Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.

Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1. — Bob Ross

I still do not see how this description of "intrinsic value" makes any sense. You seem to be saying that there are some things in the world, which demand of people, that the people want them, and they want them simply for the sake of having the thing, itself, and not for anything else. But doesn't this really just say something about people in general, that people exist in such a way that there are specific types of things which they will want, simply for the sake of having that thing.

Notice, that I say "specific types of things" that people want, but you portray particular things as having this intrinsic value, rather than types. If it is a type of thing which is valued in this way, then the value is not really intrinsic to the things themselves, but it is attributable to the type.

So take food for example, as such a type. Food appears to be valued for its own sake. This type of thing is inherently good. But what is the case, is that we make a category of things judged as good to eat, we name this category "food", and then we judge which things ought and ought not be placed in this category. So "good" is a defining feature of the category, and its definition is based on what is needed by the human being, it is not based on what is intrinsic to any particular thing.


We might say that nutrition is a good which is intrinsic to particular things, but it is only classed as "nutrition:, or "good", based on how it is received by human beings. It appears like the good is intrinsic to the thing, but it is really only "good" in its relation to humans. These chemical compounds are ones needed by humans. Isn't this very similar to pleasure and pain? These two are categories, one of good feelings, the other bad feelings. They are types of feelings, the good type and the bad type. Then particular instances of feelings need to be judged as to whether they fit one category or the other. So they are really only good or bad as a result of their relation to the conscious mind which does the judging.

I would simply want to speak about what is correctly valued as opposed to what is incorrectly valued; or what is rightly done for its own sake as opposed to what is wrongly done for its own sake; or what is the highest good/end as opposed to what appears to be the highest good/end.

* This last sentence seems to represent Aristotle's thought. Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, and others go beyond Aristotle in this, but Aristotle's position is careful and easily defensible. He does not commit himself to goodness simpliciter in any substantial sense. — Leontiskos

Yes, I think Aristotle was the first to distinguish between the apparent good, and the real good. Aquinas followed him on this distinction, and I believe Augustine did too, to a large degree. Plato was more vague on his notion of "the good".
.

I don't agree with the use of random here. Stochastic phenomena are just simply not precise (this is the word I was looking for) as an analysis. Commonly, (and I say erroneously) it is the precision upon which we judge whether something is random, or in the case of Heisenberg, uncertain. But to further judge a phenomena as undetermined is really troubling. — L'éléphant

I agree with this. The appearance of randomness is created by the system which analyzes, it is not a feature of the thing being analyzed. That the analyzing system does not apprehend the patterns being searched for and produces the conclusion of "random", is an indication that the system is not properly formulated for the application it is put to.

You have a very strange way of reading 180 Proof. Did bert1 say that "capacity" = "structure and function"? That's an odd interpretation, to assume that a capacity is a structure or function.

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it. But Aristotle and Aquinas immediately address the most obvious objection, namely that different people are made happy by different things (↪Leontiskos).

Here is how Aquinas puts the quandary:

So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above. But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.
— Thomas Aquinas — Leontiskos

Yes, this is a problem. If "last end" is defined as happiness, then we need a separate description of happiness or else the two words just become representative of each other. Then "happiness" means "last end", and "last end" means "happiness", and all we have is a vicious circle.

So if we look at the broader context, to get an understanding of exactly what happiness is, we see that it is something which is produced in a variety of different ways for the various different people. This appearance of a multitude of differences prevents that mode of inquiry from proceeding, and we are forced to look back at the more general, to find a description with a more universal application, instead of referring directly to all the specific differences.

Notice that Aquinas mentions "the fulfilment of their perfection". Developed from Aristotelian principles, the goal of "perfection" becomes the last end for Aquinas. Every existing thing, by the nature of its very own form, has a perfection which is proper to it, and it alone. So that is what could bring a person true happiness, the perfection of one's very own form, the unique form which is proper to oneself, and this becomes the last end, the goal of each individual.

So this defines "happiness" in "perfection", and leads us toward the need to understand this concept, "perfection" which is revealed as a sort of ideal form.

But math itself does not refer. — fishfry

Math is a field of study, it's not a symbol, sign, or even a group of such, so it's not used to refer to anything. But that's irrelevant. So this discussion is useless from the start

In the evolution of thought, people are going to decide math is wrong because it doesn't actually refer to anything? I thought that was a feature. — fishfry

In practise the math always refers to something. In theory it is designed to be applicable to a very wide range of circumstances. When the theory is not being used to refer to anything, it sits idle. So it only "doesn't actually refer to anything" if it never gets used, in reality it refers an endless number of things.

From what I can see, the Lounge is now the best part of this site. — fishfry

It is a pretty cool place to hang out, lots of activity down there. And they call it The Lounge. Now that's a misnomer.

Law of identity, that each thing is identical with itself, isn't actually math, but general philosophy. So I guess the law of identity is simply a=a or 1=1. Yet math it's actually crucial to compare mathematical objects to other (or all other) mathematical objects. Hence defining a set "ssu" by saying "ssu" = "ssu" doesn't say much if anything. Hence the usual equations c=a+b. — ssu

This is the crucial point, which I'd like to bring to your attention. The law of identity is an ontological principle which deals which "objects" as we meet them in our daily lives, all the different objects which we sense around us, and it forms a defining principle of what it means to be an object. It is meant to recognize the reality of these objects, in the face of skepticism, and offer guidance as to the type of existence which they have. It is probably the most universal of general principles, applying to all the different types of objects that we might possibly encounter.

On the other hand, supposed "mathematical objects" are distinctly different, and the law of identity does not apply. Now we might simply consider that the so-called mathematical objects are not even objects, therefore they don't have any identity as such, and they are really just thoughts and ideas. That seems like a reasonable approach. However, some people want to compose a special type of "identity", specifically designed for these thoughts and ideas, and through reference to this special type of identity they argue that these thoughts and ideas actually are a special type of object, mathematical objects.

