That is a loaded statement. If true, then one would have to identify something that is good or bad "outside" of social contexts, but how is this possible since the good and bad are essentially social, conceived only in societies and about social circumstances. Can one "reduce" ethics to something not "social" in its nature? — Astrophel

"Good" is clearly defined by a larger context than the social context. This is evident in principles which relate to respect for other life forms which do not partake in human society, and respect for the planet in general with issues like climate change. "Good" truly transcends the context of human society, because human beings are only a small part of life on earth, and we're all integrated.

There are actions that aren't considered immoral, but I wouldn't be that person. Rudeness is not illegal or immoral, but I wouldn't do that face to face with people. — L'éléphant

I believe that's known as "manners". Which manners are adhered to, differs according to social context, and manners can be classed as good or bad relative to that context. However, the good or bad which is associated with manners, since it varies according to social context, is not considered to be a moral good or bad. The moral good and bad is supposed to transcend all differences of social context.

Oh thanks for the encouragement and tips! I absolutely should start with a smaller dialogue first, can't believe I hadn't thought of it — dani

It's a good idea to get familiar with Plato's style. His overall humour and use of simile in a humorous way, can be very entertaining. Once you become acquainted with it, it may become very enjoyable to you. You'll be wanting to read more and more of it.

I've often read in discussions of Plato on this forum that he never claims that Socrates or anyone has ever seen 'the form of the good'. Yet in this passage, and even though Socrates has said 'God knows whether it happens to be true', he nevertheless says 'anyone who is to act intelligently....must have had sight of this.' That seems an unequivocal confirmation that the form of the Good is something that 'must be seen'. — Wayfarer

I think you ought to respect a difference between "the form of the good" mentioned in the quoted passage, and "the good" itself, discussed earlier in The Republic. The philosopher grasps the form of the good, in seeing that the good is the cause of all things, but does not grasp the good itself.

This can be compared to the way that Aquinas describes how we apprehend God as the cause of all things, through His effects, but we do not apprehend God directly. So, "must have had sight of this" in the quoted passage means to have grasped the logical need for this principle, the good, but it does not mean to have actually understood it in any complete way.

There is a separation between "the form of the good" which the individual philosopher's mind apprehends, and the good itself, which is separate or independent from the human being's mind. This is comparable to Kant's phenomenon/noumenon distinction. Aristotle, and some Christian theologians who follow him, develop this division as the distinction between the apparent good and the real good. When a philosopher apprehends "the form of the good", it is grasped by that philosopher's mind. As such it can only obtain to the level of an apparent good, which is the good grasped by individual minds. The "real good" remains separate and independent.

Notice 'present in the soul of each person'. — Wayfarer

The "good" which is present to the mind of each person is the apparent good. Enlightenment consists of acknowledging that there must be a real good which is separate and independent of oneself, and independent from everybody else. A moral soul will attempt to attune the good within one's self, the apparent good, to the real good, which is independent. The problem for the philosopher, and this is what makes philosophy the most difficult undertaking, is that we only have goods within ourselves, apparent goods, to serve as guidance for directing us toward the real good. We only have effects to serve as guidance to direct us toward the cause.

We can see an analogy toward the end of The Republic. The carpenter follows a 'form of bed' when constructing a bed. This is analogous to "the form of the good". It is a formula which serves as guidance to the carpenter. However, Plato describes how the carpenter must also respect the notion of an Ideal bed, this is the divine form of bed, the best possible bed. The carpenter knows that his personal 'form of bed', the formula which he follows in building a bed, is not the most perfect, ideal bed possible, it is not the divine form of bed. Nevertheless, he uses whatever means he can to make his personal 'form of bed' as close to the divine form of bed as possible, though he does not in any way actual grasp the divine form of bed.

Which is good, I think you're right, there are different enough for that. — flannel jesus

Yes, I described how I believe they differ. The one is intentional, therefore manageable, educational, and helpful in confronting the very real limits to one's freedom. The other consists of the very real limits to one's freedom imposing upon the person in an unwanted, unmanageable way. So the same "emptiness" is approached from two different ways. The one is a peaceful, confident, courageous approach, while the other is an anxious fearful non-approach, as it is instead imposed.

Depressed people think a lot. They think, I'm bored, this sucks, this isn't satisfying, I'm lonely, nothing is fulfilling, etc. The kind of emptiness that depressed people feel isn't a lack of thought - depression would be a lot more bearable for more people if it were. — flannel jesus

The thinking itself is not the emptiness of depression. The emptiness is the feeling associated with the hopelessness of the thought. Yet the thought continues despite the hopelessness created by the feeling of emptiness. The feeling ought to end the thought in hopeless emptiness, but it does not, so the feeling of emptiness is required to increase in order to confront the hopelessness of the thought. So, just like meditation, the emptiness is the end of the thought. But in meditation the end is properly achieved because it is a trained practise, while in depression the end cannot be achieved because the emptiness is the product of hopelessness of the thought.

