This is nonsense. To the extent that time is relative to the speed one is going, that itself is a fact about the world. — Dan

Do you not agree that moral philosophy deals with human activity? And, to adequately understand "activity" of any kind requires an understanding of time.

You seem to be taking "there is some way the world is" to mean "there is some way the world is and nothing ever changes". — Dan

No, that's not the meaning I am assuming.

I assume that in the phrase "the way the world is", "is" implies the present time. However, our sense observation (empirical data) indicates that the world is always changing at the present time. Since the world is changing (in flux) at the present time, it is impossible that there is a specifiable "way that the world is", because "is" implies the present time. This is the basic fact which Einstein takes advantage of with his principle called "the relativity of simultaneity".

Do you not agree that moral philosophy deals with human activity? And, to adequately understand "activity" of any kind requires an understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how this relates to what I said. I would say that moral philosophy deals with the activity of moral agents, which includes but is not limited to, most adult humans. Whether I would say that understanding an activity requires an understanding of time depends on what you mean by this.

I assume that in the phrase "the way the world is", "is" implies the present time. However, our sense observation (empirical data) indicates that the world is always changing at the present time. Since the world is changing (in flux) at the present time, it is impossible that there is a specifiable "way that the world is", because "is" implies the present time. This is the basic fact which Einstein takes advantage of with his principle called "the relativity of simultaneity". — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't really imply that as we can zoom out temporarily rather than trying to specify a present moment which as past by the time we express the point. Though, this is largely irrelevant as, again, points such as whether time is relative to speed are themselves claims about the way the world is. Even being in a constant state of flux is a claim about the way the world is.

I don't know how this relates to what I said. I would say that moral philosophy deals with the activity of moral agents, which includes but is not limited to, most adult humans. Whether I would say that understanding an activity requires an understanding of time depends on what you mean by this. — Dan

I mean, that since time is an essential aspect of activities, then to correctly understand any activity requires a correct understanding of time. For example, animality is an essential aspect of being human, so to correctly understand what it means to be human requires an understanding of what it means to be an animal.

It doesn't really imply that as we can zoom out temporarily rather than trying to specify a present moment which as past by the time we express the point. Though, this is largely irrelevant as, again, points such as whether time is relative to speed are themselves claims about the way the world is. Even being in a constant state of flux is a claim about the way the world is. — Dan

You are attempting to avoid the issue rather than address it.

If we "zoom out", such that "the present" is a day, a month, a year, or a million years, then the changes which are occurring at the present, get increasingly significant as we zoom out, and it makes less and less sense to even think that there is "way that the world is". And if we zoom in, the changes get faster and faster, and it becomes more and more clear that change is of the essence of the world, rather than any assumed state of being (way that the world is).

So if we "zoom out" the maximal amount, like you suggest, we end up being able to make the most general statement only, "the world is changing", or " a constant state of flux". That is supposed to be "the way the world is". This is just like your claim, that even if there is no "objective truth", that there is no objective truth would be an objective truth. Then we could choose to interpret "the world is changing" as indicating that this is the way that the world is (your interpretation), or that there is no such thing as the way that the world is (my interpretation. We'd both be right, with contradictory meaning.

All this does is provide a good demonstration to justify my claim, that "objective truth", or "the way the world is" is completely irrelevant to moral philosophy. This is because "objective truth" can only refer to the most zoomed out, general statements, while moral philosophy needs to apply to the particular actions of here and now.

Again, this is the separation between "is" and "ought". "What is" is a general statement indicating a static condition of things, while "what ought to be done" is a specific action unique to the particular circumstances of individual persons here and now. Until you demonstrate how one might be related to the other, your starting point of "what is" remains irrelevant" to "what ought to be done".

I mean, that since time is an essential aspect of activities, then to correctly understand any activity requires a correct understanding of time. For example, animality is an essential aspect of being human, so to correctly understand what it means to be human requires an understanding of what it means to be an animal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Eh, I'm not sure that this is true. Perhaps to fully understand an activity requires an understanding of time, but I think this is a very high bar you are setting for understanding an activity. I think one can understand making scrambled eggs with a fairly low-level of understanding of the nature of time itself.

