Don't you get cold living under that bridge? — frank

It's not being under the bridge that's cold, it's the truth that's cold and hard.

When we're checking a calculation and we rely on 12x12=144 without questioning it, then it's functioning as a hinge. — Sam26

Well then anything which one learns, and employs in an habitual way would be functioning as a hinge. Anything we've come to rely on we use without questioning it. Once we learn how to use something, we employ it without questioning it, it becomes a part of the toolbox. We generally don't question the tool when we pull it out, unless we're thinking of using it in an unorthodox way. This would mean that the vast majority of common language use would consist of hinges, words spoken without deliberation. We rely on them without questioning them.

We could portray anything reliable as a "hinge", but this does not support the claim that it would be unreasonable to doubt hinges. Surely, even after we've come to rely on a specific process it makes sense to question whether there might be a more efficient way, or even a better end.

So this points to an important distinction, the difference between things which we do not doubt, and things which we ought not doubt. If hinges simply consist of things which we do not doubt, they cannot serve as the basis for what the skeptic ought not doubt.

First, mathematics as a whole isn't "a hinge." A hinge is a proposition holding fast so that some inquiry can proceed. The fact that mathematics changes over time doesn't undermine the idea. Witt's river-bed image (OC 96-97) says that what stands fast can harden and later shift. That's not a flaw in the concept; it's just the nature of some hinges.

Second, Kuhn doesn't defeat hinges, he illustrates them. A paradigm is a set of commitments that hold fast so that normal science can proceed. When a shift happens, some of what stood fast gives way and new things take its place. Witt practically describes this at OC 96: "fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid." — Sam26

You are clearly reducing "hinges" to propositions which we do not doubt in practise. That's fine to portray hinges in this way, but then the hinge provides no defense against skepticism, of any sort. If the river-bed, or paradigm will shift, and the shift will likely lead to a better system, then the skeptic ought to doubt the hinges and work toward producing that shift. If "hinges" are portrayed in this way, then it is unreasonable for anyone to say that it is unreasonable for a skeptic to doubt the hinges.

Third, the skeptic point gets Witt backwards. The whole thrust of OC is that you can't doubt everything at once. Doubt requires a foundational background (a hinge background) in order to function. The skeptic who says "I must doubt everything equally" hasn't achieved some deep point of inquiry, they've destroyed the conditions that make doubting intelligible. — Sam26

This is what I assert is the false representation of doubt. "Doubt", skepticism, is to refuse judgement, suspend judgement. Judgement is what requires a foundational, hinge background. But doubt is to oppose judgement, altogether, and this enables opposition to any hinge background which supports any judgement, and the activity associated with that judgement. In meditation, contemplation, and similar practises we can doubt anything and everything which comes to mind. Doubt itself, is just a matter of refusing judgement so it doesn't require any supporting hinges. As soon as it's time to act though, we must make judgements and put an end to any radical skepticism.

So if we portray "doubt" as opposing a particular judgement, then doubt is understood as a contrary judgement. The contrary judgement of course, requires a hinge background. But if we portray doubt as it truly is, the refusal to make any judgement, this frees us from the necessity of a hinge background. Being freed from the necessity of a hinge background is what allows the skeptic to choose principles. To employ the game analogy, consider that the doubter, while doubting, is refusing to play any game. This allows the doubter to select the game of choice.

There is an argument which can be made against radical skepticism, which claims that thinking itself is an activity. This activity itself must be derived from some sort of prior judgement, requiring some sort of hinges. The problem with this approach is that it puts judgement as prior to thinking, and this would reduce the capacity of thinking to guide our judgements, producing the conclusion that we couldn't prevent activities which we were inclined to make, but thought to be wrong. So it's better to allow that judgement is the product of thinking, and skepticism can extend to all thought.

The idea is that human endeavors are game-like. You embrace certain rules, certain standards, certain word usage, etc. when you embrace a game.

Yes, you can doubt that the knight really has to move in a little L shaped path. You can even throw the knight out the window, but at that point, you're no longer playing the game.

You are a little queen, looking ahead at an impending knight fork, wondering if this is all there is to you. — frank

Yes, "you're no longer playing the game". That's the point. At this point, your humanly endeavour (throwing the knight out the window) is not game-like at all, it's anti-game-like. Then the proposition "human endeavors are game-like" is not a valid inductive generalization, because some people are always throwing the knight out the window. Such is the skeptic. But Wittgenstein tries to squeeze the square peg into the round hole, and portray the anti-gamer as a gamer, maybe just playing a different game.

A mathematical proposition like 12x12=144 is a hinge in the strongest sense (my bedrock sense) because its internal to the system. — Sam26

This doesn't really make sense to me. If 12x12=144 is a hinge, then isn't 10x10=100 a hinge, and 2x2=4 a hinge, and any other equation? So, wouldn't any, and every, mathematical statement internal to the system, be a hinge? And if every mathematical statement is a hinge, then "hinge" serves no purpose in this context of mathematics.

Or is it the case that mathematics itself is the hinge, in its entirety as a hinge discipline, or something like that? The problem with this perspective is that some parts actually change over time. And it's not a matter of just some fringe parts changing, the very fundamentals (what you might think would be hinges) like what qualifies as a number, change.

So in reference to the discussion on scientific investigations, I'll refer you to Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts. If this theory is true, then the idea of hinge propositions is faulty. The entire system must be equally doubted by the skeptic, because the entire system ties together as a cohesive unit. It is not the case that some propositions of a system are doubtable and others ought not be doubted. The skeptic cannot distinguish what is doubtable from what is not doubtable, without doubting them.

Every vote counts:

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/terrebonne-tatiana-auguste-supreme-court-result-9.7088850

Do you want to grant hinges to animals as well? — Fooloso4

I think at one point Wittgenstein implies that true "hinges" would have to actually be prelinguistic, and would be granted to animals other than human.

