Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

Can dogs compare their own behaviour with a set of rules governing that behaviour? Can they thik about the rules placed on their behaviour?

If not, then how can they know what you claim they can know?

A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. — Vera Mont

I'm guessing this refers to the earlier examples of tool use and learning how to open gates. I agree that those are cases of rational thinking in non human animals. None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.

On the contrary...

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.

you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough. — Vera Mont

That's not true.

The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational. — Vera Mont

How did sorts of thought become the central issue? — Vera Mont

Not all rational thought is the same. Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. Hence, any and all thought that is existentially dependent upon metacognition is of the sort that non human creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold.

There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.

What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here.
— creativesoul
I thought the question was whether other species are capable of rational thought. The language boondoggle was introduced later. — Vera Mont

Of course the question is whether or not other species are capable of rational thought. You and I agree that they are.

Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well.

I use the method I've been employing to discriminate between those that only we can form, have, and/or hold and those that other species can as well. One glaringly obvious distinction is that other species are incapable of having thoughts that are existentially dependent upon using language(naming and descriptive practices).

By what standard do you discriminate?

I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are.

There are some things that are verifiable, others that are not.

Nor have I claimed that.

:yikes:

There is no method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are — Vera Mont

That's not true.

My Thanksgiving blew up into an emotional drama and I feel very fragile this morning... — Athena

Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.

You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve.

There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
— creativesoul
No kidding! What's the point of a brain, if it's not to generate a mind? But if the word troubles you, turn off the sound and watch the action. — Vera Mont

It's not that the word troubles me. It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitable conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
— creativesoul
Why is that so important to you, and by what method - other than philosophizing - do you propose to discriminate? — Vera Mont

There is no other method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. We can then check and see how well our notion explains the experiment. It matters because getting it right matters.

Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
— creativesoul
I agree. But behaviour (including linguistic behaviour, and behaviours like talking to oneself silently) does express one's thought, beliefs and experiences. — Ludwig V

Indeed, but language less creatures cannot do that.

What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
— creativesoul
What else, apart from behaviour, could meaningful experience consist of?

A process.

Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature.

Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better. — creativesoul

Other creatures capable of thought…..
— creativesoul

IN-capable? — Mww

:wink:

I mentioned what they were incapable of. It's not all thought, or all belief, or all experience. Just some.

This is from Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, by Antonio Damasio:
Sensing is not perceiving, and it is not constructing a “pattern” based on something else to create a “representation” of that something else and produce an “image” in mind. On the other hand, sensing is the most elementary variety of cognition.
— Damasio — Patterner

This looks like a comparison between rudimentary sensory perception and Cartesian notion of perception, or perhaps a phenomenological account of perception. I agree with the rejection of both "representation" and "image". I'm also in complete agreement that physiological sensory perception is at the root, the basis, of thinking. However, sensory perception is not equivalent to thinking. That conflation blurs the entire timeline of evolutionary progression between moving towards light and our thinking about how they do that. I think the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around.

This is from Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment

Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the body’s health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.
— Ogas and Gaddam


Ogas and Gaddam soon talk about the roundworm. In addition to sensors and doers, the roundworm has two thinking elements. One neuron connects the sensors and the forward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is food ahead. Another neuron connects the sensors to the backward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is poison ahead. The stronger the signal a neuron gets from the sensor, the stronger the signal it sends to its mover.

Also, the two neurons inhibit each other. The stronger the signal a neuron receives from the sensor, the stronger it inhibits the other neuron.


The authors of these two books are calling it 'thinking' from the beginning. The roundworm is a step up. It is judging conflicting inputs, and choosing. It might be stretching the definitions of 'judging' and 'choosing'. And maybe it's stretching the definition to say "This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking. The sensors could evolve into eyes, or nose, or whatever. The movers could evolve into a tail, or legs, or whatever. But what connected them in the first ancient life evolved into our thinking. And, even if in only the most primitive sense, they are performing the same functions.

I agree in large part. I think they're on the right track. The notions of "mind" and "thinking" seem far too diluted for my tastes, and I suspect the account falls victim to reductio.

Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
What's the problem?
— creativesoul
My problem is the transition from apple pies to meaningful experiences. — Ludwig V

Yes, and understandably so, for they are very different kinds of things.

Apple pies are material, whereas thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences are neither material nor immaterial. Rather, they consist of material/physical and immaterial/non physical elements. In addition, apple pies could be classified as objects, whereas thought, belief, and meaningful experiences are not objects at all. Nor are they subjects. They are ongoing processes. I touched on this diversion from convention a few times earlier in the thread and mentioned to you more recently that my position turns many a historical dichotomy on its head.

There are two slightly different senses of "thought". One makes it like "belief" in that I can believe that p and think that p; the other is an activity, so it is hard to see that experience can consist of thinking. — Ludwig V

Yes. There are times when the two terms "thought" and "belief" are not interchangeable. This is irrelevant however to the position I'm arguing for/from.

Riding a unicycle is an activity. Some experiences consist of riding a unicycle. That is the case for one who is watching another ride or riding themselves.

Perhaps a large part of the problem that makes it "hard to see" how experiences can consist of thought and belief is that the conventional approaches are ill-equipped for doing so.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. They also tend to equate belief with propositions and/or belief with attitudes towards that proposition, which is a huge mistake, despite the fact that we express much of our own beliefs via language use/propositions.

On my view, it is clear that language less creatures' beliefs cannot be understood using that method. Not all belief is propositional in content. Propositions are meaningless to language less creatures. Hence, they can have no attitude towards them.

Belief and (thought that) is more like a state, rather than something that happens or that I do, so again, it doesn't seem plausible to think of it as a constituent of experience. — Ludwig V

This seems to be alluding to belief as propositional attitude without saying so.

Our discussion is an experience, partly shared - at least - by all who've participated and/or have been following along. It would be very hard to make any sense of denying that each and every participant having the experience were thinking about what they were reading. They do so by virtue of drawing correlations between language use and other things. All of those correlations are part of the experiences. They are experiences that only we can have. Those correlations(that process of thinking) are(is an) elemental constituent(s). If we were to remove all those correlations being drawn between the language use and other things, if we were to remove all of the thoughtful consideration between the claims and what the claims are describing, what would be left of each individual experience such that it could still count as the experience of the reader/participant? It would be akin to removing the apples from the pie and still claiming it was an apple pie.

Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief, but I'm reluctant to say that a sentence/statement/proposition is a constituent of thought or belief (or knowledge), since thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition. This is why some people are so reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as thought/belief/knowledge without language. — Ludwig V

On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".

The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since".

I'm not sure what that means.
— creativesoul
I hope it helps if I write that sentence as "Surely, (thought that involves trees and cats) is involved in the (behaviour that involves trees and cats)" and explain (which I should have done) that when a dog approaches a tree in order to sniffs it, it is because it believes that there will be interesting smells around it, and so on. — Ludwig V

What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here. That sort of consideration relies upon notions of "thought" and "belief". Even the approach that you seem most fond of presupposes notions of "thought" and "belief". The idea that behaviour "expresses" belief has very little, if any, restrictions around it. There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding. There are other problems as well, as I'm sure you're aware.

Regarding this example, I see no reason, ground, or justification to claim what the dog will believe is or isn't interesting.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs
language less animals can and/or cannot have?

I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. .... One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
— creativesoul
I may be wrong to think that you are referring to something that I said. If you were, I am troubled by your impression that I would dismiss the philosophical import of evolutionary progression, let alone dismiss it flippantly. I would have thought that my general insistence that there is always continuity between what animals can do and what humans can do was evidence to the contrary. I must have said something to mislead you and I'm sorry about that. — Ludwig V

I went back to check on what it was that was said. No worries. I must have misinterpreted what you wrote. My apology seems more fitting than yours. That is... it seems that it is I who owes you an apology, not the other way around.

:yikes:

My apologies.

Other creatures capable of thought…..
— creativesoul

IN-capable? — Mww

Hey Mww.

