Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise. — Dan

OK, you and I have different ideas about what constitutes "expertise". That's not surprising.

No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter. — Dan

So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert.

I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. — Dan

You give "several" definitions for the same word, or phrase. You gave at least two for "their own choice", a choice concerning one's own mind body and property, and, a choice which does not restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.

Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion.

I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. — Dan

Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation.

Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend. — Dan

I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. To me, doing this would only produce the conclusion that your judgement of "wrong" is faulty. Well, I might agree then, "the best consequences" are denial of "actual value" moral principles. Is that what "the best consequences" are in this case, recognition that the principles by which you judged the praiseworthy act as wrong, are faulty principles?

I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. — Dan

As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts.

This is like your judgement of "expertise", but inverted. We can praise a person as "an expert", and you say that even when the so-called expert makes mistakes, we continue to praise the person as "an expert". What we do, is remove the person from the context of those mistakes. We do not praise the person for the mistakes.

Now, in the inverted sense, we have the mistaken act itself, as wrong, incorrect. You want to praise the act itself, which has already been judged as mistaken. In your previous explanation, you removed the act from its context, to say that the act in "most circumstances" would not be wrong. This would put the blame on the circumstances, for the mistake, not on the person. But then it is not a case of saying "THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF" is praiseworthy, it is a case of saying that the circumstances were wrong, and the act itself was actually correct, therefore praiseworthy.

So, the "actual value" principle by which you judge the act as wrong is faulty because it puts the blame on the acter, saying that the act (as property of the acter) was "wrong", when in reality the mistake was caused by the circumstances, not the choices of the acter. It wrongfully blames the acter with a "wrong" act, and you recognize that this judgement of "wrong act" is wrong (you recognize the actual value judgement as faulty), therefore you proceed to praise the acter, knowing that the act was not really wrong, the mistake is properly attributable to the "accidents" of the circumstances, not the act itself.

Therefore, in the inverted context, the context of the judgement of "expertise", the person is judged as an expert, and praised as an expert. Yet, the person demonstrates "misunderstanding" by making a mistake. In order that we maintain the judgement of "expert" we attribute the mistakes to the circumstances, not to the field of expertise. The expert continues to display an impeccable understanding of one's area of expertise, yet fails in understanding specific circumstances, "accidentals", and this produces mistakes. The mistakes cannot be judged as "wrong acts" of the acter, because that would negate the praiseworthiness of the the person called an expert, so the mistakes are attributed to a misunderstanding of the circumstances, and "circumstances", or "accidentals" are something external to, not part of, the area of expertise.

It is not logically impossible. — Dan

OK, I grant to you, that by strict deductive logic, it is not "logically impossible". This is due to the is/ought gap. The is/ought separation makes it impossible to demonstrate logically that it is incoherent to say that we "ought to praise an act which is wrong". This is because judgements of "ought", and judgements of "is" are categorically distinct, and no logic can bridge that gap. Instead, we bridge the gap with rules of moral philosophy, ethics. These rules are definitional, like axioms of mathematics.

So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles.

What i say now, is that your system may not be "logically impossible", but since it negates and denies the conventions of moral philosophy, we cannot call what you are proposing "moral philosophy". What is "logically impossible" is for your proposed system to be called "moral philosophy". That what you propose is incompatible with conventional moral philosophy, and that you present it as "moral philosophy" is what produces incoherency, and this makes your enterprise "logically impossible". It is logically impossible that what you present is moral philosophy. It's like for example, if someone proposed new axioms which are completely inconsistent with accepted axioms of mathematics, and presented them as "mathematics". It would be logically impossible that what the person presented is mathematics. Therefore, to avoid the judgement of "logically impossible" you need to quit representing what you are doing as moral philosophy.

II understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation. — Dan

You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood.

First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. — Dan

You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy.

Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake. — Dan

This furthers the evidence that what you propose is not "moral philosophy". You have separated "value" from "what is desired", and assume some form of consequentialist valuation. However, consequentialist principles are still based in the determination of a "good" outcome. And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not?

You posit "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the ground. But this becomes circular when the definition becomes self-referential. When are the consequences judged as "good"? When that ability is enabled. But why is this principle the measurement of "good". I suggest to you, that it is because it is consistent with the "type of freedom" which you personally desire. Now your moral philosophy is grounded in desire, what you desire, and as a oral philosophy it becomes logically incoherent.

With this proposition, "the ability to make their own choices is the measure of 'good' which you desire", I bring your proposal into the system of conventional moral philosophy to judge your desire as incompatible with moral philosophy. You claim to overrule my subjective judgement with an appeal to "objectivity". You insist that your system is not grounded in what you personally desire, it is grounded in an objective understanding of "freedom". But that's false, you define "freedom" as you please.

Now you propose a so-called "moral philosophy" which does not ground "value" in something fundamentally subjective, what is desired, but you ground it in something you propose as objective, "freedom". And we're back to the start, this is not "moral philosophy" at all.

The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. — Dan

The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all.

Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan

Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them".

Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false. — Dan

That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good.

I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. — Dan

I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:

So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. — Dan

I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect.

This was the significant sticking point between us, which made agreement on what it means "to understand one's choice" impossible. I wanted this to mean applying one's rationality prior to making the choice, and put the possibilities to be selected from into the context of what is desired by the person, but you want simply "able to apply their rationality to the choice", which signifies the ability to rationalize the choice after the fact.

Actually, I don't think you even understand this difference, and the failure to agree, between us, because you deny that the nature of time is important.

It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value". — Dan

Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means.

I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here. — Dan

OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong.

No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. — Dan

This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate.

I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town. — Dan

As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good.

No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. — Dan

As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.

Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement.

Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made. — Dan

If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it?

By actual-value consequentialist principles we cannot approve the act, because it is judged as wrong. What principles, what value system do you apply when you judge the act as praiseworthy? Whatever principles (value system) you apply, to judge the act as praiseworthy, clearly it is incompatible with actual-value consequentialism, which forced the judgement of wrong.

I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. — Dan

Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind.

I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented. — Dan

And here, by "intersubective" you mean agreement amongst a number of individuals don't you? So if there is such a "standard" which you refer to, it would be a rule of criteria by which we would judge whether a person is an expert. This way, if we all followed that specific rule, there would be significant agreement about whether a person is an expert or not. I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity".

Now, what do you think is the "standard" for expertise? Is it not, as I suggested earlier, the highest possible level of understanding? To me, this means that the person can carry out actions within one's field of expertise, for an extended period of time, without showing any mistakes. I still allow the possibility of mistake at some time, but such a mistake would not be conducive to the judgement of "expert", and it would carry with it the need to reevaluate an earlier judgement of "expert".

Of course, we really don't have any such "standard". We don't say that the person must be mistake free for a year, or six months or anything like that. This is because there is a whole lot of other factors which we take into account, the person's education, the type of mistake, degree of severity, and all of this even varies significantly from one area of expertise to another.

Therefore, it ought to be very clear to you, that there is no such thing as "objective expertise". Such objectivity requires "a standard" and clearly in the case of "expertise" we have no such standard. This is why you and I have no agreement about what constitutes an "expert". Just like you say, I want way too much from the word "understand", you also think that I want way too much from the word "expert". On the other hand, I accuse you of a "sloppy" use of words.

You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy.

I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times. — Dan

I know you can "say" this, you do a lot of that. You assert many things which I show to you to be incoherent, through logical demonstration. That is known as justification. I support my claim that you are incoherent with justification. You simply assert, 'you are wrong, and I am right', and when I ask you to justify, you either continue with your assertions or attempt to justify your position through a sloppy use of words which amounts to equivocation.

So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation.

The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. — Dan

You need to support this claim. The actual, individual act, was judged as "wrong" because it led to bad consequences. It is impossible that the very same act would "likely lead to good consequences" because by the law of identity, the same act is the act itself, and that act has those consequences which are judged as bad.

If the "actual-value consequentialist" removes "the act" from the circumstances, through abstraction, then that person is no longer talking about "the same act", one is making a generalization, and talking about a type of act. And if the person proceeds to argue that this "type of act" would likely have good consequences, that would produce the problems exposed by Hume, the problem of induction, and the is/ought gap.

As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them. — Dan

I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character.

That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist. — Dan

What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.

Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism.

The problem is that the means (method of evaluating) is not consistent with the end (the stated "measure" of value). In other words the means will not produce the end. Justification of this claim is as follows. The method of measurement evaluates (measures) according to the moral restrictions of the principles of consequentialism. "Freedom" as the measure of value is a lack of restriction. Therefore the stated "method" is not a means to the end at all, being inconsistent with the stated end. The proposed method measures value relative to specific restrictions, while the stated "measure", "freedom" is a lack of restrictions.

Therefore the proposed "method" must be apprehended as a distinct end, it is not conducive to the stated end, therefore it is distinct in its assignment of value. This means that you have two distinct ends, two measures of value, therefore two evaluation systems, one which has "freedom" as the measure of value, and the other has "consequentialism" as the measure of value.

I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". — Dan

No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean.

I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions. — Dan

Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice".

This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all. — Dan

Well then what is the "measure of value"? You state above, "freedom is the measure of value". This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices".

I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. — Dan

I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments.

I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect. — Dan

I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you?

I think at this stage I would be entirely justified in saying "please, stop, for your own sake".
I literally said it is not Dan's problem. — AmadeusD

You stated, and I quote you: "That's not Dan's problem."
So I asked you, quote: "Well then what is Dan's problem?"
Do you have an answer for me?

If you could, perhaps, not entirely change the subject to attempt a further pointless and badly-worded impugning of Dan's work... That would be nice. But, it speaks to exactly what i"m saying - that's not his problem. It's yours. /quote]

It's you Amadeus, who's changing the subject. We were talking about, and this thread is about "Dan's problem". You are attempting to change the subject into "MU\s problem". I know it's The Lounge, and any sort of BS is permitted, but Dan and I are staying on topic, why do you want to butt in and change the subject. It makes no sense for you to act this way.
— AmadeusD

He's being a gentleman even giving you the time of day — AmadeusD

That is blatantly wrong. Dan is refusing to give me the time of day. As you did already, Dan refuses to consider the nature of time, thinking that this is irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Dan wants to make "freedom" a fundamental principle, then refuses to consider what makes freedom possible. If a person makes statements similar to "freedom is valuable" and "we ought to have freedom", then that person needs to be prepared to consider the means by which freedom is enabled. Otherwise it's a case of "talking through one's hat". If you, Dan, or anyone else, fails to see that human actions are a type of action, and all actions require "time", making "time" logically prior to human actions, this would seriously impair your moral philosophy.

That this has gone on months baffles me, as it probably does both of you - but for me, its his patience and your density that's baffling. — AmadeusD

Why should a few months of this baffle you? Dan claims to have already spent the better part of a decade pursuing this "problem". I'm working to demonstrate that the reason why his pursuit appears to go on endlessly is that he has a faulty approach. Let me tell you something AmadeusD. A man who's been on a specific quest for ten years, is not going to be convinced by a couple months of discussion, that his quest has been fruitless. The longer one remains on a mission the harder it is for that person to accept that it is impossible, because the amount of time wasted mounts. A few days wasted... "oops that was a mistake, glad I caught it". A few years wasted.. "after all this time I must be close to a solution by now".

So please, quit with your attempts to twist Dan's problem into being my problem. Clearly, after all these years, it's Dan's "density" which is the point of discussion, and I am the one showing patience in letting him persist with his zealous defense of his "impossible dream".

The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all. — Dan

Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement.

You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place.

The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely. — Dan

Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information.

Your ideas of "objective truth", and "objective right", are obviously misleading you now. You seem to think that since you can bring this into the example, "there is an objective truth as to whether the person is an expert or not", (your imaginary idea that there is such a thing as "being an expert", which is beyond simply being judged to be an expert), that it has some bearing in real life situations. It does not! We look at the information we have about the person and make the judgement. Whether or not the person is an expert is a matter of judgement alone. There is no "...being an expert", nor is there any "they are an expert until...", there is only "being judged to be an expert", and "they are judged as an expert until...".

How do you support your claim of "a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about"? All that the person making the judgement has to go on, is that the one in question acts like they know a lot. You assert "a big difference", because you assume some kind of "objective truth" to the matter, but this is all just imaginary. The "big difference" is in your imagination, because you are imagining an "objective truth" in the matter.

In reality, there is absolutely no difference to the people judging whether one is an expert or not, between "acting like you know a lot", and "actually knowing a lot". This is because the people making the judgment have nothing but the individual's actions to go on. So your claim of "a big difference", is only based in your imaginary "objective truth". Accordingly, you ought to conclude what this demonstration clearly reveals, your idea of "objective truth" is severely misleading you.

Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action. — Dan

Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged. You say "in most circumstances" it would not be wrong, but that's to remove the act from the circumstances and treat it as a type of act. You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action". Therefore, what you state here, that you would "not generalize this to the type of action", is inconsistent with what you actually do in the example which is to generalize.

