" language. Words don't play games. You made remarks about playing games. You were not talking about the words. You were talking about me, personally.

That's all I was getting at.

Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill. — Ludwig V

I like to maintain a distinction between what is deliberately learned in order to be able to participate in some specific activity and what one introjects without any awareness of or choice about what is being instilled.

When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities. — Ludwig V

I don't see that I have created a problem. I don't deny that social role(s) are a part of any elaborate conception or account of self. As I said before I think there is a more basic and more primordial sense of self, which is involved in the sheer sense or affect or apprehension of being.

We can to some extent talk about that but not in definite ways. It is more something to be evoked or alluded to than something to be defined. To relate this back to the OP somewhat I would say that the animal sense of self is not any different.

I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality. — creativesoul

A few posts ago, I said: "I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information." You can make rationalize decisions with inaccurate information. If you have been taught that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies, you might build a device that takes advantage of that "fact." The device won't fail because your thinking wasn't rational. It will fail because the information you used as a starting point was inaccurate.

Isn't that much the same as being able to tell the difference between what's true and what's not? — creativesoul

I guess that depends on the definition of true.

How can you assess rational thought, except through problem-solving? — Vera Mont

But wouldn’t that mean that all animals have rational thought? They all problem solve in some ways.

Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity? — Patterner

The scientific sense of the term "gravity" which we now make common use of is first recorded in the early 17th century. Yes, people before this mused about why things fall back down to Earth, but then you also have musings about witches flying on broomsticks, people walking on top of water, yogis levitating in the East, and the like. So, among many other possible examples, I'll answer that that first hominid (or group of such) that invented the wheel was just such a case of rational thinking unaware of what we now know to be (the physical force of) gravity. But then neither has any lesser animal that has ever calculated a jump been aware of gravity.

Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

And yet many a rational human yet plays the lottery hoping for the big win - this sometimes for well over a ten-year span during which no such win has occurred. Is it rational to deny the possibility of winning the lottery? Or, given the entailed limitations of knowledge, the possibility that the person who used to get off the train at such and such time and location will someday once again appear as they did previously?

In a way, I write this to point out that rational thinking includes inductive and abductive thinking, which are far less certain than deductive thinking.

A question I ask out of curiosity:

In my own appraising that many a lesser animal has the capacity for forethought: What forethought can occur in the absence of any and all rational thinking - this as regards the present and past so as to best infer the future?

The scientific sense of the term "gravity" which we now make common use of is first recorded in the early 17th century. Yes, people before this mused about why things fall back down to Earth, but then you also have musings about witches flying on broomsticks, people walking on top of water, yogis levitating in the East, and the like. — javra

Gravity defined simply as the tendency of things to fall was and is experienced by everyone. It is hardly something one could be unaware of. Speculations about it and the other things you mention are not in the same class for the obvious reason that the other things would not have been common experiences or to be skeptical even experienced at all.

lesser animal — javra

:roll:

Gravity defined simply as the tendency of things to fall was and is experienced by everyone. It is hardly something one could be unaware of. Speculations about it and the other things you mention are not in the same class for the obvious reason that the other things would not have been common experiences or to be skeptical even experienced at all. — Janus

Sure, but neither does this dispel that the force of gravity was unknown till a few centuries back nor does it in any way differentiate humans from non-human animals (which was sort'a my point): both commonly experience the tendency of things to fall. That stated, do you then claim that non-human animals know about gravity?

lesser animal — javra

:roll: — Janus

I've already made my case for this terminology here.

Sure, but neither does this dispel that the force of gravity was unknown till a few centuries back — javra

Again I disagree. The force was known. It would have been observed everywhere and even felt in the body. What was different was the explanation for the force.

I've already made my case for this terminology here. — javra

What you've said there boils down to saying that no other animals have symbolic language. In that sense and only in that sense are they to be counted as "lesser". Well we are lesser than other animals in many different ways. Need I enumerate them?

Again I disagree. The force was known. It would have been observed everywhere and even felt in the body. What was different was the explanation for the force. — Janus

And I again disagree with your disagreement. With one reference already provided in support of this. The notion of gravitational force as a scientific law was unknown until the 17th century, right about Newton's time. Before that, it was conceivable by people that witches could fly on broomsticks - but not afterwards (at least not by those who ascribed to this newly discovered force of gravity). Do you have any references to the contrary?

What you've said there boils down to saying that no other animals have symbolic language. — Janus

No, it doesn't. It boils down to lesser animals being of lesser value in comparison to humans. One can kill a mosquito without qualms but not a fellow human, kind of thing.

Well we are lesser than other animals in many different ways. Need I enumerate them? — Janus

Are you addressing things such as "humans are of lesser height (than giraffes, for example)" or that the individual human is of lesser value than the individual non-human animal?

If the first, it's already known. If the second, please do enumerate at will ... such that the life of some non-human animal is to be valued more than the life of a human.

The notion of gravitational force as a scientific law was unknown until the 17th century, right about Newton's time. — javra

I already acknowledged that the force was known but not the (scientific) explanation for it.