You and I both know that "thought" to you means something very different than "thought" to me. On your view, and correct me if I'm wrong, there is no distinction between thought and thinking about thought. We would agree that other creatures are incapable of some kinds of thought(namely those existentially dependent upon metacognitive endeavors) if there were such a distinction/discrimination on your view.

Hence, they cannot know better.
— creativesoul

It seems you don't have much experience of dogs. — Janus

Not sure how you arrived at that conclusion, but it's false... if you care enough about whether or not your beliefs about my experience are true.

I suspect that there are behaviours that dogs display after doing something forbidden, or after being approached by the humans afterwards, that you claim shows us that they know better?

I'm wondering if you looked at the argument for the claim at the top of that post, or just at the conclusion.

It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention.
— creativesoul
It's getting plenty of attention from animal behaviorists. We're getting more and more studies of problem solving in both nature and laboratory conditions. — Vera Mont

Indeed, we are. I've watched a number of different 'documentaries' about animal minds and problem solving. What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.

Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.
— creativesoul
And a great many irrational ones, as well... — Vera Mont

Agreed. The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not. Those that are, cannot be formed, had, or held by language less creatures.

We are hard-wired to connect.
— Questioner
Well, no. There are examples of folk who have turned their back on society and walked away. Check out the biography of Mark May. Perhaps we ought fight the "hard wiring"...

The point being that whatever you offer as the way things are, it is open to us to ask if they ought be that way. — Banno

We do not necessarily have to remain connected. We must first connect though. That is the way things are. Asking if it ought be that way is out of place.

:wink:

I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves. — Patterner

That all depends upon what counts as proof.

To deny that humans are leaps and bounds above any other species in significant ways is willful ignorance.
— Patterner
Who's denying it? I'm well aware of all the things humans have accomplished and are capable of that no other species - indeed, not all the other species put together - could have done or can do.
Surely, having all those superior attainments, possessions and complexity of intellect are distinction enough. Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought. — Vera Mont

Yes. It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention. Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.

It's knowing language's role that matters.

Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other?
— Patterner

Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).

Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.

In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.
— creativesoul
Exactly my point. — Patterner

Yup. The difference between language less thought and belief and language users' thought and belief are pivotal here in this discussion. How else do we avoid mistakenly attributing belief where none can be?

Morality is a human thing.

Thinking began in single-celled species. Nothing more than sensing light and moving in response to it is more complicated than dominoes knocking each other down. I can't imagine what the steps are between that and what we can do. — Patterner

I like the acknowledgement of evolutionary progression. However, thinking is something that we do. Thinking is existentially dependent upon certain biological structures that we have. We know that because we have observed and recorded the affects/effects that damaging those structures has on the mind and/or cognitive abilities of the injured. There is no good reason to attribute thinking to creatures that do not have very similar relevant biological structures.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
— creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. — Ludwig V

I'm not sure what that means.

Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.

What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.

I'm arguing in the negative.


Furthermore, I'm positing that all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of correlations between different things drawn by a creature so capable. I'm arguing in favor of that.

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
— Patterner
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all. — Ludwig V

Here is where it went off the rails.

The difference between thought, belief, and/or experiences that humans and only humans can have that no other animal can.

This presupposes a difference between other capable creatures' beliefs and our own, with a particular emphasis upon those beliefs that language use has facilitated.

Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other? — Patterner

Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).

Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.

In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.

Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness.
— creativesoul
Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean? — Ludwig V

I've an issue with attributing awareness of awareness to any creature incapable of thinking about thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. That requires naming and descriptive practices.

What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.
— creativesoul
The difference between the autonomous salivation and the growl which is under the dog's control. — Ludwig V

It does not follow from the fact that your dog can learn to stop growling on your command that all dogs have conscious control of their growling in the sense of "conscious control" that matters here. Voluntarily choosing to growl and/or not growl in some particular scenario/situation or another.

How do you know that the behaviour of language less creatures is not being misinterpreted? By what standard do you judge whether or not an interpretation is correct?