He is playing with various formulations, looking for what works and what doesn't, "that which stands fast", "river beds", "mythology" “hinges”, and “animal certainty” all taking a part, are examined and critiqued and then he passes on. And it woudl be a mistake to presume that he reaches a conclusion. — Banno

This is the point I am making. He proposes "hinges" as that which would be necessary for grounding knowledge in certainty. So he figures if there are hinges we should be able to identify them individually. He tries, but demonstrates that he cannot identify them.

He doesn't make any conclusion, but leaves the drawing of a conclusion to the reader. That is the way that Plato wrote, he stated the proposition, laid out the evidence, and allowed the reader to draw the conclusion. The conclusion which we ought to draw in this case, is that the proposal of "hinges" is a false proposition. The talk of hinges is idle talk. Wittgenstein has demonstrated that knowledge is not grounded in certainty. Knowledge is grounded in the skeptic's doubt, and certainty is an illusion which we produce to make ourselves feel better (therapy).

There's no point to this line of discussion. "Hinge" is not well defined, and as I explained above, this approach is nothing but a Wittgensteinian mistake anyway. The proposal of "hinges" is not real, a false proposition, derived from a misunderstanding of doubt and skepticism. There are no such hinges. So attempting to determine what qualifies as a hinge will be fruitless.

If they cannot make it free and easy for every citizen to get ID then it should be the government's burden to prove that a voter isn't a citizen and not a citizen's burden to prove that they are. — Michael

I think this would work very well, and something similar is probably working very well already. Illegals wouldn't even try to vote because there would be a possibility of getting caught and deported. And, they would really get very little if anything, in return for casting a vote. Clearly they would not be so inclined.

The idea that there is any significant number of illegals voting is simply ridiculous. I mean, voter turn out is only around 60% of eligible people. They can't even get the eligible motivated! It's crazy to think that there's a bunch of ineligibles just champing at the bit, to cast a vote for nothing. Voting will not make them become legal or anything like that.

Obviously, the need is to go the other way, make it easier for people to vote, not more difficult.

Meno's paradox is supposed to support past lives. — frank

That is the solution posed in The Meno. But I think it is actually posed as obviously unacceptable.

It just as well supports the idea that much of our knowledge arises from an innate framework. — frank

What Plato does in The Republic is place "the good" (and this would be the grounding for correctness as well), as outside of knowledge. That is similar to what Kant did with "noumenon". Notice that for Kant the a priori intuitions of space and time provide for your "innate framework". But Kant produced a grounding for empiricism, and Plato was a skeptic in relation to sense experience. Plato's skepticism would doubt the intuitions of space and time. For Plato, the senses often mislead us, as evidenced by pleasure leading us away from what we know is good. This means that the "innate framework" which would support "the good", or correctness, must extend beyond, or prior to even sensation. It must be prior to any form of knowledge whatsoever. That's why Plato argued that virtue cannot be a form of knowledge.

In relation to this thread, Wittgenstein judged such extreme skepticism of sense experience, as fundamentally irrational. So he proposed hinges or bedrock as a foundation which would be irrational to doubt. However, I believe that this position is based in some unjustifiable assumptions about the nature of doubt. We can take a look at what Sam26 says:

For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast, not because we’ve proved them, but because they are part of what makes checking, testing, and correction possible. That’s a conceptual point about how doubt, evidence, and investigation function, not a special attack against skeptics. — Sam26

The basic mistake made by Wittgenstein here, is the assumption that doubt ought to be intelligible. This is a mischaracterization of doubt. Doubt does not arise from within any intelligible system, it always comes from a source which is external to whatever it is which is supposed to be intelligible. That is fundamental to doubt. We may have a system of explanation (intelligibility), which is mostly closed around itself, as a closed system, but it necessarily must have openings where it relates to, and interacts with the world which it explains. Doubt enters at these openings, as what appears to be unintelligible from the precepts of the intelligible system. The important point, doubt cannot come from within the system, as the system is modeled as closed to the inside. Doubt must come from outside

So Wittgenstein makes a fundamental mistake by casting doubt as something rational, then putting a boundary where doubt would be irrational. "Doubt" is in its basic nature irrational because "rational" is a judgement or determination based on the rules enforced by the system, which doubt is opposed to. Therefore doubt must be classed as fundamentally irrational.

When we put this into relation with what is exposed by Meno's inquisition, we see that doubt must be prior to all knowledge, and is in some sense the source of knowledge. As Socrates said, philosophy is sourced in wonder. This means that a proper understanding requires that we invert the relation between knowledge and doubt, from that described by Wittgenstein. Instead of portraying doubt as something which inheres within knowledge, like Wittgenstein does, (doubt is rational), we need to portray knowledge as a culture which propagates within an environment of doubt.

The "innate framework" referred to by @frank is a framework of doubt. The cultures of certitude which pop up within that framework are illusions of certainty, produced from empiricism and the notion that the senses are infallible. Meno's paradox is resolved by revealing that it is produced from a faulty representation of knowledge, that it is constituted with infallible principles. This faulty representation of knowledge is also exposed in The Theaetetus. Once we realize that knowledge is classed as becoming, rather than being, seeking knowledge is not portrayed as seeking the correct principles.

I believe Plato resolved Meno's paradox in The Republic, by positioning "the good" as outside of knowledge.

You city gives you a birth certificate when born. — NOS4A2

So the babies are going to hang on to their birth certificates so that they'll be able to vote when they hit the legal age. Or maybe your mommy might do it for you? Life is good isn't it?

January 6th: a day of love. — Mikie

Where did February 14th go?

I've been working on a better definition of philosophy, and I thought I'd post it here just as an aside. — Sam26

I like that.

Are you arguing that without prescriptive rules for word usage, the concept wouldn't exist? What about the smaller concepts that make up a triangle, like 3 and polygon. Do those also reduce to prescriptive rules? — frank

Yes, I believe that concepts like 3 and polygon exist as individuals following prescriptive rules, doing what they ought to do. It is discipline. Plato described our apprehension of concepts as dependent on "the good". "The good" according to Plato in The Republic, is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, in a way analogous with how the sun makes visible objects visible. So the urge to do what is good is what drives us to obey the prescriptive rules, and obeyance provides for the existence of intelligible objects (concepts).

