I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term. — Janus

Believing another's words is one species of belief; one way to draw correlations; one way to make connections; one way to attribute meaning(in this case to the terms "belief" and "believing").

One way to talk? Sure. A bit shallow though.

the fact that he found it necessary to try and account for the interaction between mind and body through the pineal gland, is also indicative of the sense in which he treats the mind as something objectively existent. — Wayfarer

Hey Jeep.

I thought that the causal closure of the material world and the immaterial world drove the need to explain how it was that minds could effect/interact with bodies and vice versa.

If the mind was completely independent from the body and vice versa, then it would not be possible to think that one was hungry, or in pain, or any number of other reductios.

Do you believe that naive/direct realism cannot deny color as a property of objects? I mean, I suppose I do not see any reason that a position like naive realism cannot correct any flaws based upon newly acquired knowledge such as color perception. — creativesoul

I think that if they admit that colours are not properties of objects then they must admit that colours are the exact mental intermediary (e.g. sense-data or qualia or whatever) that indirect realists claim exist and are seen. And the same for smells and tastes. — Michael

I think that you've given indirect realism too much credit. I see no reason to think that if colors are not inherent properties of distal objects that the only other alternative explanation is the indirect realist one. They can both be wrong about color.

Olfactory and gustatory biological machinery work differently than vision. Light is not part of the objects we see. It helps facilitate seeing. Light does not help facilitate tasting and smelling.

Direct realists claimed that there is no epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are actual constituents of experience. Indirect realists claimed that there is an epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are not actual constituents of experience (and that the actual constituents of experience are something like sense-data or qualia or whatever).

Why can't distal objects be constituents of experience, and color not be an inherent property thereof?

Cheers. I'd rather be encouraging than discouraging. Enacting morality and all.

:wink:

You're often good at that.

Thanks for that. Interesting take on truth.

Could you explain it a bit more while applying it to the context?

The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat.
— creativesoul

Sure. The meaning is just what the cat does. — Banno

Meaning is not equivalent to behaviors. The identity of indiscernibles shows that nicely.

As I just said to Janus, you and I are in near complete agreement when it comes to the OP. Best leave it there with you. I'd rather keep liking you.

:lol:

That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking.
— creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief. — Janus

The term intention has very different uses, particularly between laypeople and philosophers. I'm guessing you know this already. Just thought it worth mention. It's relatively new to me. That said...

If we're using the layman's notion of intention or the philosopher's, intentionally mimicking for the sake of mimicking requires believing one is mimicking for the sake of mimicking. The object of intention(the philosopher's kind) is the mimicry in both cases, it seems to me. Although, I suppose ridicule could be the object in the deliberate cause of mimicry. The difference between mimicking without knowing one is mimicking and intentionally mimicking is the knowing part. In either case, one knows how to mimic when one mimics.

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another.

Earlier you wrote that one without hands cannot plane a board. Strictly speaking that's not true of everyone without hands, but yes... that's the gist of the existential dependency I'm setting out regarding knowledge and belief.

I understand that this is not really germane to the thread topic, but it involves belief, and I'm a sucker for that topic.

:joke:

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway.

I appreciate ya, bruddah.

Aloha! A hui ho.

You continue to think of belief as a discreet "thing in the head", as mental furniture. — Banno

That's just not true, despite the fact that you've been charging me with it for years now. You've a clever little quip about first misunderstanding a position prior to disagreeing with it. It fits here.

We each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. There are unstated beliefs. Each and every one of these can be set out as a proposition that is held to be the case.

Perhaps you believe that you have more than 28 eyelashes, but until now that belief has never been articulated. The belief is not a thing in your head.

I agree with most all of that. I used to reject the bit about articulation in a broad sense of rejection. I no longer reject it out of hand. I still question the truth aptness of unarticulated belief, as well as whether or not it makes sense to say one holds an unarticulated belief true - prior to articulation. Nonetheless, there's nothing here aside from that that causes me pause.

It would be absurd to suppose that each of one's innumerable beliefs exists somewhere in your mind.

Agreed.

That a belief can be put into a proposition is a grammatical point about the way the word "belief" is used. If you can't put it into a statement, then you can't be said to believe it.

Again. Agreed.

