Comments

  • Infinity
    I think you would approve of Wittgenstein's view. He was a finitist, and a math anti-realist. He didn't believe in set theory. He thought it was bullshit.frank

    I agree. Wittgenstein understood set theory is platonism, and rejected it as an inadequate representation of thinking. Thinking is the private property of subjects and is therefore inherently subjective. Platonism presents us with the products of thinking as something independent from the act of thinking, these are what we call "thoughts".

    But this neglects a very important feature of thinking which is communication. We present our thoughts to each other through communication. When we allow that communication must be represented as a necessary aspect of "thoughts", then the true "objects" produced by thinking are the spoken and written symbols (leading toward nominalism), rather than some ideas which are called "thoughts".

    The issue is that when we accept the reality, that communication is a necessary aspect of what is commonly called "thought", then it becomes very clear that the other representation of "thought" as some sort of ideas which are produced by thinking, has no grounding accept in platonism. The notion that thinking produces some sort of objects, ideas, is a misrepresentation, because what is actually produced is a system of symbols. And the existence of those supposed objects (ideas) have no grounding accept in platonism. So platonism is a false representation because it does not account for the role of symbols in the act of thinking.

    Banno clearly takes the platonist perspective, which ignores the role of symbols, and we can see this from the following.

    But this does not invalidate ZFC nor the axiom of choice, nor need we conclude that a limit is something the sequence approaches dynamically rather than a property of the sequence as a completed object.

    And the larger point: At issue is whether there is one basic ontology for mathematics. Sime is seeking to replace one ontology with another, to insist that we should think of infinite sequences as processes or algorithms, not completed totalities.
    Banno

    We need to consider the role of symbols in representation, to understand the thinking which is being represented in these situations. Consider the following two ways to represent the natural numbers, "1, 2, 3, ...", and "N". Would you agree that these two symbolizations each signify something different? The latter represents a complete object which we know as 'the natural numbers". The former represents an endless sequence, which by that understanding, could never be complete.

    With respect to those two distinct ways of representing "the natural numbers", would you agree that it is possible, even acceptable, and conventional, to represent what we know as "the natural numbers", in two contradictory ways? One symbolization means something, the other means something else, and the two contradict each other. This implies that there is two contradictory ways to understand what "the natural numbers" means, depending on the symbolization employed in usage.

    @Srap Tasmaner.
    This proposition, that what is meant by "the natural numbers" has contradictory meaning depending on the application, ought not be taken as an offence. You ought to accept it as a proposed description of the reality of mathematics, and judge honestly whether it is a true description or not.

    And, the idea that an "object" within a highly specialized field of study like mathematics has contradictory definitions ought not be surprising to you. Take a look for example at the difference between rest mass, and relativistic mass in physics for example. The concept of "mass" has contradictory meaning depending on the application. This is just a description of the reality of human knowledge.
  • Infinity
    Yes, I attach value to mathematics, but that's like saying I attach value to logic or to language or, you know, to thinking. The basis of mathematics is woven into the way we think, and mathematics itself is primarily a matter of doing that more systematically, more self-consciously, more carefully, more reflectively. The way many on this forum say you can't escape philosophy or metaphysics, I believe you can't escape mathematics, or at least that primordial mathematics of apprehending structure and relation.Srap Tasmaner

    OK, so you believe that mathematics is very much comparable to metaphysics, as I suggested. Do you also believe that to maintain consistency, if a philosopher believes that there is a need to be critical of metaphysical principles, that same philosopher ought to also believe that there is a need to be critical of mathematical principles?

    When you say you are critiquing mathematical principles, here's what I imagine: you open your math book to page 1; there's a definition there, maybe it strikes you as questionable in some way; you announce that mathematics is built on a faulty foundation and close the book. "It's all rubbish!" You never make it past what you describe as the "principles" which you reject.Srap Tasmaner

    Your imagination misleads you then.
  • Infinity
    So I enjoy these chances to exercise my math muscles a bit more directly than usual, and I take deep offense at Metaphysician Undercover's repeated dismissal of mathematics as a tissue of lies, half-truths, and obfuscations.Srap Tasmaner

    I don't understand this feeling of offense. This is philosophy, and what we do is critical thinking, and therefore criticize. What I don't get, is that many people think it's acceptable, even warranted and expected, that we criticize metaphysical principles, yet some of the same people believe it's for some reason unacceptable, and offensive to criticize mathematical principles. Where is the consistency in this type of attitude?

    What I apprehend here is that some people take mathematics as a sort of religion. So in the same way that some people get seriously offended when their "God" is criticized, some others get seriously offended when their "mathematics" is criticized.

    Such potentially infinite sequences do not possess a limit unless the choices are made in accordance with an epsilon-delta strategy that obeys the definition of "limit". So in this case, we can speak of approaching a limit, because Eloise and Abelard are endlessly cooperating to produce a strategy for continuing a live sequence that literally approaches their desired limit, as opposed to the previous case of Eloise having a one-move winning-strategy when competing against Abelard for proving a convergence property of a dead algorithm.sime

    This is what @Banno seems to be in denial of. The intent behind creating the infinite sequence, is to create an infinite sequence. This implies that the so-called "limit", as defined by Banno, is prior to the sequence, as a requirement for the creation of the sequence.