However, it ought to be clear to you, that this is just smoke and mirrors sophistry. The special type of identity is formulated for the special purpose of creating the illusion that these thoughts and ideas are a type of object. But it is actually impossible that these ideas are a type of object because the law of identity applies to all types of objects which we might possibly encounter, and this supposed special type of object requires a distinct form of identity which is incompatible with the law of identity.

It's like comparing what in Physics is work and what in economics / sociology is work. The definitions are totally different. — ssu

I don't think that's true true, "work" in physics is consistent with "work" in economics/sociology, physics is simply a broader sense, and "work" in sociology is narrowed down to work is done by human beings.

In the case of "identity" in mathematics, it is inconsistent with, (in violation of), "identity" in the law of identity.

Suppose I owe a creditor a certain amount of money, and ask them, "I have record of my balance as being 582 dollars plus 37 dollars. Do you have the same number?" They say, "Yes, your balance is 619 dollars and 0 cents." It would be ridiculous for me to say, "No! 582 plus 37 is not the same number as 619.00!" — TonesInDeepFreeze

Obviously, you do not understand the law of identity. By the law of identity, the symbols printed here, 582, are distinctly different from the symbols printed over here, 582. Although they appear very similar there is a different position, context, etc., so it is very clear that this is not two instances of one and the same thing, 582. By the law of identity two separate occurrences of the printed symbols, are not the same thing, they are two similar things. Under the conditions of the law of identity we cannot say that 582 printed here is the same thing as, or has the same identity as, 582 printed here.

Therefore I recommend that any wise person would completely disregard the following statement, as coming from the mind of someone who does not know what they are talking about.

The law of identity is a philosophical principle.

It is adopted in mathematics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Your thesis is that someday, Internet archeologists are going to discover this thread and go, "My God, math is wrong!" — fishfry

It's actually an ongoing process, the evolution of thought. Look at Russel's paradox for example.

Even if the discussion has moved on, I'll just point out this, what identity in math is and why math does deal with identity:

In mathematics, an identity is an equality relating one mathematical expression A to another mathematical expression B, such that A and B (which might contain some variables) produce the same value for all values of the variables within a certain range of validity.[1] In other words, A = B is an identity if A and B define the same functions, and an identity is an equality between functions that are differently defined. — ssu

All right, you just confirmed what I thought. "Identity" in mathematics is equality. That clearly violates the law of identity. The law of identity allows that identity is a relation between a thing and itself, so there is only one thing involved. Equality on the other hand allows that two distinct things may be equal to each other. So unless you can provide this distinction between equality and identity, or else show that to be equal necessarily means to be one and the same thing, in set theory, then you ought to accept this violation. And, as I mentioned already, we know that the latter cannot be done, because set theory allows that two sets with the same elements in different orders are equal. Therefore I think we ought to just conclude that "identity" in mathematics is a violation of the law of identity. Agree?

You just described your own posting style. — fishfry

That's very observant of you fishfry. Generally speaking, one's language use is a reflection of the conventions and habits which the society has immersed that person in. I like to seek, determine, and then exaggerate within my own usage, the various ambiguities, misleading implications, false representations, and overall misgivings of deceptive habits and conventions which permeate our communications, thereby laying them bare, exposed for the world to see, so that perhaps, at some point in time, the general population will start to realize that something needs to be done about this situation. Wayfarer knows me as the obfuscator.

Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. — Philosophim

This is a fair proposal. It bases value in existence, allowing for "intrinsic value" by the very fact that a thing's existence is intrinsic to it. The problem now would be how to scale different values. By what principles would you say that one type of existence is higher or lower than another type of existence?

My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake: — Bob Ross

Since value is relative, in the way I described, your discussion of "intrinsic value" doesn't make any sense. It's an oxymoron. Things like pain and pleasure do not have value, they would be better described as "invaluable", meaning beyond valuation, or impossible to value.

Do you see that "value" implies the ability to scale the worth of a thing relative to the worth of other things? The idea that things have "intrinsic value" would negate the idea that the thing's value is determined by the scale of worth. So this, "intrinsic value" cannot be "value" as we know it.

You are trying to overload the word with metaphysical baggage that it simply does not have in math. — fishfry

What I've argued is that this use of "same", is not consistent with "same" as defined by the law of identity. And if this sense of "same" is claimed to be constitutive of "identity", as Tones argues, then this is a violation of the law of identity. If this is what you want to call "metaphysical baggage", that's ok with me. There are many words with similar forms of "metaphysical baggage". The use of a specific word in one field may contradict its use in another field, and it only becomes a problem if people start to believe that the two uses are consistent with one another.

They are NOT implying any kind of metaphysical baggage for the word "same." If pressed, they'd retreat to the formal syntax. — fishfry

You may want to take this up with Tones, and his notion of "identity theory", which obviously is a kind of metaphysical baggage.

Make sense? You are using "same" with metaphysical meaning. Set theorists use "same" as a casual shorthand for the condition expressed by the axiom of extensionality. It's a synonym by definition. The set theorist's "same" is a casual synonym; your "same" is some kind of ontological commitment. So all this is just confusion about two different meanings of the same word. — fishfry

That completely makes sense. However, not every mathematician is as reasonable as you are. If you look at what TonesoffTheDeepEnd is writing here, you'll see great effort to support some kind of formal identity theory. That is not a "casual shorthand for the condition expressed by the axiom of extensionality".

Also, meta: This thread, "Infinity," is active, and I keep getting mentions for it and replying. But this thread does not show up in my front-page feed! Anyone seeing this or know what's going on? — fishfry

What has happened is that there was a new policy initiated which was to relegate a whole lot of these rambling, bickering, blah. blah, blah, type of threads to The Lounge. And threads in The Lounge don't show on the front page. You'll find The Lounge in the list of Categories on the left side of the front page.

What do you think identity in mathematics / set theory is? — ssu

I don't think mathematics/set theory deals with identity at all. I think that identity is an ontological principle defined by the law of identity. Mathematics deals with equality, which is distinct from identity. Some people on this forum have argued against this, claiming that there is an identity within set theory. But then they only seem to be able to argue that "equal" means "the same", when clearly this is false.

