But, of course, in order to establish that one has to persuade people that the phenomena (appearances, ideas, impressions, sense-data) are not a veil between us and our environment, but a window. It's not an easy or straightforward project. — Ludwig V
The issue is with the proposed analogous term, "window". The term characterizes the senses in a descriptive way. So we can ask, is the description accurate? Suppose the senses are like a window, we can apply the tinted glass analogy, and ask how is the window itself affecting our perception of what's on the other side. And when we look at the reality of being alive, we see that life is active, and then we need to allow that the supposed "window" is not a passive pane of glass, but it is actively doing something.
And if we say that the activity of the mind is to interpret the information, then why wouldn't we say that the activity of the sense organ itself is an interpretation? So the information received to the conscious mind, from the sense organ, is already a type of interpretation. And if we assume that the rational mind is a distinct and higher faculty (a difference of kind, as
@Wayfarerdoes), then we ought to accept that the interpretations given to the rational mind by the senses are less reliable.
In the faculty of intuition, where that which appears acquires its representation, called phenomenon. — Mww
OK, you say that intuition provides the boundary between the senses as out there, and the appearances in the mind, as in here. But I think this produces the problem of determining where exactly the sensation is, in here, or out there. Kant, I believe, obscures the problem by talking about "sensibility", implying the potential for, or possibility of sensation, rather than talking about actual sensation. So "the faculty of intuition", may in this way, provide the mind (the internal) with the capacity to be receptive to sense activity, but this only veils the underlying problem of where exactly the sensation is, in here (in the mind), or out there (in the sense organ).
Sensations are in the senses? — Mww
It sure seems to me like sensations are in the senses. When I touch something and feel its texture, warmth, softness, etc., I feel these sensations right in my fingertips. I taste things right in my mouth, and smell things in my nose. Sounds appear to be right inside my ears, and visual images appear to be in my eyes. All of my sensations appear to me to be right in the organs which sense them.
If there were the case, why would we have both? You want the hand to tell you the thing is heavy when all it can do is tell you of the appearance of cellular compression. You want the ear to tell you there is a sound when all it can do is register the appearance of variations in pressure waves. And so on…. — Mww
"Heavy" is not properly a sensation, but if we considered it as a sensation, we would feel it in the muscles, the pain in the muscles which are lifting the weight. The pain (sensation) is felt to be right at the location where it is sensed. Likewise, sound is heard to be right in the ears. You say that ears register vibrations, but you are not talking about "sensation" any more. If we stick to sensation, we need to recognize that the sensation we call sound, appears to be right within the ears.
Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that we are talking about appearances, and the appearance is that the sensation is right in the sense organ. This is how the concept of "intuition" clouds and obscures the issue. Instead of acknowledging that the sense organ is part of "in here", because the sensation is in the sense organ, "intuition" produces a boundary. Then "sensibility", as the capacity to sense gets placed on the other side of the boundary from the sense organ, instead of putting the capacity to sense within the organ itself. And this classifies all the senses together, as activity in the same category of "sensibility".
However, we really need to look at each different sense as possibly a distinct capacity, with a distinct object. If they are distinct, then there is a difference of kind between them, and it's wrong to look at sensibility as one capacity of the mind, provided by "intuition". We need to look at each sense as a distinct capacity, afforded by the corresponding sense organ, and determine what provides the possibility for each one.
I didn’t say all the faculties couldn’t co-exist. In fact, I said the mind could be called the composite of all the faculties, which makes explicit they do co-exist. Each faculty can still be imbued with its own dedicated functionality without contradicting the notion of a unity. — Mww
The point though, is that the concepts of "intuition" and "sensibility" lead to an unsound description of sensation. So there is an unnecessary, and I would say unjustifiable boundary created between the mind, as the unity of the faculties, and the sense organs which are left outside the mind, as other than faculties.
Kant defines reality as “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general…”. From that definition, insofar as only from the senses, and correspondingly by the sensations given from them, is any account of reality possible. This just says reality is given to us if or when the senses deliver sensations. So it is that the senses are in fact involved in both the external (input: effect of that thing which appears) and the internal (output: as affect corresponding to the appearance, which just is sensation). A completely legitimate explanatory bridge. — Mww
I wouldn't say the gap is bridged legitimately. You have conveniently left out the role of intuition here, to create the appearance of legitimacy. If we include "intuition", then we see that sensations are not delivered by the senses, they are delivered by intuition, as providing sensibility, the possibility for sensation. Then the gap remains, but it is between intuition and the senses, and there is no necessity to have "the senses deliver sensations". Intuition could deliver sensations (as in dreams), without the role of the senses at all. And so the senses are not involved in the internal at all.