It's just a feature of the two different ways that the emptiness may be induced, intentionally and unintentionally. The unintentional requires the hopeless thought as catalyst, the intentional produces the emptiness without the catalyst.

He most likely cashed in at the expense of his loser supporters.

Do you think the kind of emptiness in depression is really that comparable to the emptiness of meditation? They feel like entirely different things to me. I'd wager most people suffering from the emptiness of depression WISH they could have the emptiness of meditation. — flannel jesus

Yes I do, and what I pointed to, is that I believe that with practise and effort, one could substitute the emptiness of depression with the emptiness of meditation. So if you suffer depression, and WISH that you could have the emptiness of meditation instead of the emptiness of depression, then with the required will power, determination, and effort, your wish might be granted.
https://www.health.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/how-meditation-helps-with-depression

This is something meditators, yogis and even some philosophers understand thoroughly, of course. — Wayfarer

That's why I am arguing that the result of meditation, "emptiness" is described in the same way as the result of depression, as "emptiness". It takes one (intentionally in meditation) to the limits of one's freedom. What I think, is that the difference is that unlike depression where the limit to freedom, and consequent emptiness, is forced upon the person unintentionally, and unknowingly, from the other side, as a sort of enclosure, in meditation the limit is approached, and emptiness produced, willingly and knowingly, as a learning experience, therefore it is manageable.

Depression is quite common, yet very disruptive, and sometimes a highly disturbing mental illness. If a person practises the art of managing the condition, "emptiness", this could prove to be very useful in preventing the occurrence of the unintentional form, where the emptiness is forced upon one from the other side.

As often, because there is no direct equivalent for many terms in the Buddhist lexicon, and vice versa. There are no direct translations for karma, dharma, bodhi, Vijñāna and many other terms, nor direct Buddhist equivalents for words like ‘spiritual’. In any case, the article makes it perfectly clear that ‘emptiness’ has nothing whatever to do with depressive states. — Wayfarer

The page on "emptiness" which you referred, seems to confirm what I said. Both forms of emptiness are associated with the relationship between a person's feelings, and one's thoughts, the stories or world-views which are employed to deal with one's feelings. The difference appears to be that the Buddhist sunnata mode is an intentional suppression, while the other is an unintentional depression. Each appears to result in a similar condition, described as "emptiness". But the intentional emptiness is manageable, controlled and conditioned, being consciously intended, and therefore may be utilized toward one's well-being, while the other form of emptiness is not manageable and is therefore most likely detrimental toward one's well-being.

There have been comparisons made between śūnyatā and the epochē of Husserl, and also Pyrrho’s ‘suspension of judgement about what is not evident’ - about not reading things into the raw material of experience but learning to see ‘things as they are’. I thought I noticed a resonance between this and some of the remarks made by Astrophel but perhaps I was mistaken. — Wayfarer

The problem I see, is that experience is always preconditioned by thought, so there is no such thing as "the raw material of experience", which would be the feelings, or sensations, without any associated thought. A large portion of thought is so deep into the subconscious level, being purely habitual, learned at a very young age, that it is not even apparent to the conscious mind. So what the conscious mind takes "the raw material of experience" to be, is something which has already been affected by thought which the conscious mind has simply not taken into account, being composed of very rapid actions and reactions in the borderline area between conscious and subconscious.

In other words, there is no such thing as seeing "things as they are", without reading things into the perceptions, because things are already read into the perceptions by the time the conscious mind attempts disassociate the stories and world-view from the raw material which provides for perception. This is why we hit the bottom, the dead end which you called emptiness. The attempt to find one's "self" is stymied and we must face the reality of the fruitlessness. We, or "I", as a self-conscious living being, or self-conscious living beings, are helpless in any attempt to get down to any lower level of separating the raw material from the conditioning stories or world-views, because it becomes very evident that complete separation is utterly impossible, and the venture is doomed to failure. This leaves us empty, and forces upon us the need to salvage whatever freedom we can, from this dreadful situation which reveals that the freedom we so desire is inescapably hindered, and so we proceed accordingly. In western religions this is recognized as the soul being united to, and hindered by, the body.

And is it not translated as "emptiness" for a reason?

Also entirely mistaken, perhaps you might read the article in full (although I won't argue the point). — Wayfarer

I don't think there is much to mistake with a word like "emptiness". There isn't a whole lot of ambiguity associated with that word. So, I think you're best off not to try to argue the point.

Thanks to this exchange, I am getting to the conclusion that, although I often acted wrongly, and my spirit started to get dirty, I realize I can start to clean it up by proceeding with confession. — javi2541997

Although this might be the part of the process which makes you feel good, confident, courageous, etc., the act of confession might also be said to be the easiest part of the process. The confession helps to isolate and identify the problems of character which inhere within, but now the real effort is to tackle those bad habits. Strategy is required.