If we "zoom out", such that "the present" is a day, a month, a year, or a million years, then the changes which are occurring at the present, get increasingly significant as we zoom out, and it makes less and less sense to even think that there is "way that the world is". And if we zoom in, the changes get faster and faster, and it becomes more and more clear that change is of the essence of the world, rather than any assumed state of being (way that the world is). — Metaphysician Undercover

If that is indeed true, then that is the way the world is. I am not assuming a staticness.

So if we "zoom out" the maximal amount, like you suggest, we end up being able to make the most general statement only, "the world is changing", or " a constant state of flux". That is supposed to be "the way the world is". This is just like your claim, that even if there is no "objective truth", that there is no objective truth would be an objective truth. Then we could choose to interpret "the world is changing" as indicating that this is the way that the world is (your interpretation), or that there is no such thing as the way that the world is (my interpretation. We'd both be right, with contradictory meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mine would be right. Yours would be silly. If the world is constantly changing, that is a fact about the world that is important to know.

Also, I didn't suggest zooming out to the maximal amount. Again, that is something you have added in there. I suggested that we could zoom out. For example, when describing a river, it is silly to describe the position of each water molecule because (apart from practical considerations) they're moving. Likewise, we might seek to describe the physical laws of our universe, the phenomena we find in a particular location (for example, on earth), the logical laws that apply in all possible universes, etc.

All this does is provide a good demonstration to justify my claim, that "objective truth", or "the way the world is" is completely irrelevant to moral philosophy. This is because "objective truth" can only refer to the most zoomed out, general statements, while moral philosophy needs to apply to the particular actions of here and now. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, none of that is correct. I'm not totally sure what assumptions are lying behind this, but this claim is fairly obviously just wrong. A claim about something happening at a particular time and place can be true or false just as a claim about something happening throughout the universe can be true or false.

Also, I would say that moral truths, if they indeed exist, are necessary truths so are true in all possible worlds at all possible times, and we ought to apply those truths to the situations we find ourselves in.

Again, this is the separation between "is" and "ought". "What is" is a general statement indicating a static condition of things, while "what ought to be done" is a specific action unique to the particular circumstances of individual persons here and now. Until you demonstrate how one might be related to the other, your starting point of "what is" remains irrelevant" to "what ought to be done". — Metaphysician Undercover

What is, especially when it comes to the is-ought gap, does not indicate a static condition of things at all. That is completely wrong. It indicates a descriptive claim as opposed to a normative one. "Ought" when it comes to the is-ought gap, refers not only to specific actions, but also general moral rules and indeed normative claims of all types. This is just a misunderstanding of the is-ought gap.

As for how one might relate to the other, there are some ways in which they relate. The most obvious being that ought implies can (and can do otherwise), so the situation one is in and what actions they are capable of taking limit the space of things it can be the case that they ought to do.

Also, I would suggest that normative claims are also claims about objective facts, just objective moral facts. That an action being right, or wrong, or good, or bad, is also a part of objective reality to be discovered.

Eh, I'm not sure that this is true. Perhaps to fully understand an activity requires an understanding of time, but I think this is a very high bar you are setting for understanding an activity. I think one can understand making scrambled eggs with a fairly low-level of understanding of the nature of time itself. — Dan

I know, I expected a reply like this. You and I have significant difference in how we understand "understand". You seem to think that if a person can recognize a thing, and call it by the appropriate name, the person "understands" that thing. That's how you described "understanding one's choice".

But you are clearly inconsistent with your usage of the term. Now, to suit your purpose, you want a "low-level understanding of the nature of time" not to qualify as "understanding", though you insisted on an extremely low level, in the other case.

To understand "making scrambled eggs" one must understand temporal order, which action is first, second, and after this and after that. In "understanding" any human action, it is necessary to recognize the temporal order of means to end. The means are carried out as the actions necessary to bring about the end, which follows the means in time, as the effect of the causes. Also, in the case of your example, scrambled eggs, as in most cases, the means are most often very complex, requiring a temporal order of causes and effects within the means required to bring about the final effect, the end, which is named "scrambled eggs".

If that is indeed true, then that is the way the world is. I am not assuming a staticness. — Dan

You contradict yourself. "The way the world is" implies a staticness. That is unavoidable, "the way it is" indicates one unchanging thing "the way". Any change and it could no longer be called "the way" it would be a different "way". We cannot say "the way it is" without implying staticness because "the way" implies one unchanging "way".