No, it doesn't. It boils down to lesser animals being of lesser value in comparison to humans. One can kill a mosquito without qualms but not a fellow human, kind of thing. — javra

That humans commonly consider other animals of lesser value (just as many other animals do) does not entail that they are of lesser values as such.

If the second, please do enumerate at will ... such that the life of some non-human animal is to be valued more than the life of a human. — javra

:roll: Youre not paying attention to what Ive been saying. A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice. Humans are greater than other animals in the sense that they can if they are rational enough see through and overcome their human exceptionalism.

There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks.

I already acknowledged that the force was known but not the (scientific) explanation for it. — Janus

The (scientific) explanation allows for no exceptions. How could the force of gravity have been known prior to the force of gravity being discovered - before which exceptions to the force of gravity were granted (again, as per flying witches)?

There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks. — Janus

That's not an enumeration of how humans are lesser than non-human animals. It also completely overlooks what I've previous addressed, namely: the far greater powers and cognitive abilities of humans relative to all other known animals. As though there is no comparative value to be found in these. As you say, :roll:

I was trying to give you a simple example of even a simplest most basic daily life knowledge has a ground to be rational when examined. — Corvus

I'm afraid I may have forgotten the context of this. But if you are saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale, then I agree. Sometimes, we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational.
What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding.

Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back. — Corvus

I don't disagree. However, when we are dealing with human beings, we can cross-question them and elicit rationales from them. When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational.

Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity? — Patterner

What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter.

Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness.

The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations. — creativesoul

They can indeed make an important difference.

Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. — creativesoul

Yes. One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).

Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. — creativesoul

While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.

We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. — creativesoul

Yes, of course. But I don't see why that conclusion requires the premiss about metacognition.

There would be no sense of importance. — creativesoul

That is puzzling. Animals have wants and desires, and I would have thought that implies a sense of importance.

A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. — creativesoul

Yes. That's the standard way of putting it and my knowledge of what I believe is not to be evaluated in the same way as my knowledge of what others believe. There are a number of qualifications, which may well apply in real life. Nevertheless the believer's words are very helpful in getting a more accurate idea of what, exactly, it is that the believer believes.
But I get worried about how to establish that a candidate is insincere. If one thinks about it from the perspective that you don't know whether a candidate is sincere or not, my remark

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important. — Ludwig V

may seem less absurd, though it still seems bad-tempered and unhelpful.

What's at issue is how we need to adapt what we can do when we do not have access to the believer's own words. This does turn up in human life, but seems marginal, in some sense. But it is no longer marginal when we come to creatures that do not, and seem incapable of, human language.

Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
— Patterner
What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter. — Ludwig V

I'm not concerned with the scientific, technical side of things. You can think rationally without any of that kind of knowledge.

Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
— Patterner
I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness. — Ludwig V

Indeed. If that dog was still showing up ten years after the last appearance of the man because of loyalty, then it certainly wasn't rational.

A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice. — Janus

That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore.
I think it's not far wrong to say that all life except the life of some organisms like lichens, lives off other life; it's part of the deal. To be sure, humans do have some choice in the matter; they can manage without meat and without killing plants, but they are a long, long way off being able to live without taking life at all.

There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks. — Janus

Well, it often does. Often through carelessness and ignorance, it must be said. But human exceptionalism can be a basis for pinning responsibility on them. That's the key point of much of the argument about climate change.

What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding. — Ludwig V

Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular?

When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational. — Ludwig V

Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational?

But wouldn’t that mean that all animals have rational thought? They all problem solve in some ways. — John McMannis

Do they?
I have personally witnessed it in dogs, cats, crows, raccoons and rats and goats.
In scientific experimentation, the subjects have been predominantly apes, dolphins, canines, rodents, parrots and corvids.
I would be very interested to hear of other examples, and how the assessment was made.

Do they?
I have personally witnessed it in dogs, cats, crows, raccoons and rats and goats.
In scientific experimentation, the subjects have been predominantly apes, dolphins, canines, rodents, parrots and corvids.
I would be very interested to hear of other examples, and how the assessment was made. — Vera Mont

Maybe not all animals. But I guess it depends on what’s considered problem solving. Saying animals can do rational thinking sounds wrong though. I think it’s projecting maybe but I’m not smart enough to clearly define where the line is.

But I guess it depends on what’s considered problem solving. — John McMannis

In the scientific observations, the problem was set by humans. It would be in the form of a maze, or human-designed containers from which the subject would have to extricate a treat, by more or less complicated methods. The experiments with crows usually involve a three-part procedure that requires the subject to analyze the nature of the container and figure out how to open it, using one or more tools, or a principle of physics (such as artificially raisin the water level in a tube, or tilting a device to the correct inline) .
Ravens, apparently do very well indeed. In the primate experiments, the subject might be confronted with images or symbols of which they had to decipher the meaning. None of these experiments were 'in the wild'; ie problems that an animal would encounter in their natural habitat, while living its ordinary life - not situations in which instinct would be expected to play a part.