I suggest you identify the weaknesses within the bad habits themselves, which might provide you with a place to gain a foothold in the struggle against them. Often, the bad habits are arranged hierarchically so that you might identify a foundation which can be blasted out, dropping the rest like dominoes. This might require a hierarchy of good objectives. The good objectives will inevitably break the foundational bad habit through number, multiplicity. Many small good habits are required to take the time away from the one large bad habit. The foundational bad habit, although it's effectively the worst bad habit because it supports the others, may actually be the easiest one to break, because nothing supports it other than your material composition. That's why medication may be very effective toward curbing many bad habits.

From an article on 'emptiness' in Buddhism:

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there’s anything lying behind them.

This mode is called emptiness because it’s empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and to define the world we live in.
— What is Emptiness? — Wayfarer

It's very interesting that "emptiness" is the descriptive term often associated with depression in psychology. I think that what Buddhism demonstrates to us here, is that this position, what in the west is known as being down, empty, gives us a very unique perspective where there is only one direction, up. The Buddhist perspective explained here describes all these negatives which we associate with being down, or being empty, as artificial, created by the stories and world-views which we use to situate ourselves within 'the world'. To complete the emptiness, or depression, to bring it to its absolute end, requires removing the situation which produced it in the first place.

These are the features which have forced us down, and may hold us down within the emptiness of depression, the stories and world-views which we have used to make sense of the world in the first place. But these can only hold us down if we allow them to, by clinging to them. Once we recognize that they are in fact what has forced us down, and that they only have the capacity to hold us down because we hold onto to them, then we can release them and find true freedom.

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" as if there is some objective, mind-independent property that fixes what "red" refers to. Rather, we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework. The very notion of inverting an experience of "redness" might be incoherent without that shared linguistic coordination.
For example, instead of the color wheel being inverted for Alice, the color wheel labels are. So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned. — Matripsa

After reading this thread I come to the conclusion that we do the same thing with the words "physical" and "non-physical". Those are just two different ways of talking about experience, reflecting different cultural/linguistic frameworks. Each is itself incoherent if situated within the other's linguistic coordination.

The problem with the op though is the premise you use to make your conclusion. You state that Alice and Mark "both experience the same qualia of 'green'". But this is not a true premise, Alice and Mark are different people, with different bodies, different memories and different experiences. Therefore it is impossible that they could both experience the very same quale. You might say they experience similar qualia, but never do they ever experience the same quale.

I think it is very important to respect this difference when talking about qualia, and recognize that two different people might share the same type of qualia, but they do not share the same qualia. And this is a very significant feature of language to understand. Sometimes we talk about things, and this speech can be described as numerous people talking about the very same thing, and other times we talk about types, and this speech can be described as numerous different things being classified as of the same type.

So if we talk about qualia, as if they are things which people are experiencing, and we say that there is red qualia, and green qualia, these are different types of qualia. But if we want to talk about one particular quale, an individual's experience of green, in a particular spatial-temporal context, we need to respect the fact that no one, not even the person experiencing this particular quale, would ever experience the very same quale, in a different spatial-temporal context.

Google indicates that this is a form of metaphysics which is useful in psychedelic therapy.

I just read it and reread at the difficult parts. The beginning is straight forward, so not requiring a whole lot of rereading, as Plato sort of eases you in to it. It might be a good idea to read a couple shorter dialogues first, to get used to the writing style.

That is Plato's 'idea of the Good' among other examples. We are able to discern it, but it takes certain qualities of character and intellect to be able to do that. — Wayfarer

I think that for Plato the true good is beyond human apprehension, just like the Christians say that God is beyond the capacity of human understanding. Not even the most well-educated philosopher can claim to understand it. So we really are not able to discern the good, and this is why discussion about the good always turns into a matter of subjective opinion. Furthermore, the pragmatic and utilitarian values of scientific materialism, which you refer to, are only allowed to gain supremacy because of this deficiency in the capacity of human beings to actually discern the true nature of "the good".

What I meant was, for those who know, belief is no longer necessary, but that up until then, it has to be taken on faith. — Wayfarer

I think that's a good point. To learn requires faith in others, teachers, and all that surrounds you, in the capacity to educate you. Without that faith, knowledge is impossible. But when the desired knowledge is obtained, that faith is no longer necessary.

But this only demonstrates how epistemology is on shaky ground, as knowledge rests on faith.

I think you are trying to help me to not feel that bad about myself, and I appreciate your support a lot. The exchanges in this thread are more helpful than my sessions with my therapist, indeed. Nonetheless, I disagree with you in that quote above. I personally believe there should not be anything greater than the love for my parents. — javi2541997

Didn't you say that you lied to your mom to tell her that you were going to the library when you were really going to see a woman? So, isn't this an instance of something taking higher priority than love for your parents? As much as you say "there should not be anything greater than the love for my parents" you allow that there actually is something greater, and that affects your behaviour accordingly. This is how divisions within oneself arise, conflicting priorities which divide you.