This is why, if someone says "changing is the way that the world is", it's meaningless incoherency which can be interpreted in the two opposing ways I explained. You say that this means "change" is the one "objective truth" that we have about the world. I say that this means that that there is no "objective truth" about the world. I say that the statement "changing is the way that the world is", ought to be interpreted as a descriptive opinion about the world, rather than an objective truth. But you do not seem to understand what it means to accept a statement as meant to be a subjective description which people can either agree or disagree with, rather than as meant to be an objective truth.

This is where we have significant disagreement concerning the actions and communications of human beings. You think that communications and actions are in general, directed and guided by ideas about objective truth, while I think that actions and communications are guided and directed by subjective opinions concerning personal wants and desires. What I tell you is that the idea of "objective truth" only starts to influence our actions and communication when there is disagreement.

Also, I didn't suggest zooming out to the maximal amount. Again, that is something you have added in there. I suggested that we could zoom out. For example, when describing a river, it is silly to describe the position of each water molecule because (apart from practical considerations) they're moving. Likewise, we might seek to describe the physical laws of our universe, the phenomena we find in a particular location (for example, on earth), the logical laws that apply in all possible universes, etc. — Dan

The requirements for the description are context dependent. When attempting to understand flow patterns, erosion, etc., it is very beneficial to understand the activity of individual water molecules. This is studied in hydraulics and wave features.

This is the point. The most general statements, (most zoomed out), "the world is this way..." are completely useless in guiding human actions because they have no applicability. Applicability is determined by the particular circumstances. And, the particular circumstances are a feature of the individual's wants, needs, desires, or intentions. So if the person's intent is to make a map of the river, the description required is completely different from the description required if the person is trying to understand flow patterns and erosion.

Therefore "context dependent" refers to the person's intentions. The context which determines what is required of the description, is the person's intentions. So the requirements for the description, whether zoomed in or zoomed out, are "context dependent", where "context" is intention.

What is, especially when it comes to the is-ought gap, does not indicate a static condition of things at all. — Dan

Since you are going to keep insisting this, without explanation as to how this is possible, as you've done in other instances, I'm going to ask for justification. How does "what is" refer to anything other than a static unchanging situation, without the attempt at justification reducing the statement to meaningless incoherency? As I said above "the way it is" refers to one unchanging way, as does "what is". If "change" is invoked, then a before and after in time is also implied, and this negates "is", which refers to the present, "now". Then you no longer have "is', but a temporal distinction between two distinct times, before and after.

As for how one might relate to the other, there are some ways in which they relate. The most obvious being that ought implies can (and can do otherwise), so the situation one is in and what actions they are capable of taking limit the space of things it can be the case that they ought to do.

Also, I would suggest that normative claims are also claims about objective facts, just objective moral facts. That an action being right, or wrong, or good, or bad, is also a part of objective reality to be discovered. — Dan

You haven't justified "objective moral fact". Nor have you justified that "the situation one is in" refers to anything other than the context of one's intentions, as I explained above. So none of this has any bearing on the understanding of human actions until these assumptions you throw around can be justified.

I know, I expected a reply like this. You and I have significant difference in how we understand "understand". You seem to think that if a person can recognize a thing, and call it by the appropriate name, the person "understands" that thing. That's how you described "understanding one's choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely how I described understanding one's choice.

But you are clearly inconsistent with your usage of the term. Now, to suit your purpose, you want a "low-level understanding of the nature of time" not to qualify as "understanding", though you insisted on an extremely low level, in the other case. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not being inconsistent in the least, but if you mean a low-level understanding, then I'd probably agree. Given your history, I thought it was unlikely you would be setting a low bar for understanding.

To understand "making scrambled eggs" one must understand temporal order, which action is first, second, and after this and after that. In "understanding" any human action, it is necessary to recognize the temporal order of means to end. The means are carried out as the actions necessary to bring about the end, which follows the means in time, as the effect of the causes. Also, in the case of your example, scrambled eggs, as in most cases, the means are most often very complex, requiring a temporal order of causes and effects within the means required to bring about the final effect, the end, which is named "scrambled eggs". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not sure whether I understand time or not, but I have a reasonable guess. I think if this is the bar you are setting for understanding time (assuming that this understanding is correct, but let's not get into a discussion of time) then I think I would probably agree that understanding something like scrambing eggs probably implies some understanding of time.

You contradict yourself. "The way the world is" implies a staticness. That is unavoidable, "the way it is" indicates one unchanging thing "the way". Any change and it could no longer be called "the way" it would be a different "way". We cannot say "the way it is" without implying staticness because "the way" implies one unchanging "way". — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't imply that. You are inferring that inappropriately.