A child hears their parent say “toy” and sees them pick up a toy. Already the child has a concept of “toy”, because they have heard "toy" and seen a toy. — RussellA

i don't agree, and I think that this proposal is untenable.

He is saying that because no one can see into anyone else’s box, each person’s beetle could be different. — RussellA

That's right, and as such the beetles are insufficient as analogous of "a concept". Each person's concept of "beetle" would be private and unique, so there would be no such thing as "the concept of beetle", only a multitude of distinct concepts.

The meaning of the word “pain” in a public language is directly determined by empirically observable outward behaviour, and only indirectly by an assumed inner feeling. — RussellA

You argue two inconsistent, or even opposing things. First, you argue that if a person simply observes the use of a word, they must have an inner concept of that word. Now, you ague that the meaning of the word is dependent on the person' use of the word. The latter denies the possibility of the former. The person could not have a concept for the word, prior to demonstrating "empirically observable outward behaviour" of such, unless you are saying that the person could have a concept of the word without the word having any meaning for the person.

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept. — RussellA

This is not true. Have you never watched a child learn to speak? It is not true that a person "only speaks because they have a prior concept". Your example is not even making sense to me.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different. — RussellA

So you are saying that there are as many concepts of "freedom" as there are people who use that word? Wouldn't this amount to us each having one's own private language? And isn't this exactly the type of conclusion which Wittgenstein is trying to avoid? There is no beetle in the box, no concept of freedom in the mind. That's what the beetle analogy is meant to show, this is a faulty way of looking at things.

That is not unjustified. The only enforcement pressure for the "rules" of language is not being understood or being misunderstood. But that is seriously undermined by our ability to understand what people mean to say even if they say it in a way that breaks the rules. — Ludwig V

That's right, that's why I said "a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement". It's just a generalization making an inductive statement about how the word is commonly used. It is a descriptive rule rather than prescriptive. There is no "enforcement pressure", not even an implied ought.

I don't see why we should not allow that animals have concepts. It would be hard to understand them if we did not. — Ludwig V

You are not making sense any more Ludwig. Why does understanding something require that the thing which is understood has concepts? We can understand through behavioural patterns. The sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening on a very regular basis, and this allow us to understand the solar system. Would you say that we couldn't understand the solar system if it doesn't have concepts?

That's right. But they can decide to play either game, or play one the first week, the other the second and so on. It's only a problem if they try to play both games at the same time. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's the point, it would be two distinct concepts of "football", not one concept. And if we tried to insist that there is one concept of football we'd have to acknowledge internal contradiction within the concept.

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How would rules conjure a concept? It's probably that both rules and concepts are elements of post hoc analysis of language. — frank

The difference between prescriptive rules (how one ought to behave), and descriptive rules (post hoc inductive statements about behaviour) is very important. I understand a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement. However, in educational institutions we are taught to use certain words according to strict rules of application, like my example of "triangle". In this case the rules are prescriptive, and this is what I've argued is constitutive of "concepts".

Both use in practice and formulation of a rule are aspects of concepts. — Ludwig V

I agree that both are aspects of concepts, but I also argue that what you call use of words in practice extends far beyond the use concepts. So "use in practice" is a very large category, and the majority of it does not involve concepts. And, I argue that this is a very important point to understand if we want a proper representation of "use in practice". If we assume that all "use in practice" involves concepts, then we'll end up saying that all communication, even that done by other animals involves concepts. Therefore I think we need some rules as to what exactly "a concept" is, and we need to adhere to those rules in discussions like this.

You could say that there are two different, but related, concepts here, or you could say that there are sufficient similarities between the two to justify calling them one. — Ludwig V

The point is that you cannot call two distinct sets of rules for using a specific word "one concept", without allowing for the possibility of contradiction inhering within that concept. So in your example of distinct uses of "game", things which one person would qualify as "a game" would be disallowed by the other, so you'd end up having contradictory uses of "game" being allowed for by "the same concept". This means that your proposition for "concept" allows for a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Again, there are several varieties of football - different concepts of it if you like, since there are formal books of rules. It isn't a usually a problem. I don't see the point of arguing about it. — Ludwig V

It is a problem for anyone who claims that the different varieties are "the same game", though having different sets of rules. if two different teams want to play the same game, "football" and they each have different sets of rules, that's a very real problem. They have to hammer out their differences and decide on one game to play. They can't each be playing a different game, and insist that it is the same because they both have the same name. Likewise with concepts, if we want to have a logical discussion, we can't each be proceeding with different rules of usage for the same word, and insist that it is the same concept. That's a fallacy known as equivocation.

So, in my view, the use of the word in practice is more important that whether an explicitly formulated rule is being followed. — Ludwig V

For logical procedures following explicitly formulated rules is of primary importance. I agree that use of the word in practice may sometimes serve as a guideline for creation of those rules, especially if common practice already follows from a field of discipline (rule guided). But in many cases, the principle of "use of the word in practice", just serves to deliver equivocation, therefore it must be curbed for philosophy and logical procedures.

I agree that we have the concept of “freedom” and there are rules as to how the word “freedom” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does).

But there are no rules as to why we have the concept “freedom” in the first place (rules as to what the concept is) — RussellA

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".

How could you use the word “freedom” in a sentence if you did not know what freedom meant, did not know the concept of freedom. — RussellA

That's simple, you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts.

I agree that some concepts can be rules, such as “do not touch”, but some concepts are not rules, such as freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less.
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I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules.
— Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between what a concept is and what a concept does.

I agree that as regards what a concept does, it can be a rule or not be a rule, but as regards what a concept is, I don’t see that a concept is something with a logical structure or formal rules. — RussellA

I still don't understand what you could mean by "concept". Sure we can all use words such as those of your examples, "freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less" but unless there are definite rules of usage, how can you assume that there is any concept involved with these words?

Take "freedom" for example. We can all use the word in a variety of contexts, each context having a different meaning. Why would you think that being able to use the word implies that there is such a thing as a concept of freedom. On the other hand, if we stipulated well defined rules of usage, like we do with mathematical concepts, then we'd have the basis for the claim that this constitutes a concept of freedom.