So I think then the question for you, Metaphysician Undercover, is how is the identity different between two sets that have the same elements? — ssu

Having the same elements does not mean being the same as. Having a different order for example would make two sets with the same elements not "the same" by the law of identity which indicates that a thing is the same as itself only. So, even identifying them as "two sets" indicates that they have a different identity.

Because you say "to read the axiom of extensionality as indicating identity rather than as indicating equality is a misinterpretation", it seems that you think this is different. A lay person would think that a set defined by it's elements. — ssu

Yes, identity is very different from equal. By the law of identity, we only call it "the same" if it is one and the same thing. The computer I typed on this morning is the same computer as the one I type on now. Two equal things are not necessarily the same. There were other computers at the store which are equal to mine but each one of them is different, i.e. not the same computer as the one I brought home. I think a lay person would agree with that.

And please just look how identity is defined in mathematics, and you'll notice what fishfry is talking about. — ssu

If you can find that definition for me, I'll take a look. Then we can discuss whether "identity" in mathematics is consistent with the law of identity.

I'm pretty sure I never said that, but if I did, please supply a reference to my quote. — fishfry

My apologies, for misrepresenting what we argued about. I thought you argued that the axiom of extensionality indicated identity.

Goodness is identical to ‘having value’... — Bob Ross

The problem with this perspective can be found through reference to Aristotle, as the others have indicated. "Value" is relative, and it is determined in relation to a further end. So if something has value, it is apprehended as the means to an end. You go to work for the sake of earning money, for the sake of buying things, for the sake of this or that want, or need, etc., etc.. Aristotle noticed that this cannot go on as an infinite regress so he said that there must be an ultimate end. Therefore he proposed happiness as that ultimate end, which is desired only for the sake of itself.

To explain the problem now, the relative values, as means to ends, are validated in relation to the ends which they are needed for. Without the end which a thing is given value for, as the means to that end, the thing on its own cannot be said to have any value. Its value exists only in relation to the end which it is useful for. The ultimate end, proposed as happiness, has no such thing which it is useful for, or else it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore it cannot be validated as a value. If it has nothing which it is useful toward, it cannot have any value. So if goodness is defined in reference to the end, instead of the means, it must be defined by something other than "value", because value is what defines the means.

...nobody really knows what entropy really is so he will have the advantage in winning any arguments that might occur... — Wayfarer

This provides a good representation of this thread. Use a term with sufficient ambiguity, "information" in this case, so that the unintelligible is adequately hidden within what is proposed as intelligible, and it will appear like you are saying something intelligent. The majority of people are fooled by appearances.

They are bad, and when you pull up the floorboards, they aren't even sensible. — AmadeusD

Are you implying that one has to "pull up the floorboards" to access the plumbing? Can't we just go into the basement?

But for what it's worth, the symbol string "same" has no meaning in ZF. — fishfry

"Same" has a meaning in the law of identity. So when you say that the axiom of extensionality is a statement of "identity", you are employing the concept of "same", where it does not belong. "Same" is implied by "identity". That's why I argued that to interpret the axiom of extensionality in this way, as a statement of identity, is a faulty interpretation.

You're adding things that aren't in the game. — fishfry

Actually, it is you who is adding things that aren't in the game, with your faulty interpretation. You are adding "identity", when the law of extensionality is really a definition of "equal". As I've been telling you, equality and identity are not the same concept. This is because "identity" implies "the same" whereas "equal" does not. So, we can have two different things which are equal, but two different things cannot have the same identity.

Therefore it is incorrect to interpret the axiom of extensionality, which is clearly an expression of equality, as an expression of identity. To interpret as a statement of identity is to add something which is not in the game, sameness, when the statement really concerns equality instead, which does not imply "same".

"Subject" is a complicated word. I believe that the meaning of "subject" in the sense of referring to a person, is derived from the ruler-subject relation in which "the subject" is under the dominion of the ruler. Since the activities of "the subject" here are subject to the will of the ruler, this does not provide a good base for understanding the human person as a conscious, free willing agent.

So "conscious subject" is full of hidden implications, the principle one being the physicalist idea that the person's actions, and perceptual apprehension of the world in general, are simply a response, or reaction to the world, as the person is subjected to one's environment. That is the determinist perspective, which commonly inheres within the notion of "subject". This is the alternative to representing the person and the person's perceptual apparatus as acting agent.

Their thoughts, unlike yours and mine, had powers enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude.

I would say, it's not the power of one's own thoughts which is the subject here, but the power of the divinity which the contemplative mind comes into contact with. Since the divinity is a real "other" for that mind, to portray this as solitude is a false representation.

@fishfry
From that wiki page:

"or in words:

Given any set A and any set B, if for every set X, X is a member of A if and only if X is a member of B, then A is equal to B."

I see the phrase "A is equal to B", but where does it indicate that A is the same as B?

Ha, ha, very funny.

So I'll go back to a point I made earlier, that even if she is wrong about what Descartes said, she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

I take it that no one wants to address the issue of the philosopher's (whether the philosopher is a solitary white man or not) relationship with the divine. It appears to me like the issue is not the hegemony of any particular human being, but that of the divinity which some appear to establish a relationship with.

To exist is one thing, and Berkeley gives me no reason for supposing that existence of anything depends on being perceived or judged to exist. I can make some sense of the idea that anything that exists is capable of being perceived - especially if indirect perception is allowed. — Ludwig V

To "exist" is not well defined, and we tend to use it in whatever way we find suitable for the occasion.

Berkeley is no doubt relying on his argument against abstract objects. It supplies a way of accommodating abstract objects in his system, but is not obviously effective in the absence of his axiom. But his introduction of the notion of "notions" undermines his slogan, since he accepts the existence of my own mind and other minds, and God, even though they are not (directly) perceived. It is clear that he accepts that they are not (directly) perceived, because he introduces notions to get around the problem that my ideas do not themselves include the idea of myself. It's the same objection that was raised against the cogito. — Ludwig V

I agree, it is likely that a thorough analysis would reveal that minds don't actually "exist" if we adhere to Berkeley's principles. That is the problem I referred to earlier, which inclines me to think that we need to bring matter in, through the back door. He provides no principles to provide a separation between one mind and another, or a human mind from God's mind. If we want to conceive of separate minds we need something (like matter) to separate them. Having distinct and separate ideas, in itself, does not suffice because something needs to separate the ideas, one from another.