You generalize to say that the type of action the doctor made (a similar action in different circumstances) is praiseworthy, even though the identified "individual action" is judged as wrong because of the circumstances. The one judgement judges the type of action, "right", while the other judgement judges the individual action, "wrong". The mistake you make, which I pointed out, is that the category of judgement, the principle of predication is "moral value". And, since the individual act is predicated as "wrong", it cannot be predicated as "right" in that same category of moral value, because that would be contradiction. This means that if you adhere to those principles which judge the individual action as "wrong", you must recognize the differences which make it wrong, and not predicable with that property "right". Therefore you need to recognize it as not only a distinct individual act, but also different with respect to that property, "moral value". Therefore the (individual) act which is judged as wrong is not the same as the (individual) act which is judged as praiseworthy. That I tell you is what reveals the problem with your enterprise.

I've seen MU be a bit less than becoming of his intellect in stating Dan has "Wasted 10 years". Perhaps he means such in the truest earnest form of communication. Perhaps he's just frustrated. Perhaps a bit of both? — Outlander

Look at the situation, Outlander. Dan asks in the op, if anyone can "solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on". I replied right after reading the op with "Therefore the 'freedom' perspective and the 'consequentialist' perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible.' So it was very clear to me, right away that Dan was tying to do something which is impossible, and I mean in the truest most earnest form of communication, that Dan has wasted that time.

We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'.

So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? — Outlander

If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear) — Dan

This I would say is quite a good summation. The issue is clearly not that you misunderstand me, it is simply that we have different beliefs. The question might be, why do you adhere so strongly to your beliefs, and I adhere so strongly to my beliefs, yet they are very different. On top of that, we might also add that these beliefs which are so different, concern a very important subject, moral philosophy.

Suppose you and I were both asked to judge a particular philosopher, to say whether that person was a good moral philosopher. I'm sure we would not agree. Since whether or not a person is an "expert" is a similar judgement, why do you think there is such a thing as "being an expert", rather than simply judgements made by people as to whether a person is an expert or not. If you think that there is such a thing as a good moral philosopher, independent of judgements made by people, how do you think we would ever know whether or not a person was this, so we could ensure that our judgements would correspond with this reality.

I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter. — Dan

This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject.

A "habit" is by definition not ultimately restrictive. — Outlander

For reference, the point I made is that a habit restricts one's freedom by inclining one to act without considering other available possibilities. Not looking at information limits the possibilities which are present to the person's mind, therefore restricting the person's freedom to choose (specifically the possibilities not present to the mind). There was some question about what constitutes "available" information. If the person has to seek the information does this qualify as "available"? And in the most simple case, if the person has to search through one's own memory, does this qualify as "available"?

When you consider this problem, of what qualifies as "available" information, the power of habit to restrict our freedom becomes even more evident. Since even searching one's own memory requires a directed "seeking" of information, the issue is not the availability of information, the issue is the inspiration or ambition to seek the information. Habit robs us of this inspiration, or ambition, by inclining us to act directly and immediately without seeking any further information to guide us, which might instill the desire to act in another way.

Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom — Dan

More precisely, the point I make is that valuing freedom is inconsistent with valuing consequentialist moral principles. This ought to be quite obvious, in principle, so I can't understand why it's so difficult for you. Freedom is the capacity to choose and make any action. Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. — Outlander

This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts.

P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective — Dan

All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict.

I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach.

As i said earlier, we have a significant difference as to the meaning of "understanding", which makes discussion extremely difficult. I should never have come back to this subject.

I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism

Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not? — Dan

Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you?

This distinction is very relevant to your example of the doctor. However, for some reason, you appear to have a mental block, or an attitude of denial, which seems to make you incapable of considering this very important distinction.

When a person makes a judgement, one is limited, restricted in one's freedom of choice, by the restrictions which are imposed as the limitations we express as "available information". Increase in information increases one's freedom of choice, by revealing more options.

Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information.

This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person.

Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details). — Dan

"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same".

Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical. — Dan

You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation.

Look, the predication is made relative to moral quality, and this is a judgement of two distinct types of act, "good", and "bad". The two predications of "type of moral act", bad and good, are opposed to each other, such that "good" is necessarily a different type of moral act from "bad". If an act at one time is judged as "bad", and an act at another time is judged as "good", these two distinct acts cannot be judged as "the same type" in relation to moral evaluation.

What you propose is that there is a type of act, which is sometimes good, and sometimes bad. The problem is, that moral standards of evaluation set "bad" and "good" as opposing, contradictory, and incompatible types of actions. Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction to say that the same type of act, in relation to moral judgement could be sometimes bad and sometimes good. Your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge them this way, indicates that your judgement "they are the same type of act" must be a faulty judgement.

However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act.

That's not Dan's problem. — AmadeusD

Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is?

Expert implies a quality of understanding I agree, but this does not exclude misunderstandings. What I am saying is that those who are experts in their field, who have a strong understanding of it, can and do still misunderstand aspects of that field, even narrowly construed. — Dan

I dealt with this already. I agree "expert" does not exclude misunderstanding, we all know that no one is perfect. However, "expert" implies the highest level of understanding, and that means no known misunderstanding. "Expert" signifies the highest possible level of understanding, and this means "no known misunderstanding, in the area one is an expert in.

And, "no known misunderstanding" is substantially different from "some known misunderstanding". If the misunderstanding is known, then the person cannot be judged as "expert", because this is not the highest level of understanding which is "no known misunderstanding". The fact that we know that no one is perfect, and even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, is irrelevant.

No, there isn't a substantive difference here. If we judge someone to be an expert knowing that they likely misunderstand something, then later on we find out what it is that they misunderstood, we don't say "oh, well they weren't an expert then". Also, there are people we judge as experts now despite judging them to be wrong on some aspect of the topic. When two experts in a field disagree about something, they don't no longer consider one another experts because they judge the other person to misunderstand. Expertise is not mutually exclusive with misunderstanding. — Dan

This does not address my post. There is a substantial difference between known misunderstanding and unknown misunderstanding. We readily allow that even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, because no one is perfect. However, if the person has a misunderstanding which is evident, and known, we do not judge the person as an expert.

You deny that there is "a substantive difference" between "known misunderstanding" and "unknown misunderstanding" but this is incorrect. There is a substantive difference because "unknown misunderstanding" allows for "no known misunderstanding" within that category, and this is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding". Therefore "unknown misunderstanding" allows within its category something which is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding", i.e. "no known misunderstanding". This opposition indicates a substantive difference between the two.

What I claimed was that (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective) the doctor's actions were wrong, yet those same actions would be right in most circumstances... — Dan

I already explained to you why this is incoherent. "Different circumstances" implies different acts. Therefore it is incoherent to refer to the same act in different circumstances. And when we consider the difference of circumstances we can understand why similar acts are judged in different ways, because they are not the same act, they are different.

You seem to have no respect for the law of identity. But of course, denying one of the three fundamental laws of logic incapacitates the other two, so this violation of the law of identity is a tool which enables your contradictory argumentation.

No, I would say a field of study might be something like evolutionary biology, astrophysics, biochemistry, etc. I don't want it to be something like "science". This is just a misunderstanding. I was just saying that there would be no experts in any field worthy of the term, I wasn't suggesting that we should consider someone an expert in "science". And of course people have misunderstandings within their own field and are still experts, what you are asserting here is just silly. — Dan

Ok, I suggest the misunderstanding lies within ambiguity in these terms, "field", and "expert". So "field" can be used to refer to anything from "science" in general, as a field of study, down to a much more specific branch of biochemistry, like the study of "nucleic acids". This difference is a type of ambiguity.

Furthermore, there is similar ambiguity in the use of "expert". When a person develops an expertise, it is usually cited as a very particular aspect of a specific branch of a field. So we might say, "the person is an expert in the way that nucleic acids convey genetic information". The field of expertise is usually stated as a very narrow practise which the individual is involved in, and this way of speaking which narrows down the area of expertise, is the result of intentionally avoiding the problem I've been showing you.

So for example, when a person takes a doctorate, one chooses a specific area of a field, and "specializes" in that area, then becomes a "specialist". Notice, that if a person is a "specialist" in the study of the activity of nucleic acids, someone might still be say of the person, that they are "an expert in biology". That would be a very sloppy use of "expert", because there would be much in the broad field of biology where the person lacked understanding, and likely even had demonstrated misunderstanding. Such a judgement of "expert", where the person's area of expertise is stated as broader than it really is, would be a faulty judgement of "expert", as explained above. Therefore it is sloppy usage.

It is far better to know the person as a "specialist", as this avoids such faulty judgements. We can call the person a specialist by reference to the specific area that the person specializes in, without the value judgement which "expert" implies. "Expert" implies a quality of understanding, 'goodness', and this excludes "misunderstanding, which is 'badness'. But when we say that the person is a specialist we just acknowledge that the person's attention is focused on a very specific aspect of a field, so it is implied that the person is possibly an expert in that specific aspect. An accurate judgement of "expert" though, is much more difficult than a judgement of "specialist", because the latter only requires that the person has specialized one's study, but the former judgement, "expert", is best reserved until after the person proves oneself through experience, practise. Notice the difference between theory and practise here. The judgement of "expert", if rigorous standards are employed, requires practise as acts of proof, to demonstrate the quality of the person's education. And this is why many fields employ apprenticeships and internships.

I understand what you are claiming, and it's silly. — Dan

I know you think it's silly. You think adhering to strict rules of definition is unnecessarily pedantic, and doing such in the field of moral philosophy is a ridiculous way of proceeding. So you'd rather go around in your circles of vagueness and principles with self-referential definitions which lead nowhere. This enables your intention of hiding contradictory statements in your illogical endeavour of attempting to show how two incompatible systems of evaluation are compatible.

I might go as far as to say that all experts in all fields worthy of study misunderstand aspects of their field. — Dan

I will readily grant you this, "every expert has aspects of misunderstanding within one's area of expertise". To claim that understanding in the area of specialization excluded the possibility of misunderstanding in the parts, would be a sort of inverted composition fallacy, a division fallacy.

However, if I agreed that this is relevant I would just be supporting your strawman. How many more times must I reiterate? This strawman is irrelevant!!! Please read, and at least make an attempt to understand the following.

We all know that "expert", a predication of quality as described earlier in this post, does not imply perfection. However, what is at issue is the situation where a defect of understanding is exposed, and
known as "misunderstanding". Since "expert" signifies the highest possible quality, then, when a defect of understanding (misunderstanding) is exposed, it is illogical to judge the individual as an "expert". This is the point of programs like apprenticeship and internship, to expose misunderstandings, and deny the judgement of "expert" to someone who is already a specialist.

The fact that we make the general judgement that experts are not perfect, and all experts have misunderstanding, is irrelevant to the judgement of whether an individual with a known misunderstanding ought to be called an "expert". This is because the former is concerned with unknown misunderstandings while the latter is concerned with known misunderstandings. This makes the type of :misunderstanding of the two examples categorically different. Because of this difference it is acceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of unknown misunderstandings, yet unacceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of the person's known misunderstandings.

I recommend that you learn, understand, and consider this principle very closely, because it is extremely relevant to your example of the doctor's actions, and probably other issues you've pointed to. Notice, we can judge the doctor's actions as good, right, and correct, the actions of an expert, acknowledging that no expert is perfect, and the patients death was accidental. And, we can judge that when there is a lack of information there was an accidental, or incidental, misunderstanding of the situation, where these terms, accidental, incidental, refer to the doctor's area of expertise, because "misunderstanding" refers to the situation, not the field of expertise.

However, when the lack of information (misunderstanding of the situation) is exposed, after the fact, we are obliged to review the judgement of good, right, and correct, and therefore the judgement that the doctor is an expert, to confirm that the misunderstanding truly was accidental or incidental.. This calls the doctor's practice into question. We can either conclude that the doctor did follow protocol, did do what is good, right, and correct, and is an expert, or we can revise our judgement, and say that the misunderstanding was not accidental or incidental, the doctor should have done something different, therefore did not do what is good, right, and correct, and is therefore not an expert. But we cannot do as you propose, and have it both ways, saying that the doctor's actions were both right and wrong, that in itself would constitute misunderstanding in the field of moral philosophy.

It is often said that our perceptions are representations of that which affects our senses. I would prefer to speak of "presentations". In either case something is either repsented or presented is implied. It is also common to hear that our perceptions consist in what appears to us and that what we perceive is determined by whatever affects our senses. — Janus

The problem with "presentation", as with "appearance", is that this denies us any intelligible relation to the independent reality. In fact, without something represented, the mind might just produce presentations and appearances without any external "thing" at all. So, to recognize the reality of the external world, and that there is some kind of relation between it and what the mind produces, it is common to understand what the mind produces, as a representation. This is what allows that the external world is in fact, real.

that what we perceive is determined by whatever affects our senses. — Janus

That what we perceive is "determined by" what affects our senses, is proven to be wrong by hallucinations, delirium, even dreaming. So, despite the fact that it is "common" to hear this, it is common in the sense of vulgar and uneducated. This is the result of a determinist attitude which trickles down from scientism, and the awe which common people have for the great power unleashed by the scientists' application of determinist principles. Scientism inclines people to believe that "determined by" is applicable to living systems.

Notice your choice of words. You say the perception is "determined" by what "affects" our senses. To affect something is to have an effect on it, to influence it. So if the sense organs are "affected" in their function, and their function is intermediary between what is sensed, and the mind which holds the perception, we cannot conclude that the perception is "determined" by what affects the senses. We have a relation of influence (affection) between the thing sensed and the sense organ, and we might assume a similar relation of influence (affection) between the sense organ and the perception in the mind. But this is far from what is required to say that the first "determines" the third.

