Further, isn't it the case that the cows can be over there even if it is not the case that you, I or anyone else knows that they are over there, or has justification for claiming that they are over there. — Banno
The point is duration t3 can have an effect on t1. — Mark Nyquist
If you think of a time line with a duration of time (instead of an instant) moving with the arrow of time then the backward propagation only exists in the duration....moving backward. — Mark Nyquist
Try this,
Take a sheet of lined paper and write t1 to t10 down the left side.
Draw a box next to t1. It represents a duration of physical matter during the T1 duration
Draw a box next to t2 shifted to the right by say a third the duration of t1. Same size.
And so on down the page.
Think of the boxes as matter progressing through time in 3D. — Mark Nyquist
I've learned that the concept of relativistic mass is deemed troublesome and dubious by some. Can you elaborate how it falsifies E=mc2
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2
? — ucarr
There is a solution to this in the form of back propagation of energy. — Mark Nyquist
If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then e=mc2
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is false? — ucarr
he unity, and hence the identity and the being, of a non-living thing is little more than the contiguity of its parts. If a rock, for example, is divided, we simply have two smaller rocks. In a living thing, on the other hand, the members of its body constitute an organic whole, such that each part both conditions and is conditioned by the other parts and the whole. A living thing is thus one being to a far greater extent than a non-living thing. — Eric D Perl Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition
Aristotle certainly put the active principle above the elements being acted upon. I am not aware of any passage that expresses a ratio of the sort Perl is putting forth. — Paine
Might be interesting to be informed as to what you think scepticism actually is, and therefrom, where in transcendental philosophy it resides, as a flaw in it. — Mww
I think I’ve mentioned the tension several times. It’s important to distinguish between (a) a priori concepts and forms of intuition, and (b) inner/outer experience. Although Kant is obviously stuck in a cognitivist and Cartesian paradigm, he is pushing against it in exactly the way I described. Flipping the priority of inner and outer experience is an important aspect of the CPR, expressed first (in A) in the fourth paralogism, and then (in B) in the “Refutation of idealism”. The latter especially is a paradigmatic case of Kant’s transcendental arguments. — Jamal
I take the important and controversial question to be how Wittgenstein’s late philosophy can be transcendental given that it’s significantly anthropological and seemingly empirical, and given that he specifically cautions against the identification of, and the search for, necessity and universality (and by implication, the a priori). — Jamal
Crucially too, the transcendental is anti-sceptical, and not just as a pleasant side-effect. This is seen at various points in the CPR (the Transcendental Deduction of the categories, the Refutation of Idealism, and the fourth Paralogism in the first edition). Generally what we get is the idea that it doesn't make sense to say that objects as we perceive and know them are such apart from those conditions (there is a sense in which Kant's transcendental idealism is almost a tautology: you cannot experience something except in the way you must experience it). Since I'm more familiar with OC than PI, I wouldn't mind pursuing this angle ("Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application."). — Jamal
Similar to Wittgenstein (and Davidson's "triangulation"), Kant transcendentally flipped inner and outer experience to give primacy to the latter, i.e., to the experience of the "external world" as opposed to self-knowledge and self-consciousness. Descartes and his followers, both rationalist and empiricist, assumed that... — Jamal
But he does not explicitly state that “there are laws of nature”. He says we could say “there are laws of nature” if there were a law of causality. He does not say P; P cannot be said. He says If X then we could say P; but we cannot say P. — Jamal
There is not, as Wittgenstein puts it, something "unassailable" that we run up against, but something transcendent and without limit, which, in having no limit, must necessarily include the whole, and thus both sides of mind/nature and appearance/reality (and in this, we get something closer to Hegel's solution to the same issues). — Count Timothy von Icarus
But eventually there has to be something, some concrete principle or law other than what would be the only other option "randomly changing nonsense" or some sort of Twilight Zone. — Outlander
How could you suggest something if you then say it cannot be pinpointed. — Outlander
With the older and newer expressions placed side by side, Cometti can be seen to be missing the mark when stating:
In the later Wittgenstein the notion of "forms of life" takes the place of the Tractarian doctrine of the boundary between what can and cannot be said, which determines in turn the "limits of my world". My world takes on the limits of my form of life.