This is why, if someone says "changing is the way that the world is", it's meaningless incoherency which can be interpreted in the two opposing ways I explained. You say that this means "change" is the one "objective truth" that we have about the world. I say that this means that that there is no "objective truth" about the world. I say that the statement "changing is the way that the world is", ought to be interpreted as a descriptive opinion about the world, rather than an objective truth. But you do not seem to understand what it means to accept a statement as meant to be a subjective description which people can either agree or disagree with, rather than as meant to be an objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say it is the "one" objective truth. I said that if the world is in a constant state of change, then that is something that is true about the way the world is.

It's not a subjective description at all. It is an objective claim which may or may not be true. People certainly disagree about things that are objective all the time, it's just that some of them (sometimes all of them) are wrong.

This is the point. The most general statements, (most zoomed out), "the world is this way..." are completely useless in guiding human actions because they have no applicability. Applicability is determined by the particular circumstances. And, the particular circumstances are a feature of the individual's wants, needs, desires, or intentions. So if the person's intent is to make a map of the river, the description required is completely different from the description required if the person is trying to understand flow patterns and erosion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean this is fairly obviously not true. There are plenty of general statements about the way the world works that are also of practical importance to the individual and their goals. Further, whether something is useful to the individual and their goals is a completely different issue to whether it is correct.

Since you are going to keep insisting this, without explanation as to how this is possible, as you've done in other instances, I'm going to ask for justification. How does "what is" refer to anything other than a static unchanging situation, without the attempt at justification reducing the statement to meaningless incoherency? As I said above "the way it is" refers to one unchanging way, as does "what is". If "change" is invoked, then a before and after in time is also implied, and this negates "is", which refers to the present, "now". Then you no longer have "is', but a temporal distinction between two distinct times, before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Is" in the is-ought gap refers to descriptive claims, rather than normative claims. The point of the is-ought gap is that you cannot derive a normative conclusion from non-normative premises. Premises can be descriptive without refering to only a single time, for example they might describe a process that occurs over time.

You haven't justified "objective moral fact". Nor have you justified that "the situation one is in" refers to anything other than the context of one's intentions, as I explained above. So none of this has any bearing on the understanding of human actions until these assumptions you throw around can be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking me to justify the words or the claims here, I'm unclear? Do you really need me to justify what "the situation one is in" refers to in the context I've used it here?

I mean, I'm not sure whether I understand time or not, but I have a reasonable guess. I think if this is the bar you are setting for understanding time (assuming that this understanding is correct, but let's not get into a discussion of time) then I think I would probably agree that understanding something like scrambing eggs probably implies some understanding of time. — Dan

OK, It looks like we finally have some agreement on something. Understanding of human actions "implies some understanding of time". From this, we can also conclude that a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human actions.

Since moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions we can conclude that the moral philosopher requires sound premises regarding the nature of time. Therefore "a discussion of time" is not to be avoided, but is a necessity.

It doesn't imply that. You are inferring that inappropriately. — Dan

Again, you keep making stupid assertions like this without any justification. I explained very clearly how "the way the world is" implies staticness. Allow me to reiterate:

"The way" implies one way. And "one way" implies unchanging. If the world was changing (unstatic) at the time designated by "is" (now), we could not truthfully call it "the way" the world is, we'd have to say "the ways" which the world is (now).

I'm really tired of such stupid assertions, where you simply ignore my logical demonstrations and make a contrary (stupid) assertion.

I didn't say it is the "one" objective truth. I said that if the world is in a constant state of change, then that is something that is true about the way the world is. It's not a subjective description at all. It is an objective claim which may or may not be true. People certainly disagree about things that are objective all the time, it's just that some of them (sometimes all of them) are wrong. — Dan

This is simple begging the question, in the way I explained. You assume that the statement "changing is the way that the world is" is meant to represent an objective truth, rather than what the author claims, that it is meant to represent a subjective opinion. And this assumption provides the conclusion you desire "if the world is in a constant state of change...". That's begging the question, making an assumption which produces the desired conclusion.

You do not seem to have a firm understanding of ontology and metaphysics. Propositions in these fields are speculative, and not meant as "objective truth". These are like unproven hypotheses in science. They are not proposed as objective truths, they are proposed as theories to try with evidence and logic, in a procedure which would hopefully lead toward understanding.