In either way of speaking the things which affect our senses are not themselves representations or appearances, If we are perceiving we are perceiving something, and the question as to whether the perception resembles what the thing that is perceived is like when it is not being perceived seems to be an incoherent question. I hope that clears it up for you. — Janus

That clears it up, but it shows you misunderstood. The perception is the representation. The thing being perceived, i.e. what is represented, is what is said to have existence regardless of whether it is perceived (independent existence). That is what independent existence signifies, that it exists whether or not it is perceived. Now, the point is that this thing which has independent existence ( has existence regardless of whether it is perceived) does not necessarily have any resemblance whatsoever, to the perception of it, while it is being perceived.

We absolutely don't do this. If you stop thinking someone is an expert in a field when they get something wrong about that field, then I suggest you should not think there are any experts in science, or for that matter any field broad enough to be worthy of the title of "expert" in the first place. Everyone gets things wrong. Everyone misunderstands things. What you are looking for is not expertise, but perfection, and you will not find it amongst humans. — Dan

I don't know what you are talking about. A "field" is not something broad like "science". When we say that a person is an expert in one's field, we mean the subject of one's study or education, so even within the various branches of science, like biology, chemistry, or physics ,there are many fields of study, which an individual can be an expert in.

You are not making any sense, because you still want to make "the field" something broader than the person's area of expertise, like "science" in general, so that the person can misunderstand things in "the field" which are outside the person's area of expertise. But if the misunderstanding is not part of the person's area of expertise, then it is not part of the person's field of expertise, even if it might be in the same branch of science. And if the misunderstanding is within the person's field of study, then that person is obviously not an expert in that field.

We absolutely do judge people to be experts while knowing that they are probably wrong about/misunderstand some aspects of their field. — Dan

Again, you strawman me. How many times do I have to repeat myself, concerning the same misrepresentation?

I am not talking about believing that an expert "probably" has some misunderstanding. I am talking about judging that the person actually does have misunderstanding, and also judging at the same time, that the person is an expert in that field within which the person has misunderstanding. This implicitly violates the law of noncontradiction, because expert in the field implies understanding in that field.

The reason why your strawman is irrelevant is as follows. To say that a person is an expert in a specific field implies that the person understands that field. To say that the person has misunderstanding in that field contradicts this. To say the person is an expert in such and such field, but probably misunderstands something in that field, is simply a way of stating that you judge the person to be an expert, while admitting that you are probably wrong in judging the person to be an expert. So all you do by stating that the expert probably has some misunderstanding, is to devalue your own capacity for judgement, by saying that you make that judgement but also asserting that the judgement you've made is probably wrong.

This isn't a story of someone who didn't know what they were talking about being exposed as a fraud, it's a story of someone being shown to be wrong and accepting that because every expert in every field worth discussing is likely to be wrong about some of their beliefs. — Dan

Irrelevant due to your strawman.

This is, I think, a pretty clear indicator you're either not connecting with what's being said, or are simply avoiding it. — AmadeusD

I am both, not connecting with it, and avoiding it like the plague, because, as I've demonstrated, it is nothing but contradiction.

This explains the entire exchange. — AmadeusD

Yes, Dan is demanding that I accept contradiction, and I refuse. We have freedom of choice, and we do not need to give what the other person demands. If this leaves me incapable of connecting with what Dan is saying, then so be it.

What is the difference between a representation and an appearance according to you? — Janus

Representation: an instance of standing for, or corresponding with, something else.
Appearance: a form as perceived.

The difference therefore, is that "representation" implies something else which is being represented, while "appearance" has no such implication.

So when you said "The appearance could only resemble the thing that appears when it is not appearing if the thing that appears is an appearance when it is not appearing...", you have no distinction between two things, like "representation", and "thing represented" does. And this renders your phrase unintelligible. Like I said, there is no distinction between "appearance" and "thing that appears". These refer to one and the same thing, "appearance" is a form as perceived, and "thing that appears" is also the form as perceived. So it makes no sense to talk about whether one resembles the other, they are the same.

How did you rule out that the world just is a miserable place — Tom Storm

For me, the world is not a miserable place, I quite enjoy it. That some see it as miserable is strong evidence against what Janus says, that we all see the same thing.

Janus' argument is deeply flawed. That a number of people can point to the same place, and agree to call what is at that point, at that time, by the same name, is not proof that we see the same thing. Such a conclusion involves an equivocation in the meaning of "the same thing" which is based in the well known category mistake of confusing the particular with the general.

"We all see the same thing" is asserted by people like Janus, as a general statement. What is really meant by that general statement is "we all see the same things". The problem though, is that this proposition would obviously be false. There is very significant variance in what two different people see when looking at the same 'scape. So the people like Janus, who argue this point, compose the general statement as "we all see the same thing", where "thing" (singular) is a generalization representing a multitude of things (which we do not all see the same of), and is sometimes just called "the world". Then, as supposed proof, or justification of this general principle, they refer to instances where a number of people will point to "the same thing". In this case, "the same thing" refers to a particular. In other words, a multitude of "things" is presented as a "thing" (the world) implying generalization, or inductive reasoning.

So, the category mistake based equivocation is very evident. What is asserted is that "we all see the same thing", where "thing" is a generalization of the multitude of all things, known as "the world". But what is argued as proof of this, is that "we all see the same thing", where "thing" means one particular within the multitude. If we deny the equivocation as constituting an invalid argument, what we are left with is a very faulty generalization, faulty inductive reasoning. Particular instances of a number of people seeing the same particular thing, are used as evidence to support the general principle "we all see the same thing". Clearly, if "the same thing" is argued as a generalization of all particular things, as is the case when "the same thing" means "the world", it is a faulty generalization.

We do not all see the same "world", as each person perceives, is interested in, and apprehends, very different particulars. We are all unique and different in the things which grab our attention and pique our interest. Therefore, perception, and understanding of "the world", is unique, and specific to the individual. This is very evident in threads like this where we do not get any agreement as to what "the world" signifies. And that is also very good evidence that each person's mind creates one's own "world" which I believe, is the argument of the op.

The appearnce could only resemble the thing that appears when it is not appearing if the thing that appears is an appearance when it is not appearing, which is a contradiction. So I think the question is ill-formed, incoherent. — Janus

I think your reply is ill-formed, irrelevant, and unintelligible. First, "the appearance" and "thing that appears" seem to refer to one and the same thing. So it makes no sense to talk about one resembling the other.

All that is irrelevant and a poorly formed reply, because I was talking about a representation and the thing represented, not any "appearance".

The representation is the sense image, which a person has within one's mind. The thing represented is the independent reality. The question was, in what way might we assume that the representation would resemble the thing represented. And the answer was that it need not resemble it in any way. Therefore we ought not assume any resemblance between the sense image and the independent reality.

Taking sight as the primary sense involved in describing things, are you asking something like whether the things that appear to us look the same when they are not being seen? — Janus

I am asking in what way might the representation (the visual image) resemble the thing being represented (the independent reality)? And, I am answering, that it is not necessary for there to be any resemblance whatsoever, as indicated by my example of words.

That is a ridiculous bar to set. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are using them in a way that is divorced from both common usage and, in this case and others, reality. — Dan

Common usage would not say that the doctor's action was wrong, yet we ought to encourage others to act this way because it was also right. Nor would common usage say that an expert has misunderstanding within the field which one is an expert in.

When it turns out that someone was wrong about some aspect of their field, and they come to a better understanding, we don't say that they weren't an expert previously. — Dan

That's exactly what we do say. "I thought that guy was an expert, but he fucked up, now I know otherwise."

Expertise, and indeed understanding, is not the same as perfection. — Dan

You somehow seem incapable of understanding the issue. The point is not that we exclude the possibility of misunderstanding from the judgement of "expert", to hold that the person must be proven to perfection to be called an expert. The point is that we don't judge the person to be an expert, and also judge the person to have misunderstanding in the same respect, at the same time. This is an implicit violation of the law of noncontradiction. "Expert" implies understanding. "Misunderstanding" is the predication opposed to "understanding". By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot judge the person to have both these properties, understanding and misunderstanding, in the same respect, at the same time. The "same respect" refers to the specific field of study. If we judge one to be an expert in some field, we judge that person to have understanding in that field. We cannot also judge that person to have misunderstanding in that field without contradiction..

The point of the story is about science admitting it can be wrong, but it would be a very different story indeed if all those present said "well, I guess he wasn't an expert in evolutionary biology after all". Again, this is not a sensible bar to set when it comes to expertise. — Dan

People don't say things like that, because they are polite. I'll say it here though. Clearly the guy fucked up. Everyone thought he was an expert until some smart ass came along and proved him wrong. Then the truth was revealed, he was not an expert at all, and inside, everyone was laughing at him, but too polite to say anything rude.

The true situation is exposed by the phrase "zealously defending a view". What drives a person to zealously defend a view, is an unhealthy type of self-confidence, often known as "conceit". The conceited person creates an air of expertise, which is a false expertise. This is a deceptive attitude designed to give others the impression that one is an expert, when it's not really the case. In the example, it required a special individual to demonstrate the conceit to the person who had it. That's not an easy task, to get someone to see oneself as conceited. The others most likely could already see through the conceit, so it probably came as no surprise to them when the guy was outed as phony, and the false expertise was demonstrated.

All incorrect because knowing what the objectively right thing to do is does not mean they must choose it necessarily. It means they should, but not that they will. — Dan

I know, this is exactly the problem with your dual evaluation system approach. If you value free choice, ('the ability to make one's own choice' or however you represent it), then you also value the ability to choose something other than the "objectively right" choice. But this robs the value from "objectively right", by allowing that the possibility of choosing something other than what is objectively right has a higher value than actually choosing what is objectively right. Then how would the concept "objectively right" be supported as a valid concept, if there is something of higher value (freedom to choose)?.

The two valuation systems are incompatible, yet you want to employ them both. This results in incoherency, contradiction throughout your examples. The doctor's action was both right and wrong, depending on the valuation system employed. The person ought to be able to choose, even when that means choosing what is wrong.

If we employ "objective right" as the value system, then the highest goal is to do what is objectively right. But you also want to assign value to making one's own choice", and this would mean often choosing other than what is objectively right. If doing what is objectively right is the highest value, then you cannot also hand value to the possibility of doing something other than what is objectively right, without contradiction. The two values are simply incompatible.

The issue is their existence independent of humans or any percipients. — Janus

That is not the issue. I don't think anyone here is questioning the existence of the independent reality. The question is whether that independent reality is as we sense it or not. Once we recognize that sense images are creations of the living system, created as representations, then we can understand that the independent reality need not be anything like the sense images, just like the word "dog", as a representation, is not anywhere similar to what it represents.

So the 'somethings' have roughly the same characteristics for the dog as they do for us. — Janus

I don't see your point. We all evolved from the same source according to evolutionary theory. Most our DNA is the same as the dog's. Human beings and dogs create their mental "worlds" in similar ways. There is nothing here to produce the conclusion that the way the independent reality is, is anything even remotely similar to our perceptions of it.

Consider my example. Millions of people can look toward a pointed at place, and agree that what is pointed at is a "dog". This in no way indicates that the word "dog" is in any way similar to the real thing pointed to. This is simply the nature of "representations". There is no necessity for the representation to be similar to what is represented. Why should we think that sense images are any different? Sense images are "representations".

I could go along with that. I always find the translation of 'On the Soul' as 'D'Anima' very suggestive of that - an 'animating principle. — Wayfarer

If we go further, and posit the capacity to choose as the fundamental property of the soul, therefore final cause as the basic act of the soul, this is very consistent with the way that quantum mechanics understands the micro-scale. However, to conceive of this capacity to choose, requires a peculiar understanding of "the passage of time" common in mysticism, within which the world is understood to be created anew at each moment, as time passes. Accepting the reality that we can choose freely, produces the need for a discontinuity of "the world", between past and future, which breaks the determinist continuity.

This perspective produces the need for a completely different way of understanding the relationship between the small and the large. The small is understood as the "internal", and the large is understood as the "external", the subject has created for itself, a somewhat arbitrary boundary between these two, which you describe as the boundary which the subject has created between itself and "the world" . I believe it is important to understand that there is also a boundary between the subject and the internal. In this case, "subject" indicates the consciousness. The internal is all the nonconscious activity of the soul, producing sensations, desires, emotions, etc.. The "subject", as consciousness has a pair of soul-created boundaries, one to the external, and one to the internal, and this is known as the conscious perspective.

Since the internal is what is responsible for our capacity to choose, and to move freely in the larger expanse, we need to conclude that the activity of "the passage of time", which is really a series of events which constitutes the world being created anew at each moment, is directed from the internal to the external. In speculation I can say, that when the world is created anew at each moment of passing time, it is an extremely rapid internal to external event, an "explosion", like a mini 'big bang' at each point in space, at each moment of passing time.

This interpretation is supported by our observations of "spatial expansion", when a framework of two dimensional time is adopted. Assume that there is a succession of these internal to external "explosions" which constitutes the passing of time. Each explosion is the world being created anew at each moment. And, each one is similar to the last, but not exactly the same, and this constitutes the orderly change we observe in the world. The activity of "the explosions" requires the second dimension of time to understand, the breadth of the present.