One of Berkeley's principles is "esse" is "percipi aut percipere", which, on the face of it and in fact, is false. He seems to treat this as a axiom, so I don't know why he believed it. — Ludwig V

I don't understand why you would say this. How can you conclude that the principle is false? To be, or as you state it, "esse", is to be something, and that means to have been judged as having a whatness, or "what it is". This, "what it is", is a judgement based on perception. You cannot dissociate the whatness from the judgement, to give a thing an independent whatness, or "esse", because the whatness. "what it is", is a product of the judgement.

The point was the reality of our communion with the divine. It shows that Midgley's representation ("Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system") is a strawman. Philosophers, in general, do not represent an individual's consciousness as a closed system.

But the true way to understand that the individual consciousness is not a closed system, is through one's internal communion with the divine (like Socrates' daimon), not to apprehend the connection as an external relationship with other consciousnesses. The external relations, with the misgivings of lies, deception, disappointments, and the general failures of communication with others, only reinforces the feeling of isolation. Yet the internal relation with the divine remains the most true and honest, allowing for one to really "break free" from isolation.

Nature of the Higher Realm: Plato describes a transcendent realm that is "colourless, utterly formless, intangible" and accessible only to true knowledge (epistēmē). This description emphasizes the abstract and non-physical nature of the One beyond being and non-being. In this metaphysical domain, the only faculty capable of perceiving this is reason (nous). Plato often characterises reason as the pilot or charioteer of the soul, guiding it towards true knowledge. This underscores the idea that reason, rather than sensory perception, is what allows the soul to apprehend the true nature of reality. — Wayfarer

The logic of "being and non-being", represents the discrete nature of the reality of "now". At each moment as time passes, there is a true representation of what is and what is not at that precise moment. Since this is a static form, a true "what is" at each precise moment in time, it transcends the sensory realm of what we know as the physical world. Sensory perception gives us a projection of continuous activity, rather than discrete moments of "what is". It is only reason which can lead us beyond the illusion of temporal continuity which our material bodies present our conscious minds with, through the unreliable, and deceptive, sense organs.

This is the way out of Plato's cave. If you study Augustine, you'll see that he takes up this position very strongly. The importance of "the free will", is the strength of will power. The free will allows us to separate ourselves from the temporal world of sensory diversions, to focus on the eternal principles, "being and non-being", and the true nature of reality.

Yes, that's exactly how Berkeley presents his argument - officially - and why he thinks he can maintain that he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists. (Notice how ambiguous that is - he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists, but then he doesn't think that matter exists.)
His book was met with widespread ridicule, as the anecdote about Dr. Johnson illustrates. Another illustration of that ridicule is the name given to his doctrine ("immaterialism"). In case you hadn't noticed, it is a pun. His text is full of references to philosophical ideas being laughed at.
I don't know whether he didn't really know what he thought or he was upset by all the ridicule, he equivocates, oscillating between presenting his immaterialism as common sense (especially in the Dialogues and as a technical dispute within philosophy and between presenting his doctrine as a revolution in thought and as requiring no significant changes at all. — Ludwig V

What Berkeley did was ridicule the common notion of "matter", and this invited a reciprocation of the ridicule. The difference is that Bishop Berkeley's ridicule of the common notion of "matter" was well formulated and based in solid principles, whereas the reciprocated ridicule was more like a knee-jerk reaction.

Notice, that "matter" represents the temporal continuity of existence (as you say, what persists through change) and this is presented to us through sense perception. Isaac Newton had represented matter as having the property of inertia, and his first law takes inertia for granted. But Newton had said that this law is really dependent on the Will of God. Bishop Berkeley merely emphasizes this point.

Now, when Hume removes God, and portrays temporal continuity as something produced within human intuition, by representing sense perceptions as distinct instances, discrete impressions, instead of portraying the sense organs as providing us with continuous activity, he makes a false description. So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises.

There was a general realisation that doubt cannot be the whole of philosophical method. — Banno

Does Midgley address the philosopher's appeal to God?

.Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system... — ENOAH

Through the mystical method, philosophers often claim to have union with a divine source. Unlike Moses and "the burning bush" portrayal, the mystic's communion with the divinity is internal. Consider Socrates and his "daimon" for example. The common form is "prayer".

Yes. But, for me, the unintelligibility of matter is not a conclusion, but a problem. If you were to present this conclusion to Berkeley, he would conclude that matter didn't exist, and I would not be able to explain why he is wrong. — Ludwig V

I can tell you why matter doesn't exist, in a very simple and straight forward way. "Matter" is an Aristotelian concept, and the conceptual structure is arranged so that the form of a thing is what has existence. Matter, as the potential of a thing, simply does not exist, and that's why it's so easy for Berkeley to argue this, and why it seems to make logical sense, what he argues, even though intuitively we would expect otherwise. So it's really not a matter of "why he is wrong", he's not wrong. The real question is why do our intuitions lead us toward believing that he must be wrong. And the answer to this, is that we've grown up being exposed to a common usage of "matter", which propagates a faulty intuition. The faulty intuition is that matter inheres within the independent thing, supporting its unperceived (independent) existence. The intuition if faulty because "matter" is really just a concept, used to account for the apparent persistence or continuity of the object, while the true nature of the supposed persistence and continuity of the object is really an unknown. So "matter" is not something inhering within the object, as our basic education leads us to believe, it is just a concept used to stand in for this unknown aspect of the object.