Well, I had the impression that Wittgenstein's point about "game" was that there could not be a single definition (formal rule) that would be the basis of a concept. "Game" is applied to a very wide range of games, but he explains his meaning by means of the metaphor. There is no single thread that runs through the whole of a rope; its strength is made by a number of distinct threads which interweave and overlap. Better known, perhaps, is his metaphor of "family likenesses" which connect member of a family. Similarly, there is no single likeness that connects all games; but there are a number of different likenesses that interweave and overlap to connect them. — Ludwig V

So doesn't that indicate to you that there is no concept of game? There is the single word, like the single rope, but that is composed of may different fibres, ways of usage. There is no single meaning therefore no single concept. Overlapping, distinct but similar uses, which are analogous to "family likenesses" does not constitute what we commonly understand as "a concept".

However, he then goes on to explain how one could dictate boundaries of usage, for a specific purpose.
This, applying rules to limit usage, boundaries, I conclude is the production of a concept. For example, the concept of "triangle" is the explicit rule of plane figure with three sides and angles.

I think we understand that we use the word differently; there doesn't seem to be any point about that. — Ludwig V

How could you say that there is a "concept" involved if we each use the word differently? Doesn't the very essence of what it means to be "a concept" indicate that the word must be used in the same way? If someone was calling a round plane figure a triangle, and someone else called a rectangular plane figure a triangle, how could we claim that there is a concept of "triangle"?

The first thing China will do is terminate ALL Ice Hockey being played in Canada, and permanently eliminate The Stanley Cup. — Questioner

I love this line. It just demonstrates Trump's MO, of saying whatever he thinks might get people riled up. If he was a little bit more in tune with what Canadians actually worry about, he might have said that China would close all Tim Hortons. Then he could even claim that he would step in, and interfere for Canada, preventing them from closing Timmy's, so long as he could rebrand the chain as "Don Trumps". Then Canadians would all be buying their coffees from Donny's.

The dislike that Canadians have for Trump is quite deep. He came into Toronto with a grand scheme for Trump Toronto, along with big Russian financing. He paid himself shit loads of Russian money, went bankrupt, and left the locals with a whole lot of unpaid bills. How anyone could "lose money" on a real estate deal in Toronto at that time, is unimaginable.

Let the concrete principle be “don’t touch a hot stove” and the abstract concept be “touching a hot stove causes pain”. A logical structure can be thought of as synonymous with formal rules.

Where are the formal rules in the abstract concept that touching a hot stove causes pain? — RussellA

You're example does not make sense to me at all. If the concrete principle is “don’t touch a hot stove”, then the principal concept involved is "do not touch", and that itself looks to me like a formal rule. The "a hot stove" is less formal, because criteria is required. I don't see how you even draw a relation between this and "causes pain". this is a common problem with ethical rules, the lack of relation between is and ought.

Wittgenstein definitely didn't adhere to the dogmatic community view (social platonism) that considers meaning to be necessarily social - for "Wittgenstein's manometer" example makes it clear that a diarist's private use of "S" might be turn out to be correlated to rising blood-pressure - a hidden cause of the diarist's behaviour that might be unknown to both the diarist who feels the urge to write "S" and to his community. (Wittgenstein even calls the appearance of a mistake an illusion). Hence Wittgenstein does indeed hint at what i previously called "self-justifying" verbal behaviour - namely verbal behavior that a community considers to be "private" because 1) the behaviour doesn't follow a recognizable existing convention, and 2) the behaviour has no presently known causal explanation. — sime

Could you please explain to me how Frege's "third realm", "sense", is related to this? What would be the sense of Wittgenstein's "S" in this example? The following is how I would interpret this.

From what you've explained, I take "sense" to be a sort of meaning-giving context. If that's the case, then for the public observer, the sense of "S" would appear to be the rising monometer (notice I say manometer, not blood-pressure, because that is what is evident to the observer). For the diarist, the sense would appear to be the inner feeling. Is the true "third realm" then, the blood-pressure itself? For the diarist, the inner feeling is a representation of that presentation (rising blood pressure), and for the observer, the manometer is a representation of that presentation.

From this perspective, we have two opposing, or inverse approaches to "the appearance of a mistake". If both, the outward representation, the manometer, and the inward representation, the feeling, are representations of an intermediary presentation, then we need to allow for the possibility of mistake in either directions of representation.

Suppose we assume that "sense" is the intermediary between speaker and hearer, in this way. To avoid the possibility of mistake, we might designate the true intermediary as the spoken words themselves. This implies that the sense is the words themselves, and that would leave the blood pressure as irrelevant, no longer qualifying as the intermediary. Then the public compares the spoken "S", with the manometer But I think that this would misrepresent the intent of the diarist, who's use of "S" is not as a public presentation, rather it's a private record. Now there is an issue of whether the spoken words (or written) are intended to be an intermediary, or not, and this is an issue in relation to whether the words can actually be the "sense".

I have never thought of a concept as a logical structure with formal rules. For example, if I think of the concept of a slab, there is no logical structure to my thoughts of slabs and there are no rules limiting my thoughts of slabs. — RussellA

Doesn't, "an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles", say to you, "logical structure with formal rules"? What else, other than a logical structure with formal rules, could serve as a foundation for concrete principles?

If someone can use terms like "tree" or "table" without that formal framwork, it seems a bit odd to deny that they have the relevant concepts. — Ludwig V

I don't agree with this. People will readily understand, and know how to use words like "tree", and "table", and if you ask then to tell you what the concept of tree or table is, they cannot give you an answer. This is because they do not have such "concepts" when they learn how to use those words. That is the point Wittgenstein made with "game", we all use the word without having any specific concept of game. I believe he takes this idea further in On Certainty. Knowing how to use a word doesn't indicate that the person using it has a concept of the word.

Interesting, thanks frank.

My concept of “slab” must be similar to yours, but cannot be the same as yours, because we have experienced different Forms of Life.