The subject has been given, by the soul-created boundaries, a specific place in the explosion, somewhere between the very small and the very large, by means of the somewhat arbitrary boundaries. The boundaries are very precise though, because the position within the explosion must be extremely consistent from one explosion to the next, to produce the appearance of temporal continuity. The identity of a particular thing, object or individual, is its continuity of position between one explosion and the next. Notice the degree to which a living being has freedom to alter its own physical continuity. When we extrapolate from our sense perspective (our precise location on the explosions), to extend our observational capacity over a large duration of time (many many explosions, or "moments"), we see "spatial expansion" as produced by the discrepancy in the position of those boundaries.

We will agree on the exact locations of the knots and the patterns, and we can confirm this by pointing to them. Now if there were nothing there determining the positions of those details on what basis could we explain our precise agreement? — Janus

I don't think you understand what is being claimed. The argument is not that there is "nothing there", but that whatever it is that is there, may not be anything even similar to how it appears to us.

Consider the nature of language for example. Language consists of symbols which do not necessarily appear to be anything at all similar to what they represent, yet they are extremely useful. In fact, by making a simple symbol represent complex information, we increase the efficiency of language. Some biologists like to extend this symbol/information model through all levels of living activity, as semiosis and semiotics. If we extend this type of understanding, we can see that what is created by the mind as a "sense image" is just a symbol, which represents some information gleaned from "external activity". The symbol represents information to be interpreted, it does not actually represent "the thing" which is being sensed. The sense image is a symbol created to represent some complex information, in a simplified way, much the same as "word" represents some complex information in a simplified way.

So, with respect to your criticism, agreement and pointing to the exact same places, does nothing to indicate that what we each see as "an image", is in any meaningful way, "the same". We have simply created a system of communication which allows us to understand each other, by representing complex information with simple symbols. It may be the case that the personal images are as different as the same word in different language. The languages are compatible but by no means the same. And, since the information is extremely complex, and each individual person has a distinct spatial-temporal location as perspective, it is highly improbable that the information represented, is in any reasonable sense, "the same".

Because physics does not show determinism, it at best suggests probabilities, which are very foreign to our debates on free will. — Manuel

Newtonian laws are deterministic, and they still play a large role in modern physics, especially when mass (matter) is being dealt with.

e absolutely can and do consider people to be experts in a specific field in which they misunderstand (or misunderstood) some element of that field. One judgement does not preclude the other at all. — Dan

Speak for yourself then. If I knew that a particular person misunderstood some elements, or even one element, of a specific field, I would never call that person an expert in that field.

It appears like you would. And that is why I say you use words in a sloppy way. You see no sloppiness in speaking this way. And that's why I judge you as unreasonable.

There is a big difference between knowing a lot about a subject and having a good understanding of it, and having a perfect knowledge of a subject and not being wrong or misunderstanding any part of it. I suggest you go ask scientists about their area of expertise and ask whether they think it is likely that they are wrong about some element of that area, or that something they have thought they understand will one day turn out to be misunderstood, I think you will find that those who are intellectually honest will say that this is very likely indeed. — Dan

The issue is not a question of whether the person might be called an expert even when there is the possibility of that person being "wrong about some element" in that field. The issue is having judged the person to actually be wrong, about a specific element in that field.

First, this isn't true, as we might think that it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely. — Dan

You are missing the point. If the person apprehends the choice as the objectively right choice, then they must choose it necessarily, according to the apprehension that it is objectively right. So when you say "it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely", it is implied that the thing chosen is not the "objectively right" thing, because it is chosen freely. So "right" here does not mean objectively right, and "objectively right" would remain irrelevant.

This is the principle which produces the incoherency in your doctor example. The doctor chooses freely to do what is believed to be "the right thing". However, from the actual-value (objectively right) perspective, it is the wrong thing. You refuse to acknowledge the incoherency and insist that it can be both, the right thing to do, from the free choice perspective, and also the wrong thing to do, from the objectively right perspective.

Second, I'm fairly sure what I said was that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value, which is rather different to "a person ought to choose freely". In this case, the objectively right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom (again, this is a simplified maximizing verison, which I don't agree with, I'm just pointing out that these things aren't inconsistent) — Dan

This makes no sense. If, "a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value", how do you make this consistent with what you posit as the objectively right choice, "the most freedom"? The 'most freedom" implies not being restricted by those conditions, "understanding", and the restriction you described earlier as the person's "own" choices.

But that is a stipulation that mind is above matter. — Manuel

It's not a stipulation. What I explained is that it is the result of, a conclusion drawn from understanding the concept of matter.

Why can't mind be a specific configuration of matter? — Manuel

The concept of matter is not compatible with the concept of mind, to allow for this. That is because matter is a principle assumed to account for the apparently deterministic aspects of the world, i.e. temporal continuity, while mind and free will are things requiring exception to that, i.e. temporal discontinuity.

Matter cannot be configured in a way other than what is allowed for by determinist causation. This I believe is the importance of understanding the relation between "matter" and Newton's first law. Newton assigns to matter itself, a fundamental property, which is inertia, and this renders all material bodies as determined. So mind, which has the capacity to choose, cannot be a configuration of matter.

Which raises an interesting possibility: could this self-maintenance be the earliest appearance of mind, even if in a rudimentary form? If so, then complex minds in higher organisms wouldn’t just be the product of matter—mind could also be understood as a causal factor. The fact that mind is not something that can be identified on the molecular level is not an argument against it - as everyone knows, identifying the physical correlates of consciousness is, famously, a very hard problem ;-) — Wayfarer

What I do is separate "mind" from "soul", in the way described by Aristotle. Soul is the base, so that all the potencies, capacities, or powers of the various life forms (self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and even intellection), are properties of the soul. This allows that mind, or intellect, in the human form, as a power of the soul, can come into existence through the process of evolution. But soul itself is prior.

The power to choose, to select from possibilities, which is very evident in human free will, may well be the most basic power of the soul. It appears to be required for all the basic living capacities. In this way, what you call here "the earliest appearance of mind", or the "rudimentary form" of mind, is the capacity to select form possibilities. And when we understand what it means to select, or choose, we see that intention is necessary for this, as that which causes one possibility to be actualized rather than any other. So this puts intention (final cause) as the basic property of the soul, as what is required for that basic power, the capacity to choose.

Matter' is an idea. If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea. — Janus

That's not true. As I explained, "matter" signifies the reason why perceived things maintain similarity, from prior time to posterior time, as time passes. This principle of temporal continuity provides the foundation for the conception of an independent world, as well as being the basis for "inertia" in the physics of motion. As "the reason why", "matter" signifies an idea.

Not a fact—a mere assumption. — Janus

I can explain how "matter" is merely a conception. It is something that is assumed to underlie the reality of sensible objects, which accounts for them apparently maintaining their similarity as time passes. In the physics of motion, matter is represented by inertia.

Now, it's your turn to explain how you believe that "matter" signifies something other than an idea.

If one notices something, ask the other if they also notice the same thing—that would be a proper test. — Janus

As I said, that is explained by the power of suggestion. I guess you didn't read the rest of my post. That we agree to call what we see in the same situation, by the same name, does not prove that we are seeing the same thing. We readily agree about things like that simply because it facilitates communication.

The only way a strict separation is possible is if you assume that matter cannot be mental in any respect, or that mind is above matter, which is not coherent until someone says what matter is, and where it stops. — Manuel

I believe that when a person develops a good understanding of the concept of "matter" it is inevitable that mind will be understood as above matter. This is because "matter" is assumed as a principle, to represent things which we do not understand, about the way that we perceive the world. So "matter" represents something peculiar and fundamentally unintelligible about our perceptions. And this is very significant, because as fundamentally unintelligible, it does not fit into our conceptions of an independent world. Matter transcends the supposedly independent world, and this evident even in the most vulgar conception of "matter" as that which the world is made of. But it is only that way because the mind makes it that way, simply because the mind needs that principle. So the mind creates the idea of something which transcends the world, matter, but it's just an idea.

We're getting nowhere.

Every expert in every field worth discussing will have incorrect beliefs about that field, but they could still be said to have a good understanding of it. — Dan

This is a sloppy use of words designed to cover up or veil the incoherence in your belief. You use "field" which has a very broad an ambiguous meaning to produce the equivocation required to accept your statement. The equivocation is between the specific "field" which the person is an expert "in", and the more general "field" which the expert has beliefs "about".

An expert "in" a field has a specific area of expertise and this is known as one's field of expertise. Within that field of expertise, there can be no misunderstanding or else we cannot say that the supposed expert has a good understanding of that field, and is therefore an expert. However, the "field" in general extends far beyond the expert's specific field of expertise, and so the expert's knowledge "about that field" in general, may contain misunderstanding concerning areas which are not a part of the specific field of expertise.

In other words, if we clear up the ambiguity you introduce with your use of "field", "in a field" and "about that field", we'll see that your claim cannot be accepted. A person may claim to have a "field of expertise", or may be judged to have a "field of expertise". If the person is judged to have misunderstanding within that field we cannot also judge the person to be an expert in that field. The one judgement excludes the other. The judgement of misunderstanding excludes the judgement of expert, and the judgement of expert excludes the judgement of misunderstanding.

Again, that isn't what I said at all. What I said was that it might be wrong (on an actual-value consequentialist approach) but the doctor might have every reason to think it's right and we may want future doctors to continue to act in the same way in the same (in terms of relevant features) situation. — Dan

This does nothing to validate your incoherency. You are claiming that we ought to encourage others to carry out an act which has been judged as wrong.

A choice being right does not impinge on anyone's freedom. — Dan

What I said is that we cannot value both principles, "there is an objectively right choice", and also the principle "a person ought to choose freely". The two principles are implicitly incompatible.

If there is an objectively right choice, then the person ought to make that choice and no other choice. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the person ought to choose freely.

Also, and again, I have also pointed out many features of the world which seem not to be changing, which we could describe as features of the way the world is without any reference to a specific time period. You must agree, even on your restrictive use of "is" and "the way" that unchanging facts about the world can be considered facts about the way it is, right? — Dan

I agree that people state things about the world, laws of physics, etc., which are intended to be eternal unchanging facts about the world. However, I would also argue that the latest evidence, and what numerous physicists agree to, is that this is not an accurate representation.

Ah. Fair enough. To be clear "idealism" covers a lot of ground, as does "materialism". It's a matter of what one emphasizes, it seems to me. — Manuel

The basic and essential difference I see between the two ontological posits is that idealism proposes that mind/ consciousness/ experience is fundamental and materialism/ realism takes energy/ matter to be fundamental. — Janus

As Berkeley keenly demonstrated, materialism is swiftly reduced to idealism. This is due to the fact that matter, or energy, whatever term you choose, signifies only an idea. So Berkeley demonstrated that we can have a completely adequate understanding of the external world without employing the idea of "matter". What is actually the case, is that the idea of "matter" is just a substitute for the idea of "God". Each of these two words signifies the concept of an imperceptible (yes matter is imperceptible as what we perceive is the form) aspect of reality, the existence of which is assumed by us human beings, to account for the temporal continuity of the world. We assume the world to continue its existence independent of human perception, and we posit "matter", or "God", to account for this..

What is important to note though, is that materialism is reducible to a form of idealism, not vise versa. This assigns logical priority to idealism over materialism. Materialism, through the choice of "matter" as the base idea, which supports the reality of an independent world, is a distinct form of idealism from theology which holds the choice of "God" as that base idea.

I think the fact that we all see the same things and can agree down to the smallest detail as to what we see and that our observations show us that other animals see the same things we do, suggests very strongly that these things are not just mental constructions. — Janus

This is a very faulty argument. If we take two people, point them to the horizon in a particular direction, in an active situation, and ask them to make a sentence about what they see, they will undoubtedly make different statements. The fact that we can agree is attributable to the power of suggestion.

"Do you see that tall red thing straight ahead?" "Well, it looks more rusty orange than red to me, but sure, I see it". "See what's going on to the right of that, I call it 'X', do you agree?" "Sure, I'll agree to call it that."

The fact that we agree to use the same words in the same situation is indicative of a desire to facilitate communication, it provides no evidence that we see the same things. Nor does it prove that the names are not applied to mental constructs rather than supposed independent things.

In order to come to conceptualize ^tree^ we must first be able to see one. — Janus

This as well, is not true at all. We produce all sorts of conceptualizations of things not yet seen or experienced in any way. This is the basis for Kant's a priori. As a simple, but very powerful example, consider the reality of prediction. Predictions are exactly that, conceptualizations of things not yet experienced, and this capacity in its basic form is commonly known as "imagination". The dual capacity of that faculty, to produce images of things not experienced, as well as images of things experienced through sensation, indicates that this faculty of imagination produces, or creates, the images, and is not dependent on sense experience in its creations.

Also yes, I think you can have a good understanding of something that you misunderstand elements of. — Dan

That's incoherent. "Misunderstanding" explicitly indicates the incorrectness of one's assumed understanding. It does not signify an incompleteness of understanding, it signifies an incorrectness of understanding. By acknowledging that there is incorrectness within the proposed understanding, you implicitly acknowledge that it is not a good understanding.

This is very similar to your idea that the doctor's action (in your example) might be the correct choice from the doctor's perspective prior to the action, but the wrong choice from a perspective posterior to the action. Just like the person with the supposed "good understanding" does not recognize and acknowledge that aspects of this understanding are incorrect, and therefore it is not a good understanding, the doctor does not recognize and acknowledge the information which makes the choice wrong.