From this perspective, the unintelligibility of matter is not a problem but rather a solution to a problem. The problem is that the human intellect is not omniscient, it is deficient and lacking in the capacity to understand the complete reality, especially what is commonly represented as the continuous existence of the separate, or independent object. That there is an unintelligible aspect of reality, in itself, is only a problem to the philosophically minded, who have a desire to know the complete reality. But this mindset, this desire to know, pervades through all the sciences as they work to probe the unknown, and attempt to expand the overall body of knowledge. To be integrated into the body of knowledge, the new knowledge must be made consistent with the existing body. The unintelligible lurks as that which cannot be made consistent.

There are two distinct approaches to the unintelligible. The simple approach is to hide the unintelligible within the knowledge, as vagueness, ambiguity, rendering a knowledge which has a level of certainty that is compromised overall. This is the approach of "formalism". It dismisses the importance of content (subject matter, which is the unintelligible), but in doing this it allows the unintelligible content to inhere within the form. This compromises the resulting knowledge because the unintelligible permeates the entirety and there are no principles to distinguish the intelligible aspects from the unintelligible, allowing fallibility into the whole body of knowledge. The solution to this problem is to provide a clear separation of the form (as intelligible) from the content (as unintelligible matter), right from the outset. This leaves an outlined realm of "the unintelligible" as distinct and separate from the body of "the intelligible", as knowledge, allowing for the process of skepticism to analyze "the intelligible", the existing body of knowledge, in a way which would determine why this existing body of knowledge renders specific aspects of reality as incompatible, unintelligible. That is why designating matter as "the unintelligible" is really not a problem but a solution to the problem.

I'm sure you know about the controversy about Hume's atheism. I don't think there is a determinate answer about what he "really" believed. But the Enquiry is perfectly clear. He rejects rational arguments for God's existence and Christianity, but believes in them on faith, which he acknowledges is a miracle. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. Hume does not allow "God" as a principle or premise for any logical proceedings, he would dismiss this as unsound. Therefore he would not be able to accept Berkeley's use of God to support the continued existence of objects when not being perceived by a human being. So, he turns things around (whether intentionally or not is irrelevant), as I tried to explain. The continuous existence of objects is not taken for granted by Hume as it is by Berkeley.

Berkeley portrays perception as the sensation of continuously existing objects, and God supports that continuity when humans aren't looking. So continuity is inherent within perception. But for Hume, perception consists of instances, distinct impressions, which he makes compatible with distinct ideas. This puts continuity as something which happens between distinct perceptual impressions. So continuity becomes a big problem for Hume. How does a perceptual impression at one moment link up, or connect to an impression at another moment? It is not reason which does this associating, because the rational mind works with distinct ideas, and the relating of them, one to another. The relating of sense impressions is a sort of natural, intuitive process which is not an act of reason. This is why he classes all the aspects of temporal continuity, induction and causation, as something other than reason.

What I said earlier though, is that Hume has this wrong, because sense perception really consists of the perception of activity, which in itself is a representation of temporal continuity. So really Berkeley's representation of sensation as continuously existing objects, therefore active and changing objects is a more true representation. Then the real problem, or breakdown, is between the reasoning mind which deals with distinct ideas, and sense perception which gives us continuity. Hume's representation, which makes sensation consist of distinct perceptions, in order to establish consistency between the mind's distinct ideas, and sense perception, is a false premise, designed to bridge this problem, this breakdown between the mind and the senses.

I didn't express myself clearly. There are ordinary uses of "appear" and "real" that are perfectly in order. The stick in water appears to be bent, but isn't "really". — Ludwig V

This is exactly the point. That the stick really isn't bent needs to be supported with principles. Now we are into logic, premises like refraction, etc., and sense perception is relegated to being unreliable. So we have no grounds to accept that what sense perception gives us is in any way "real", it is unreliable. And the skeptic is completely justified.

But when we posit a world of "appearances" (or "experiences") that exist independently of the entities that they are appearances of, we are seriously mistaken. — Ludwig V

Why would you say this? The "appearances" are what sense perception provides to the mind. The mind determines that these appearances are often faulty and misleading, like the bent stick example. If the mind can prove that the appearances are sometimes faulty and misleading, then why not accept the possibility that the appearances are always faulty and misleading? The appearances are a creation of the human body, it creates them with its nervous system, and they are a form of representation. Consider other forms of representation now, like language, signs and symbols. The signs and symbols are created in a completely different context from when they are later applied. So there is no reason not to think that the appearances (like signs and symbols) exist within a realm (the mind) which is independent from the things which it applies them to. Consider dreaming for example, the mind has a whole arsenal of images (appearances) which are independent, and which it can apply.

I'm afraid I'm not quite on board with this. It makes sense on its own terms. I thought matter was posited to account for things persisting through change, and that in any case, for Aristotle, if not others, the object of perception of things is their form (or maybe perceptible form?). But I don't recognize Berkeley here.
For Berkeley, the mind-independent existence of anything is ruled out by "esse" is "percipi". That principle is why he rules out matter as not merely unnecessary but impossible. — Ludwig V

I find this to be a bit scrambled but I'll see what I can do to sort it out with my understanding of Berkeley. First, I do not think that Berkeley could, even if he tried, prove that matter is impossible. The materialist, he explains, assumes" matter" to account for the continued existence of bodies when not being perceived. This is 'the need' for "matter". Berkely avoids this need with the assumption of God. Instead of being material, bodies can exist independently of human minds, as ideas, by being in the mind of God.

I believe that the notion of mind-independence is a bit misleading when interpreting Berkeley. Things not apprehended by my mind, may still exist independently of my mind, if they are apprehended by your mind or someone else's, as you acknowledge. So things not apprehended by any human mind might still be apprehended by God's mind. All things are mind dependent as things, and this makes "matter" in the sense described, completely unnecessary. It doesn't prove that "matter" is impossible, and I can show you how matter must be allowed, in through the back door.

Berkeley allows that separate people have separate minds, and God's mind is separate from human minds. But I do not think that he adequately addresses the issue of what provides for the separation between one mind and another. So we need a concept like "matter" to provide for the separation between minds.

As for Aristotle's concept of matter, it is primarily defined in his physics, as you say, as what persists through change. However, since the form of the thing is what actually changes, then the matter is said to provide the potential for change. That's how matter escapes the law of excluded middle, as potential, what neither is nor is not. And this is why it is the aspect of the world which is unintelligible to us. So the supposed underlying aspect of a thing which persists through change, matter, is completely unintelligible to us.