So the imposition of the concept "intuition" produces the appearance that the gap has been bridged with that intermediary, intuition. However, in reality the proposed medium "intuition" is placed completely on one side of the gap, and therefore does not actually provide a bridge.
It is not itself a self-contradictory idea, but it is an unintelligible object. — Mww
"Unintelligible object" is contradictory by traditional Aristotelian principles. An object necessarily has a form, as its identity, and "form" is intelligible. If it has no identity, form, it cannot be said to be an object. Notice that "intelligible" signifies the possibility of being grasped by an intellect, so actually being apprehended by a human intellect is not required. This is how Aristotle excluded "prime matter" (matter without form) from reality, by showing that it cannot be an external, independent object, it can only be an idea in the mind. But as an idea in the mind it is self-contradicting, therefore it is excluded from the mind as well.
This is why the Christian metaphysicians assigned "Form" as the necessary aspect of the independent objects, and "matter" accounts for the accidents and contingencies, observed within the independent objects. The "logical hole" is then filled with an intelligible Form, God, which is to the highest degree intelligible, yet cannot be apprehended by the human intellect due to the human intellect's dependence on matter. The hole is filled because God is intelligible, yet unintelligible to humans, so we do not have self-contradiction within that form, or idea.
And Kant doesn’t, indeed cannot, deny the possibility of noumena, insofar as to do so is to falsify the primary ground of transcendental philosophy, re: “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, which just says if I do think noumena, which is to hold a certain conception, and then prescribe to myself an object corresponding to it, then I immediately contradict the mechanisms I already authorize as that by which corresponding objects are prescribed to me at all, from which follows I have contradicted myself. The warning ends up being.…think noumena all you like; just don’t try to do anything intuitive with it. And if you can’t do anything intuitive with it, don’t bother thinking it in the first place. — Mww
This is how Kant turns things around from the traditional Christian perspective. The tradition holds that the boundary, which is "the unintelligible", is matter, and places that as external to the mind. Kant brings the boundary as "intuition" into the mind. This allows "noumena" as a sort of replacement to "matter", being the unintelligible, to creep into the mind, in that area of the mind portioned off by the boundary, intuition. The self-contradictory concept is hidden behind intuition, so to speak. Within the mind it is nothing but a useless self-contradicting concept, unintuitive. Therefore we can see the need to reject it completely. But this requires restructuring the boundary so as not to allow it in there, behind the intuitions.
On what basis did Aristotle designate man the ‘rational animal’?
The ‘faculty of reason’ is a perfectly intelligible expression, and the idea that humans alone possess it fully developed, and some animals only in very rudimentary forms, ought hardly need to be stated. Yet for some reason whenever it is stated, it provokes a good deal of argument. Which I attribute to the irrationality of modern culture! — Wayfarer
The problem I see here, is that we, in our rational thinking impose strict boundaries on species of life forms. These boundaries are produced for epistemic purposes, although they may be based in real ontological principles, such as reproductive capacity. So we tend to believe that the differences indicated by our divisions of species, are real differences of kind even though they are really just established for epistemic purposes.
The real problem which this creates is an inability to adequately understand evolution. Once we set up those differences of kind between the species, we rob ourselves of the conceptual tools required to properly understand the interspecies relations which are essential to that process called evolution. So the divisions into types are very useful for some purposes, but as Plato shows in The Sophist those purposes could include sophistry. This means that we need to call into question, to doubt the boundaries which are drawn, because they are generally drawn for a purpose which might not be representative of good metaphysics.
So for example, you say some animals possess the faculty of reason "in very rudimentary forms". Isn't this indicative to you, that this difference is a difference of degree? I think, that to assign to human beings a distinct faculty, which is a difference of kind, we need to exclude these rudimentary forms from the others. And I am not at all arguing that this is impossible. As I said, I think that some of the distinct senses we have demonstrate differences of kind. But this creates a further problem which is the need to understand how differences of kind can evolve.
This is an ancient problem, traditionally resolved by having God create the different kinds of life forms individually. Denying the reality of differences of kind altogether, allows for the reality of evolution, and emergence, but this produces a different problem, the one encountered by the ancient atomists. To avoid an infinite regress of divisibility to account for all the differences, we need to assume a first basic, universal kind, a fundamental particle, known as prime matter. But as Aristotle showed, "prime matter" is actually incoherent. This implies that differences of kind must be real, and ontological, but we just do not have the adequate principles of understanding to properly identify them. And so we continue to assign "difference of kind" by somewhat arbitrary principles, according to the purpose at hand.