However, you, in presenting the examples do recognize the misunderstanding which inheres within the proposed understanding, and you do recognize the doctor's failure to ascertain the patient's condition. Therefore you, are making an incoherent description when you judge the understanding which contains elements of misunderstanding, to be "good", just like you are making an incoherent description when you say that the doctor's action is both correct and wrong.

What is indicated by the nature of these examples, is that you are consistent in your incoherency. This demonstrates a deeply entrenched habit of illogical thinking. You have a way of thinking which accepts contradiction and incoherency. I suggest that this is likely the result of many years of attempting to reconcile incompatible ideas. When an individual takes up the challenge of attempting to reconcile contradictory ideas (which is really to do the impossible), the resolution to the problem often appears to the person to be a sloppy use of words (which I've exposed), so that the incoherency of uniting two contradictory ideas is hidden underneath that sloppy use of words. It then appears like contradictory ideas have been united We might conclude that the person appears to have "a good understanding", in uniting incompatible ideas, but what lies underneath is a misunderstanding of the elements, which makes such a union impossible, so it is not a good understanding at all.

The objectively right action would be the action which protects the most freedom. There isn't two different measures of value here, there is one measure of value to determine what is action is right (and again, this isn't what I would say, as I am a satisficing consequentialist, so I would say there are often multiple morally permissible actions, I'm just simplifying it for you). — Dan

I really can't believe that you do not see the incoherency here. I think you are glossing it over, in an attempt to hide it under a sloppy use of words. Let me state the situation clearly and succinctly. If it is the case that "the most freedom" is what is valued the highest, then it is impossible that there is an "objectively right" choice in any situation. Absolute freedom, which is what is signified by "the most freedom", if assigned the highest value, denies the possibility that any value can be assigned to any choice for being "the right choice". This is because that value, assigned to "the right choice" would detract from the person's freedom to choose anything (which is stated as the most valuable by "the most freedom"), by making that specific choice 'weighted' with more value than any of the other possibilities. Therefore assuming a "right choice" negates the value assigned to "the most freedom". The two are simply incompatible.

If someone says "the river near your house is polluted, I know you may not like it, but that's just the way it is" that does not suggest that said river has always been or will always be that way. That being said, I have also made numerous claims about the features of the world that presumably do not change, but you have ignored those points and instead focused on how I am using the words "is" and "the way". — Dan

You have a very strange way of misrepresenting what I say, to deny the logic of my argument, and then you persist with your incoherent way of using words.

In the phrase "the river near your house is polluted", the static "way" that the river is, signified by "polluted", is indicated by "is", to exist at the present time, now. This in no way implies that the river always will be, or always has been polluted (as your strawman), it indicates that at the present time, there is a static, unchanging condition, signified by "polluted".

This is simple predication. "the river is polluted". The predicate "polluted" is assigned to the subject "the river", and "is" signifies that there is a specific time, now, at which the proposition is meant to apply. By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot make the opposing predication with the same time, now, indicated. We cannot say that the river is not polluted. However, the law of noncontradiction provides for us to make the opposing predication at a different time. We can say "yesterday the river was not polluted". If we take these two propositions as true, it is implied that "a change" occurred between the two times which are indicated, yesterday, and now. Yesterday there was a static condition of "not polluted" and now there is a static condition of "polluted", and a change occurred in between.

What is important for you to recognize, is that the two predications each signify a static condition "is polluted", and "was not polluted". That is the nature of predication, a "stated" property is assigned to the subject. The subject cannot be changing with respect to that property or else it could both have and not have. or neither have nor not have, the same property at the same time. So in order for the law of noncontradiction (which states that the opposing property cannot be assigned for the same time), and the law of excluded middle, to be applicable, a time must be indicated. The present, now, is indicated by "is".

Now consider the predication "is changing", "the river is changing". Again, a static condition, a property, is indicated by that predication, according to the nature of predication as described above. And, a time is indicated as now. We cannot propose the opposing predication, "not changing", for the same time. That's fine, we can predicate "changing", as a static property, all we want, but to understand what is being said by this predication we need to understand what "changing" means.

If "change" is understood as becoming different, and becoming different is understood as what happens in that time period between having some property and not having that property, then "changing" as a predication, presents us with very peculiar difficulties. What it means is that a period of time is indicated as the present, now, with "is", and within that period of time, the same subject may be said to both have, and also have not, some property, or properties, or to neither have, nor have not, that property or those properties which support the predication "changing" (becoming different).

I propose to you that this is a very sloppy form of predication. It is sloppy because it is a form of predication specifically designed to avoid the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Instead of determining whether it is correct or incorrect to say whether the subject has a certain property at a specific time, we simply predicate that the subject "is changing" at that time. This is meant to imply that the proper predication is not required, thereby averting the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

I'm not using words in a sloppy way. I'm using them in a precise way, just not the way you want them to be used. — Dan

You have not used "understand" in a precise way at all. In fact, you complained about my request for precision in meaning when we discussed what it means to understand one's own choice. You wanted to allow 'understand" to mean anything from being able to provide a reason for the choice, after the fact, to simply being able to describe the choice with words. Now, you state that a good understanding can consist of elements of misunderstanding. That's incoherency, and clear evidence of sloppy usage.

Objective right also does not conflict with freedom being valuable. For example, if the thing which is objectively right is the thing which protects the most freedom (which is not my view, but is an example of a maximizing view with the same measure of value) then that is surely treating freedom as valuable. — Dan

Your example only demonstrates the incoherency which results from the incompatibility. If "objectively right" is taken as a general principle, "protect the most freedom", then each person in each situation which one finds oneself in, must have the most freedom to choose, and this implies that there is not an objectively right choice to be made.

The incompatibility is between the general and the particular. If there is an objectively right choice in particular circumstances, then the value of freedom must be denied in favour of the value of the objectively right choice. The freedom to choose can have no value relative to the need for the objectively right action. And if "objectively right" is taken as a general principle to state "the most freedom is what is objectively right", then the person must be allowed the most freedom, to choose whatever one wants to do in any circumstances. This leaves us no principles to determine what is "the right choice".

Of course you try to find your way around this problem by restricting "freedom of choice" to "freedom to make one's own choice", where the meaning of "one's own choice', we've already seen, gets lost in sloppy usage.

Further, I am not using terms in a way similar to defining square in a way that can include circles (though there are certainly contexts in which this could be entirely reasonable, eg "a square meal"), I am using words in a fairly common way to communicate sensible points. — Dan

"The way the world is" indicates a static unchanging thing signified as "the way". To affirm that you use "the way" with meaning which could include change, is no different, in principle from saying that you use the word "square" in such a way so that it could include circles. If we say that there is such a thing as circles, then it would be contradictory to say that all figures are squares. Likewise, if the world is said to be changing then it is contradictory to say that there is such a thing as "the way the world is". What would be the purpose of the usage you propose, if not to create misunderstanding and/or to deceive?

Reducing "the way X is" to only ever apply to static description is not reasonable - particularly in the face of the user of the phrase telling you that's not baked in. — AmadeusD

Sure, someone can use "square" in a way which does not exclude a circle from being a type of square, and assert "this is the way I choose to use that term", insisting that the other person in the discussion must accept such incoherency if they want to continue discussion, but what's the point? How could this be conducive to understanding?

In reality, if understanding is our goal, we must seek out such sloppy usage, define the boundaries of contradiction and adhere to them, thus annihilating the sloppy usage. So if someone insists that they want to use "state" or "the way X is" as a descriptive term which would include "actively changing" into the category of being a "state", I would simply dismiss myself from the discussion, recognizing it as conducive to misunderstanding rather than understanding, therefore not a productive discussion.

The matter of what the user of the phrase is demanding is not relevant. Each individual must make the judgement of what is reasonable, and what is not reasonable, for oneself. You judge what I am insisting on, two incompatible categories, as unreasonable. But I judge what you and Dan are insisting on, describing (what I apprehend as) two incompatible features of the world by the same terms, as unreasonable. We judge each other to be unreasonable, refuse to agree, and this makes discussion of that subject pointless.

As evidence of the pointlessness of accepting Dan's demands, and adhering to my principles, I point to Dan's claim of having spent close to a decade trying to resolve this problem. I argue that it is Dan's failure to establish clear boundaries of contradiction, thereby allowing contradiction and incoherency to permeate the usage of words which is being demanded, which creates the illusion to Dan, that an unresolvable problem might be resolved. Therefore Dan obliviously trudges onward failing to recognize where the unreasonableness really lies.

The digression has helped me to understand why you've spent the better part of a decade trying to do something which I quickly apprehended as impossible. Your approach is to 'loosen up' definitions, or the meanings of words, when two principles are incompatible, believing that using words in this sloppy way will make the two incompatible principles compatible. So for example, (I'm not saying that this is what you have done, I'm saying it's a similar example), if the traditional way to understand "free will" is incompatible with the traditional way of understanding "determinism", then if one could 'loosen up' the meaning of one or both of these terms, that person might create the appearance that the two are compatible. And so we have what is called "compatibilism".

I think that this is best described as sophistry. But the loosening up of definitions allows ambiguity and equivocation, which propagates misunderstanding. Further, the loosening up of the meaning of "understanding" allows you to say that you have a good understanding even though misunderstanding inheres within what you assume to "understand" ( "one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally").

What you demonstrate is that you allow the incoherency of contradiction to penetrate deep within what you assume to be "understanding". You allow that a person might be judged as having a good understanding of X even though there are elements of misunderstanding within that supposed "understanding". This is a sneaky, sophistic way of violating the law of noncontradiction, by allowing that the contradictory property inheres within the affirmed one. 'Blackness inheres within the white of that objects.'

By not performing a proper analysis, and distinguishing which elements are understood, from which are misunderstood, and simply allowing the incoherent notion that misunderstanding inheres within understanding, you deny yourself the possibility of a true (real) understanding. You refuse to purge yourself of misunderstanding by accepting this incoherent idea that misunderstanding may be a part of a good understanding.

So, in summary, what you have demonstrated is that you "loosen up" definitions in the sophistic way. You do this to make opposing, incompatible principles appear to be compatible. This produces misunderstanding of basic, fundamental, and foundational, ontological principles. Then you argue that even if there is misunderstanding hidden deep within my claimed "understanding" it might still be a good understanding.

Back to the op. Succinctly stated, your belief that there is such a thing as "objective right" is incompatible with your belief that there is value in free choice. If there is such a thing as "objective right" then there must be an objectively right thing to do in every situation, and the objectively right thing to do would be assigned the highest value. Freedom of choice, which would allow a person to choose something other than the objectively right thing, therefore cannot be assigned any value.

So you 'loosen up' the meanings of these terms, to use them in a way which promotes the appearance of compatibility, but all this does is foster misunderstanding. The misunderstanding which is evident within your use of terms like "free choice", and "freedom", disables you from recognizing the incompatibility because it was designed to hide that incompatibility. However, the incompatibility cannot be vanquished by hiding it, so it persists and prevents you from adequately resolving the problem you present n the op. Now, instead of recognizing that this sloppy use of words has propagated misunderstanding, and this misunderstanding has veiled the true nature of that problem, you choose to argue that your "understanding" might still be a good one, even though misunderstanding inheres within it.

I mean, I don't agree that implies indicates necessity, but putting that to one side, are you suggesting that to misunderstand something is to not understand it at all surely there are degrees of understanding? — Dan

In my understanding, there is two distinct senses of "implied". One means what is indicated by evidence, the other means what is indicated by logic. The first sense does not produce necessity, because "evidence" does not provide the required certainty. The other sense, being valid logic, produces logical necessity. So for example, All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, "implies" that Socrates is mortal, by logical necessity.

The latter sense, the one of logical necessity is the one used in the argument about the relation between understanding time and understanding human actions. When we say that an understanding of human actions "implies" some understanding of time, it is a logical relation being referred to. We are saying that any understanding of human actions necessarily consists of some understanding of time, through a logical relation between "the understanding of human actions" and "the understanding of time". In the example above, when we say Socrates is a man "implies" that Socrates is mortal, we are referring to a relation of logical necessity between "man" and "mortal", in the very same way. Understanding human actions implies, due to logical necessity, some understanding of time.

With respect to the relation between degrees of understanding, and misunderstanding, this is what I tried to explain to you earlier, as two distinct things. When we are learning things, mathematics in school for example, we go through degrees of understanding as we increase our knowledge. Never can this be classified as "misunderstanding" unless the student learns a wrong thing, goes in a faulty direction. "Misunderstanding" consists of mistaken knowledge, when someone learns something which is wrong. Since it is mistaken, and wrong, it cannot be any degree of understanding.

'll thank you to keep your rudeness to yourself. — Dan

I'll try, but since it is the lounge, inhibitions loosen, then spontaneity and habit guide the tongue.

I am denying obviously incorrect claims that you haven't backed up properly. You haven't provided logic and evidence, you have provided fallacious arguments, usually backed by improper definitions of terms. — Dan

Uh, continuing with the ...assertions. Look Dan, you assert that what I say is incorrect, and my arguments are fallacious, but you do not address them. You just assert, assert, assert.

I pointed out this was wrong and then explained what the is-ought gap is, and that you were using it improperly. — Dan

This is incorrect for the following reasons. You explained how you interpret the meaning of the "is-ought gap", and I proceeded to show you how that understanding of the principle was completely consistent with what I was arguing, how I was "using" the is-ought gap..