Not sure who "he" is here. But Berkeley certainly dispenses with matter altogether. It has no place in his world. God supplies all that is needed to explain our sensations of things, and explains change. I'm not sure whether his concept of ideas matches the idea of forms, but it certainly seems possible. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree Berkeley dispenses with matter, as unnecessary, but not as disproven. And, as I explained above, his way of dispensing of it leaves a hole in our understanding of reality, what separates one mind from another mind, and human minds from God's mind. So he leaves the back door open, for matter to take on a new position in his form of idealism. Therefore dualism is not avoided.

I'm not sure about this at all. I agree that, for Hume, relations between ideas are created (by association) in our minds. I found him curiously silent on Berkeley's issue. I have the impression that the existence of external, mind-independent objects is not explicitly ruled out. My speculation is the Hume did not want to get caught up in Berkeley. — Ludwig V

I believe the principal difference between Hume and Berkeley is that Hume didn't believe in God. This is why he turned things around, as I described. He had to put sensations, sense impressions, as prior to ideas, because the independent things could not be conceived of as existing as ideas. Ideas are derived from sense impressions, so that there is a sort of separation between these two, whereas Berkeley saw no need to make such a distinction.

Well, "reject" is perhaps too strong and too simple. How could I not recognize the difference between appearance and reality? Whether it is consistent with how I experience things is one issue.
But our senses tell us about the world we live in, so long as we are suitably critical of what they seem to be telling us. Somehow they have become a VR headset which is an obstacle to our knowing that the world is "really" like and probably feeding us nothing but lies. It's a fantasy and the granddaddy of conspiracy theories. (OK, that's a caricature. It's only meant to show the direction of travel.) — Ludwig V

This is where we completely differ. How can you possibly distinguish between appearance and reality? Once you accept that there is such a distinction to be made, you plunge yourself into a quagmire because you need to provide principles by which you would distinguish between the two. But anything produced would be a principle, and not something sensed. So being "suitably critical" of what our senses tell us really means nothing more than being skeptical. And I guess you might describe the skeptical position as "the senses are feeding us nothing but lies", but really it's just that they don't show us the way reality truly is. And I believe science has already proven this, so where's the big problem with skepticism?

I'm wondering how Berkeley might distinguish between an idea having a cause "that is not me" and an idea having a cause that is me, but of a sort of causality that Berkley doesn't understand. — wonderer1

This is the issue I refer to above, the separation between one mind and another mind, between human minds and God's mind. Berkeley provides no good principles to account for this separation, and that allows us to bring "matter" in through the back door, as that which separates individual minds, and keeps a distinction between God's mind and human minds.

Perhaps mess and muddle is an inescapable part of human life? And then, the attempt to escape also becomes an inescapable part of human life. Perhaps the best thing to do is to embrace mess and muddle - but then, what would become of philosophy? — Ludwig V

I think philosophy is the embracing of mess and muddle.

Well, the first half of that is a bit unorthodox. — Ludwig V

Notice, that for Berkeley "matter" is presented as a concept which would commonly be used to account for the supposed independent existence of the things (noumena). However, he shows that "matter" is really an unnecessary supposition, it is not actually required to be assumed as part of the independent thing to understand its independent existence. This implies that "matter" is actually a concept use to account for the sense appearance of things (phenomena).

Look at it like this. He shows that if we take "matter" out of the thing, we lose nothing from our conceptions of independent things. That is because our conceptions are formal (in the Aristotelian sense of form). Nevertheless, regardless of what Berkeley shows, we find that "matter" is indispensable to the understanding of our sensations of things. This is because we sense things as active, changing, and Aristotle introduced "matter" as the means for understanding the potential for change.

Incidentally, Hume seems to reverse this perspective in his critique of skepticism. He represents sense perception as consisting of instances of changeless states of being, with activity or change being inferred as what occurs between these describable instances or states of sensation. If this is reality, then the forms of things are what we perceive through sensation, and "matter" is added by the mind to account for what happens to the independent things between these instances of sensation.

In each case, "matter" maintains its Aristotelian base as the potential for change, and the unintelligible aspect of reality. Berkeley, like Kant (with space and time) positions matter as something a priori, created within the human body or mind, as a necessary condition for sense perception, but not necessary for the independent existence of things. Hume turns this around and leaves matter as an a posteriori concept created by the mind in order to understand the independent existence of things which are sensed, rather than as necessary for the sense appearance of things. This he does in his effort to quell skepticism. But Hume misrepresents sensation as consisting of instances, or states of being, rather than consisting of continuous activity. So Hume's attack on skepticism is supported by falsity.

Perhaps so. However, I've always thought that Kant essentially accepts Berkeley, especially his argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities doesn't hold up, so that time and space are mind-dependent, as well as colour, etc. Including matter in that argument makes sense. Once you have accepted the distinction between reality and appearance, ideas and things, phenomena and noumena, that conclusion is more or less inevitable. The only way out is to reject, or at least recast, the distinction. — Ludwig V

Why reject it though, when it seems to be completely consistent with how I experience things? Time and space are not the properties of any things, nor are they in any way a part of the form of a thing, they are the basis for the conceptual tools by which we understand the activities of things. And what we sense is these activities, while the mind distinguishes things, as aspects of the sensations which appear to maintain sameness. Whether this sameness, continuity, which appears within our sensations of activity, and is constitutive of being and existence, is real or not is the object of skepticism.

Only in that the visionary was not in charge of making policy during his lifetime and is not in charge of making policy after he's dead. I.e. never. — Vera Mont

The point though, is that another visionary just takes up the idea, and actually takes charge of enacting policy.

Certainly, but I cannot call them benevolent. — Vera Mont

That's just your subjective opinion.

Sorry I can't respect them all equally. — Vera Mont

I know you can't. You make the blanket generalization of assuming that those who have visions, but do not move toward bringing their visions to policy are "good", and those visionaries who move toward enacting the policies are evil. So be it, you've expressed your opinion.