Here is a simple one for dogs

To determine cooperative actions, the strings are set so far apart that one dog cannot reach them both. Two dogs are positioned in front of the table. The goal is for the dogs to cooperate by pulling the strings simultaneously, releasing two treats. In this study, dogs cooperated with each other or with human participants. It was also observed that if one dog was set in front of the table, he waited for the other dog to get in position before tugging on the string. So, dogs are good at working with others to get the job done.

The problem solving I myself observed in dogs involved something the dog(s) desired, that was normally denied to them, so that they would have to find ways to circumvent human-imposed rules and overcome human-created obstacles. I have personal experience with many animals, including numerous confrontations with one memorable rat we dubbed Albert Houdini. It took six months of devising ever more ingenious traps to catch that little bastard and relocate him to a wild environment. Since we had also released several other rats in that location, we can only speculate how much we've contributed to the evolution of a super-race of rodents.

Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular? — Corvus

Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale?
If so, I agree.
It seems to follow that when we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational. Do you agree?
I did ask a further question. Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying.

Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational? — Corvus

I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons.

Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale? — Ludwig V

That has nothing to do with rationalising. That is just a perception. Perception and recalling what they saw when asked, is not reasoning.

Reasoning takes place when thinking takes place on why and how, and being able to logically and objectively summarising the grounds for the perception, beliefs, actions or propositions.

Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying. — Ludwig V

Every beliefs, actions, speaking and perception is one time only in the path of time, therefore they are unique. There is no repeat or going circular in reasoning, unless you are talking about the Sun rising every morning. Even rising of the sun is unique events because it takes place in the path of unique time.
No I didn't find anything annoying. I was just trying clarify the points using reasoning.

I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons. — Ludwig V

The agents with no or little linguistic ability is not the point of the topic. They are not the subject of reasoning. They are objects of reasoning. We have been talking about whether your thoughts and comments on them are rational. Not them.

Please think about Hegel's saying "The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Philosophy of Right. 1820.

What did he mean by that? He didn't mean to say anything about the owl in actuality. He meant to say the metaphor about reason and philosophy.

How could the force of gravity have been known prior to the force of gravity being discovered — javra

It was known as I said by being experienced and understood as a force. It is irrelevant that Newton may have coined the word 'gravity'. Are you going to try to argue that the ancients had no concept of force?

As though there is no comparative value to be found in these. — javra

There is comparative value to be found in all animal capacities. I haven't denied that it is commonly believed that humans in some senses have greater cognitive capacities than most other animals.

That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore. — Ludwig V

I wasn't suggesting that it was a prejudice that could be changes, merely that it is a kind of natural prejudice shared by all social animals in favoring their own over other species.

But human exceptionalism can be a basis for pinning responsibility on them. That's the key point of much of the argument about climate change. — Ludwig V

I cannot agree with that interpretation. Humans are responsible for climate change simply insofar as they are causing it.

One must be able to differentiate between inaccurate and accurate information then? Basically, rationality boils down to that capability? — creativesoul

I don't know what else it could mean. — Patterner

Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

For a dog that begins going to the train station at 5 o'clock on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday for all sorts of reasons, including meeting a human, it would be rational for that dog to occasionally hold such expectation. They very well could have passing memories of the human after death.

The train station is part of a lifelong routine. The train station is connected to the human by the dog. That's what makes them both meaningful to the dog. The train station can also be connected to feeling good.

All meaningful experience begins with connections being drawn between different things. The world becomes more meaningful as a direct result. That's early rational thought.

That's what else it means.

You said they could have been rational all along, but not if knowing the difference between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality.

between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality — creativesoul

This doesn't seem, to me, to be true at all. You can be rational with inaccurate information, provided it isn't directly illogical. If you've been mislead, misinformed, lied to etc.. it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? Perhaps you can form a way it is - i'm quite unsure, i'm just giving my intuition. The standard objection to JTB seems to, weakly, support this

You give reasons it could be rational for the dog to go to the train station a decade after the man stopped getting off the train. And there obviously were reasons, since the dog continued a decade after. But the dog wasn't still going a decade after because it expected the man to get off the train.

But the dog wasn't still going a decade after because it expected the man to get off the train. — Patterner

He was just faithful.
Some things we do are not rational in a strict sense of the word. My favourite cat went out one night three months ago and didn't show up in the cedar tree outside my office window next morning. Chances are, a coyote or a car killed her. I'm aware of these dangers, having access to information dogs and cats don't. My grandfather died in another town; his human family was notified. The dog never saw his body and was told nothing. I still look out at the cedar tree every morning: though I don't rationally expect to see Sammy there, some superstitious* part of me keeps hoping. The same way the families of soldiers missing in action keep hoping for years or decades that their loved one will come home some day.

*I suppose it's the same part in many humans that insists on believing in a soul and afterlife. Hope, even the most improbable hope, is hard to give up.

Yes. I was just expanding the scope of what counts as being rational to include more than just the ability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information.

One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy). — Ludwig V

There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs.

Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things.
— creativesoul
While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.

We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use.
— creativesoul
Yes, of course. But I don't see why that conclusion requires the premiss about metacognition. — Ludwig V

I'm sorry. That post was not reviewed prior to posting. There were half edits going on. As it stood, on my view it was nonsense. :blush: From my own poorly attended post nonetheless.