    On the other hand, we could look at the infinite extension of pi, as an unintentional infinite sequence. Notice, that now there is no "limit". This exposes the nature of "the limit", it is a concept which serves the purpose of creating an infinite sequence. When an infinite sequence is created unintentionally, there is no "limit".

    This leads to a question about the intentionality of the infinity which is the natural numbers. If this is an unintentional infinite sequence, we ought to assume that there is no limit. But if it is intentional, then there ought to be some sort of limit, as the source of its creation.
  • Infinity

    Your denial never ceases to amaze me.
  • Infinity
    This is exactly arse about. The limit is a result of the sequence. Those who care to look can see exactly that in the proofs offered earlier.Banno

    Take a look at the quoted sequence:

    he key is that an infinite sequence may have a finite sum: ½ + ¼ + ⅛ ... = 1Banno

    Quite clearly, the limit must be assumed prior to taking half of it.
  • Infinity
    look at what "as close as we like to some number" means. It means there is no limit to how close we can get to that number. That is how you define "limit" a specified number for which there is no limit to how close we can get to it.

    Added: the pedagogic problem - it's not a mathematical problem - is how to dissipate the notion that the limit is "a little bit more" than the sequence?Banno

    Obviously, there is always "a little but more" in terms of how close we can get to the limit. that is implied by your definition of "limit". If we'd like to get closer to the limit, than any previously proposed closeness, we can do that, and get closer to that limit. This is what your definition indicates. Therefore, to "dissipate the notion" that there is always more, would be a big mistake, contrary to the definition. Why would you aspire to do this?.

    Notice that the limit is set out in terms of the sequence - the limit is provided by the sequence alone! so the limit results form the sequence. But it need not be one of the elements of the sequence. It's not something the sequence reaches toward — it is a property of the sequence itself.Banno

    So here is where your mistake lies. The limit is the condition for the sequence, the sequence is derived from it, as a formula, a repetition of "half the value between this point and the specified limit". Therefore your mistake is in saying "the limit results form the sequence". The limit is necessarily specified prior to producing the sequence. Then, the sequence is produced from the way that "limit" was defined. We can always get closer to the limit, if that is what we want to do.

    Because the limit is prior to the sequence it is not "a property of the sequence itself". The limit preexists the sequence as a necessary condition for it. So if one is to be said to be a property of the other, the sequence is a property of the limit. By this mistake, what you say which follows, is all wrong.

    The limit isn't something the sequence is trying to get to; it's a concise description of how the sequence behaves. The sequence doesn't "know about" or "aim for" its limit - the limit is simply our label for a pattern in the sequence's terms.Banno

    The sequence is designed, and produced from the limit. Therefore knowing the limit, and aiming for it, in this way of getting ever closer to it, is an essential aspect of the sequence. the sequence is derived from the nature of "the limit". And this is clear from the way you define "limit". We know "some number", and we also know that there is no limit to how close we can get (we can get as close as we like) to it. The sequence is derived from the specified number.
  • Infinity
    If ∣x∣<ε for every ε>0, then x=0 is not a stipulation about limits; it is a theorem about the real numbers, derived from the order structure of ℝ.Banno

    The conclusion "x=0" is not valid without a further stipulation that there can be nothing between the least ε and zero. But we know there is no least ε and there will always be another lesser ε . Therefore x has no place in that number system, and is wrongly inserted as a category mistake. What is x? And how is it allowed to fit into the number line in this way, when it is not itself a number?.

    Since what constitutes "the real numbers" is a matter of stipulation, you are wrong to say it's not a stipulation. You have inserted, through a category mistake, something called x which is not a number, but somehow you claim that it is equal to a number, zero in this case. That is a stipulation.
  • Infinity
    I'm not concerned about credibility or showing that I'm working.frank

    Banno's proofs continue to be a matter of begging the question. Stipulate that the limit is the value, then use that as a premise in proving an instance of this.

    The electron is, in fact, conceived by scientists as a point. It's startling, but true.frank

    That's half true, because the electron is also conceived as a probability cloud. Hence the wave/particle duality.
  • Infinity

    But the point I made is that "point particle" is a conception of convenience, designed for the purpose of representing interactions. It does not represent how the electron is actually conceived as existing. The electron is modeled as a "point particle", but it does not exist that way, the probability cloud is a better representation (though still very inadequate) of how electrons exist.
  • Infinity
    For (2) to be possible, I must be offering you the actual value.Srap Tasmaner

    Sorry Srap, I can't see how you make this conclusion. 'Within a specified tolerance' does not indicate "the actual value" has been given. It just indicates that the value is within a specified tolerance. In neither case is the value which is being rounded off, actually specified. If "the actual value" was specified the procedure would be unnecessary. So I don't see any significant difference between the two, just two different forms of rounding off.

    But an electron is conceived as a point.frank

    I don't think so, electrons are conceived as a cloud of probability, with a variable density.