That is the reason for the anxiety you describe, and the reason why you say your soul is rotten. You do not adhere to your own code. You attempt to enforce a code (nothing higher than your parents) which is contrary to your very nature (you seek a woman). Therefore a chasm opens up between your code and your actions. Now, you must either change your code to reflect more truly your nature, or exercise your will power and determination, to enforce your code, and annihilate parts of your nature determined as consisting of bad habits. Otherwise you will be forever torn between your code and your actions, rife with anxiety concerning what you apprehend as your own sins.

What is it to have a good behavior? — javi2541997

The good behaviour is what comes naturally from the principle of love, as described by BC above. If love is your top priority, you will not act badly. Of course, we are all influenced by a variety of different things though.

What if I have good behavior, but I accidentally lie to my parents once? — javi2541997

If you lied to your parents, then you allowed something to take higher priority than love of your parents. but that's what I mean when I say we are influenced by a variety of different things.

I haven't confessed to a priest in my entire life yet. I think this act would prove that I am contradictory, because if I didn't buy the writings of the Gospels, I should not go to a Church to confess myself. What will the priest do, by the way? He would listen and answer generic answers based on the Bible. This is another reason why I struggle with religious faith. It is unfair that sacred temples - like churches - and their members are the only places to confess the redemption of the spirit. I wish we could do this differently... — javi2541997

I as well, believe that you do not need the Church to redeem yourself. The example of Catholic confession was an example of the type of thing which could be done, but it is obviously not the only route to redemption. If you keep in mind that principle of love, described by BC, or a similar principle, you'll find many different ways to redeem yourself.

I am concerned about abstract problems: lying and its consequences; having sexual desires without limitation; wasting savings on useless stuff when they were there for food or supplies, etc. I don't understand why I shortly act this way sometimes...
What I am aware is that this is bad and it corrupts my soul. — javi2541997

I suggest that you consider these things as habits. Habits, when identified as bad, are difficult to break. The first step, which you've made, is to recognize them as bad. That is the point of confession, you're beyond that now. The next is to move forward with a strategy which will allow your will power to break the bad habit. Different types of people use different types of strategies, and different types of strategies are required for different types of habits. Each bad habit has to be individualized and a plan put in place specifically designed for annihilating it. And make your goals achievable, aiming too high invites failure which is not conducive to mental health. Remember habits are difficult to break, often requiring much time. I like to find many things to do, to occupy my time, (like being here), and this directs my attention away from the influence of the bad habits. In other words, I like to always keep myself busy, because the bad habits never seem to get completely annihilated, they lurk so be aware.

Firstly, yes, I am trying to establish a forced code of ethics. — javi2541997

Why? What I tried to relay to you, is that the forced code of ethics is the wrong way. Notice that a central tenet in The Old Testament is The Ten Commandments, then in The New Testament, this is reduced to one principle 'love thy neighbour as thyself' or "The Golden Rule". This marks a huge advancement in moral principles. Instead of a whole list of things "Thou shalt not...", a code of ethics, there is simply one principle of guidance toward how you ought to behave. What is displayed here is a move away from a system consisting of a code of ethics stipulating what you ought not do, toward a virtue ethics directing you to act toward appropriate ends. The virtue ethics provides guidance to motivate good behaviour, instead of the code of ethics which provides rules to deter bad behaviour.

As I confessed to Metaphysician Undercover, I lied to my parents multiple times. Some would say it is not a big deal because these things usually happen. But I think it is bad anyway, and my soul feels corrupted, or as James Joyce says: engendered by putrefaction. — javi2541997

Confession is a big part Catholicism. It is the first step toward forgiveness, which is the way to bring yourself out from those bad feelings associated with guilt. The first principle, "Love" encourages one to forgive, and forgiving encourages confession. Confession allows one to rid oneself of those bad feelings.

Ethics then is a prerequisite for freedom. The man who can't actualize what he thinks is truly good is limited in some way, as is the man who acts out of ignorance about what is truly good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sorry Count, but I totally disagree with what you posted. Freedom is clearly prior to ethics, as the reason why ethics is needed. If it was the case, that there was no freedom prior to the existence of ethics, then ethics would never come into existence because there would be no need for ethics, being no freedom to act otherwise, nor even the freedom to create ethics.

"Spirit" is what motivates action, it drives ambition, will, and determination. Adopting a "code of ethics" which you attempt to force yourself to follow, will only stifle your spirit. So a code of ethics is not what you are looking for. What you need is a way of guiding or directing your spirit so that it can maintain its strength.