Let me rephrase .. I hope we can have productive discussions elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

From how you've shown yourself in this thread I don't see that as likely. You need to actually address the things which another has said, and show your reasons for disagreement, instead of repeatedly asserting that the other's position is erroneous, absurd, etc., if you really want a productive discussion.

What she may be trying to express, though rather badly, is that philosophers, however transcendent their thought, ought not to disengage from the mess and muddle of ordinary human life. I think that's true and important. — Ludwig V

Yeah, and when philosophers disengage from ordinary human life, that's when their own lives become a real mess and muddle.

So Berkeley was wrong to think that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter? — Ludwig V

That's not what I' saying. There is a very fine line to understand here. I believe that Berkeley did not claim that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter, he showed that the concept of "matter" is not required to understand the reality of independent things. This puts "matter" in a peculiar position. It is required to understand sense observations, but not required to understand the reality of independent existence. Therefore we can infer that matter is a feature the human system which makes sense observations, just like Kant says space and time are.

I'm sure we'll have more productive exchanges elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

Another example of how you make faulty assertions. It seems like you have a tendency to claim that you are sure about things, when your professed certainty really has no foundation, or support of any kind.

Anybody can 'interpret' it, subsection it, misapply it, misdirect it any way they want. — Vera Mont

I don't see how this significantly differs from when the person is alive. The difference is that when the person is alive one might attempt to interfere and correct the interpreter. But in most cases, they do not bother unless the interpretation is seriously offensive.

Paul ran with an idea Jesus had and made a complete hash of it. Lenin did similarly with Marx. And poor old Rousseau did not fare any better at the hands of Robespierre. The ones who enact are not the visionaries and not usually benevolent and the 'influence' is not reflected very well in the actuality that ensues. — Vera Mont

All those mentioned, Paul, Lenin, and Robespierre, are visionaries in their own right. I don't see how the fact that one visionary makes use of the ideas of another, and may be argued to misinterpret the other, alters the fact that the visionaries are the ones who enact the policies. It just relegates the original to secondary, as i said about Plato. But since the supposed "original" visionary derives ideas from a previous source. the infinite regress you are setting up is just a distraction from the reality of the situation. That reality is, the truth of the matter which you refuse to respect, and that is that visionaries really do enact policies, and where they derive their ideas from is not relevant to this truth. The very thing which you assert that visionaries never do, "make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes", is actually impossible to do, if one is not a visionary. The non-visionaries are simple followers.

In case you wonder way I stray from the op, it's because, based on what I've read here, I totally agree that this is “trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into intellectual life". Therefore nothing more needs to be said.

I find the discussion on celibacy to be similar to old school thoughts on celibacy in male athletes. It was commonly thought that male athletes ought to practise celibacy to improve performance. That sort of nonsense has been thoroughly debunked and we could call it a "trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into [athletic] life".

Thanks for the overview of Aristotle. It does make sense overall, doesn't it?

Your version makes him seem much closer to Plato than some others that I have seen. — Ludwig V

What I find is that Plato provided a very thorough analysis of Pythagorean idealism. In doing this, he exposed its faults. Aristotle paid close attention to this, and took Plato as rejecting this form of idealism. The Neo-Platonists on the other hand seem to represent Plato as accepting Pythagorean idealism. That forms the principal difference between Aristotle's school and the Neo-Platonist school.

In numerous places, Aristotle criticized those who would represent Forms which were supposed to be incorporeal, with images that could not be conceived of, as other than corporeal. Aristotle insisted that the first principle, which is necessarily immaterial, must be truly immaterial. There's a section in Metaphysics for example, where he criticizes Pythagorean/Neo-Platonist ideas through an analysis of the different senses of "one", or "unity", showing how this conception cannot be derived from anything other than material principles, therefore cannot form a proper immaterial conception.

Ok? — Lionino

The point now, is that for Aristotle, "to subsist", therefore to be substance, is to have form. And, form does not require matter, so this validates the substantial existence of immaterial forms, i.e. the subsistence of immaterial forms. However, the separate, independent, subsistent forms reveal themselves to us, or are evident to us, through sensation, as material things, particulars, or individuals, and so there is the appearance that their substance is material.

But critical analysis of the intellectual experience shows that "matter" is something added by the sensing subject, a condition of the subject, not proper to the thing itself, in a similar way to how Kant describes space and time as added by the sensing subject. This necessitates dualism, because independent forms are real and subsistent, yet matter is also real as inherent within the intellectual, sentient being. This perspective just inverts the common notion of dualism which puts the immaterial as internal and the material as external. It puts the material as internal and the immaterial as external.

A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. Berkeley was wrong about many things, but about this, he was right. — Ludwig V

Consider what I wrote in reply to Lionino above. Physics, as science in general, can only know the forms of the world. And, as Berkeley demonstrated, there is no need to assume that there is any material aspect to the supposed independent world. This, it appears, ought to make physics capable of apprehending and comprehending the entirety of the independent world. However, there is a fundamental problem, science understands through sense observation, and sense observation instills "matter" into the phenomena. This produces what @Wayfarer likes to call the blind spot of science.

Not arbitrarily, but to fill in an oversight. I had neglected to point out earlier that people make national policy and religious doctrine while they are alive.
You eventually returned with a list of men who wrote books, that may later have influenced the thinking of men who made policy and revolution. None of the resulting policies and actions, AFAIK, yielded the outcome envisioned by the writers. — Vera Mont

I don't see how whether the ideas are adopted when the person is alive or dead is relevant to what we were talking about. You said: "Do these big-picture individuals attempt to communicate their vision? Of course they do. Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never."

Clearly, whether the social policy is enacted before or after the person is dead, is irrelevant to the question of whether these people are the ones who "make" the policies.

Not by contact with human minds. That is incoherent. — AmadeusD

Let me remind you, that it was your words, you, who said the good comes in contact with human minds. You said: "It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds."

I am having great difficulty trying to understand what you are saying. Now you are saying that what you said earlier is incoherent. What are you trying to say?