Because we have learnt our concepts of “slab” through an extensive personal Form of Life, our concepts are too complex to be defined.

Our concepts of “slab” probably generally overlap, but it is unavoidable that sometimes my concept of “slab” will be different to yours. — RussellA

I would not use the word "concept" here. I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. Instead, we both know how to use the word, though our particular instances of use will vary. Where we all overlap in usage, we have what is required to make a generalization (inductive conclusion) which may serve as a dictionary definition. What I think, is that if someone states particular criteria, or rules governing the use of the word, for the purpose of a logical procedure, then we have what is required for a "concept". Notice though, that I am stipulating such rules in this case, proposing a restriction to the way that you use the word "concept".

It seems to be used in place of "my perception" or "my recollection" which would be more correct usages. — Peter Gray

The ancient phrase "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" refers to a subjective truth. So it's not a new trend.

There is the universal aspect, in that the function (meaning) of a word is to be used in a language game and there is the particular aspect, in that the meaning of a word is its use in the language game. — RussellA

What I had in mind was more like the difference between the dictionary definition of a word, and what the word actually means in any particular set of circumstances (context). So the dictionary definition states how the word is commonly used, in a general way, with a universal statement. But in any particular instance of usage, the context adds something, so that the use of the word is not exactly like what is described by the dictionary.

This indicates two very distinct interpretations of "meaning is use". One is to interpret that the meaning of the word is the universal, inductive conclusion of how the word is generally used, as outlined by a dictionary. The other is to interpret that the meaning is specific to each instance of use, and somewhat unique according to the peculiarities of the circumstances. The latter is the way that words are actually used. The former is very weak inductive reasoning.

I see trump is trying to rile up his racist followers to criticize the NFL. Maybe that explains why he randomly put out that Obama tape the other day. He was trying to get the ball rolling.

I would have thought that P1 “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” is quite central to Wittgenstein’s argument. — RussellA

I think you ought to consider that "use" has two principal meanings, one referring to the universal, the other the particular. So in the "use" of a tool like a hammer for example, there might be a universal rule, "a hammer is used for pounding nails", but this does not describe the particular instance of use, where it may be the case that "the hammer was used to crush a walnut". Wittgenstein recognizes these two very different and often conflicting aspects of meaning, what is given by the universal rule of "a practice", and what is given by the particular circumstances of practise. The former involves a sort of inductive reasoning, and the latter isn't necessarily consistent.

Wittgenstein doesn't say that rules are “necessarily external” in the sense of being outside a practice, outside a speaker, or imposed from above. What he denies is that a rule can be a private, inner object that fixes what counts as following a rule. — Sam26

Inside a practice, or a speaker would be internal to the mind of the person who performs the act. But the rule is something external to this, by Wittgenstein's definition. That is his very important "tool", this specific conception of "rule". The rule is external to the mind of the speaker, not something internal which the speaker follows in one's mind.

You basically say the same thing as me when you say " What he denies is that a rule can be a private, inner object that fixes what counts as following a rule". Therefore the rule must be external to the mind.

That’s also why the private language doesn’t need the premise “rules are external.” It needs the point that correctness requires more than a private impression of correctness. — Sam26

I cannot see the difference.

That’s also why the private language doesn’t need the premise “rules are external.” It needs the point that correctness requires more than a private impression of correctness. If you allow a “private rule” that has no criteria for correct reapplication, you haven’t saved rule following, you’ve emptied it. You can’t even make sense of “I’m following the rule” versus “I only think I am,” because there is no difference. — Sam26

That's exactly the point, and why rules are necessarily external, for Wittgenstein. If the rule was internal to the mind of the person, there would be nothing but "a private impression of correctness". Then there would be no difference between "the person is following the rule", and "the person believes that they are following the rule".

So this specific definition of what it means to follow a rule, positions the rule as external to the mind of the person speaking, and this move is a very important tool for Wittgenstein.

And the claim that “concepts are constructed with rules, therefore external” is too rigid. Language is full of normativity without explicit rules, and many concepts have family resemblance structure with flexibility. There are rules in the sense that some moves are correct and others aren’t, but that doesn’t mean the concept is a construction laid down by an external authority. The normativity is carried by the practice itself. — Sam26

Family resemblances are not concepts, they are a variety of different games. They evolve from free, unruly individual expressions, so they are not rule based. That's the point I made already. There is no rule as to what "game" means, no real concept of "game". However, Wittgenstein explains how one can apply boundaries for a specific purpose. To apply boundaries is to apply rules, and this creates a concept. Unruly, free evolution with family resemblances is clearly very different from concepts which are created by applying rules.

Wittgenstein’s tool is to block the fantasy that rules are private inner things/objects that determine their own application. — Sam26

So why would you deny that it is essential to Wittgenstein's position, a very important "tool", the proposition that rules are not inner things, but external to human minds?

I'm inclined to think that Wittgenstein was not concerned to refute the specific idea that pain is an object. — Ludwig V

In the book, right before he provided the example, with the symbol "S" to signify a sensation, he asked what would qualify as a criterion of identity for an internal sensation. And he used a chair as an example of an object with an identity.

I was impressed by the thought that if language is a system of communication, it is hard to see how it could not presuppose the existence of some sort of social relationship. So, at most, I was suggesting that a social context was a necessary condition for language. — Ludwig V

We can assume, and take for granted, that "language is a system of communication", but Wittgenstein was questioning whether this assumption is justified. That's why he proposed the possibility of a private language. If it is the case that language is dependent on rules, in the way that he defines rule following, then language is a system of communication. However, the family resemblances analogy shows that language might not be dependent on rules. That is why he had to go further in his analysis.

Third, the idea that “rules must be external” is too quick. — Sam26

For Wittgenstein, as stated in PI, rules are necessarily external. This is 'the essence of a rule' and it provides the basis for the distinction between "what seems right and what is right". It's a key premise to the so-called private language argument. If you allow the premise that a person could have a private internal rule, and judge oneself to be following that rule, the entire explanatory system of PI would be demolished.