This means that you need to be able to avoid undue restrictions, those which unnecessarily restrain your spirit. The type of restrictions that you appear to be having difficulty understanding are social restrictions, those presented by other people. Social restrictions, people, are much more difficult to understand and predict than natural restrictions like rivers, mountains, darkness, etc., are. Organized forces like law enforcement are relatively easy to predict, because they are organized, so they're easy to avoid. But individual people are more difficult. Some get insulted or offended easily, and may be vindictive. Some may be deceptive and misleading, seeing you as prey. Some are simply unruly. But that brings us in a circle, back to the question of a code of ethics. The code of ethics obviously cannot contain the free-spirited, the unruly.

My advice would be to look at something like Plato's Republic, how he moves to define "just". It appears to be a matter of doing one's own thing without interfering with others. That allows your spirit to move you freely.

So there's no such things a change then? I thought you were talking about bringing change.

How does Brahman bring change if he is unchanging ?

Brahman grounds the temporal realm in which both mental and bodily change occurs. The change has no beginning, nor end. — Sirius

How can you even comprehend the meaning of "change" without a before and after, future and past? Which implies dualism.

I recall an article about how geometry began in Egypt - obviously the construction of the Pyramids required advanced geometry but well before that it was used to allocate plots of farming land on the Nile delta. It will be recalled that this floods every year and the boundaries are erased, so every year the plots have to be allocated anew along the sides of the river-banks, which required sophisticated reckoning. — Wayfarer

Yes, I read similar information. I was researching the origins of the Pythagorean theorem, and "the right angle" and found that the general principle (probably the 3,4,5 triangle) was being used by the Egyptians to produce parallel lines for plots of land. In one of Plato's dialogues, in a sort of myth form, he talks about the movement of ideas from Egypt to what is now Italy. I believe it was part of Greece then.

The point I was making is that it may be the case that numbers first arose simply for the purpose of ordering, priority, before and after. Notice that when we learn to count, at a very young age, what we learn is an ordering of the symbols, count from one to ten for example. We learn to count (order the symbols) before learning about quantity. I believe this is why numbers are known as objects.

There is nothing else for the symbols to represent, because they do not represent a quantity of things. 1 is before 2, and 2 is before 3. To understand this meaning in terms of hierarchic priority, or even temporal priority would require very difficult conceptualization for a child learning how to count, so we simply say that "1" stands for a number, which is before the number represented by "2" etc., or "lower and higher". Employing these objects (numbers) allows us to avoid understanding what before and after, lower and higher, actually mean, leaving that to be determined by the context of application. The principal application became lower and higher quantity. So, by saying that the numeral represents an object (a number), and that the objects may be ordered, allows that "order" be left undefined, for unlimited applications.

But the object, the number itself is actually redundant. The symbol may directly represent the quantity or order of the application without the requirement of the object as a medium. The object was only employed to facilitate understanding the usage. So the idea that there is an object (a number) between the symbol and the thing which the symbol represents in usage, is a sort of self-deception. This self-deception becomes very misleading when it becomes an axiom of set theory.

And the diagram you provide illustrates the problem, as it's two-dimensional. I think that what happens in reality, is that rational inference (including counting) operates on a different level, but in concert with, sensory cognition (per Kant). Whereas the diagram seeks to treat them in the same way, that is, as objects, and then asks how they're related. It's a category problem, which ultimately originates in the 'flattening' of ontology that occurs with the transition to the modern world-view (hence the relevance of the 'flatland' argument.) Hence, it's a metaphysical problem, but as the proponents of empiricism are averse to metaphysics, they of course will not be able to acknowledge that. — Wayfarer

It may be argued that the most fundamental use of numbers is in ordering, first second third, etc.. In this sense the number cannot be an object at all, but a place marker in a hierarchy or perhaps a temporal order. The hierarchy is a value structure, and it may be asked what it means to mark a position in such a structure. Even the question of what it means to mark a place in a temporal order is perplexing.

Yes, that is the defining claim of a substance-based metaphysics. I fail to see how this is a knock against process-metaphysics. It's saying "if we assume substance metaphysics is true, then process metaphysics isn't." Well obviously.

I will agree that substance metaphysics is more intuitive. However, our understanding of nature has often required us to drop intuitive models for less intuitive ones. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The point is that neither substance metaphysics nor process metaphysics is adequate because nature reveals to us, the reality of both aspects. And, since one is incompatible with the other, nature cannot be solely described by one or the other. That is why dualism provides the best approach. Neither substance metaphysics nor process metaphysics can provide what is required for a complete understanding

This just seems like question begging. If a particle is defined by "interactions" it seems just as correct to say it is defined by processes. To claim that "detection equipment" is fundamentally substance just assumes the truth of substance metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is in the nature of empirical observation, and the language applied for description. We observe things and make statements, and so we describe the world in this way. You can argue that this constitutes assumptions which beg the question, but it's really just a matter of what constitutes "truth". We must start with true premises, to produce sound conclusions, and true premises describe things (substance). As Aristotle demonstrated, becoming (process) defies the law of excluded middle, so simple descriptions of processes cannot provide us with true premises. If we adhere strictly to process metaphysics we have no truth and no sound logic. Then we get ontologies like model-dependent realism. It doesn't really matter that you might argue that requesting true premises is begging the question, because assuming that there is such a thing as truth is to make a substance assumption, because truth is simply what we want. Dismiss it as "intuition" if you want, but most philosophers agree that to dismiss intuition is to make a mistake.