See, I produced an application of that principle, the is-ought gap, I applied it to what we were arguing. Then you provided an understanding of the is-ought gap, and I showed you that your understanding is consistent with my application. However, instead of accepting my application, or even trying to demonstrate that it is not consistent with how you understand the principle, you simply denied my application, and asserted that I am wrong. Then you topped that off with something extremely rude, and downright stupid:

"I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean."

How can you proceed from the premise that you cannot understand me, to the conclusion that I do not understand myself?

But let's take a fairly everyday usage of "now" and say that the physical properties of the universe (where things are, what state they are in, etc etc) are changing now. That is a claim about the way the world is. — Dan

This is an invalid implication. Consider how I explained the logical sense of "implies" above. Now, take a look at your proposition "the physical properties of the universe are changing now". Your claim is that this proposition implies something about "the way the world is". It does not, for the reasons I've already explained to you. Simply put, "the way the world is" implies that there is a way that the world is, while "the properties of the universe are changing" implies that there is not a way that the universe is, because it is in a condition of changing. There is no logical relation, therefore no logical necessity, because the two are incompatible.

See, you simply ignore the logic applied to the meaning of the terms, and insist and assert things which if accepted, render the words incoherent and meaningless. What's the point? We wouldn't be able to get anywhere if we accepted things like that.

You say this is pedantic, but pedanticism is extremely necessary here. We are trying to get a handle on moral principles, a field in which the deeper we delve into it, the less relevant empirical evidence becomes, due to the is-ought gap. Therefore the only thing we have to guide us, to keep us on the straight and narrow, is strict adherence to rigorous principles. Without that, we can claim anything as ought, right, good, etc..

I have pointed out the goal of metaphysics and ontology and explained that that is a goal directed at objective truth. — Dan

No, you have merely asserted that. It is nothing but your opinion, and as I said, it's a principle you assert for the purpose of begging the question. If you know Plato, you would see that goals are named as "the good". And, you'd understand that "the good" is distinctly other from "objective truth". Again, the difference between the two denies the possibility of logical implication.

That doesn't follow. Requiring some understanding of something does not imply that having a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human action as one might have some understanding but also misunderstand something to with time — Dan

It doesn't follow, for you, because you didn't follow the argument. That is evident from this misrepresentation. Allow me to restate it please.

The argument starts from the primary premise which you and I agreed on, "understanding of human actions implies some understanding of time". "Implies" here, indicates that "some understanding of time" is necessary to understanding "human actions", as an essential part of the concept indicated by "human actions". That word "implies" indicates the logical relation, some understanding of time is required for an understanding of human actions. Do you understand the premise?

Now the second premise is "a misunderstanding of time". "Misunderstanding" means something other than understanding, as we've discussed earlier. A person thinks oneself to understand, and appears to oneself as having an understanding, but the thing which appears to the person as an understanding, is not an understanding at all, it is something other than an understanding, and actually opposed to understanding, so it is properly called "misunderstanding".

The conclusion drawn from those two premises is that the person who has a misunderstanding of time will necessarily have a misunderstanding of "human actions". This is because the concept "human actions" is dependent on "some understanding of time", and "misunderstanding of time" signifies a lack of understanding, something other than understanding. which appears like understanding but is not. Therefore, what appears to the person as an understanding of "human actions" would really be a misunderstanding, according to the extent that "understanding time" is required, necessary, or essential to, "understanding human actions", indicated by that word "implies".

These are not stupid assertions. You keep claiming things that are blatently wrong and I am just pointing it out. — Dan

There you go, backing up your use of stupid assertions with more stupid assertions. We'll have an infinite regress of stupid assertions, with nothing justified. How is the statement "you are blatantly wrong" supposed to indicate anything to me other than how stupid you are?

Have you ever been in this situation? You demonstrate to someone what you believe to be sound logic, premises backed up with good evidence, and arguments of valid logic, and the person replies "you're blatantly wrong". So you provide more evidence and logic, and the person persists with "that's simply incorrect". Wouldn't it occur to you, that the person is just countering sound logic with stupid assertions?

The way something is does not imply it is the only way it ever will be. You are asserting that it does, but it just doesn't. — Dan

I made no such assertion, that's a complete misrepresentation. I said "the way something is" refers to something static, unchanging, as "the way", and "is" refers to the present time, now. I never said that this implies that it hasn't changed in the past, or that it implies that it will not change in the future. So your representation of what I said is clearly wrong.

But I also said that the proposition "there is a way the world is" is contrary to evidence. This is because evidence indicates that the world is changing at the present time, now, which is what "is" refers to. So your statement "the way something is" indicates something unchanging at the present, now, while allowing that this static condition of now, might change in the future, or past.

This statement is clearly contrary to reality. In reality, known by empirical evidence, things do not change in the past, nor do they change in the future, they change only at the present, now. That is the only time when change occurs, at the present. So the evidence is clear, you are the one who is blatantly wrong. Things are not static now, as "the way something is" indicates, with the possibility of change in the past and future, in reality things are changing now, with the possibility that the named thing might be the same in the past or future.

It's not a contradiction because you are adding an assumption of staticness which you aren't entitled to. — Dan

I'm adding no extra assumptions, "constant state", were your words, and "state" implies static.

The claims of ontology and metaphysics are descriptive claims about the way the world (or possibly worlds) is (or possible are). They are very much concerned with objective truth. — Dan

Again, an unsupported assertion, which is the basis of the fallacy of begging the question, that you commit.

Hitler killing millions of Jewish people was a bad thing. One might think that I should prevent him from doing so. However, the situation I find myself in is that this happened many years before I was born and, alas, I have no time machine. Thus, I cannot do this. Because I cannot do this (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to do it. — Dan

Are you presenting this as evidence of how important an understanding of time is to moral philosophy. That's what I argued since the beginning. And I also said that the biggest, most significant restriction on one's freedom is that the past cannot be changed. Both you and Amadeus dismissed this fact as irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Now I see that you are starting to understand how time actually does restrict one's freedom to act. You call it "the situation", but if you keep looking at your example, you'll see that the description names time as applying the restriction. This is indicated by the condition "I have no time machine". This shows that if you had a time machine, the restriction would not apply, therefore it is time rather than "the situation" which is limiting your freedom.

Similarly let's say I come across a child drowning on my way home from work. One might think that I ought to jump in and save the child. However, for the sake of argument, I am paralyzed from the neck down and so cannot do so (also there is no way I can use my hypothetical wheelchair to push a stick over to them etc etc etc). Since I cannot jump in and save the child (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to (though perhaps I ought to call for help or something else that I am capable of). — Dan

I don't see your argument. What you "ought to do" is determined by intention, not the situation. As I said, the context is the intention, the context is not the situation. Intention dictates the end, the situation dictates the means. So if "ought to save the child" indicates the good intention, then you ought to do this regardless of the situation. This means that if the situation limits your means, it only makes the task more difficult. You can't swim, so you think of the stick method. That doesn't work so you try something else, etc. etc. etc., maybe even call for help.

The fact that you provide all these different alternatives indicates that you recognize "ought" belongs to the intention, "save the child" in this case, and not to any particular one of the specified means, which are dictated by the situation. "Ought" therefore, is not restricted by the situation, nor is it restricted by what is apprehended as what "can" be done. We must allow that it transcends the situation, as intention transcends the situation, inspiring us to find the means to get through seemingly impossible situations.

This issue of "ought" being restricted by the situation is very similar to the issue of "ought" being restricted by "the information which one has". This is a defeatist attitude which allows "the good" (what is intended), to be compromised unnecessarily by the way that one perceives "the situation". This is is conducive to cop outs, excuses, and rationalizations as to why one did not do what ought to have been done. Sorry, I was limited by the circumstances".

When you allow "ought" to be restricted by the situation, or by the information which one has, then you need a whole slew of other principles applicable in all the different circumstances, to determine, at what point do I stop trying to find ways to save the child, at what point do i stop seeking further information. To properly deal with this problem, we need to allow that "ought" transcends the situation. Therefore, "situation" is irrelevant, as I said.

I mean, I'm not sure whether I understand time or not, but I have a reasonable guess. I think if this is the bar you are setting for understanding time (assuming that this understanding is correct, but let's not get into a discussion of time) then I think I would probably agree that understanding something like scrambing eggs probably implies some understanding of time. — Dan

OK, It looks like we finally have some agreement on something. Understanding of human actions "implies some understanding of time". From this, we can also conclude that a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human actions.

Since moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions we can conclude that the moral philosopher requires sound premises regarding the nature of time. Therefore "a discussion of time" is not to be avoided, but is a necessity.

It doesn't imply that. You are inferring that inappropriately. — Dan

Again, you keep making stupid assertions like this without any justification. I explained very clearly how "the way the world is" implies staticness. Allow me to reiterate:

"The way" implies one way. And "one way" implies unchanging. If the world was changing (unstatic) at the time designated by "is" (now), we could not truthfully call it "the way" the world is, we'd have to say "the ways" which the world is (now).

I'm really tired of such stupid assertions, where you simply ignore my logical demonstrations and make a contrary (stupid) assertion.

I didn't say it is the "one" objective truth. I said that if the world is in a constant state of change, then that is something that is true about the way the world is. It's not a subjective description at all. It is an objective claim which may or may not be true. People certainly disagree about things that are objective all the time, it's just that some of them (sometimes all of them) are wrong. — Dan

This is simple begging the question, in the way I explained. You assume that the statement "changing is the way that the world is" is meant to represent an objective truth, rather than what the author claims, that it is meant to represent a subjective opinion. And this assumption provides the conclusion you desire "if the world is in a constant state of change...". That's begging the question, making an assumption which produces the desired conclusion.

You do not seem to have a firm understanding of ontology and metaphysics. Propositions in these fields are speculative, and not meant as "objective truth". These are like unproven hypotheses in science. They are not proposed as objective truths, they are proposed as theories to try with evidence and logic, in a procedure which would hopefully lead toward understanding.

So we can take your representation "the world is in a constant state of change", or my representation, "changing is the way that the world is", and analyze such propositions for the potential of truth. Now we can see that each representation is self-contradicting in the way described above. "State of change" is incoherent by contradiction, as well as "changing is the way" is incoherent by contradiction, as explained above.

Therefore opinions like those, which appear to express what is intended as "objective truth" must be rejected because of incoherence. This leaves us with two distinct and incompatible approaches, the approach of staticness, "the world is in a constant state", and the approach of activity, "the world is changing". Empirical evidence supports the latter, "the world is changing". Now we must dismiss all such propositions which appear to express opinions intended as objective truth, as inadequate for an accurate ontology, metaphysics, and consequently moral philosophy.

"Is" in the is-ought gap refers to descriptive claims, rather than normative claims. — Dan

Right, but can't you see that "descriptive claims" are essentially claims about "the way the world is"? These are claims which are intended to purvey an "objective truth". And, as explained above, this approach is inadequate for ontology and metaphysics. And, because this approach produces faulty ontology and metaphysics, it is also a faulty approach for moral philosophy.

So ontology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy must assign priority to change, as changing is how we actually know the world. Once the world is understood to be known as changing, rather than misunderstood to be known by descriptive claims, which imply "objective truth" (is), then we seek normative claims which involve judgements concerning good and bad changes (ought).

Do you really need me to justify what "the situation one is in" refers to in the context I've used it here? — Dan

Yes, that's exactly what you need to justify. And, the problem is as I've explained above. The "situation" is always rapidly changing, Therefore, in reality, what is actually happening in any real circumstances, is that there is activity which cannot be understood through descriptive claims intended to represent an "objective truth" concerning "the situation".

Furthermore, since this is what is actually going on (rapid changes), and the subject is conditioned to deal with what is actually going on, through evolutionary forces, these changes are understood through the context of intentions, wants, desires. Therefore reference to "the situation one is in" is meaningless and irrelevant. The person is in the midst of rapid changes, which are understood by that person in relation to (within the context of) what is intended, wanted, or desired by that person. The proposed "situation one is in" has no relevance.

If you really believe that "the situation one is in", is of any relevance here, you need to justify that opinion.

Eh, I'm not sure that this is true. Perhaps to fully understand an activity requires an understanding of time, but I think this is a very high bar you are setting for understanding an activity. I think one can understand making scrambled eggs with a fairly low-level of understanding of the nature of time itself. — Dan

I know, I expected a reply like this. You and I have significant difference in how we understand "understand". You seem to think that if a person can recognize a thing, and call it by the appropriate name, the person "understands" that thing. That's how you described "understanding one's choice".

But you are clearly inconsistent with your usage of the term. Now, to suit your purpose, you want a "low-level understanding of the nature of time" not to qualify as "understanding", though you insisted on an extremely low level, in the other case.

To understand "making scrambled eggs" one must understand temporal order, which action is first, second, and after this and after that. In "understanding" any human action, it is necessary to recognize the temporal order of means to end. The means are carried out as the actions necessary to bring about the end, which follows the means in time, as the effect of the causes. Also, in the case of your example, scrambled eggs, as in most cases, the means are most often very complex, requiring a temporal order of causes and effects within the means required to bring about the final effect, the end, which is named "scrambled eggs".

If that is indeed true, then that is the way the world is. I am not assuming a staticness. — Dan

You contradict yourself. "The way the world is" implies a staticness. That is unavoidable, "the way it is" indicates one unchanging thing "the way". Any change and it could no longer be called "the way" it would be a different "way". We cannot say "the way it is" without implying staticness because "the way" implies one unchanging "way".