    Isn't that the same as the idea of an infinitesimal in math?frank

    An electron could not be infinitely small, because this would reduce the probability of them having any location to practically zero. And that is contrary to what is observed and verified by the cloud of probability conception.

    The issue is actually quite complex, because "point particle" is really just a conception of convenience. It's not meant to actually indicate the physical properties of the supposed particle. Rather it's a convenient way to conceptualize interactions. Compare this to the concept of "centre of gravity" for example. This is meant to represent a point which indicates where a body's weight or mass is centred around. But it's just a conception of convenience which helps to model interactions, it doesn't indicate a real point that the body is centring itself around. Nor does the "point particle" concept indicate a real point where an electron is located. They are both conceptions of convenience, intended to facilitate the representation of interactions.

    According to Zvi Rosen, the sum and the limit are not equal (according to Cauchy). They're just as close as we "want" them to be.frank

    It's just a matter of definition. Notice what you say, that they are as close as we want them to be. Banno wants them to be equal, and so he defines them that way. But in the context of this discussion such a stipulation is really meaningless.

    The salient bit today is that a limit is not a rounding off.Banno

    Then why did you say to@jgill, "a more intricate form of 'rounding off'"? That really looks like "rounding off" to me. The point being, that applying a limit to that which is limitless (infinite), is nothing other than a form of rounding off. it's really no different from saying that pi is 3.14, or that it is 3.14159, or however you want to round it off. You are apply a limit to what is limitless, and that is a form of rounding off.
  • Infinity
    It's not that the adjacent members of a sequence become "infinitely close": they become "arbitrarily close", and so the series (in this case, the sum of the members of the sequence) becomes arbitrarily close to — well, that's the thing, to what? And that's your limit.Srap Tasmaner

    That's exactly when rounding off is employed, when things are designated as "arbitrarily close". How have you done anything other than described a case of rounding off?
  • Infinity
    The difference between the limit and the sum is an infinitely small number.frank

    "Infinitely small number" really has no meaning in this context. If the formula is applied to spatial distance, as in the Zeno paradox, it means infinitely short distance, not infinitely small number.

    We could say that this solves Zeno's paradox as along as space and time actually conform to the calculus framework. I think the average scientist would agree that they do conform, but there is still room to reject the calculus angle.frank

    I don't agree. I think the average scientist would say that it doesn't make sense to talk about infinitely short distances. So if they round something off to zero it wouldn't be an infinitely short distance which is being rounded off, because the limitation of practise would require rounding off before infinitely short distance (whatever that actually means) is reached.

    For example, when I use pi I round off to 3.14. Some scientific applications might request something more precise, but really the precision of the outcome is relative to the precision of the actual measurement. But, it's never an infinitely short amount which is being rounded of. So in the other example, are the measurements such that you are rounding 1/2+1/4+1/8 +1/16 to 1, or are you rounding 1/2+1/4+1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64 to 1? In the first case, 1/16 would be lost, as rounded to zero. In the second case 1/32 would be lost. The smaller the size becomes, the more difficult it becomes to measure it, and the required precision is application dependent.
  • Infinity

    I'll repeat, since you did not address the issue.

    It is a difference between theory and practise. In theory, the sum approaches the limit. In practice the sum is the limit. The latter can be understood as "rounding off". Failure to recognize this is to misunderstand.
  • Infinity
    The key is that an infinite sequence may have a finite sum: ½ + ¼ + ⅛ ... = 1Banno

    You mean the key is to put an end to the infinite sequence by rounding off. That's what we've done with pi for thousands of years. But if you think that this puts an end to the infinite sequence, and solves Zeno's paradoxes, you misunderstand.

    This obviously works in practise. But the paradoxes are theoretical, they always have been, and they've always been irrelevant to practise. "Limits, infinitesimals and calculus" change the practise, but have no affect toward answering the paradoxes, which remain unchanged despite the changes in practise.
  • Time Dilation and Subjectivity
    Replayed songs are physicalCorvus

    isn't the firing of neurons, which constitutes the playing of the song in the mind, something physical as well? It doesn't happen at the speed of light, because it occurs through a physical medium. So wouldn't time dilation slow down that activity?

    But you cannot access the other folks mind, hence you wouldn't know what song is being played in his/her mind.Corvus

    Consider, you could have an analyzing system hooked up to the person's brain. The person tells you i am playing Social Distortion's "I was Wrong" in my mind, and you observe the corresponding neural activity. Then, whenever you see an exact replication of that physical activity you know the person plays that song. From a different frame of reference, would time dilation apply? You might see the same activity slowed down.
  • Time Dilation and Subjectivity
    No.Corvus

    Why not? it's like when you play a 45 at 33 1/3.
  • Infinity
    Does that explain it?frank

    No, you described a long process, and the problem is with the use of "at some point". How does a process occur at a point?
  • Infinity
    Ok. All I know is that it's common sense that if you're driving from Washington DC to Alaska, you will, at some point, be in British Columbia. Those who claim this view is wrong should at least acknowledge that what they're saying sounds bizarre.frank

    I would say the opposite is the case, what you say sounds bizarre. You are representing driving through British Columbia, as being in British Columbia at some point. What does "at some point" even mean in this context? You use it because it's an acceptable figure of speech, but taken literally, it doesn't fit. So what does it really mean?
  • Donald Trump (All Trump Conversations Here)
    Trump is being fetishized as the personification of pure evil...Tzeentch

    From the "tribal" perspective, that which divides the tribe is evil. And the designation is justified.
  • Infinity
    Maybe there's no joy there. Still, forcing the unwieldy mass of rational numbers to line up single file to be counted was a master stroke.Srap Tasmaner

    When the measuring stick needs to be measured, it's time to throw away the measuring system completely, and devise anew. Otherwise paradoxes are produced, like Russell's.