— Jean-Pierre Cometti, 'Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and the question of expression'
Wittgenstein is observing the same limits of 5.557 in both works. The use of "form of life" is not a replacement of a previous schema. — Paine
For fuck’s sake. Check what Wittgenstein actually wrote before you go off on one of your rants:
If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature.
But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest. — Jamal
You see it, it must be governed by something, hence its existence, which is the key proposition here, true or not. — Outlander
Simply reporting a fact "that can clearly not be said" may refer to a relative state of affairs and absolute accurate assessment of a given situation not an absolute limitation for all knowledge or context of it. — Outlander
The first man who observed fire, for example. It clearly exists, it clearly has laws, but at the time, for whatever reason, also, simply could not be explained. That's one possibility. — Outlander
Simply reporting a fact "that can clearly not be said" may refer to a relative state of affairs and absolute accurate assessment of a given situation not an absolute limitation for all knowledge or context of it. — Outlander
Nothing in the text suggest that is the case. I am getting the impression that the argument has no existence for you because you have written it off as a fallacy from the beginning. — Paine
Wittgenstein is not trying to prove Hume's principle. Wittgenstein's statement is:
"There are natural laws.
But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself."
This goes to express the recognition that the limits of explanation are not the limit of what can be experienced through the use of a method. To that end, the argument is a deeper acceptance of transcendence than what Kant expressed. — Paine
Your use of "fact" and its place (or absence of place) in the world has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's argument. What cannot be said is found through recognizing our condition:
6.4312 The temporal immortality of the soul of man, that is to say, its eternal survival also after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
(It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.) — Paine
The dimensions of this condition are found through the structure of our representations. The argument of what can be said or not is the description of that structure. That is where the limits of what can and what cannot be done are laid out. The method is the linking of these "cannots."
2.16 In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.
2.161 In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation.
2.171 The picture can represent every reality whose form it has.
The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.
2.172 The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth.
2.173 The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is its form of representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or falsely.
2.174 But the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.
2.223 In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There is no picture which is apriori true.
3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
3.22 In the proposition the name represents the object.
3.221 Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. I can only speak
of them. I cannot assert them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is.
3.262 What does not get expressed in the sign is shown by its application. What the signs conceal, their application declares. — Paine
With these limits established, the arguments can observe differences between logic and the world we talk about: — Paine
From this point, what cannot be explained is distinguished from the explanations given through natural science referred to in 6.4312:
6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: There are natural laws.
But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself.
6.363 The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.
6.3631 This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen.
— ibid. — Paine
That assertion does not appear in the text. — Paine
I recommend reading the introduction written by Bertrand Russell to get a sense of the "world" as a boundary rather than as a "thing."
I don't agree with Russell's framing of many issues, but he does reflect the distance from the "totality of facts" given in the descriptions: — Paine
Davidson distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: subjective, intersubjective, and objective, and he doesn’t reduce any of these to any of the others. Intersubjective knowledge is not just a subset of objective knowledge or subjectivity multiplied but is something else: knowledge of other minds. Objective knowledge is knowledge of the world that the subject shares with others (or rather, that the subjects share), which has a bunch of objects in it. — Jamal
So instead of subject and object you have an object plus at least two persons who share a language. — Jamal
Both, I guess. The fallacy of composition is to assume that because a certain type/element of thought is linguistic, that all aspects of it must be — e.g., if there are things we like about a piece of music or art that we can't put into words, this je ne sais quoi isn't contained in "thought." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Similar to Wittgenstein (and Davidson's "triangulation"), Kant flipped inner and outer experience to give primacy to the latter, i.e., to the experience of the "external world" as opposed to self-knowledge and self-consciousness. — Jamal
When making arguments it is good to have a leg to stand on, to take a stance, and have a proper and I assume in your case fetching attitude. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein had an infamous disregard for the history of philosophy. Some might say this was in order to think things through without prejudice; others that it was in order to claim credit for the ideas of others.
But Kant does not loom large either in Wittgenstein's own accounts of his influences, or in the accounts of contemporaries and sympathisers. The links seem to be relatively recent scholarship.