So we can take your representation "the world is in a constant state of change", or my representation, "changing is the way that the world is", and analyze such propositions for the potential of truth. Now we can see that each representation is self-contradicting in the way described above. "State of change" is incoherent by contradiction, as well as "changing is the way" is incoherent by contradiction, as explained above.

Therefore opinions like those, which appear to express what is intended as "objective truth" must be rejected because of incoherence. This leaves us with two distinct and incompatible approaches, the approach of staticness, "the world is in a constant state", and the approach of activity, "the world is changing". Empirical evidence supports the latter, "the world is changing". Now we must dismiss all such propositions which appear to express opinions intended as objective truth, as inadequate for an accurate ontology, metaphysics, and consequently moral philosophy.

"Is" in the is-ought gap refers to descriptive claims, rather than normative claims. — Dan

Right, but can't you see that "descriptive claims" are essentially claims about "the way the world is"? These are claims which are intended to purvey an "objective truth". And, as explained above, this approach is inadequate for ontology and metaphysics. And, because this approach produces faulty ontology and metaphysics, it is also a faulty approach for moral philosophy.

So ontology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy must assign priority to change, as changing is how we actually know the world. Once the world is understood to be known as changing, rather than misunderstood to be known by descriptive claims, which imply "objective truth" (is), then we seek normative claims which involve judgements concerning good and bad changes (ought).

Do you really need me to justify what "the situation one is in" refers to in the context I've used it here? — Dan

Yes, that's exactly what you need to justify. And, the problem is as I've explained above. The "situation" is always rapidly changing, Therefore, in reality, what is actually happening in any real circumstances, is that there is activity which cannot be understood through descriptive claims intended to represent an "objective truth" concerning "the situation".

Furthermore, since this is what is actually going on (rapid changes), and the subject is conditioned to deal with what is actually going on, through evolutionary forces, these changes are understood through the context of intentions, wants, desires. Therefore reference to "the situation one is in" is meaningless and irrelevant. The person is in the midst of rapid changes, which are understood by that person in relation to (within the context of) what is intended, wanted, or desired by that person. The proposed "situation one is in" has no relevance.

If you really believe that "the situation one is in", is of any relevance here, you need to justify that opinion.

OK, It looks like we finally have some agreement on something. Understanding of human actions "implies some understanding of time". From this, we can also conclude that a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human actions.

Since moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions we can conclude that the moral philosopher requires sound premises regarding the nature of time. Therefore "a discussion of time" is not to be avoided, but is a necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't follow. Requiring some understanding of something does not imply that having a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human action as one might have some understanding but also misunderstand something to with time

Also, I wouldn't agree that moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions.

Again, you keep making stupid assertions like this without any justification. I explained very clearly how "the way the world is" implies staticness. Allow me to reiterate:

"The way" implies one way. And "one way" implies unchanging. If the world was changing (unstatic) at the time designated by "is" (now), we could not truthfully call it "the way" the world is, we'd have to say "the ways" which the world is (now).

I'm really tired of such stupid assertions, where you simply ignore my logical demonstrations and make a contrary (stupid) assertion. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are not stupid assertions. You keep claiming things that are blatently wrong and I am just pointing it out. It is as if you said "well obviously, 'time' implies the use of an armadillo as a sundial" and I am simply pointing out that this is obviously incorrect.

The way something is does not imply it is the only way it ever will be. You are asserting that it does, but it just doesn't. That isn't a reasonable thing to infer from what I said.

Also, while I have been granting your assertion that the world constantly changes for the sake of pointing out that this would be a feature of the way the world is, there are plenty of things about the world that presumably do not change, such as the fundamental laws of physics, and things which don't change across all possible worlds, such as necessary truths.

This is simple begging the question, in the way I explained. You assume that the statement "changing is the way that the world is" is meant to represent an objective truth, rather than what the author claims, that it is meant to represent a subjective opinion. And this assumption provides the conclusion you desire "if the world is in a constant state of change...". That's begging the question, making an assumption which produces the desired conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you genuinely mean that as a subjective opinion similar to "I don't like tomatoes" then why are you telling me and why should I care?