    Some people reject talking about infinite collections, I think, or reject talking about performing operations on them.Srap Tasmaner

    Of course, an infinite collection by any standard definition of "collection" is nonsense. A collection consists of things which have been collected, not things designated as collectible. And that's problems arise in set theory, "collection" becomes a designated collectible type, rather than the collection itself.

    This is how the concept of "the empty set" creates paradoxes like Russel's. A "collection" with no items is not a collection at all. It is only a criterion for collection, therefore an abstract 'type" distinct from an item. Allowing for an empty set means that "the set" itself is not the collection of things (or else an empty set would not be a set), but "the set" is the abstract type, which describes the things to be collected. The things themselves, therefore, the elements of the set, must be categorically distinct from the sets, or else the empty set is the contradictory notion of a collection of nothing. Failing to follow this categorical distinction, which is necessitated by "the empty set", and allowing that a set might itself be an element of a set, produces problems.

    But if the collection consist of things designated as collectible, and there is none of them, then it makes sense to talk about an empty set. However, this leaves cardinality as completely unjustified because the elements are just possibly collected, and therefore not counted.

    Who would say no to that? How could you get from A to B without arriving at a point that's halfway between?frank

    I think that what Srap is saying is that we cannot reduce motion to a succession of truths. That's what Aristotle demonstrated as the incompatibility between being and becoming. If change is represented as a succession of different states of being, one after the other, then there will always be the need to posit a further distinct state, in between any two. Then we have an infinite regress, without ever accounting for what happens between two states, as the change, or "becoming" which occurs as the transition from one to the next.

    So if motion is described as getting from A to B, A and B are the two points of being, you are at A, then you are at B. Since they are not the same, there is distance between, and we can posit a middle point. You are at C. Then we posit a point of being in between A and C. You are at D. Notice, we've reduced motion to "being at a point which is different from the previous point". But this produces an infinite regress without ever addressing the real issue of how you get from one point to the other, what happens in between. This is the real nature of motion, what happens in between, and it cannot be represented as being at a designated point.
  • Donald Trump (All Trump Conversations Here)
    DHS notes a more than 1000% increase in assaults on ICE agents.AmadeusD

    I wonder why that happened.
  • Infinity
    So you think that "to be is to be the value of a variable" is a platonist principle?Ludwig V

    if being is reduced to value, that's idealism, not necessarily platonist though, but most cases yes. That's classical Pythagorean idealism, the cosmos is made up of mathematical objects.

    Except that ordinal numbers don't assign a value; that assigns a place in an order.Ludwig V

    A place in an order, or hierarchy is a value.

    No, it isn't. It is about whatever I am assigning a value to.Ludwig V

    What we were discussing was the act of assigning value, counting. That was the subject. Now you are changing the subject to claim that we were not talking about this act, but that we were talking about the thing which you assign the value to. Clearly we were not, as whatever it is assumed to be was not even mentioned.

    Not all words refer to anything. That's why there's such a fuss about dragons and the present king of France.Ludwig V

    Why do you allow that sometimes when words refer to ideas (two, three, for example), they refer to things, but sometimes when words refer to ideas (dragons, present king of France), they do not refer to things? Why not just maintain consistency and recognize that these are all cases of words referring to ideas?
  • Infinity
    I think many people believe that if something is referred to, it counts as an object.Ludwig V

    I think that would be an odd use of language, if every word referred to an object. Definitely not suitable for a rigorous logic. For example, we distinguish noun and verb, object from subject, subject from predicate. To disregard these distinctions would incapacitate logical procedures.

    So you are right to foreground what we do with numbers - or numerals if you prefer. But I think you slip up when you say that the numeral refers to an idea. That just resuscitates that argument you gave about numbers as ideas. The assignation of value in this context is public and shared, so it cannot be about ideas in our individual minds.Ludwig V

    I actually don't mind when people refer to numbers as objects, that's the way I learned in school. But when people do this they need to respect the ontological consequences.

    When you count something publicly, you share your assignment of value. Other people can observe and correct you if they think you make a mistake. This clearly is about ideas in our minds.

    I'm getting the impression that your objection is simply to the concept of an abstract object, which you call platonism. Would that be fair?Ludwig V

    Banno was denying that the principles he asserted were platonist, and so I was trying to get him to acknowledge that they are. My objection was to the hypocrisy of publicly rejecting platonism then employing platonist principles.