Good post, very informative.

Oh, and as for the question I quoted - from my limited understanding, Frege, who had quite a bit to say about that, believed in the reality of abstract objects, which nominalism explicitly does not. See Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge (public domain.) — Wayfarer

I believe that what nominalism rejects is the idea that abstractions may be classed as "objects". So nominalism does not explicitly reject abstractions, it rejects "abstractions are objects".

If i remember correctly, the difference between nominalism and realism follows from a difference in interpretation of Aristotle's active intellect and passive intellect. Aristotle had determined that the intellect must consist of a passive aspect to receive forms from sense objects, and an active aspect to constrict conceptions beyond the limits of particular instances of sensation. Differences in how one "positions" these two aspects "within the world" result in the distinction between nominalism and realism.

Some thinkers wanted to maintain the intellect as pure separable Form, allowing that the intellect transcends the body in the immortality of the soul. That, I believe, is the realist position. This places the reality of the abstraction as non-spatial and within the intellect of the individual, but separable from the passive aspect which receives forms in sensation, and is attributed to the sense organs. Others assumed that the proper "active intellect" is already independent from the individual, as a feature of the collective 'people'. That, I believe, is the nominalist position. This makes the individual's intellect simply a passive intellect, receiving all it knows through sensation, passing that to the society where it becomes "knowledge" through justification.

You'll notice the nominalist representation is the more simple, at first glance, on the first level, dividing the passive intellect from the active through the two evident principles of 'property of individual', and 'property of the society'. It leaves a huge problem though, at a deeper level, as the reality of "the collective" the society, which must now be an entity with properties. The realist representation appears to be more complex because it exposes the problem of the duality of the intellect on the surface, as inherent within each individual intellect, instead of hiding it under the veil of an illusionary object "the collective".

The two render the "position" of the actual existence of the abstraction as fundamentally different. The realist places the abstraction as non-spatial, inside the fundamentally immaterial mind of the individual, while the nominalist places the actual existence of the abstraction as attributable to the society as a whole, and therefore independent from the individual mind. Therefore nominalism leaves the abstraction as a property of an object (the collective society) rather than as an object itself, while realism allows the abstraction to be a special type of object (non-spatial) which inheres within the minds of individuals.

Each has it's own problem. The nominalist has to validate the reality of "the collective", as an object, and the realist has to validate the reality of "the mind" as something within the individual, yet distinct from the physical body.

I'd argue this is getting things backwards. We only understand "things" in terms of what they do. What properties does any thing have when it is interacting with nothing? You can only describe properties in terms of how something interacts with other things or how parts of it interact. Substances without process can't explain anything. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's really irrelevant, because the point is that we understand that it is things which are interacting. It's obvious that we understand things through interactions, that's what sensation is, an interaction. But, as I said earlier, these are the two incompatible aspects of reality, the passive thing (being), and the activity (becoming). One is not reducible to the other. Therefore the attempt to reduce everything to processes provides no advantage over the attempt to reduce everything to substance. We need to account for the reality of both, as distinct and not reducible to one another. That is, the thing, and what the thing is doing

But the particles are mathematical constructs too. As Wilzeck puts it, with quarks the "it is the bit." These particles are entirely defined in mathematical terms. This is what ontic structural realism makes its hay on, the fact that they are defined as nothing but math. So, if being described in terms of mathematical constructs is disqualifying, then fundamental particles are every bit as problematic as fields. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The particle is defined by its interaction with the equipment that detects it, which is substance. The fields represent the potential for interaction. So the particles are not "mathematical constructs" in the way that the fields are. "Particles" is an assumption made from, and supported by, sense observation, just like the existence of a table, chair, or any other object is an assumption supported by sense observation.

I don't see why this should be the case. Protons seem to have beginnings and ends, which is why it seems fair to think of them as underlined by processes. However, they are remarkable stable otherwise. I don't see any reason to think we have "invented" rather than discovered protons, atoms, molecules, etc. Indeed, it's hard to see what we can even say about the world if these are to be considered purely as "inventions." To be sure, we invented ways of talking about them, systems for describing them, etc. But such systems didn't spring out of the ether; rather, they were developed by examining these phenomena. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not saying that we cannot think of mass as being composed of underlying processes, I am saying that this perspective does not solve any problems. To label a proton as "a stability" provides no sort of understanding. The concept which bears that name, "stability", is an invention, an ideal, and whatever it is that is supposed to be stable, the proposed underlying process, is not at all understood. So we have an invention called "a stability", and the thing called a proton is said to be this invented thing. This becomes more obvious if you describe an atom is "a stability", and a even more obvious if you describe a molecule as a "stability". Describing these things with the use of that ideal really says nothing about the constitution of the thing.