In fact, I would say that this characterization of "rule" is a principal "tool" of Wittgenstein's. This is the means by which concepts, which are constructed with rules, are described as external instead of internal.

Are there whole new fields of mathematics just waiting to be discovered? Does this have any other possible impact on our daily lives? — EricH

I would say yes to the first question. There is clearly room for improvement on mathematical principles, therefore new fields waiting to be discovered. The second question is not quite so straight forward. But I would say, that unless you are one of the individuals who is going to forge those new fields, there is no immediate impact on your daily life.

I'm not clear what the difference is between a foundation and an ultimate foundation. But I don't see how inner feelings can be the only essential condition for language. They are necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient. If we were not social beings, there would be no language. Our form of life would be unrecognizable without inner feelings, social living, and language. — Ludwig V

I think this is an interesting way to put it. The necessary condition may not be sufficient, likewise though, the sufficient conditions may not be necessary. So "social being" turned out to be the sufficient condition for language development, but language could have developed under different sufficient conditions. Then the language which developed would not be the same as that which did develop, but would still be language anyway. "Sufficient conditions" may be tricky and difficult.

So for example, "social being" may be the result of language development rather than a primary condition for it. For example, it could be the case that when language first started to develop it was under sufficient conditions other than social being. Then, as language developed the condition of social being took priority and became the primary condition. I am not arguing that this is the case, only that "sufficient conditions" lack the necessity required to draw certain conclusions.

Are you saying that inner feelings exist independently of language? In an sense, that may well be true, but then social life can also exist independently of language. — Ludwig V

Yes, it's quite likely that feelings are prior to what we consider to be "language", and this would allow us to say that they would exist independently. However, by the difference between "necessary" and "sufficient" we cannot turn this around as you propose. What is apprehended as a "sufficient" condition is not necessarily prior, and can arise simultaneously.

Hi ,
I think we're actually very close to being in complete agreement here. We both place the inner feelings as prior, as "what make these language games possible", but there is some inconsistency between us as to how we interpret Wittgenstein's representation of "the concept". In the end, we seem to agree that concepts are not a part of the inner, but we both get there in slightly different ways.

The key to understanding the difference between us, I believe is to separate "inner" from "object". The inner is very real, but there is no such thing as an inner object for Wittgenstein. So, when "concept" is understood as abstract "object" it cannot be something inner.

Yes, a person can reflect on what they feel, but that reflection is optional and secondary. If you treat it as the foundation, you’ve already put the inner object picture back at the center. — Sam26

This is what Wittgenstein does, he puts the inner at the centre. His point though is that the inner is incorrectly portrayed as "object". This is what he demonstrates when he does the little thought experiment where he labels "a sensation" as "S", and ,marks in his journal every time that he feels "S". He is demonstrating that the recurrence of the inner sensation is not the recurrence of an object which can be named, as we name an external object. In this way he takes "object" out of the picture, but he leaves "the inner" as still central, but consisting of something other than objects.

You also say Wittgenstein rejects concepts, but that only works if concept means a private mental thing we consult before we speak. That isn’t Wittgenstein’s view. He relies on concepts in the public sense, the grammar of a word, what counts as using it correctly, what counts as a mistake, and what follows from it. If you deny concepts in that sense, you’re denying the very thing he’s investigating. — Sam26

What I said is that he rejects concepts as primary, fundamental, or natural. He describes the reality of concepts as a practise of applying boundaries for a purpose. So concepts are constructed with the use of language, the application of rules, formal logic, etc.. They are not something which underlie language use as its base.

Notice that "what counts as a mistake", requires rules, in the sense that it is an action contrary to a rule. But a "rule" under Wittgenstein's usage requires language for its existence. He is very clear on this. And "mistake" can only be judged as what is not consistent with conceptual rules.

However, the majority of natural language use (such as your example of "game") is not bound by these rules. Therefore the concept of "mistake" does not even apply to natural language use under Wittgenstein's description. When a person uses slang for example, using a word in a very unorthodox way, this is not a mistake. Neither is any new or innovative use of a word, a "mistake", because the person is not acting within a conceptual structure of "rules" concerning the words used. The person is creating one's own use within one's own mind, where rules do not apply.

The same point shows up in the game example. Wittgenstein isn’t saying there is no concept of game. He’s saying there’s no single essence of game. He uses game to point out that a concept can be held together by family resemblance rather than a strict definition. Saying “there is no concept” disregards his point and replaces it with something he never claims. — Sam26

Saying "there is no single essence of game" has the same effect as saying "there is no concept of game". To produce a concept of "game" requires rules which stipulate necessary criteria, an essence. Accordingly, there might be numerous concepts of "game" which people would produce for a variety of different reasons, but this is not saying that there is a concept of "game", it is saying that there is a multitude of concepts of "game".

I believe that his point is not to show "that a concept can be held together by family resemblance" it is to show a distinction between "concept" and "family resemblance". The natural way that meaning exists is as described by the family resemblance analogy. The concept however, is created by applying rules, boundaries which are applied for specific purposes. So the family resemblance usage of words may provide the basis for a multitude of different concepts of "game" ("game" as defined for this purpose and that purpose), produced from those different natural ways of using the word, but this is not a holding "the concept" together, it is a multitude of distinct concepts, each with its distinct set of rules. Following one set of rules would be making a mistake by another, and the same word, "game" supports distinct concepts. Notice specifically, that intentional ambiguity may be natural, and not a case of breaking any rules.

Finally, your picture collapses normativity into imitation. “Choosing to behave like others” explains copying, not rule following. Rule following requires the distinction between what seems right and what is right, between correct and incorrect moves. That distinction shows itself in training and correction. — Sam26

The point is, that rule following must be willful. We cannot force people to follow rules of language. So even training and correction require that underlying desire. Therefore "choosing to behave like others" does explain rule following. The fundamental desire for communion, to be a part of the group, is what enables rule following. Force does not enable rule following.