You do not seem to have a firm understanding of ontology and metaphysics. Propositions in these fields are speculative, and not meant as "objective truth". These are like unproven hypotheses in science. They are not proposed as objective truths, they are proposed as theories to try with evidence and logic, in a procedure which would hopefully lead toward understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just incorrect. Certainly there are some metaphysicians who are happy to spout similar nonsense, but it certainly isn't the case that metaphysics does not aim at objective truth as a rule. Also, unproven theories in science are proposed as suggestions of what the objective truth might be, or at least some approximation of it, to be tested when possible.

So we can take your representation "the world is in a constant state of change", or my representation, "changing is the way that the world is", and analyze such propositions for the potential of truth. Now we can see that each representation is self-contradicting in the way described above. "State of change" is incoherent by contradiction, as well as "changing is the way" is incoherent by contradiction, as explained above. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a contradiction because you are adding an assumption of staticness which you aren't entitled to.

Therefore opinions like those, which appear to express what is intended as "objective truth" must be rejected because of incoherence. This leaves us with two distinct and incompatible approaches, the approach of staticness, "the world is in a constant state", and the approach of activity, "the world is changing". Empirical evidence supports the latter, "the world is changing". Now we must dismiss all such propositions which appear to express opinions intended as objective truth, as inadequate for an accurate ontology, metaphysics, and consequently moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of this makes a lick of sense. Even if it were the case that what I said implied staticness, which it doesn't, none of this would follow from it. To say that truth is objective certainly does not imply that the world never changes. That is fairly clearly silly.

Also, I'm not sure you get to appeal to empirical evidence as support for a position without the assumption of objective truth.

Right, but can't you see that "descriptive claims" are essentially claims about "the way the world is"? These are claims which are intended to purvey an "objective truth". And, as explained above, this approach is inadequate for ontology and metaphysics. And, because this approach produces faulty ontology and metaphysics, it is also a faulty approach for moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

The claims of ontology and metaphysics are descriptive claims about the way the world (or possibly worlds) is (or possible are). They are very much concerned with objective truth.

So ontology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy must assign priority to change, as changing is how we actually know the world. Once the world is understood to be known as changing, rather than misunderstood to be known by descriptive claims, which imply "objective truth" (is), then we seek normative claims which involve judgements concerning good and bad changes (ought). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean.

Yes, that's exactly what you need to justify. And, the problem is as I've explained above. The "situation" is always rapidly changing, Therefore, in reality, what is actually happening in any real circumstances, is that there is activity which cannot be understood through descriptive claims intended to represent an "objective truth" concerning "the situation".

Furthermore, since this is what is actually going on (rapid changes), and the subject is conditioned to deal with what is actually going on, through evolutionary forces, these changes are understood through the context of intentions, wants, desires. Therefore reference to "the situation one is in" is meaningless and irrelevant. The person is in the midst of rapid changes, which are understood by that person in relation to (within the context of) what is intended, wanted, or desired by that person. The proposed "situation one is in" has no relevance.

If you really believe that "the situation one is in", is of any relevance here, you need to justify that opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you have understood what I was talking about at all here as you seem to have gone off on a weird tangent that has very little to do with it. But sure, I will explain why how the situation one is in relates to what it can be the case that one ought to do.

Hitler killing millions of Jewish people was a bad thing. One might think that I should prevent him from doing so. However, the situation I find myself in is that this happened many years before I was born and, alas, I have no time machine. Thus, I cannot do this. Because I cannot do this (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to do it.

Similarly let's say I come across a child drowning on my way home from work. One might think that I ought to jump in and save the child. However, for the sake of argument, I am paralyzed from the neck down and so cannot do so (also there is no way I can use my hypothetical wheelchair to push a stick over to them etc etc etc). Since I cannot jump in and save the child (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to (though perhaps I ought to call for help or something else that I am capable of).

These examples demonstrate the way in which ought implies can and how the situation we find ourselves in is relevant to this.

That doesn't follow. Requiring some understanding of something does not imply that having a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human action as one might have some understanding but also misunderstand something to with time — Dan

It doesn't follow, for you, because you didn't follow the argument. That is evident from this misrepresentation. Allow me to restate it please.

The argument starts from the primary premise which you and I agreed on, "understanding of human actions implies some understanding of time". "Implies" here, indicates that "some understanding of time" is necessary to understanding "human actions", as an essential part of the concept indicated by "human actions". That word "implies" indicates the logical relation, some understanding of time is required for an understanding of human actions. Do you understand the premise?