We might accept G.M D’Ariano's claim that particles are like "the shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," because universal fields and information have the ontological high ground, and still accept that these incredibly robust stabilities have a real ontic existence. The fact is, the "particle zoo" is still not all that big. Our "universal process" is such that it results in a fairly small diversity of stabilities that emerge at small scales - the same sort of thing we see when we play around with the rules of various "toy universe" models. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is not the ontic existence of the stability itself, as this is what becomes evident to us through sensation, the thing represented as a stability, as something (an object, thing, or being) with temporal extension. The problem is in understanding the supposed underlying processes which happen to be stable. We tend to understand processes through reference to the things which are actively involved in the processes. So for example if a molecule is a stability of processes, the things involved in those processes are the atoms. And if an atom is a stability of processes, then the underlying things involved in those processes are the parts of the atoms. Now when we get to fundamental particles, you might say that there are "fundamental fields" which constitute the processes, but fields are mathematical constructs. Unless we determine a medium for the supposed wave activity, (the ether), the proposed processes have no substance, and they are simply mathematical constructs built to represent the observed stability.

"Fundamental particles," can be thought of as stabilities in process, and the fact that they appear to have beginnings and ends (e.g. the destruction and spontaneous formation of quark condensate) seems to go along with this nicely as far as I am aware. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Stabilities" are represented as equilibriums which are artificial ideals that have no real independent existence. So the ideal equilibrium is compared to reality in modeling, and how reality strays from the equilibrium, is known as change. But the reality is that things are changing, whether fast or slow, so the equilibrium is just an artificial tool, and does not represent any thing really independent. It's a fabricated mathematical tool.

Then the reality of the situation, how it is possible that a rapidly changing world can maintain the semblance of stability within some aspects, gets completely neglected. The "being" which is represented as a stability, equilibrium, symmetry, or whatever, is taken for granted as conforming to the ideal principle, the equilibrium, when it really does not conform. None of the supposed stabilities could be anywhere near eternal in reality, and the representation just misleads us into thinking that ideal equilibriums are real existing things, which are being caused to surrender their equilibrium by the actions of various forces. Then when we get to the fringes of our understanding, instead of recognizing that the proposed equilibriums are simply not real, and that they get further and further from being an accurate representation as we head to these fringes, the trend is to employ concepts of chance as a cause, like "symmetry-breaking". .

. Although Hegel's conception of becoming emerging from being/nothing seems to offer up a potential way to balance these issues if the dialectical is thought of in an ontological sense, as in Jacob Boheme and Eriugena, Hegel's big forerunners. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think Hegel provides a solution because his proposals lead to the violation of the law of non-contradiction in dialectical materialism and dialethism when being/not-being are subsumed by becoming.

That's right. "Everything is contingent" implies two things, the possibility of nothing, and infinite regress. Infinite regress implies infinite time which with the principle of plenitude realizes the possibility of nothing. The reality of nothing denies the possibility of any contingent thing. So "Everything is contingent" is self-refuting, incoherent, because what it actually means is that it is impossible that there is anything.

I think the point is simple. If the proposition "Everything is contingent" is true, then there is always nothing. The proposition "After all contingent things existed" is eliminated as meaningless because there would never be any contingent things.

The shift to the process view helps here because you lose the problems of reductionism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The process view has its own problems, such as how to explain the reality of mass, as that which stays the same while time passes, inertia.

The two different perspectives, the perspective of "being" and the perspective of "becoming" (process), each if taken to account for the totality of reality are reductionist. The former reduces reality to particles which themselves remain the same as time passes, and in their relations produce the objects we know. The latter reduces all beings to basic units of activity, processes, which in their relations to each other constitute the objects we know.

The problem is that the two, the perspective of being and the perspective of becoming, are fundamentally incompatible as Plato found out, and since reality is revealed to us as consisting of both, the entirety cannot be reduced to one or the other. This is why dualism cannot be dismissed because it provides the only true foundation for a complete understanding of reality.

Dupes actually believed Trump meant political violence, and fell for a very simple fallacy as proffered by those who would exploit their gullibility. That’s the important context. — NOS4A2

Yes, but here's the important question. When the "dupes" interpret in the way that they do, does Trump expect in advance that they will interpret that way, and say those words with that intention?

So for example, when Trump used "fight" twenty whatever times in his Jan 6 speech, did he expect that the dupes in the audience would believe that he meant political violence, and he was thereby exploiting their gullibility?

The nothing did not occur, that's the point of the argument. If nothing did occur then there would still be nothing today. But if everything is contingent nothing would have occurred. Hence the conclusion of necessary being.