Good's are literally an invention of human minds. — AmadeusD

The issue is not whether goods are an invention of human minds, it is a question of whether these things, which you insist are created by human minds can transcend those minds.

Suppose for example, we name a concept "X", and we define X as a thing which transcends human minds. Clearly X must transcend human minds or else it is self-contradicting and incoherent, therefore not a concept. Since it is a very real possibility, and not contradictory at all, to propose such a concept, one which transcends human minds, then there is no logical basis for the rejection of such a proposition, the concept "X" which transcends human minds. Therefore regardless of whether the concept X is created by a human mind, it cannot be rejected on any principles of logic, and it must necessarily, by definition, transcend human minds.

It is very clear that what you are asserting is illogical. You claim that the supposed fact that human minds create goods, implies that goods cannot transcend human minds. This would mean that only a human mind could create a good. So here's another way that your position may be refuted. Your mind is not my mind. My mind creates its own goods, and your mind creates its own goods. My goods may transcend your mind, and your goods may transcend my mind. Unless you can prove that only a human mind could create a good, then we must allow that there could be goods which transcend all human minds, perhaps created by a mind which is not human. And clearly we have evidence of such goods. Birds build nests, and other animals make homes for themselves, so all these creatures produce their own goods, with their own minds, and these goods transcend all human minds.

And it simply means in scholastics "something that exists by itself", there is no problem conceiving something immaterial that exists by itself unless you are a close-minded physicalist. — Lionino

From Aristotle, "something that exists by itself", is commonly translated as "subsists", and this is understood as "having subsistence", therefore "exists by itself" is a predicate.

What's going on here is even weirder than that. Latin has a perfectly good equivalent for ousia, "being" in "esse". But somehow that got used for the Aristotle's phrase "en tôi ti esti" - literally "what it is to be". (Obviously, he can't find an actual Greek word for what he has in mind. His Metaphysics is riddled with his coinages.) — Ludwig V

"What it is to be", is the essence, or form of a thing. There's a very complex and difficult section of Aristotle's Metaphysics in which he explains how forms, or essences, must subsist. He does this through reference to "the good". It is impossible that the good itself is other than the form, or essence, of the good. And yet it is necessary that there is such a thing as the good. Therefore the good, must subsist, as a form or essence.

Further, he argues that all things, particulars, or individuals, must subsist, and each one's subsistence must be identical to its form or essence. For anyone who does not understand the concept of "matter" in Aristotle, this appears to leave no place for matter, because a thing itself is nothing other than its form, as indicated by the law of identity. However, matter as the potential for change. is understood as a general principle, and is therefore not properly a part of the thing itself.

They all may well have influenced people, even long after they were dead, but in their lifetime, they changed not one dot or iota of public policy or prevailing morality or general standards of behaviour. — Vera Mont

I think you are wrong, and these people did effect changes within their lifetimes. However that little disagreement is irrelevant because the condition of "in their lifetime" has been arbitrarily added by you anyway

You just ignored my question. You didn't do what was asked. — AmadeusD

I explained to you why your question was ridiculous and unanswerable because it was based on the false premise. You asked me to point to a good, when goods are not the type of things which can be pointed to. You, yourself, even affirmed that the premise of your question was false, later in your post when you, stated that a good doesn't come into contact with anything but a human mind. Therefore it was already clear to you that you were asking me a question which assumed a falsity, and your question was nothing but trickery.

And if you are thinking that because goods come into contact with human minds, they must come into contact with a human mind, to be a good, then this is faulty logic. That would imply that goods are only created through contact with human minds.

Examples of what I mean by things that aren’t immoral but you shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them include living your life in a drugged stupor like the lotus eaters of Greek mythology or someone who wants to do nothing in life but cover themselves in filth and watch Salo on repeat. — Captain Homicide

I think that any time you state a general rule such as "you shouldn't want to be the kind of person that does... (X)", this statement represents a moral judgement. Anything represented by (X) here is judged as bad in some way. Therefore it is a moral judgement, because to judge a type of activity as bad, is a moral judgement.

If, on the other hand, you were to state "I would not want to be the kind of person that does...(X)", in full respect that others may want to be the kind of person that does... (X), and there is no problem with that, then you simply state a matter of personal preference. It is when you say "you shouldn't want to...", imposing your personal preference upon others, that you turn the statement into a moral statement.

Could you give some examples of benevolent visionaries who made national policy or church doctrine? — Vera Mont

In ancient times we could begin with Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. And since these three were greatly influenced by Plato, we could designate him as having a secondary role. In more modern times we might consider philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and even Marx.

I understand that you are refusing to engage with what you have obviously understood: — AmadeusD

Sorry Amadeus, I have no idea what your talking about. All you have done is made incorrect assertions. First you said that my supposition is erroneous, so I corrected you on that. It is not erroneous, but debatable, as suppositions often are. Now you are simply asserting that my position makes not sense.

Well, of course my position makes no sense to you. You dismiss my supposition as erroneous, without bothering to debate it. So be it, continue to live in your narrow-minded world.

Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never. — Vera Mont

Never say "never". You appear to be not well educated in the history of humanity.

'Supposed' is the operative word here. And that supposition is erroneous. Point to the Good, sans human interaction? — AmadeusD

That is correct, "supposed" is the operative word here, and its selection was deliberate. However, whether or not the supposition is erroneous is debatable, that's why I used that term rather than "known" or something like that. Therefore the mistake is yours, to assert that the supposition is erroneous, when the truth or falsity of it is unknown.

You ask a very ridiculous question, point to something without interacting with it. To sense it, thereby point to it, requires interaction, so I dismiss your question as nonsense. The way that we come to know that the supposition of an independent "good" is a requirement, necessary, is a logical process. The independent good is not something sensed, whereby we might point to it, it is determined to be real through logical necessity.

It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds. — AmadeusD

See, you even knew that the good is not something which could be pointed to. Therefore I am justified in dismissing your question as an act of deception, and you, as the fool who thought that they could get away with such an obvious deception.