This is why, if someone says "changing is the way that the world is", it's meaningless incoherency which can be interpreted in the two opposing ways I explained. You say that this means "change" is the one "objective truth" that we have about the world. I say that this means that that there is no "objective truth" about the world. I say that the statement "changing is the way that the world is", ought to be interpreted as a descriptive opinion about the world, rather than an objective truth. But you do not seem to understand what it means to accept a statement as meant to be a subjective description which people can either agree or disagree with, rather than as meant to be an objective truth.

This is where we have significant disagreement concerning the actions and communications of human beings. You think that communications and actions are in general, directed and guided by ideas about objective truth, while I think that actions and communications are guided and directed by subjective opinions concerning personal wants and desires. What I tell you is that the idea of "objective truth" only starts to influence our actions and communication when there is disagreement.

Also, I didn't suggest zooming out to the maximal amount. Again, that is something you have added in there. I suggested that we could zoom out. For example, when describing a river, it is silly to describe the position of each water molecule because (apart from practical considerations) they're moving. Likewise, we might seek to describe the physical laws of our universe, the phenomena we find in a particular location (for example, on earth), the logical laws that apply in all possible universes, etc. — Dan

The requirements for the description are context dependent. When attempting to understand flow patterns, erosion, etc., it is very beneficial to understand the activity of individual water molecules. This is studied in hydraulics and wave features.

This is the point. The most general statements, (most zoomed out), "the world is this way..." are completely useless in guiding human actions because they have no applicability. Applicability is determined by the particular circumstances. And, the particular circumstances are a feature of the individual's wants, needs, desires, or intentions. So if the person's intent is to make a map of the river, the description required is completely different from the description required if the person is trying to understand flow patterns and erosion.

Therefore "context dependent" refers to the person's intentions. The context which determines what is required of the description, is the person's intentions. So the requirements for the description, whether zoomed in or zoomed out, are "context dependent", where "context" is intention.

What is, especially when it comes to the is-ought gap, does not indicate a static condition of things at all. — Dan

Since you are going to keep insisting this, without explanation as to how this is possible, as you've done in other instances, I'm going to ask for justification. How does "what is" refer to anything other than a static unchanging situation, without the attempt at justification reducing the statement to meaningless incoherency? As I said above "the way it is" refers to one unchanging way, as does "what is". If "change" is invoked, then a before and after in time is also implied, and this negates "is", which refers to the present, "now". Then you no longer have "is', but a temporal distinction between two distinct times, before and after.

As for how one might relate to the other, there are some ways in which they relate. The most obvious being that ought implies can (and can do otherwise), so the situation one is in and what actions they are capable of taking limit the space of things it can be the case that they ought to do.

Also, I would suggest that normative claims are also claims about objective facts, just objective moral facts. That an action being right, or wrong, or good, or bad, is also a part of objective reality to be discovered. — Dan

You haven't justified "objective moral fact". Nor have you justified that "the situation one is in" refers to anything other than the context of one's intentions, as I explained above. So none of this has any bearing on the understanding of human actions until these assumptions you throw around can be justified.

I don't know how this relates to what I said. I would say that moral philosophy deals with the activity of moral agents, which includes but is not limited to, most adult humans. Whether I would say that understanding an activity requires an understanding of time depends on what you mean by this. — Dan

I mean, that since time is an essential aspect of activities, then to correctly understand any activity requires a correct understanding of time. For example, animality is an essential aspect of being human, so to correctly understand what it means to be human requires an understanding of what it means to be an animal.

It doesn't really imply that as we can zoom out temporarily rather than trying to specify a present moment which as past by the time we express the point. Though, this is largely irrelevant as, again, points such as whether time is relative to speed are themselves claims about the way the world is. Even being in a constant state of flux is a claim about the way the world is. — Dan

You are attempting to avoid the issue rather than address it.

If we "zoom out", such that "the present" is a day, a month, a year, or a million years, then the changes which are occurring at the present, get increasingly significant as we zoom out, and it makes less and less sense to even think that there is "way that the world is". And if we zoom in, the changes get faster and faster, and it becomes more and more clear that change is of the essence of the world, rather than any assumed state of being (way that the world is).

So if we "zoom out" the maximal amount, like you suggest, we end up being able to make the most general statement only, "the world is changing", or " a constant state of flux". That is supposed to be "the way the world is". This is just like your claim, that even if there is no "objective truth", that there is no objective truth would be an objective truth. Then we could choose to interpret "the world is changing" as indicating that this is the way that the world is (your interpretation), or that there is no such thing as the way that the world is (my interpretation. We'd both be right, with contradictory meaning.

All this does is provide a good demonstration to justify my claim, that "objective truth", or "the way the world is" is completely irrelevant to moral philosophy. This is because "objective truth" can only refer to the most zoomed out, general statements, while moral philosophy needs to apply to the particular actions of here and now.

Again, this is the separation between "is" and "ought". "What is" is a general statement indicating a static condition of things, while "what ought to be done" is a specific action unique to the particular circumstances of individual persons here and now. Until you demonstrate how one might be related to the other, your starting point of "what is" remains irrelevant" to "what ought to be done".

This is nonsense. To the extent that time is relative to the speed one is going, that itself is a fact about the world. — Dan

Do you not agree that moral philosophy deals with human activity? And, to adequately understand "activity" of any kind requires an understanding of time.

You seem to be taking "there is some way the world is" to mean "there is some way the world is and nothing ever changes". — Dan

No, that's not the meaning I am assuming.

I assume that in the phrase "the way the world is", "is" implies the present time. However, our sense observation (empirical data) indicates that the world is always changing at the present time. Since the world is changing (in flux) at the present time, it is impossible that there is a specifiable "way that the world is", because "is" implies the present time. This is the basic fact which Einstein takes advantage of with his principle called "the relativity of simultaneity".

I put it to you that there exists a world beyond what we believe in. And that world is some way. — Dan

OK, so you propose a dualism, what is referred to by "the world", and what is referred to by "some way" that the world is.

I put it to you that this dualism is fundamentally incorrect. Time is passing, and as time passes things change. Therefore there is no such thing as "the way that the world is". Your claim that the world is "some way" is demonstrably incorrect through demonstrations of empirical evidence. The theory of special relativity shows this quite clearly. The fact that time is passing makes "the way that the world is" best understood as perspective (frame) dependent, and this way of understanding, is to assume that there is no such thing as "the way that the world is".

Furthermore, since moral philosophy deals with human activities, actions, which require the premise that the world is actively changing, in order to properly understand human actions, your proposal (the "world is some way)" would leave us incapable of producing a moral philosophy. Your premise that the "world is some way", is inconsistent, and incompatible with the true premise, that the world is active and changing. Therefore this premise of yours that the "world is some way", would seriously mislead us, make moral philosophy unintelligible, leaving us incapacitated in that faculty.

This is why I tried to explain to you, that first and foremost, prior to proceeding into any moral philosophy, it is necessary to have a very clear understanding of the nature and reality of time and change. This provides the ontological basis which makes moral philosophy intelligible. Without this, one might start from a faulty ontological principle such as that the "world is some way", which would make true moral philosophy impossible.

This problem commonly manifests as the is/ought distinction. The premise "the world is some way" is an "is' premise. The "ought" premise assumes that the world is actively changing, and there is a way which we as human beings, should act within this active world.

I only don't understand what it would mean to discuss the existence of God without the assumption of objective truth. I do assume that the truth is objective, and so I understand what it would mean for God to exist. The reason I don't think He does isn't that I don't understand the claim. I was pointing out the incoherence of your worldview, not expressing my own. — Dan

As I've been trying to tell you, "objective truth" is irrelevant to moral philosophy. If there is such a thing, it falls within the category of your ontological assumption that the "world is some way". This is an ontological assumption which is fundamentally incompatible with the ontological assumption required for moral philosophy that "the world is actively changing".

I don't think it does produce a dualism. — Dan

You state it yourself, as a dualism. There is "a world", and there is "some way" that the world is. Obviously these two are not the same, because then you would just state "there is a world". However, if this is really your desired starting point, we can apply Aristotle's law of identity, and claim that by the law of identity (a thing is the same as itself), the world, and the way the world is, are one and the same.

If you take this approach, you still need to allow for the reality of change, activity within the world to be able to proceed into moral philosophy which deals with activities. And change requires potential, the possibility of change, so we still need a basic dualism which allows for a separation between "the world" (the way that the world is, being one and the same as the world), and the real possibilities for change. The way that the world is, is changing, and this implies real possibility, potential.

Now, the dualism proposed here is not the traditional dualism of "the world", and statements or ideas about the world (the world and the way the world is), it is a dualism of "the actual" and "the potential". We must allow that both of these aspects of the world are equally real, but mutually exclusive, in the way of a dichotomy. Also, each must be accepted as equally important to any moral philosophy.

This, I propose to you, is the way to deal with the two incompatible principles which you desire to employ, moral consequentialism (based in the assumed reality of what actually "is"), and the freedom of the individual (based in the assumed reality of potential, possibility). But you need to understand the dichotomy, and how the two are based in incompatible principles, due to the difference between "being" (what is), and "becoming" (change). So we represent them as a dichotomy due to the reality that they are incompatible.

No, facts about the world are not statements. The world is as it is, regardless of what we say about it. Statements and facts are not the same thing. Things aren't "chosen" to be true, they just are. — Dan

I don't see why you can't understand the problems with what you are arguing. "Facts about the world" implies two distinct things to make it coherent; what is referred to with "facts", and what is referred to with "the world". Likewise, "the world is as it is" implies a similar subject/predicate division. There is "the world" which is referred to, and there is "as it is" which is referred to. These two referents, "the world" and "facts" in the one case, and "the world" and "as it is" in the other case, are the two things which are judged to correspond, in a judgement of "truth".

Now, the "facts" cannot be a part of "the world", because then we would need facts about those facts, and facts about those facts, and this would cause infinite regress, denying the possibility that any facts are complete, because no facts could include facts about themselves without implying a vicious circle. This means that we must assign to "the facts" a separate realm, a separate part of reality from "the world", in a form of dualism, allowing "the facts" to transcend "the world". We could say that "the facts" exist in God's mind, or we could just assign to them their own separate realm distinct from the world without even invoking God. However, this choice, at this time, is not important.

What is important though, is for you to recognize that if we deny the existence of "God", because we do not understand what it would mean for God to "exist", then to be consistent we need to exclude the existence of such objective "facts" for the very same reason.

Therefore, when you choose to proceed from principles which exclude God, for the reasons you describe, we must also exclude "facts" in as similar way, by applying those same principles. This we must do, to maintain consistency. Then we must revise statements like the following:

Assuming that there is a right answer to get to, that there is a world beyond just whatever we believe, is necessary to have any kind of sensible discussion. So no, we can't avoid this assumptions. We must make them.

We cannot assume that there is a "right answer to get to", because we've excluded the reality of a "right answer", with the argument that we do not know what it could mean for the right answer to "exist".

I propose therefore, that we start with a different principle, something like this: 'The individual subject ought to try to do one's personal best, in the particular circumstances, of one's unique situation'. Notice, that this principle does not require the assumption of "the existence of the best possible answer" in an objective sense. It requires only the assumption of "one's personal best", which is a subjective sense of "best possible answer".

I'm not sure what this kind of "usefulness" even means. Things like predictive power don't make sense if there isn't an external world that has phenomena in it to be predicted. — Dan

The issue is not whether there is "a world". That we can take for granted. So there is no problem with the term "usefulness", it refers to the means we employ toward achieving our ends within our world.

The question is whether there is such a thing as "facts about the world". This produces a dualism between "the world", and "facts about the world". You imply that you accept such a dualism when you refer to "an external world" here, already implicitly invoking the internal/external division.

If I decided that you agreed with me, would that mean there was no sense in discussing the point anymore? — Dan

Generally yes, an agreed upon principle becomes an established "fact", so to speak, forming the grounds for conceptual structure. That thing we call 'the sun", that is "the moon", "1" stands for the numerical value of one, and "2'" stands for the numerical value of two, for example. Once we have agreement we can quit discussing what we ought to call these things, and move on toward more elaborate conceptual structures. But if we meet someone who does not agree, then we need to either discuss again, to justify our principles, or change and adapt the principles to allow the other's perspective, or simply exclude the other as not reasonable.

I'm not sure what this means, so I don't know whether I agree. — Dan

What I was saying, is that we might assume "objective truth", if you insist. But then as we work toward our goal of understanding and obtaining the objective truth, as you describe our goal ought to be, we would come to understand that the goal of objective truth is not what guides and directs the vast majority of human beings in the vast majority of actions. In reality even philosophers who seek objective truth in philosophy, do not seek it in their mundane activities, which is the majority of their activities. And the majority of people are not even philosophers seeking objective truth in philosophy. They only appeal to "objective truth" in cases of disagreement, as I explained. But the majority of human actions are carried out without interference or objections from people disagreeing, causing the need to appeal to "objective truth".

That there are facts about the world that would be true whether or not we believed them. — Dan

But "facts about the world" are statements about the world. Who judges what qualifies as "about the world", and makes the appropriate statements rather than some other statements, if not "we"? Do you not see that someone must choose "the correct" statements about the world, and make them, for there to be existent facts about the world? Or do you believe that every possible statement is already made, so that includes all the facts and also all the falsities?