"The cat believes the mouse ran behind the tree" shows exactly that - "the mouse ran behind the tree" being the content of the cat's belief. What is not claimed is that there a thing in the head of the cat that somehow is named by "the mouse ran behind the tree". Rather there is the cat's capacity to recognise, chase, anticipate, and so on. It is humans, you and I, who benefit from setting this game out in terms of belief and intent.

Two sticking points directly above. The first is the same one hinted at earlier at the top of this reply; that you're arguing against an opponent of your own imagination, because I do not argue for spatiotemporal location of beliefs, let alone 'in the head'. I reject and vehemently argue against that sort of mischaracterization.

The second involves the content of the cat's belief. If the content of the cat's belief is the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree", and the proposition consists of the mouse, the tree, the spatiotemporal relationship between the mouse and tree, in addition to the mouse's behaviour, then I agree. If the proposition consists of words, then I disagree. The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat. Those words are not.

That's the contentious part.

I'm currently watching/studying Searle's lectures on philosophy of mind. I also recently purchased several of his books including "Mind". At least I think that's the name of it. I understand that on Searle's view, the content of the intentional state of belief is the proposition, but I do not yet agree with that. I may never.

The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat. Words are not. Of that much, I'm certain. We've not even bridled that horse yet, let alone ridden it to death and flogged it afterwards. It's germane to "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", and 'meaning is use' cannot apply.

:wink:

Knowing and believing are language games, ↪creativesoul. — Banno

Sure, that's one way of using the terms. It's odd though, in that some language less creatures are capable of both; believing and knowing that a mouse ran behind the tree.

If that was the case prior to language use, and I see no reason to deny that, then knowing and believing are not just language games, because language less creatures do not play such things.

Either all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief or it is not.
— creativesoul

I don't think there is an empirical matter of fact about that (certainly not a determinable one, in any case), — Janus

Oh, I completely agree. There are an abundance of them.

It's probably worth saying that one need not be aware of their own beliefs. Beliefs come first, then awareness of them. That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking.

Sometimes, very young children are acting like others around them... in times of mimicry, that is. They are trying to do what they've seen done. Their attention is not towards the fact that they're mimicking, they're attention is on what they're doing(that counts - to us - as mimicry).

I just think we will disagree as to just where it has its roles, or to put it another way, about where it is appropriate to speak about belief being a factor... — Janus

Perhaps, but that is the interesting part of all this. How it is a factor, and in what way, as well as to what extent, etc.

:wink:

Yup, that's what I'm keeping in mind.

What are the pitfalls you warn of?

What I meant about planing boards and riding bikes is that you can watch others doing them, and then have a go, trying different things and improving with practice. — Janus

No doubt.

I see no need for any particular beliefs in that...

"In that" is not how I would put it. It's that mimicry presupposes at the very least, that the mimicker believe they are mimicking.

It's not that I'm 'framing things in terms of belief'. Rather, I'm situating belief in such a way as to revive it's vital importance to being an intentional being/agent. The church has not helped. Truth, knowledge, belief, and certainty were absconded. Many folk are repulsed by the words due to how the church used them. That's really too bad.

"Absconded" is the wrong word, but hopefully you get the point. It's been a long day.

:wink:

"Tainted" would be better.

. The notion that evolution 'progresses" is somewhat problematic. Take care. — Banno

Well, in my defense, those words left your keyboard, not mine.

"Evolutionary progression" implies process over time.

But yes, it's complicated.

I can be aware of whatever it is that is present to me right now without believing or knowing anything about it in any propositional sense. — Janus

We may not disagree there, depending on the candidate filling in the blank left by "whatever it is". I'm not fond of the notion of "proposition"...

This infatuation with evolution is new, isn't it? — Banno

It is not. I've just mentioned it more here in recent past.

Why should we kowtow to evolutionary "progress"? — Banno

The same reason we no longer seriously entertain geocentric models.

Planing a board cannot be done without a tool. A tool cannot be made without belief. Planing a board cannot be done without belief. Belief is necessary for planing boards in terms of existential dependency as well as practicality. Belief less creatures cannot know how to plane boards.

Robots can plane boards, but they cannot know how. Robots are automated tools. We can learn how to use them to plane boards, and given sufficient time and practice, begin using them without consciously focusing upon the task at hand. We can sing to ourselves while going through the motions. We can carry on complete conversations while using planers.