I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.
— creativesoul
I wasn't conflating those two descriptions. — Ludwig V

Thought, belief, and/or knowledge is not a description. Some folk say that dogs are somehow, someway, doing calculus when they catch a ball. I say that that's bad thinking. Conflating mathematical descriptions(calculus) for knowing how to catch a ball.

we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.
— creativesoul
OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer. — Ludwig V

It's not about my preferences. It's about thought, belief, and/or experience that exists and existed in its entirety prior to language use on the evolutionary timeline. You claimed that thought, belief, and meaningful experience consists of behaviour. I asked twice already, and now I'll ask again...

Are you claiming that some, all, and/or any thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) consist(s) of behaviour and behaviour alone?

Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.

Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...

Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.

What's the problem?

We can look at what language less animals are doing with language too. <---- Here, of course, by "language-less" I mean complex spoken and written language such as our own, capable of metacognition. I really need to start being better about that qualification though, because I'm confident we're not the only language users — creativesoul

All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Meaningful experience begins the moment one draws correlations between different things. Like sands and piles of sand. No clear lines here where thought and belief magically poof into existence. Evolution is very slow. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things. All language use consists of correlations. Not all correlations consist of language use. All correlations are meaningful to the creature drawing them.

Language use - in the beginning - is a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things as a means to communicate their own thought, belief, desire, wants, etc. It is by virtue of drawing correlations between the same things that shared meaning emerges. If the growl is to be considered language, then it must mean the same thing to both. I cannot say I know if that's the case. I know it must be if it is to count as language at that stage. The growl is one element within the experiences of a plurality of dogs. All draw correlations between the growl and something else. The growl is meaningful to both as a result of that and that alone. The growl may or may not mean the same thing to all creatures that witness the occurrence. It's the something else that may differ here and the growl itself cannot tell us what else is included in the dogs' correlational content.

Meaningful experience is prior to language. All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature/candidate under consideration. All meaningful things become so by virtue of becoming part of
that creature's correlational content. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things.

Hence, regarding your dog and other domesticated non-human animals that obey and/or understand basic commands and/or other language use...

These are no longer language less creatures having language less experience. Each and every correlation drawn between language use and something else counts not as language less experience. So, as I've said before, the difference between language less creatures' experiences and language users' experiences are clear. The former does not - cannot - include correlations including language use, and the latter does.

I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. It would be all too convenient for many a philosopher if philosophical positions/notions of thought and belief did not require being amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Denying the evolutionary history of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience does not make it go away. One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.

philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why. — Ludwig V

Might have something to do with the fact that not all behaviour involves using language. All linguistic behaviour does.

I meant to directly address this, but didn't. Didn't pay close enough attention, I suppose. So, again, sorry for the delay...

However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-

A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.

But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. — Ludwig V

Yes. I would agree that the dog salivates upon hearing the bell, after the bell has become meaningful to the dog. The bell becomes meaningful to the dog when the dog draws correlations between it and eating. Hence, both are autonomous. The correlations drawn between the bell and food as well as the involuntary salivation.

 

Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena.

What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.

I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak.

The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.

There's a sleight of hand here. Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. That sort of 'higher order' thinking requires thinking about awareness as a separate subject matter in its own right(metacognition). Metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do.

I'm not sure I'm okay with calling it a warning, to be frank. That presupposes knowledge of the growling dog's worldview(intention) that I am not privy to.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
— creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at. — Ludwig V

Are you claiming that language less thought, belief, and/or experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone?

I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.

:smile:

There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of?
— creativesoul
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? — Patterner

First, we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.

It's 'the things' that matter most here. Those are the differences between language less thought, belief, and meaningful experiences, and those of language users. Our knowledge acquisition of those things, if the right sort of approach is used and maintained, very clearly set out the difference(s) between the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences of language less creatures and language users.

I'm not sure why that difference seems so puzzling to some. Language less creatures do not - cannot - draw correlations between language use and other things. It's as simple as that. Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. They do not draw correlations between language use and other things.

The difficult and interesting aspects of this endeavor come with explaining the gradual increase in complexity that happens once language use has begun in earnest.



