but when that is taken to be a true account of the nature of being, then it goes too far. — Wayfarer

I'm not saying it is a true account of the nature of being (whatever that might mean), but rather merely, leaving aside our personal interests, a natural, hopefully unbiased, account of things as they appear to us.

It's not arbitrary, but it is contingent, both on what there is to see, but also on how we see it. — Wayfarer

I have never disagreed with that.

The difference therefore, is that "representation" implies something else which is being represented, while "appearance" has no such implication. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is often said that our perceptions are representations of that which affects our senses. I would prefer to speak of "presentations". In either case something is either repsented or presented is implied. It is also common to hear that our perceptions consist in what appears to us and that what we perceive is determined by whatever affects our senses.

In either way of speaking the things which affect our senses are not themselves representations or appearances, If we are perceiving we are perceiving something, and the question as to whether the perception resembles what the thing that is perceived is like when it is not being perceived seems to be an incoherent question. I hope that clears it up for you.

You've often said you have devoted time to reading Heidegger. Would you agree with this synopsis of his views on objectivity?

"Heidegger argues that scientific objectivity is grounded in a specific metaphysical framework: the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. This framework presumes that the world is composed of objects existing independently of the observer, available for detached study and measurement. Consequently it overlooks the more fundamental ways in which humans encounter the world as being-in-the-world (Dasein). Scientific objectivity reduces things to mere "present-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit), stripping away their richer modes of existence as they are experienced in the lifeworld.

Heidegger’s overarching concern is that science forgets or obscures the question of Being (Sein). By focusing only on what can be measured or quantified, science neglects the broader ontological context in which things appear as meaningful. This leads to an impoverished understanding of reality, where the richness of Being is replaced by a narrow focus on instrumental utility or efficiency."

Everything about human understanding is in terms of subjects and objects. I think the human-independently real is non-dual, but that does not mean it is totally homogeneous. Although it is a perspective that derives from science, which means in the final analysis, from experience, I think the idea of objects being energetic perturbations in a field is the closest I can come to conceptualizing the human-independently real in non-dual terms.

I don't believe that science and ordinary observation, of which science is an augmented form, are impoverished understandings of reality—they merely present a different perspective than the "zuhanden" perspective (which itself does not succeed in transcending the subject/object dichotomy in my view. I don't believe any discursive understanding can transcend duality because our language itself is inherently dualistic. No experience at all is possible without the primordial distinction between self and other.

None of which is to deny the empirical fact that boulders will roll over cracks and into canyons — Wayfarer

Okay, and do you also agree with this:

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape. — Leontiskos

You cite Schopenhauer and Berkeley. Are you agreeing with them in toto?

It is often said that our perceptions are representations of that which affects our senses. I would prefer to speak of "presentations". In either case something is either repsented or presented is implied. It is also common to hear that our perceptions consist in what appears to us and that what we perceive is determined by whatever affects our senses. — Janus

The problem with "presentation", as with "appearance", is that this denies us any intelligible relation to the independent reality. In fact, without something represented, the mind might just produce presentations and appearances without any external "thing" at all. So, to recognize the reality of the external world, and that there is some kind of relation between it and what the mind produces, it is common to understand what the mind produces, as a representation. This is what allows that the external world is in fact, real.

that what we perceive is determined by whatever affects our senses. — Janus

That what we perceive is "determined by" what affects our senses, is proven to be wrong by hallucinations, delirium, even dreaming. So, despite the fact that it is "common" to hear this, it is common in the sense of vulgar and uneducated. This is the result of a determinist attitude which trickles down from scientism, and the awe which common people have for the great power unleashed by the scientists' application of determinist principles. Scientism inclines people to believe that "determined by" is applicable to living systems.

Notice your choice of words. You say the perception is "determined" by what "affects" our senses. To affect something is to have an effect on it, to influence it. So if the sense organs are "affected" in their function, and their function is intermediary between what is sensed, and the mind which holds the perception, we cannot conclude that the perception is "determined" by what affects the senses. We have a relation of influence (affection) between the thing sensed and the sense organ, and we might assume a similar relation of influence (affection) between the sense organ and the perception in the mind. But this is far from what is required to say that the first "determines" the third.

In either way of speaking the things which affect our senses are not themselves representations or appearances, If we are perceiving we are perceiving something, and the question as to whether the perception resembles what the thing that is perceived is like when it is not being perceived seems to be an incoherent question. I hope that clears it up for you. — Janus

That clears it up, but it shows you misunderstood. The perception is the representation. The thing being perceived, i.e. what is represented, is what is said to have existence regardless of whether it is perceived (independent existence). That is what independent existence signifies, that it exists whether or not it is perceived. Now, the point is that this thing which has independent existence ( has existence regardless of whether it is perceived) does not necessarily have any resemblance whatsoever, to the perception of it, while it is being perceived.

You cite Schopenhauer and Berkeley. Are you agreeing with them in toto? — Leontiskos

Schopenhauer, more than Berkeley. Where I part company with Berkeley, is his dismissal of universals - his nominalism, in short. I think it leaves many gaps in his philosophy. But whenever I read his dialogues, I'm reminded of how ingenious a philosopher he was.