    In the Roman number system "V" counts as five. The Chinese system has 五 (wǔ) for the same number. The ancient greeks used the letters of their alphabet as numerals, so five was the letter epsilon. If you just talk about numerals, you lose the equivalences across different systems.Ludwig V

    That's exactly the reality of translation. In most cases there is no true equivalence "across different systems". The different language games come into being and evolve under different social contexts. The assumption of platonism, produces the idea of eternal unchanging objects which words refer to, and disables us from being able to understand the reality of the nonequivalent aspects.
  • Infinity
    That's pretty cool.frank

    Much appreciated, thank you.
  • Infinity
    An abstract object is something that isn't physical, but it's not simply mental either.frank

    This is platonism. The abstract object is independent from minds, but accessed by them.

    What of quantification?Banno

    Quantification doesn't require platonism. The proposition that a numeral represents a thing which is a number is platonism. But we can quantify without that premise. For example, we can do a bijection between the numerals and the things to be quantified. The presumption of "numbers" is superfluous in this case.
  • Infinity
    So math is just language games, right?frank

    You could say that. The point though is that if a numeral refers to a number which is an object, and that object is said to be an idea in someone's mind, then it would be a different object in each mind. We are all distinct individuals with different bodies, different minds, and different ideas. It could not be the case that the idea in my mind (if we call it an object) is the same object as the idea in your mind even if we each refer to our ideas with the same word. We might use the same name "1", and even be trained to describe it with the same words, but it's still not the same idea.

    You might consider the beetle in the box analogy. We use the same word, "beetle", and we might even describe it in the same way, but we still have distinct objects. The only way to assume that the numeral refers to the same object for distinct individuals, is to assume that the object is independent. That's Platonism. For whatever reasons, I do not know, @Banno insistently denies the obvious, to say that a numeral refers to a number, which is an object, is classic platonism. No one ought to be surprised by this. Western ideology is firmly based in idealism.
  • Infinity
    If each individual 1 is a token of the type <1>, you have to say what sort of thing the type is. That's not going to work out.Srap Tasmaner

    I don't understand you. In each instance where 1 is taken to be a token, the type is a symbol. And the type of symbol is mathematical. And the type of mathematical symbol is a numeral. How is there a problem with this?

    if they are only in the mind, he owes us a story about how we manage to do things with them in the world.Banno

    I have no problem with that story. we are human beings with minds and free will, and we figure things out and do things. Don't you think that's the case?

    Notice that this odd position is blandly asserted, not supported by any argument.Banno

    It appears like I didn't make the argument clear enough for you, when I stated it earlier. So, here it is.

    If a numeral refers to an object, which is within a human mind, it is a different object for me as it is for you, due to the nature of subjectivity. My thoughts are not the same as your thoughts, so we'd have distinct objects being referred to because we have distinct minds. Therefore, since a numeral is supposed to refer "an object", not a bunch of different objects, and also to the same object for you, as it refers to for Srap, that object must be independent from both of you. The referenced "number", as "an object", must be an independent object This is known as a platonic object. Hence, assuming that a numeral refers to an object called a number, is platonism.

    To state it simply, without assuming that the object referred to is an independent, platonic object, it is impossible that the numeral refers to the same object for distinct people, because we each have distinct minds with distinct thoughts. Then the numeral would refer to a bunch of different objects in different minds, instead of "an object", the specified "number". Therefore the assumption that a numeral refers to an object called a number is platonism.

    He relies on presuming that all reference must be object-reference,Banno

    That's another one of your very absurd misrepresentations. I explicitly stated, in the passage you quoted, that the symbol might refer to an idea in a mind. Never did I imply that I believe all reference must be object-reference.

    What I said, is that if a numeral is taken to refer to an object, a thing called a number, that object must be a platonic object. This is supported by the argument above. However, I do not believe that a numeral refers to an object called a number. I believe that it refers to an idea called a value. I believe that values are not objects, yet they are referred to. Therefore, in no way do I believe that all reference is "object-reference".
  • Infinity
    Numbers are not just ideas in the mind, but are rooted as objects in our shared practices.Ludwig V

    Let's be clear, numerals are objects in our shared practices. Numbers if they are assumed to be objects are nothing other than platonic objects.

    The question is, what do you think a numeral like "1" refers to. If you think it refers to an object, in the type of "number", or the "mathematical" type, that is a platonic object. If you think it refers to an idea of quantitative value, or order, in your mind, that is meaning, not an object. If you think it refers to an object of shared practise in your mind, there is no such thing. Numerals are objects of shared practice in your minds, not numbers.
  • Infinity
    But we need another step - "1 counts as a number" - to get the procedure moving.

    ...

    It's not platonic.
    Banno

    The only way that "1" can refer to an object called "a number", instead of referring to distinct ideas in the minds of individual subjects is platonism. Platonism is the only way that "1" can refer to the same thing (a number, an object) for multiple people. Otherwise "1" refers, for you, to the idea you have in your head, for me, to the idea I have in my head, and so on. This is the way that values such as mathematical values are presumed to be objective rather than being subjective like many other values. It's known as platonism.
  • Infinity
    Do you mean the premiss that space can be infinitely divided, not merely conceptually, but also physically?Ludwig V

    No, I've repeated this numerous times now, "space" is purely conceptual. it doesn't make sense to talk about dividing space physically. Physically there is substance, and that's what is divided. And representing that substance as "space" which is infinitely divisible is what I called the false premise which produces Zeno's paradoxes.