Second, we know language less creatures are capable of meaningful experience, because we can watch them do all sorts of stuff that it makes no sense to deny it. In addition to our ever increasing knowledge base regarding the biological machinery involved in our own experiences, our own working notions/terminological use of "thought", "belief", and "meaning" come to the fore here.

If language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experience(s), and all experience is meaningful to the creature having it, then it is clear that meaning exists prior to language creation on the evolutionary timeline. All meaningful experience consists - in very large part - of thought and belief about the universe. If a language less creature can form, have and/or hold belief about the world, and some of their belief about the world can be true, then either true belief exists without truth, or truth is prior to language.

If it is the case that meaningful experience predate language users, then one's notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaning" better be able to dovetail with those facts. Current convention fails to draw and maintain the actual distinctions between thinking and thinking about one's own thinking(thought/belief). That's been the bane of philosophy from Aristotle through Kant, Descartes, etc. I know of not a single philosopher who has drawn and maintained that distinction. Of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one, but, I've been asking many people for over 20 years, and I've yet to have been given an affirmative answer/author/philosopher so...

 This scope of this subject matter is as broad as it can be. If we've gotten our own thought and belief wrong, and I'm convinced we have, then we've also gotten something wrong about anything and everything ever thought, believed, spoken, stated, uttered, and/or otherwise expressed.

If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?

Indeed, it does.

Okay. Again, sorry for the delay.

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
— creativesoul
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response? — Ludwig V

When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted.

Pertaining whether or not I regard fear as a stimulus or a response...

I do not find it helpful to use that framework. It could be either, depending upon the framework/conceptual scheme being employed and point of view. Fear is the result of autonomous biological machinery doing its job. It is part of fearful experience. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Fearful experiences are meaningful to the creature full of fear, whether that includes an alpha male's growl accompanied by submissive members' behaviour, or the fear from/of falling(which I understand to be innate). Fear is always an internal element within a more complex experience involving both internal and external elements.

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
— creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either. — Ludwig V

Sure. Mimicry, for the sake of mimicking, involves the mimic drawing correlations between an other's behaviour and their own. Again, biological machinery plays an autonomous role here. However, I do think that neuroscience has established, as you've alluded to perhaps with the infant's smile, that there is not always a mimic who's mimicking for the sake of mimicking. Mirror neurons also play a role in empathy as well as recognizing/attributing other minds. At least, that's what I believe to be the case... very generally/roughly speaking. Smiles are contagious after-all. And then there's also the fact that young children learn how to act in this or that situation by virtue of mimicking others' behaviours, in a "children learn what they live" sort of thing.

I'm not sure what you're saying or referring to with "pattern of correlation".

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use.
— creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour. — Ludwig V

That is exactly what I'm arguing for. The basic elemental constituency of all thought... rational thought notwithstanding. The success or failure of identifying those is completely determined by the methodological approach. Current convention fails.

...that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
— creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about? — Ludwig V

Well, we can use what we do know about our own thought and belief as a means for beginning to set out what must be the case if language less thought exists(if it is possible for language less creatures to think), or if language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought or belief, or if language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experiences. I've touched on all this earlier in the thread. I'd be pleased to dig in. It's time.

Such metacognitive endeavors shift the focus away from behaviour and onto our own thought, belief, and meaningful experiences. That is the only place to start. It is not the only place to finish.

My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
— creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour. — Ludwig V

I'm confused.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.

I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language. — Ludwig V

I'm happy to clarify. I'm unsure what you're after though. The fact that some philosophers cannot or do not have any idea how distinctions can be drawn without language doesn't bear on my argument as far as I can tell. Seems to me like a problem with their conceptual/linguistic framework(s). My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.

Okay. Sorry for the delay...

A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". — Ludwig V

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.

I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex.
— creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. — Ludwig V

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. Pavlov and Skinner differ in their respective explanations. What they're taking account of(attempting to explain) existed in its entirety prior to their account. <----------that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.

I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.

But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.

I look forward to your reply. — Ludwig V

It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me.

:wink:

...which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love? — Athena

None that I can tell. Pondering one's own existence requires having already situated oneself in what isn't. Commit solipsism to the flames...