I mean, it makes a big difference. If we assume there is a right answer to questions, we might have reason to seek it. If we don't assume there is a right answer, or that anything is true independant of our believing it, then we need not search for evidence, or engage in logical reasoning, we can just make up whatever shit we like instead. — Dan

If we did not assume that there was an objectively "right", or objectively "true" answer, then "usefulness" would be what we seek in our theories, our answers, and reasoning. And, for the most part the evidence of modern science supports that this is the case. The capacity to predict is what is generally sought in science, as the means toward usefulness.

How do we tell if others agree if the fact of their agreement is determined wholly by our beliefs, as is, presumably, the fact of their existence? — Dan

It's not hard to tell that others agree, they say so, just like you and I say that we disagree with each other.

Objective truth is the bottom of any subject worth discussing. Assuming that there is a right answer to get to, that there is a world beyond just whatever we believe, is necessary to have any kind of sensible discussion. So no, we can't avoid this assumptions. We must make them. I've been willing to allow a lot of silly assumptions and definitions for the sake of argument, but I'm afraid I cannot make any assumption do away with the assumption that truth is objective.

As for "right" being objective, that is what I mean by "right". It is possible that such a thing as objective morality doesn't exist, that moral error theory is correct, but "right" as I understand the term, isn't subjective. — Dan

OK, let's assume that there is such a thing as "objective truth", as you insist that this must be the starting point. Do you agree that we are on the path toward objective truth if we recognize that objective truth is not what directs us in our actions? What directs us, is our wants, needs, desires, our intentions.

I think we are pretty much at an impasse Dan. We have no hope of understanding each other, as we go deeper and deeper in opposite directions.

I said "objective truth", like "objective right", implies a mind independent of human minds (God) in order to interpret a statement and to judge whether it is right or true. You said that is not the case, because a claim, or statement is the meaning of the words, and this either corresponds with reality or not. I say that a statement or claim exists as symbols, and that meaning is only determined by a mind which hears or reads them. Then this mind may make a judgement about corresponding with reality.

I mean, it doesn't. It assumes that these things are relative, rather than absolute. But that, if true, is taken to be objectively true. — Dan

This is another excellent example of how your begging the question misleads you into misunderstanding. Relativity theory assumes that motions are relative, as you say. However, physicists do not take this "to be objectively true", they take it, and use it as a useful theory. Relativity theory was developed by Galileo who noticed that planetary motions could be described by either the geocentric model, or the heliocentric model. Even though he recognized that the true model is the heliocentric model, he realized that truth was not necessary in representing motions. As long as we produce a model which is useful for the required purpose, truth is completely irrelevant.

Your faulty premise, that people look for truth in theories, statements etc., rather than usefulness, misleads you into believing that physicists apply relativity theory as if they are applying objective truth. This is a mistake, because the founding principle of relativity theory is that truth is not important, and completely irrelevant, because all that matters is usefulness. Then your argument, which concludes that relativity would be objectively true if taken to be true, is a matter of begging the question from that faulty premise, because in reality "true" if applied to relativity theory would mean useful. Science uses a pragmatic theory of "truth", where "true" means useful, especially for prediction.

Again, I think all of this judgement stuff is completely the wrong way to be looking at things and is very much putting the cart before the horse. — Dan

The issue is "choice", therefore the nature of "judgement" ought not be dismissed in this way.

However, I'm not sure what it even means to say that God exists if we can't discuss the objective truth of the universe. Like, if God can exist for some people, does that mean those people get to have objective truth, but it only exists for them? Because that's not really how something being "objective" works. — Dan

"Objective truth" has no meaning for you, it's just something you assert. You assert that statements of claim have "objective truth" independent of any minds judging them as true. But this is unintelligible, meaningless nonsense.

You haven't demonstrated this, you have asserted it based on the dubious assertion that truth is a judgement. — Dan

There's a lot more to my claim than that. A statement needs to be interpreted, compared to the thing which it is a statement about, and then it can be judged for truth or not. You seem to believe that a statement either corresponds with something, or it does not, and that's all there is to it. That belief is both useless and meaningless.

I mean, I think we are demonstrating right now that without the assumption that there is a right answer, this discussion is entirely meaningless. To return to the example of God, without assuming that whether He exists or not has a correct answer, then all of these claims about Him providing a basis for objective truth are meaningless. — Dan

You are intentionally ignoring the point. Whether or not there is a correct answer is what is the meaningless question. You know, like we discussed already, we could assume that there is an "objectively correct" answer, but we''ll never know whether we have it, so the assumption is meaningless to us. So the assumption of a "right answer" is completely useless because ti makes no difference to us whether we assume it or not.

What is at issue is whether we can agree on something. If we agree, then we have something to work with. If we are working on it then we must believe it is right, each of us individually with a subjective belief. Whether or not the thing we agree on is "right" in some transcendent (objective) sense, is irrelevant. All that matters is that we agree, because agreement allows us to get things done. And we don't need to stop and worry about whether we are doing "the right" thing, because we've already agreed that it needs to be done therefore we do believe it is the right thing. But if someone else comes along, and disagrees, then we need to start all over again, and look for agreement with that person.

What are the criteria for justifying a belief on that assumption and why are those criteria any better than any other? — Dan

The criteria for justification is agreement. Isn't this obvious to you? If you demonstrate your reasons for believing what you do, and the other person agrees, it has been justified. If the other does not, it has not been justified. If some agree and others do not, then there is more work to be done, to complete your justification.

God doesn't provide a basis for objective anything. You've got things backwards. In order to assert that God exists (in the sense of existing for everyone, rather than in the sense of tomatoes being disgusting), then we must assume that things can objectively exist. — Dan

OK, then let's dispense with all ideas about "objectivity" here. You've been claiming "objective truth", and "objective right", and I've explained that these terms only make sense to me in a religious structure. To me, assuming such things as "truth exists", and "rights exist", is just as bizarre as the religious claims of "God exists". So for the sake of agreement, and having a starting point, can we get rid of all such bizarre statements about "objectivity", and start from the bottom, the subject?

Biden ramped it up for no other reason than politics. — NOS4A2

What a surprise. Aren't all wars about politics?

We’ll have to see what Trump does. In any case, whatever they do, it will be an order of magnitude greater in transparency. — NOS4A2

Don't hold your breath on that one. Remember, he said he'd stop the war before taking office. Is it transparent what he is doing now?

As we’re winding down the one-term presidency, the demented Joe Biden gives Ukraine the go-ahead and the weaponry to fire ballistic missiles into Russia, further escalating the war and leaving a mess for the next administration and the world. — NOS4A2

Yes, war seems to be ramping up, contrary to Trump's claim that if elected he'd have the war stopped before even taking office, because he knows Putin so well. It appears like Trump's close ties to Russia will be significantly strained this term, by this clash of personalities, as each of these individuals attempts to prove oneself to be the most powerful man in the world. This time around though, Trump will acknowledge no debt owed to Russia for his position. The dog unleased will turn on the master, and the table is set for disaster.

I agree it implies self-contradiction, because the position that truth is subjective is itself contradictory.

Would you instead say that your claim, that truth is subjective, is false for me? If so, why are you trying to convince me of something false? — Dan

There is another solution, as I've indicated, "God".

So model-dependent realism isn't a theory of physics so much as the philosophy of science, and it doesn't assume a lack of objective truth so much as thinks its the wrong thing to be focusing on. As for relativity and the multiverse, neither of these assume a lack of objective truth at all. You have badly misunderstood these theories. — Dan

Relativity very clearly assumes a lack of objective truth about motion. All temporal concepts, velocity, momentum, etc., are frame of reference dependent.

If we assume that truth is subjective, then what the heck do any of these claims mean? What are you claiming when you claim I am begging the question? Are you claiming I am actually begging the question, or just that you believe I am? — Dan

Obviously, from what I've written, the claim is what I believe about your premises. When I say "you are begging the question" it means I believe you are begging the question. I mean that's pretty obvious isn't it? That's what any such statements of claim consist of, expressions of what one believes. Sometime we emphasize the strength of such a belief by saying "I strongly believe...", even we might insist "it is true that...", or "it is a fact that...", but in reality these are statements of what is believed. Surely you must recognize this. Don't you?

"Do what appears right based on the information you have" is pretty reasonable advice and is not the same as "rush to judgement and don't gather more information". — Dan

Clearly, the phrase "based on the information you have", instructs one not to seek more information. And, the reason why the doctor's act, in the example, ends up being judged as wrong, is the failure to seek more information. So your instruction "Do what appears right based on the information you have" is very faulty, as it encourages the type of decision making which produces the wrong decision in the example.

No, God does not provide the grounds. Even if he existed, that wouldn't show anything about morality at all. That being said, if truth were subjective, I'm not really sure what the claim "God exists" would mean. Would he just exist to the faithful, but not to the nonbeliever? — Dan

As I said, "God" provides the grounds for what you call "objective truth", and "objective right". What I explained is that "true", and "right" are judgements, and if we assume that there is such judgements independent of those made by human beings (this is what constitutes your meaning of "objective truth" and "objective right") then we must assume an agent which makes these judgements. That is commonly known as "God".

Second, you haven't provided the assumption of objective truth to be false. — Dan

I know I have not proved the assumption of objective truth to be false. I have very clearly demonstrated that the assumption of objective truth requires the assumption of some sort of divine mind (God), to justify it. Therefore the assumption of objective truth implies the assumption of God.

This is due to the fact that "true" and "right" are judgements, and judgements are only made by minds. You have asserted, and insisted, that such judgements exist independently of minds, that it's simply "fact" that X is true, or Y is right. I have asked, to no avail, for you to justify these assertions.

You said that objective truth is irrelevant to most human actions, I pointed out it isn't. — Dan

You provided one example. I explained why your example is not representative of "most human actions".

When you say "this is what human beings care about" what does that even mean? Does it mean "this is what I think they care about" or "this is what they care about, in my world". If the truth is subjective, then aren't we just arguing about our favorite dinosaurs here (and everywhere)? If I think that this isn't what people care about, aren't I right? In what sense could I be wrong? — Dan

Yes this is a fairly good representation. You just need to refine it a bit to understand what I am showing you. If you switch "aren't we just arguing about our favorite dinosaurs here" with "aren't we just arguing about God here", then you would be on the road to understanding clearly.

What I am saying is that by claiming "objective truth", and "objective right" to support your moral philosophy, this means that God is what supports your moral philosophy. However, you insist that your moral philosophy is not supported by God. So, I am showing you what a moral philosophy which is not supported by God actually looks like, and this is "subjective truth", and "subjective right".

You really do not seem to like moral philosophy which is not supported by God, you find concepts like "subjective truth" and "subjective right" to be incoherent. So I ask you, why not just accept the fact that you really do believe in God? If moral philosophy without God is incoherent to you, and you profess a moral philosophy which relies on God, then doesn't this mean that you believe in God?

There is another option I've given you, "an out". This is to justify your claim that there can be objective truth, and objective right, without God. Simply asserting that a statement corresponding with reality is a fact rather than a judgement, does not justify. You need to show how there could be a correspondence between a statement, which consists of a bunch of symbols, and the way things are in the world, without a judgement being made.

You have made a claim with no evidence and now seem annoyed that I am dismissing it just as easily. If you want to make a point about what people believe, I suggest you back it up with some form of evidence. Though, again, I'm not sure why you would be trying to convince me of anything if truth were subjective. Are you just trying to recruit me to your worldview? Not a matter of correct or not, but just a kind of intellectual tribalism? — Dan

I've given you very clear demonstration of how "objective truth" requires God. You dismissed God. So I showed you what "subjective truth" consists of. Now you dismiss that. What do you choose at this point?

"Opinion" here is a little vague, so I'm going to clarify. Do you mean to suggest that everything you have been saying up until now amounts to nothing more than a matter of taste? You may as well have been telling me why I should like tomatoes? Is that your position here? I want to be sure. — Dan

I wouldn't call it "taste", I'd call it "belief". Tastes are generally not justifiable. Beliefs are often justifiable, but sometimes not. When a belief is not justifiable, it may be classed as more like a taste. I have justified my belief, that objective right and objective truth require God, but you have not justified your belief that these do not require God. So I assume that to be a sort of "taste".

How exactly do we discuss goals if there is nothing to judge against whether the goal has been met beyond opinion? — Dan

Where's the problem here, it's a matter of agreement, and agreement forms convention. Has a particular goal been met? If we agree, then the conclusion is accepted and we move on. If not then we decide what else needs to be accomplished, we do that and then we agree. If there is disagreement about what needs to be accomplished, then we might look into the possibility of an "objective truth" on the matter. Why is this difficult for you to understand?

I did consider that and in fact wrote all of those assumptions out in full. My post is seven pages long and details all possibilities surrounding this. If you don't think so, perhaps on the basis of reading it, then that's just your opinion and it isn't true for me. — Dan

I agree with you, "subjective truth" is very difficult to wrap one's head around. You asked me what I believe in, and I did not answer you. I told you that the choices are two, God or "subjective truth".

I want to get a clear indication from you, as to what the premise are for our procedure, which is to analyze your theory. We need to take one approach or the other. I have no problem to choose "objective truth", "God", along with a shit load of baggage which weighs us down like a ball and chain, but I also have no problem to choose "subjective truth", which frees one of all that baggage, but also makes morality extremely difficult to understand. I do have a problem with any attempt to combine these two incompatible perspectives because that produces incoherency.