If all things are contingent then there would have been nothing at some time in the past (by the principle of plenitude). If there was nothing at some time in the past there would still be nothing now. There is not nothing now, there is contingent being. Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being.

Then the implications are clear when other politicians, like Biden, use the exact same words. — NOS4A2

That's right. But of course the context is different, and that's what's important.

The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated? — NotAristotle

No, I don't see how it could be a problem. Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude. This makes your reference to "after now" irrelevant.

But in context it was blatantly clear that the bloodbath Trump was speaking about was a figurative one, an economic one. — NOS4A2

Any use of "bloodbath", whether literal or metaphorical, implies violent aggression. It's similar to his use of "fight" on Jan 6. You can downplay it as "figurative" all you want, but the implications are clear. And, there is consistency in his way of speaking like that. The 'enemy', is the American political system and the goal is to smash it down.

But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent. — NotAristotle

I don't think that's relevant. If everything is contingent, then there would be an infinite regress of contingent beings prior to now, implying infinite time prior to now. However, "all being is contingent" implies the possibility of nothing. And, by the principle of plenitude there would have been a time of nothing. If there was a time of nothing prior to now, there would still be nothing. Therefore "all beings are contingent" is incoherent.

But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent." — NotAristotle

Right, and by the principle pf plenitude, if everything is contingent there would have been a time in the past with nothing. And, since "contingent being" implies that a prior cause is necessary for the being's existence, if there ever was nothing, there would always be nothing after that time. Therefore "everything is contingent" is incoherent.

How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent? — NotAristotle

By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent.

Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:

1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being. — NotAristotle

I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived.

Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too? — NotAristotle

There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism.

The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only. — NotAristotle

That issue becomes irrelevant when we consider what is prior to now, as Aquinas did. By considering what is prior to now we see that it is impossible that everything is contingent only. Therefore the "hypothetical assumption" has already been ruled out as incoherent in the way I described, through reference to what has occurred in the past. So applying that hypothetical assumption toward the future is pointless because it's already ruled out as incoherent through a proper understanding of the terms. When you say "there will be or may be nothing posterior to 'now,'" you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent.

Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false. — NotAristotle

I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. Aristotle showed how it is the case that when potential is a part of the thing we are talking about, we must allow a violation to the law of excluded middle with respect to that potential. This is in relation to the future, things not yet decided. In the case of material things, their "matter" is that potential, so as Aquinas says, these things are possible to be and not to be, and this provides for "change", generation and corruption. So instead of violating the law of noncontradiction to deal with the possibility to be and not to be, under Aristotelian principles, matter, as potential, violates the law of excluded middle, because it neither is, nor is not.

You'll see that modern dialectical materialists (and dialetheists), following Hegel who actually rejected the law of identity, allow that the nature of matter defies the law of non-contradiction. This is a resolution to the problem of "potential" which Aristotle considered, but rejected, insisting that the law of noncontradiction must be maintained, and opting for a violation of the law of excluded middle instead, to allow for the reality of potential.

I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment. — NotAristotle

This does not resolve the issue with "now". By this description, any proposed "exact present moment" as "now", is really a moment in the past, because by the time it is proposed as "now", it has passed. If you propose a future now, then it is not present, but future. The "now", as a point in time is not real because in reality, time is passing, and any proposed point in time will always be future or past. You could propose an extended period, or duration of time as your "now", but this duration of time would consist of change, and this destroys our capacity to truthfully say that there is such a thing (notice the static fixity of "thing") as what exists now.

So, when we look at "now", we are stuck with a duration of time. And, that duration of time consists of change, "becoming". Aristotle showed that becoming is fundamentally incompatible with the logical contraries of "being" and "not being", "is" and "is not". If we have state A (what is) at time 1, and state B at time 2, and change occurs between these two proposed points in time, then we need to describe this intermediary time, in order to understand change. If we propose a state C (what is) at time 1.5 as the intermediary, then we are left with having to describe the change between the initial state and the intermediary state, and between the intermediary state and the final state. If we propose more states of what is, in between, we just head for an infinite regress of states of being, without ever describing the actual "change" which occurs between the states of being.

This is the problem with "now". We like to represent it as a point in time, with a particular, describable "what is" which corresponds with that point of time. However, when the point in time is properly analyzed we find that it cannot ever adequately represent "now", as we know and understand "now" in lived experience, as it always ends up being in the past, or a projected point in the future. So we find out that "now" really consists of a duration of time. The duration cannot be entirely in the past, or else it would be past time, nor can it be entirely in the future. Therefore the duration which we call "now" must consist of both past and future. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between past (as what is fixed, determined, and necessary), and future (what is indeterminate, not fixed, and possible). Since both of these somewhat opposed. and incompatible aspects of reality exist at the very same time, "now", the question of "what exists now?" is itself incoherent.