    But a physical limit to the process of division doesn't undermine the conceptual description.Ludwig V

    It means that the conceptual description is false. And, this falsity, because it is a falsity, produces the absurd conclusions which Zeno demonstrates.

    We've already left Meta behind, since he has claimed numbers are not ordered...Banno

    As usual, a completely false and utterly ridiculous representation. I said it doesn't make sense to use "next" in a way which is not either spatial or temporal. If we switch the term to "order" rather than "next", this allows all types of hierarchy such as good/bad, big/small, etc.. But the principle of the hierarchy, and the order of things within the category still needs to be defined. There is no such thing as simply "order" in the general sense. And to have a next implies a direction, which implies either a temporal or spatial ordering.

    Therefore we cannot avoid expressing the order itself in spatial or temporal terms. If the scale is big and small for example, then for there to be an order one of the two extremes must be prior to the other, and this turns out to be a temporal order. If there was a supposed order which was infinite in all ways it could not be an order, because infinite possibility is disorder.

    I was thinking some days ago that, though I'm not sure what the favored way to do this is, if pressed to define the natural numbers I would just construct them: 1 is a natural number, and if n is a natural number then so is n+1. I would define them in exactly the same way we set up mathematical induction. (Which is why I commented to Metaphysician Undercover that the natural numbers "being infinite" is not part of their definition, as I see it, but a dead easy theorem.)Srap Tasmaner

    You just show that it is limitless which is how "infinite" is defined, so there is no difference and you are not getting away from it being so, by definition.

    But we need another step - "1 counts as a number" - to get the procedure moving.Banno

    The prerequisite platonist premise.

    It's not platonic.Banno

    The usual denial. That "1 counts for a number" rather than signifying a quantitative value, is platonic. That's what platonism does, it makes values which are inherently subjective mental features, into countable independent objects. This is a faulty attempt to portray what is fundamentally subjective (of the subject) as something objective (of the object)

    So we get "One counts as a number" and "every number has a subsequent number" and discover that the pattern does not end, and then learn to talk of the whole as being unbounded and that infinite counts as being unbounded... iterating the "...counts as..." to invoke more language games.Banno

    Your statement "every number has a subsequent number" is a stipulation. Therefore it is something produced by design, definition, it is not something that we "discover". So you continue in your misguided attempt to justify mathematical platonism.
  • Infinity
    Because next can mean two different things.

    1) Next in the definition (logical next).
    In mathematics, next often just means “the item with the next label in the sequence.” It’s part of how the rule is set up, so if you tell me where you are, the rule tells you what counts as the next one. That doesn’t require anything to be happening in time.
    Sam26

    The "logical next" is next in time in this context. The only other option is "beside" in space, and this is clearly not the case. "The item with the next label in the sequence" is the one which comes after the other. Therefore the sequence is temporal. Without the separation of before and after, there is no sequence. The rule tells you "what counts as the next one", but unless you follow the rule, and produce "the next one", then the next one never comes. And following that rule is a temporal process. Therefore the sequence is a temporal process.

    One might argue, that the order of such mathematical things simply exists, as eternal platonic objects, and that "the rule" is a description of that platonicly existing order. Then we'd have the nontemporal order, without having to fulfil the process of following the rule. But platonism is clearly wrong here. the rule is clearly not descriptive, because the proposed platonic objects cannot be observed to be described. They have no spatial/temporal existence. Therefore the rule is a prescriptive rule, and the sequence only comes into existence by following the process temporally.

    "Next" here implies a relation, and mathematics is the study of the relations between its "objects," which it is happy to treat as effectively undefined.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, "next" implies a relation, as you say. It implies a temporal relation. "Next" has two distinct meanings, a spatial relation, or a temporal relation. In this case it is not a spatial relation, therefore it must be a temporal relation.

    You may insist that mathematics keeps "objects" as undefined, But mathematics would be useless if it cannot define its relations. And this is a serious consequence of having "object" as undefined. If we cannot identify an object, how can we formulate relations? In other words, we cannot unequivocally understand the proposed relations between objects if we do not know what an object is.

    So, you are asserting that "next" implies a relation. Do you think you could explain what "next" means in the context of a mathematical sequence, without describing it as either temporal or spatial? Otherwise you are simply making an unjustifiable claim.

    Empirically, that may be true - especially if you regard a field (gravity, magnetism) as a medium. But setting up a set of co-ordinates does not require a medium in addition, so far as I can see.Ludwig V

    I know we can do that, and that's the point I was making. We can, and do set up sets of co-ordinates without reference to the medium. That is a universal conception of "space", which allows in principle, for infinite positioning. But it is conceptual only. And if one sets up such a universal set of co-ordinates, with infinite possibility, and applies it to a real medium, it is a false representation as the primary premise in the representation which will follow. That false premise is what creates Zeno's paradoxes.