Schopenhaeur likewise - I'm almost totally on-board with his 'world as Idea', but the major issue I see with his philosophy of will is that, if will is 'irrational and blind', then how come the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences? I think Schopenhauer has blind spots of his own, much of them attributable to his hatred of Christianity. But he's still brilliant in my view - 'the last great philosopher', I'm sometimes inclined to say.

I will add, I've learned a ton of stuff about all manner of subjects since joining this forum, and including Husserl and Heidegger, about whom I knew next to nothing when I joined. I would like to think my overall approach is maybe nearer to a kind of phenonenology than to idealism per se.

The issue I wanted to highlight is that I think it's kind of hard to imagine having perception without some minimal intellectual capacities, because then it seems to me it would be hard to retain the perception. — Manuel

I can't imagine why anyone would want to deny animals even a minimal amount of intelligence. I have to stress I don't believe that conceptualization is some amazing special ability. The amazing ability here is syntactic language, conceptualization is merely a part of describing language-use.

Examples of animals suffering from abuse and being fearful of humans for a while seem to suggest some degree of association, which goes slightly beyond "mere" perception. — Manuel

The thing is, if you go down this road of "creating associations always involves the use of concepts" I believe you will end up attributing powers of conceptualization to very simple organisms, including machines.

'According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do.' — Wayfarer

I have to agree with you that this is too much baggage, I think the concept of reality/the world is a necessary primitive, but I don't know if it has to be conceptualized in terms of objects, properties, relations etc.

But do you not make a distinction between disagreements about how the world ought to be conceptualized and disagreements about how the world actually is? When people speak of mind-independent objects is believe I understand and agree with their meaning, even if I realize their conceptualization of reality is not the be-all end-all.

My take on collective consciousness more akin to Hegel's 'geist', which describes the way geist (usually translated as mind or spirit) manifests collectively in culture, history, and shared institutions. — Wayfarer

Kastrup is my go-to example because his is the only version of idealism I believe I've somewhat managed to understand. I certainly don't understand Hegel. One thing I particularly like about Kastrup is his immense commitment to parsimony.

Schopenhauer, more than Berkeley. Where I part company with Berkeley, is his dismissal of universals - his nominalism, in short. I think it leaves many gaps in his philosophy. But whenever I read his dialogues, I'm reminded of how ingenious a philosopher he was. — Wayfarer

Although I know very little about medieval philosophy, I get the impression that the debate between Realism and Nominalism would be pertinent to the topic of a Mind-Created World vs whatever the alternative might be : a Self-Existent Material World?

Contrary to the definition below, I naively assumed that Realism could be summarized as "what you see is all there is". Which would exclude Universals & Abstractions & Qualia, and Universal Mind, that are knowable only as ideas. Please comment on those alternative worldviews. Thanks. :smile:


Nominalism
The theory that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals are only names or labels for groups of things or events. Nominalists believe that the mind cannot create concepts or images that correspond to universal terms.
Realism
The theory that universals exist in addition to particulars, and that all entities can be categorized as either particulars or universals. Realist philosophies include Platonic realism and the hylomorphic substance theory of Aristotle.
Nominalism and realism were two major theoretical positions in the later Middle Ages, and were particularly important to theological scholars. For example, Thomas Aquinas was a prominent realist philosopher who argued that essence and existence were distinct. William of Ockham was a prominent nominalist philosopher who argued that universals were psychological labels.
___Google AI overview

I have tried throwing sticks too large for the dog to pick up. Or bricks. He will chase them but as soon as he realizes it is too big or hard to pick up in his mouth he loses interest straight away. In any case when you say the dog chases movement it seems you agree that the dog and I both see something moving at the same place and time and in the same direction and the same distance. — Janus

Ok, so we can guess that what initially gets them going is motion associated by a gesture you make which is related to "play time". Once the reach the object, maybe they try to life it up, maybe they get confused for a moment and then they look at you or ignore the object.

Here's the issue: why don't they pick up the object? Is it because they experience its structure as being too big and then retreat? Or is it an innate predisposition that makes them realize that this thing is too heavy (not related to structure) ?

I don't know. I think we can agree that the best we can do in the human case, which is the case in which we have the most data, is to try to understand a little why people do what they do - and even that is very hard very frequently.

When it comes to other animals, we are effectively guessing. Maybe they don't pick it up because they perceive a structure that's too big, maybe it's an innate response related to heaviness or pain avoidance.

I have never denied that the dog has a different experience of the world. I have no doubt he experiences the things I experience differently, but the difference is not all that radical and can be made sense of by considering the differences between my constitution and the dog's constitution. The dog sees his food bowl as 'to-be-eating-from' and his bed as 'to-be-laying-in' and given the way I experience those things in terms of size, shape and hardness the dog's behavior towards those things is consistent. — Janus

Here is where we disagree, and I don't see a remedy. I think the experiences are, in large part, very different. Sometimes there can be overlap - no creature is going to run into a fire or jump from a large distance. But whereas I think you are attributing this to shared structure, I think it's an innate response (not conscious) related to survival.