I think that you're getting at or pointing towards the kind of habitual muscle memory habits that develop given enough time and repetition. With that I'd wholly agree, but as "cross-purposes" implied, that's not what I was talking about.

For me an empirical fact is something that can be directly observed. That said, I think we may be talking at cross-purposes. I agree that, in the sense that everyone is aware of things, believes things and knows things that awareness, believing and knowing cannot be completely independent. — Janus

I think you're right here regarding "talking at cross-purposes".

I'm arguing from the standpoint of evolutionary progression. The safest starting point for this conversation may be the moment of conception(fertilization), although any acceptable robust notion of belief must be amenable to the evolutionary progression of the species as well; by my lights anyway.

My point is that we can be aware of a particular thing without believing or knowing anything about that thing, we can believe a particular thing without being aware of or knowing anything about that thing, and we can know how to do something without believing anything or being aware of doing the thing.

Examples may help me to grasp what you're saying here. The above, as written, seems plainly false to me. I would argue that all three candidates/examples/suggestions are false, as they are written.

Of course, we do have to be aware of what we are doing when we are learning to do something. I think it really comes down to how you want to think about it. There is not just one correct way.

The evolutionary progression of human thought and belief is not a matter of personal preference. It evolved however it has, regardless of how one wants to think about it.

Either all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief or it is not.

The direct realist believes that this relationship is constitutive (entailing such things as the naive theory of colour) — Michael

Do you believe that naive/direct realism cannot deny color as a property of objects? I mean, I suppose I do not see any reason that a position like naive realism cannot correct any flaws based upon newly acquired knowledge such as color perception.

Searle takes up the argument from science quite well if you'd like to read an opposing argument. — NOS4A2

Indeed. Searle is a self-proclaimed naive realist. I'm currently listening/studying his lectures on philosophy of mind.

I do like how that accounting practice covers other mental states aside from belief, in terms of sharing the same content.

Thanks for the bits about a disjunctive account.

We’re talking belief/knowledge... — Mww

Indeed. You and I agree on the OP question. Knowledge is not merely belief. My claim was that knowledge is existentially dependent on belief(knowledge requires belief). The candidate in question was knowing how to ride a bike. I claimed, would argue and defend - if given a chance - the claim that all bike riding is existentially dependent upon all sorts of different beliefs. Some belonging to the rider, and some not.

Just because you claim that knowing how to ride a bike is not existentially dependent upon all sorts of prior beliefs, does not make it so.

And yes, you've been arguing against your own imaginary opponents. I've never claimed that belief was enough for knowledge. I've never argued that bike riding was existentially dependent upon any of the beliefs you've been reducing to ad absurdum.

I agree that it comes down to which should be thought the best way of talking about it, since there is no empirical fact of the matter to be found. I personally prefer to think in terms of direct awareness, knowledge and belief all being quite distinct and independent of one another. — Janus

But I think that there are empirical facts of the matter.

Direct awareness, knowledge, and belief are distinct, but given the need for evolutionary progression, I cannot agree with claiming that they are independent.

You are about to put food in the bowl. The cat knows that. That is a proposition. — Banno

What does the proposition consist of, here, on this account? If the content of the cat's belief is the proposition, and the content of the proposition is me, the food, the bowl, my actions - as compared/contrasted with words/meaningful marks - then it may be the case that we're calling the same thing by two different names.

The object of your cat's belief is presumably the imminent full bowl. — Banno

I've not worked out what the object of the cat's belief would be according to Searle, but that seems in line with what he set out.

I agree that propositions are not always what he calls 'the object' of belief but can be.

His account still is in agreement with the idea that all belief content is propositional, as he draws a distinction between propositional attitudes and propositional 'content'.

...someone said all knowledge requires belief, both of which I for sure, and ↪Janus apparently, reject.
————- — Mww

Your rejection is based upon a conception of experience that cannot include language acquisition. Your responses thus far have been full of strawmen and red herring. Funny ones, but horribly inaccurate if aimed towards what I've said here.

Knowledge, then, is multifaceted. Since to agree, to accept and to devote have different truth conditions - or none at all, like a devotion. — fdrake

Devotion is of the believer. Truth conditions are not always.

One sees the bike, handles it...no need for belief. I have to go right now...will resume later. — Janus

I'm thinking deterministic causal chain of events. Bike riding definitely arose via belief. It makes no sense to say that belief is not necessary for bike riding.