    The point being that we can, and do set up such co-ordinate systems, I'm not arguing against that. What I am saying is that when we apply them they are applied as false premises, As such, they produce unsound conclusions as demonstrated by Zeno. Zeno concluded that motion cannot be real.
  • Infinity

    I made it far enough in mathematics, before getting too ornery, to know that you have to do multiplication and division before you do subtraction and addition.
  • Infinity
    In math, process doesn’t have to mean a thing happening in time. It may just mean a rule, a precise recipe that tells you how to get the next step, or how to compute the nth term. Infinity shows up because the rule has no final step.Sam26

    How could "the next step" not imply "a thing happening in time"?
  • Infinity
    For me, empty space is not a mediium.Ludwig V

    Of course it's not empty space, or else it wouldn't qualify as a medium. That's the point I was making. There is no such thing as empty space between objects. So to make a co-ordinate system which shows the positions which an object could have requires knowing the type of object and the type of medium.

    Space is a co-ordinate system, which defines the possibilities where certain kinds of object may be. Objects are distinct from mediums because the latter are found everywhere, but objects have a locating within space.Ludwig V

    So "space" here is completely conceptual. And the point I was making is that it needs to be conceptualized according to the objects which are to be mapped and the medium between the objects. If we make a co-ordinate system which allows any objects to be anywhere (infinite possibility) that produces Zeno paradoxes. It's the faulty conception of space which allows for infinite possibility that creates Zeno type paradoxes.
  • Donald Trump (All Trump Conversations Here)
    so the advice is to remain calm, don't open the door unless they show you a warrant,.frank

    Careful, they may be disguised as Jehovah's Withesses.
  • Infinity
    It seems to me that the question of a medium in space is secondary. The first move is to set up a co-ordinates and rules for plotting the position of objects on those. (In other words, the concept is defined by the practice.) Once we have co-ordinate and objects, the question of a medium makes some sense. How non-mathematicians develop the concept is another question. But we can be pretty sure it is by interacting with the ordinary world. Mathematics, in my book, is a development of that.Ludwig V

    Well, I can't say I understand exactly what you are proposing, but it seems like you are saying the question of the medium is secondary, but then you explain why it must be primary.

    The nature of the medium, in relation to the nature of the substance which is moving, determines the possible positions. So without determining the medium and the substance first, one could set up a co-ordinate system with infinite possible positions, but it would be false if the medium doesn't allow for it. That is also the case with divisibility. The mathematical system could allow infinite divisibility, but in reality divisibility must be determined according to the substance to be divided, and the means of division. So we might start with the co-ordinates and rules for plotting, as you say, but then it would just be trial and error, in application.

    So you start out by saying that mathematics ought to be prior, "The first move is to set up a co-ordinates and rules", but then you end with the statement that mathematics is a development from our interacting with the world, which would place it as posterior.

    The paradox of Zeno's paradox, for me, is that Achilles is precluded from reaching a point that defines the system - the limit. The first step is to divided the distance from the start to the goal, limit, by 2, and so on. The limit is not an optional add-on, (as it seems to be in the case the natural numbers).Ludwig V

    The problem in this paradox of Zeno's, is the issue which is explained above, as starting with the designation of rules and limits, instead of determining the true limits of the medium and substance first. The rules allow for infinite divisibility, but this does not correspond with the true medium.

    Here's a way of looking at it. Suppose the measurement is on the ground, a long tape measure on the ground. Each time Achilles takes a step, the foot is at a new position on the tape measure. And, the section of the tape measure between there and the last step, is never traversed by Achilles. he steps from one position to the next, with a gap in between. So the false premise which Zeno makes is that all the area has to be covered. It doesn't Achilles steps from one spot to the next. Achilles could give the tortoise a short head start, then take one step and be past the tortoise, without ever properly catching up. This is why the nature of the movement and the medium is so important.
  • Mechanism of hidden authoritarianism in Western countries
    In particular, these laws are always aimed at suppressing small businesses, because small businessmen are less dependent on the power and can overthrow it.Linkey

    In general, large business is advantageous to the government. There are many reasons, but it's easier and more efficient for the government to have the company rule over its various activities itself, and it's employees, collect taxes etc., and report to the government, then for it to govern over a whole bunch of small businesses.

    So in agriculture and food production for example, the government can stipulate that the company must hire inspectors, and maintain a safe food supply, rather than having to send out a whole crew of inspectors around to all the different small businesses. The company does the inspections, but a small business couldn't afford this. It's a matter of efficiency.
  • Infinity
    The question is, at what level of explanation should this incompatibility be situated? at the physical level, as physics usually assumes, or at the level of the rules of mathematics?sime

    I think it must be both. The theoretical mathematicians who practise what they like to call pure mathematics want to be free from the constraints of the physical world. So, they may produce axioms independently of the requirements of physics, and other sciences. However, the axioms which get accepted and become conventionalized are the ones which are applicable. Then by the time the use of any axioms become standard practise, they have been selected for, by the needs of the scientists.