So, the point is simple. Inner feelings make these language games possible, but they don’t fix meaning. Concept isn’t some spooky inner tool, it’s the public grammar of use. And rules aren’t authoritarian commands; they’re the norms of what makes correctness and mistake intelligible. If you want to disagree with Wittgenstein, disagree with that, not with behaviorism or private mental classification, because those aren’t his positions. — Sam26

See, you are in complete agreement with me at the basic level, "Inner feelings make these language games possible. The "inner" is at the base of language. Where we disagree is with our understanding of "concept". What I'm saying is that Wittgenstein separates "concept", as we generally understand this word as an "abstract object", out from this "inner" which is at the base of language. But as you also agree, the "concept" is something dependent on community and language, therefore it is better described in that way, as a property of the public and its rules, rather than as something inner. So the point is that the inner is still prior and fundamental, as you agree, but "the concept" is not something inner, which you also agree to.

This is how we get to understand Wittgenstein's distinction between "what seems right and what is right". What is right is what is dictated by the rules and can only be judged in a public way. That is a grounding in justification. But, despite the fact that a person can learn and understand rules, and even apply them to oneself, the judgement will always be "what seems right" due to the influence of the inner, which cannot be rules, therefore never a proper "what is right".

But when “I’m in pain” is used as an avowal, or a cry, or a call for help, it’s a different language game. The grammar isn’t “I inspected an inner object and concluded,” it’s closer to “this is how we express pain, and this is how others respond.” — Sam26

I believe that this is a complex point, which should probably be looked at more closely. When someone says "I'm in pain", often they have inspected their inner feeling and conclude "pain" is the appropriate word. However, there are other ways that we respond to pain, reflexive recoil, "ow!", etc.. Notice that there is a difference, and Wittgenstein points this out.

The further issue is how others respond to the expression. "Pain" is a simple example, one does not need to shout "I'm in pain!", the "ow!" serves the same purpose. But the expression of many other feelings won't have the same sort of response from others, being less obvious. So this is why people tend to believe that "concepts" are at play here. They think there is specific criteria that a person applies when saying "I feel happy", or "I feel angry", so the person employs a concept before making that statement. This I believe is what Wittgenstein takes exception to.

I think that what he is pointing to is that in all of our expressions of feelings, we learn in the same way that we learn to say "ow!". Instead of analyzing the exact feeling, and deciding on the word which applies, we simply respond to the circumstances with the word that we've learned for that type of situation. And we learn by watching others. If something good happens, I say "I am happy", I don't analyze how I'm feeling, and decide that happy is the right word. When something bad happens I say I am said. Analyzing your feelings to apply a concept is what you learn from a psychologist.

Game is Wittgenstein's classic case. Board games, card games, children’s games, sports, video games, solitary games, competitive games, cooperative games. Some have winners and losers, some don’t. Some require skill, some are luck heavy. Some are played for fun, some for money, some as ritual. There’s no one trait that every game has. But there’s also no confusion in ordinary life. We learn the concept by learning a family of activities and how the word is used in each context or case. — Sam26

The point here is that there is no "concept" of game. And the larger point is that the idea of "concepts" is generally misleading. It's not a real description of how language works. A word gets a broad family of usage, but the word cannot be said to have a concept. However, we might attempt to create a concept by applying boundaries to usage. So the important point is that concepts are not a natural part of our language, serving to guide our word usage, they are something we attempt to create artificially by applying boundaries, rules of usage, criteria etc..

This points to the dichotomy indicated by @sime. The application of boundaries and rules, creates concepts, but this is not the natural way of language evolution. Thinking of "rules' in this way, as some top-down authority which the community holds over the individual, can be very misleading.

Look at the example above, of how we learn the expressions for feelings, like "ow!". By watching others, we learn how to express our feelings in specific situations. And we mimic what we've seen. You might call this 'learning a rule', but at the basic level, it's not a matter of community authority. Instead, it's a matter of choosing to behave in a way similar to others. That will, or desire to behave like the others, provides the "natural" base. Then, the training in boundaries, grammar, rules, and the formal education of '"concepts", is capable of taking advantage of this fundamental attitude, the desire to behave like the others.

So metaphysician undercover is now saying numbers are not ordinal, only cardinal. — Banno

Come on Banno, get with it, and quit your ridiculous straw manning. I'm saying there's no such thing as "numbers".

Unless you are referring to the symbols, what we call numerals, the assumption of "numbers" is blatant platonism, which we have no need for. We can still do orders, when 1, 2, 3, refer to first, second, third, etc..

Notice how this is much more realistic than the platonism you espouse. We get a clear distinction between "2" referring to a quantity, and "2nd" referring to an order position. This is simply a difference in the usage of the symbol. It's much clearer, easier to understand, and a more realistic representation, than the ambiguity of 'the number 2' being somehow both an order position, and a quantity.

That's the data from philosophers of mathematics. 43 respondents. Structuralism was ahead, with 18 agreeing. Platonism is int he alternatives, with 15 respondents.

Not perfect data, but far from a consensus for platonism. — Banno

The problem here has become obvious. there are probably many platonists, like Banno, who either don't realize it, or simply deny it. So response to a survey asking "what are you", would provide very misleading information. Better information would be obtained with some sort of questionnaire.

Quine's approach has a distinct advantage over your own, in that it allows us to do basic arithmetic. — Banno

Sorry, I don't see the relevance. We can do arithmetic without assuming that there are numbers which are positioned in between other numbers. All we need is symbols which represent values. Care to explain what you are trying to say?

Like I said, the ties with the CIA, MI6 and Mossad are clear. — Tzeentch

Let me tell you something about Epstein. Everything published about him which is "clear", is what he wanted the public to know. What he was really doing, his intentions, he obscured and kept secret. There are two sides to him, the public presentation, and the private, what he was actually doing. And, he was a master at secrecy. That's why he did what he did, so well.

The proffered alternative is that mathematical statements are true, and we can talk about mathematical objects existing, but this doesn't require positing some separate realm outside space and time where numbers "live." Instead, mathematical language works the way it does - we can truly say "there is a prime number between 7 and 11" - without needing to tell some grand metaphysical story about what makes this true. — Banno

Banno, the assumption that mathematical objects exist requires justification or else you're just talking through your hat. When anyone tries to justify their existence, Platonism is exposed in that attempt.