I share your well respected trepidation of religious remnants of language regarding the key terms here.

If "knowing that" includes my cat knowing that I was about to put food in her bowl as I began the ritual, despite her clear inability to form/possess and/or otherwise have/display a propositional attitude, then it only follows that not all belief is equivalent to propositional attitude. Some. Not all

Are you and I still at odds on that? Searle shares my loathing towards the notion of belief as propositional attitude.

:wink:

For future events? Depends. In a practical sense, sure it's warranted in that not assuming (to the degree needed) would prevent action.
But I do not think it right that past events can warrant certainty about future events, in the strict sense. Constant conjunction and all.. — AmadeusD

Does not matter to me how many conjunctions are necessary.

I'm certain that my fridge will be there when I go grab a yogurt.

Unshakably. Absolutely. Certitude is worth keeping. It's temperance and judgment that need honed. In other words, sometimes it is wise to not expect a pattern to continue. Not all.

I know how to ride a bike, plane a board, paint a picture, write a poem, play the piano and so on, and I don't see how any of that requires belief. — Janus

Five activities with five different sets of existential conditions. Is expectation nowhere to be found?

Maybe I believe I can’t know how to ride a bike cuz I’m a hopeless klutz who believes he shouldn’t use a hammer given the historical precedent of experiencing serious bodily injury. — Mww

The bike emerged onto the world stage through the belief of the original bike makers. Impossible to ride a bike that you do not believe is there.

If A is existentially dependent upon B, then either B emerged prior to or simultaneously with A.

Fill in the blanks. Find an exception.

Bike riding - as we know it - is existentially dependent on the belief of the original bike makers.

"Belief is not necessary for bike riding" is proven false.

Maybe I believe I can’t know how to ride a bike cuz I’m a hopeless klutz who believes he shouldn’t use a hammer given the historical precedent of experiencing serious bodily injury. But then, out of sheer well-being necessity, I find myself riding a bike in order to escape the neighbor’s mutt. If knowledge requires belief, and the belief is negative the knowledge must also be negative thereby how to ride a bike should not have been known to me, and under sufficiently strong negative belief that I can’t know how, I shouldn’t have even bothered to try. Yet given that riding a bike….which I’m now doing….presupposes at least the awareness of the mechanics and principles by which bike riding is accomplished, re: I’m peddling upright in a progressive series of times, it is the case what I believe about bike riding (I can’t know how) has nothing whatsoever to do with my coming to know how to do it (YEA!! Look it me, here I am bike riding).

So did I switch beliefs and come to believe I can know how to ride a bike? Like that little engine that could? Seems kinds silly to me, to take the time to believe something at the same time I’m discovering it for myself in conjunction with the extant experience that bikes are inherently ride-able. Even if IthinkIcanIthinkIcanIthinkIcan is running through my brain, am I navigating positively because of that alone, or am I concentrating on the objects of certain mechanics and principles necessary for transportation via bicycle? Do I really need to believe in the authority of those principles in order to use them, especially considering the fact I’m only interested in their objects I use and not the principles themselves I merely think as given?

Wonder why Nike, instead taglining with “Just do it”, didn’t instead go with “Believe you can know how to do it then just do it”? — Mww

Do you think someone has made the argument that all belief is necessary for bike riding?

Hey. Once again, for no particular reason while agreeing in a rhetorical fashion…..

I question whether all knowledge does require belief.
— Janus

Pretty dumb, methinks, to merely believe I know how to ride a bike while I’m actually doing it, and conversely, even dumber to claim to know I can ride a bike by merely believing I’ve been on one and in control of it. — Mww

Yup.

Who's made those claims anyway?

I question whether all knowledge does require belief.
— Janus

If such were the case, it reduces to belief being a necessary condition for knowledge. — Mww

That's one way to talk about it.

There are a variety of ways in which the experienced rider is not avoiding danger in the way that someone who is learning is avoiding danger — Leontiskos

Irrelevant to the point being made.

Where there has never been bikes and people there could have never been people riding bikes. The first creator must have believed it were possible to make a bike, otherwise they would not have tried.

It points at a problem with claiming that belief is not necessary for bike riding.

It's a matter of existential dependency.

Truth is inscrutable and ineffable — ENOAH

Huh. Self defeat much?