    Therefore we can separate the two in principle only. We put the hypotheses of science in one category and the hypotheses of mathematics in another category. But if we maintain the supposed separation into a description of actual practise, science must have logical priority. Ultimately then, conventional and standard mathematics has been shaped to meet the descriptions of scientists. So the incompatibility is within the descriptions provided by physicists. We must maintain a different, real separation though, and that is between descriptions and the real world. It is not necessarily a feature of the real world, which causes incompatible mathematics to be accepted, but perhaps a mistaken description.

    So the conventional mathematics is shaped by demand, and the demand is the sciences. The incompatibility manifests in the mathematics which has been conformed to the descriptions of the sciences. Therefore the descriptions provided by the sciences must be faulty, they require incompatible mathematical principles. Like @Banno says, we cannot conclude that the real world is faulty. So what Zeno demonstrated is that our descriptions of motion are faulty, and the mathematics as applied to these descriptions, reveals this by leading to paradox.

    I think we should consider the fact that Newton and Leibniz didn't invent calculus for the purpose of solving Zeno's paradox, but for describing trajectories under gravity. Hence the mathematical definition of differentiation that we inherited from them and use today, isn't defined as a resource-transforming operation that takes a mutable function and mutates it into its derivative; rather our classical differentiation is merely defined as a mapping between two stateless and immutable functions.sime

    What you say here about Newton and Leibniz demonstrates how modern mathematics was fundamentally subservient to physics. Since then, the study of pure mathematics, and number theory have become more distinct and separate from that foundation. This actually provides an advantage toward solving these issues, because it allows us to look directly at the incompatibilities within the mathematics, without being influenced by empirical prejudice. Plato's principle "the senses deceive us" is very important.

    I believe this is how the heliocentric model of the solar system was figured out. When we remove the mathematics from the influence of our observations of the empirical world, which the mathematics is formed around, then we can extend it in all directions to see where the infinites appear. Each appearance of infinity represents a problem within the empirical description. (In the case of the solar system eternal (infinite) circular motion was the fundamental problem demonstrated by Aristotle.) Then we can make a map of just the problems themselves, and attempt to correlate them and determine a unified underlying cause. A huge number of problems can actually have one simple cause.

    But if Zeno's paradox is to be exorcised from calculus, such that calculus has a dynamical model, then I can't see an alternative than to treat abstract functions like pieces of plasticine, that can be sliced into bits or rolled into a smooth curve, but not at the same time.sime

    I think the key issue is that we improperly represent time. Modeling time as the fourth dimension of space implies that time emerges from space. So at the Big Bang, there is something spatial, and time emerges. But that's fundamental incoherent because all activity, including "emergence" requires time. So this representation implies that time existed before time. To rectify this we need to model time as the zeroth dimension, and allow that space emerges from time. This requirement is also indicated through an analysis of the pure mathematics, removed from empirical prejudice. The non-spatial, non-dimensional, "point", is very real and necessary to mathematics. Therefore it must be accommodated for in our modeling of activity in the empirical world. Currently, empirical descriptions do not allow for the reality of non spatial activity (time passage without spatial change). This is a very big problem, which makes the modeling of activity at a non-spatial point completely speculative, and somewhat incoherent.


    That is part of what @sime was talking about, the incompatibility between representing objects as having position relative to each other, and as being in motion relative to each other. So when we attempt to unite the concepts of space and time, we must alter them. "Space" gets altered by being "curved", so that standard Euclidian geometry doesn't serve. And "time" gets altered by the relativity of simultaneity, so that there is no objective present.
  • Infinity
    We can be pretty confident that space is not infinitely divisible and yet still use calculus to plot satellite orbits.Banno

    This is an interesting remark. Many would say that "space" is conceptual only. And if it is, how could it be anything other than the way we represent it, as infinitely divisible?

    "Space" might be the distance between two objects, but space is not what is measured, distance is. Furthermore, we commonly assume a medium between two objects, air or something. And space is not the air. Clearly, if we were talking about air, we wouldn't represent it as infinitely divisible.

    So this is why there is a problem, when we get down to the basics, the medium between the nucleus of the atom and the electrons of the atom for an example, we really don't know what the medium is. The proposal of aether has been dismissed, so we just produce an artificial (imaginary) medium, some fields or something like that. Since the concept of "space", and its accompanying mathematics provide for infinite divisibility, and the proposed medium is simply conceptual, how could the medium be modeled in any way other than a way which is consistent with the concept "space", and the related mathematics, i.e. as infinitely divisible. Without proposing a real medium with real restrictions to divisibility, to propose that the fundamental medium between things is not infinitely divisible, according to how it is conceptualized as "space", is somewhat incoherent.
  • Trump's war in Venezuela? Or something?
    As the Trump administration oversees the sale of Venezuela's petroleum worldwide, Senate Democrats are questioning who is benefitting from the contracts.

    In one of the first transactions, the U.S. granted Vitol, the world's largest independent oil broker, a license worth roughly $250 million. A senior partner at Vitol, John Addison, gave roughly $6 million to Trump-aligned political action committees during the presidential election, according to donation records compiled by OpenSecrets.
    — Stephen Groves, The Associated Press

Metaphysician Undercover

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