The truth of mathematical statements is connected to their role in our practices, proofs, and language games rather than correspondence to abstract objects in a Platonic heaven. — Banno

If your practise is to start with the premise that numerals refer to abstract objects, then the truth of this premise requires a platonic realm where these abstract objects exist. Otherwise any logic which follows is unsound, based in a false premise.

Here is the problem. For convenience sake, and common vernacular, we talk about numbers as if they are objects, and this in principle has no effect on mathematics, as mathematics is used. There is a clear separation between the talk about mathematics, people talking about numbers as objects, etc., and how the mathematicians are actually using the language of mathematics.

Describing mathematics in that way is just done to facilitate talk about mathematics. The talk about mathematics is in that way false, but it's a falsity of convenience, it facilitates our talk about mathematics. However, if the assumption that numbers are abstract objects makes its way into the axioms of mathematics (set theory), and this assumption is false, then we have a false premise within that logical system.

This view preserves mathematical realism (mathematical statements have objective truth values) while avoiding the metaphysical commitments of Platonism (no need for causally inert, spatiotemporally transcendent entities). — Banno

If it is the case, that within the axioms of mathematics, abstract objects are assumed, then "this view" which you present is a false description of mathematics. Clearly, set theory assumes within its axioms, abstract mathematical objects. Therefore the "objective truth" of mathematical set theory requires platonism.

You want to have it both ways (your cake and eat it, as frank says). You say that we can talk about numbers as abstract mathematical objects, though we know they really are not, and when we do mathematics the objective truth of mathematics is not dependent on this. That is fine in principle, if it is true. However, the truth about mathematics is that set theory assumes the existence of platonist objects, and the logical system is dependent on this assumption. This means that when we do mathematics using set theory, "abstract mathematical objects" is assumed, and the objective truth of mathematics is dependent on the "abstract mathematical objects".

So it is not just a matter of talking about numbers as mathematical objects, it is a matter of premising that numbers are platonic objects, and constructing a structure of mathematical logic with this premise as the foundation. That is set theory

Therefore, this talk about numbers as abstract objects, which we might recognize as false, yet still use, for simplicity sake, has been allowed to infiltrate and contaminate the system itself. We say that we recognize this assumption as not really a truth, but do we recognize the consequences? A vast logical structure, set theory, is based on what we recognize as a false assumption.

Platonism is not just "numbers exist", as Meta supposes. — Banno

Platonism is "numbers are objects". "Object" implies existing. When you propose that "X" stands for an object, or "2" stands for an object, the existence of that object must be justified. That's what Wittgenstein showed with the private language analogy. One can point to a chair, and say that is the object I'm talking about. But we can't point to a number this way. If I say that there is an object which is a number, this object must be independent from my mind, for its existence to be publicly justifiable, and that is platonism.

Otherwise the beetle in the box analogy applies. I have an object in my mind which I call "2", and you do too. We call them the same name, maybe even describe them in a very similar way, but your object is not the same as mine. therefore we do not have a proper "object" referred to with "2". The only way to justify 2 as an independent object is to assign platonic existence to it.

The response is not to reify the procedure that produces each digit; yet π is a quantified value within mathematics. It figures under quantifiers, enters inequalities, is bounded, approximated, compared, integrated over, etc. None of that is in dispute, and none of it commits us to Platonism. π is quantified intensionally, via its defining rules and inferential role — not extensionally, as a completed set of digits. — Banno

But you do not apply this principle infinite sequences. You do not say that each of these "is not a completed object. It is an instruction for producing digits". You insist on the very opposite, that these are completed objects That requires platonism to justify.

Go back and finish reading my post, instead of just replying to the second sentence.

If the rules of a single system contradict each other, as in the example, then "learning to use the rules" has a nuanced meaning, which includes choosing which of the opposing rules best suits one's purpose. Providing for an individual to choose from contradictory rules, according to one's purpose, allows subjectivity to contaminate the discipline which is supposed to provide for objective knowledge.

Both misunderstand mathematics, which consists in public techniques governed by rules. — Banno

That's insignificant drivel. We could say it about any discipline, they all consist of techniques governed by rules. That's education, learning the rules. The issue here however, is what do the rules say. If the rule says that "the natural numbers" refers to a completed object, that's platonism. If the rule says that "the natural numbers" refers to a count which can never be completed, then this refers to a mental act. The problem is that we cannot have both rules in the same system without contradiction within the system.

Depends on whether the first symbolism is time dependent. Does counting actually require temporal steps. Can you think of 1,2,3 as instantaneous? Just speculating. — jgill

This is the issue of platonism which Banno intentional avoids. The only way to believe that "N" could refer to a non-temporal, eternal object, is platonism.

What, you mean all the American billionaires and banks? — Tzeentch

American billionaires, and their banks are not a "state". Furthermore, you need to distinguish between the targets of the extortion and blackmailing, and the beneficiaries of the extortion and blackmailing.

You proposed that Epstein and his wife managed a "decades-spanning", "state-run enterprise" of "extortion and blackmailing".

If this is the case, then some state must have provided them with the funding, to operate, and in return that state would receive benefit from the extortion and blackmailing.

Have you seriously looked into which state was providing this funding, and benefitting from the operation?

Russia, ... really? :lol: — Tzeentch

Follow the money. Take a look at Epstein's funding.

Both Jeffrey and Ghislaine have deep ties to the CIA, MI6 and Mossad, leading me to believe this was a state-run enterprise. — Tzeentch

Which "state" would that be? The proposal of "state-run" requires that there is a specific "state" which runs it. The mention of association with a number of different states, is sort of contradictory to "state-run". And this is before even considering the possibility of Russian financing. To determine who "ran" the operation would require an understanding of who provided the funds.

Having ties to many states implies an entity acting outside the bounds of any state. Therefore it appears, at this time, like it was an operation run for personal gain, rather than for any state. That's why Trump appears to click right in to that clique. However, if it turns out that the financing was Russian, and it was "state-run", by Russia, that opens another can of worms.