So I would urge some caution. — Banno
Back to Kant and what the individual sees and knows (and can't know). — frank
I think in this sense Wittgenstein becomes a guru, who utters infallible truths in the view of his followers, and nobody notices that in effect he is speaking nonsense. — god must be atheist
Davidson argues that thought has content if and only if the thought is related to a social system. That is my perception Davidson's opinion, after reading paragraphs in this thread. — god must be atheist
Dogs cannot set out the rule they are following. — Banno
This allows him the space to develop a theory where conversation and intersubjectivity are essential to the human experience, and how we come to "say things about things," without getting "stuck in the box of language," or "the cabinet of the mind." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Scurrilous accusations. — Jamal
But yes, people do argue that Freud in particular tried to conceal his sources. Turns out he’d probably read more Nietzsche than he admitted. And if he did take sublimation from someone else it was likely Nietzsche, who used the word in Human, All Too Human. — Jamal
That said, I see from Googling around that there’s been some talk of sublimation as expressing some of the sense of Hegel’s Aufheben. And I quite like that sense in the context of the OP as well. — Jamal
Are you confusing sublimation with Hegel’s sublation? — Jamal
How is an appeal to "family resemblance" a negation of logical structure? What structure are you referring to? — Paine
A common response to this is: "think" or "think about it" or "think it through". We might also ask for an explanation. — Fooloso4
You are late to the party. This has been part of the discussion since the OP. — Fooloso4
Very amusing, MU. — Jamal
It is the logical structure underlying language and not mind that is a check against illogical thought. I take this to mean that any illogical thought or propositions would evidently involve a contradiction.and would not be accepted. — Fooloso4
It is not my representation. It is what Wittgenstein says. I cited it. Unless you are claiming that he means something else by the term 'transcendental. — Fooloso4
I think this misses the mark. It is logic rather than language which is transcendental. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible. Language and the world share a logical structure. Logic underlies not only language but the world. It is the transcendental condition that makes the world possible. — Fooloso4
One more interesting thing to note is that Kant and Wittgenstein are similar not only in their transcendental perspective on human beings, but also in their use of this perspective to show that most philosophy hitherto has gone astray by asking questions that cannot be asked. — Jamal
The logic is not merely supposed to be rigorous. It is rigorous in these senses: (1) The axioms and rules of inference are recursive, thus, for a purported proof given in full formality, it is mechanical to check whether it is indeed a proof, i.e., merely an application of the inference rules to the axioms. (2) It is proven that the logic is sound, i.e. that a formula is is provable from a given set of formulas only if the formulas is entailed from the set of formulas. — TonesInDeepFreeze
mathematics, in ordinary context, 'x=y' is true if and only if x and y are the same object, which is to say 'x=y' is true if and only if what 'x' stands for is the same as what 'y' stands for. The claim that there are no such objects is not properly given as an objection to the fact that '=' stands for identity, since we would still have '=' standing for identity if the objects were physical, concrete, fictional, hypothetical, 'as if', abstract, platonic, etc. — TonesInDeepFreeze
* Sets are not determined by an order in which the members happen to be mentioned. If I say, "What are the members of the set of books on your desk", then if you say, the set of books on my desk is all and only the books 'The Maltese Falcon', 'Light In August' and 'The Stranger', then no one could say "No, that's wrong, the set of books on your desk is actually all and only the books 'Light In August', 'The Stranger' and 'The Maltese Falcon'!" — TonesInDeepFreeze
No law of identity is violated there. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Nobody says that the set of items on a desk is different depending on the order you list them. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Not quite. Whether the object of fear is known is irrelevant to Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety. Instead, the source of the phenomenon (within the world or not within the world) determines whether the phenomenon is fear or anxiety.
That in the face of which one has fear is always an entity within the world while that in face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within the world. See Being and Time at 230-231, (Macquarrie & Robinson).
Simply put, "the forest and the trees" is not a good analogy for understanding Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety. — Arne
I agree. But what makes me wonder about how Fosse wrote the book is whether the silence is a reference to death (his parents and sister passed away and he feels alone) or the inability to say to them that he wants to go back to Norway. In this novel, the silence is a key factor and, most of the time, is confusing because even the protagonist feels scared of why his family remain in silence at the pier. — javi2541997