How much we share is very difficult to ascertain, but I think we could be misleading ourselves if we take ourselves to be reliable narrators of things outside us (the world, including other animals). It was no until we began to doubt our shared experiences, that modern science arose.

Also, one should mention dogs are the creatures which we have most co-existed with out of all animals, making them particularly misleading, imo.

I can't imagine why anyone would want to deny animals even a minimal amount of intelligence. I have to stress I don't believe that conceptualization is some amazing special ability. The amazing ability here is syntactic language, conceptualization is merely a part of describing language-use. — goremand

That's interesting to me. I think conceptualization of any kind is quite remarkable, even proto-conceptualization. But language is a unique instance, so far as we know, so it is, in a sense, more "special".

The thing is, if you go down this road of "creating associations always involves the use of concepts" I believe you will end up attributing powers of conceptualization to very simple organisms, including machines. — goremand

It's tricky to know where the cut-off point between explicit consciousness (such as elephants or monkeys) stops and mere reaction kicks in, maybe a fish or an oyster. But I do believe there is such a point.

To talk in this manner about machines, is to play with words, it's not substantive as I see it. So, we agree here.

But do you not make a distinction between disagreements about how the world ought to be conceptualized and disagreements about how the world actually is? When people speak of mind-independent objects is believe I understand and agree with their meaning, even if I realize their conceptualization of reality is not the be-all end-all. — goremand

That is a very perceptive question, and the precise point at issue in another current thread on metaphysical realism and anti-realism (there's a lot of crossover between the two threads). As I'm generally advocating an idealist approach, then I'm in the anti-realist camp, although the term bothers me, because I am still acutely aware of many real things that have to be dealt with on a daily basis. ('Life is like a movie, but with actual pain'.)

My spontaneous response is that I think classical philosophy had the insight that we do not, by default, know what anything actually is. If you go back to Parmenides, his fragmentary prose-poem says outright that most human beings are ensnared in an illusory domain where they entertain opinions about unreal things. And come to think of it, in today's hyper-connected and social-media-dominated world, that really doesn't seem so far-fetched. Wisdom is not being deluded, but then, delusion is ubiquitous. Not necessarily to the point of gross delusion and actual mental illness, but in the middle of the bell curve of normality. So we tend to look to science and objective judgement as the arbiter of what is real and the antidote to delusion, but the problem with that is that science is largely quantitative and arms-length. Actual life is too close to bring such an approach to bear. But the effect of that belief is to form the notion that reality is what already exists, and we gradually expand and enhance our knowledge of it. That is what is generally understood by realism. So in that context, 'mind-independent' means objective, not a matter of opinion, the criterion of what is actually so. I copied some scrapbook lecture notes on Heidegger above which address this point.

'Heidegger argues that scientific objectivity is grounded in a specific metaphysical framework: the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. This framework presumes that the world is composed of objects existing independently of the observer, available for detached study and measurement. Consequently it overlooks the more fundamental ways in which humans encounter the world as being-in-the-world (Dasein). Scientific objectivity reduces things to mere "present-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit), stripping away their richer modes of existence as they are experienced in the lifeworld.

Heidegger’s overarching concern is that science forgets or obscures the question of Being (Sein). By focusing only on what can be measured or quantified, science neglects the broader ontological context in which things appear as meaningful. This leads to an impoverished understanding of reality, where the richness of Being is replaced by a narrow focus on instrumental utility or efficiency.'

I've only read a little of Heidegger, but that diagosis makes perfect sense to me.

Although I know very little about medieval philosophy, I get the impression that the debate between Realism and Nominalism would be pertinent to the topic of a Mind-Created World vs whatever the alternative might be : a Self-Existent Material World? — Gnomon

In Aristotelian philosophy, the mind is united with the forms of particulars by the understanding. That prevents the sense of separateness or 'otherness' that haunts modern culture. That's a big topic.

But whereas I think you are attributing this to shared structure, I think it's an innate response (not conscious) related to survival. — Manuel

But is it not most reasonable to think they are responses (whether innate or not) perhaps to survival, or perhaps to enjoying themselves or whatever, to different things in different situations? And when we observe them do not those responses make sense to us in terms of what we see those different things in different contexts to be?

I mean you seem not to want to admit that the dog sees a ball, and yet you say the dog sees me making a gesture or movement. So my dogs see me and I'm an object in the environment. My dogs recognize me—of that there is no doubt. Now they may well not see me in the same way as people do (but then different people may not see me in exactly the same way either).

Also you say that dogs will not jump into a fire or from a high place—so it follows that they perceive fire and high places. They also do not bump into trees or walls (unless they are blind which was the case with my mother's cocker spaniel when I was a kid). They behave differently and consistently towards different things in the environment and that behavior makes sense in terms of how we perceive those objects. I don't know what else to say. If you remain unconvinced then I have nothing further to add.