Now the second premise is "a misunderstanding of time". "Misunderstanding" means something other than understanding, as we've discussed earlier. A person thinks oneself to understand, and appears to oneself as having an understanding, but the thing which appears to the person as an understanding, is not an understanding at all, it is something other than an understanding, and actually opposed to understanding, so it is properly called "misunderstanding".

The conclusion drawn from those two premises is that the person who has a misunderstanding of time will necessarily have a misunderstanding of "human actions". This is because the concept "human actions" is dependent on "some understanding of time", and "misunderstanding of time" signifies a lack of understanding, something other than understanding. which appears like understanding but is not. Therefore, what appears to the person as an understanding of "human actions" would really be a misunderstanding, according to the extent that "understanding time" is required, necessary, or essential to, "understanding human actions", indicated by that word "implies".

These are not stupid assertions. You keep claiming things that are blatently wrong and I am just pointing it out. — Dan

There you go, backing up your use of stupid assertions with more stupid assertions. We'll have an infinite regress of stupid assertions, with nothing justified. How is the statement "you are blatantly wrong" supposed to indicate anything to me other than how stupid you are?

Have you ever been in this situation? You demonstrate to someone what you believe to be sound logic, premises backed up with good evidence, and arguments of valid logic, and the person replies "you're blatantly wrong". So you provide more evidence and logic, and the person persists with "that's simply incorrect". Wouldn't it occur to you, that the person is just countering sound logic with stupid assertions?

The way something is does not imply it is the only way it ever will be. You are asserting that it does, but it just doesn't. — Dan

I made no such assertion, that's a complete misrepresentation. I said "the way something is" refers to something static, unchanging, as "the way", and "is" refers to the present time, now. I never said that this implies that it hasn't changed in the past, or that it implies that it will not change in the future. So your representation of what I said is clearly wrong.

But I also said that the proposition "there is a way the world is" is contrary to evidence. This is because evidence indicates that the world is changing at the present time, now, which is what "is" refers to. So your statement "the way something is" indicates something unchanging at the present, now, while allowing that this static condition of now, might change in the future, or past.

This statement is clearly contrary to reality. In reality, known by empirical evidence, things do not change in the past, nor do they change in the future, they change only at the present, now. That is the only time when change occurs, at the present. So the evidence is clear, you are the one who is blatantly wrong. Things are not static now, as "the way something is" indicates, with the possibility of change in the past and future, in reality things are changing now, with the possibility that the named thing might be the same in the past or future.

It's not a contradiction because you are adding an assumption of staticness which you aren't entitled to. — Dan

I'm adding no extra assumptions, "constant state", were your words, and "state" implies static.

The claims of ontology and metaphysics are descriptive claims about the way the world (or possibly worlds) is (or possible are). They are very much concerned with objective truth. — Dan

Again, an unsupported assertion, which is the basis of the fallacy of begging the question, that you commit.

Hitler killing millions of Jewish people was a bad thing. One might think that I should prevent him from doing so. However, the situation I find myself in is that this happened many years before I was born and, alas, I have no time machine. Thus, I cannot do this. Because I cannot do this (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to do it. — Dan

Are you presenting this as evidence of how important an understanding of time is to moral philosophy. That's what I argued since the beginning. And I also said that the biggest, most significant restriction on one's freedom is that the past cannot be changed. Both you and Amadeus dismissed this fact as irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Now I see that you are starting to understand how time actually does restrict one's freedom to act. You call it "the situation", but if you keep looking at your example, you'll see that the description names time as applying the restriction. This is indicated by the condition "I have no time machine". This shows that if you had a time machine, the restriction would not apply, therefore it is time rather than "the situation" which is limiting your freedom.

Similarly let's say I come across a child drowning on my way home from work. One might think that I ought to jump in and save the child. However, for the sake of argument, I am paralyzed from the neck down and so cannot do so (also there is no way I can use my hypothetical wheelchair to push a stick over to them etc etc etc). Since I cannot jump in and save the child (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to (though perhaps I ought to call for help or something else that I am capable of). — Dan

I don't see your argument. What you "ought to do" is determined by intention, not the situation. As I said, the context is the intention, the context is not the situation. Intention dictates the end, the situation dictates the means. So if "ought to save the child" indicates the good intention, then you ought to do this regardless of the situation. This means that if the situation limits your means, it only makes the task more difficult. You can't swim, so you think of the stick method. That doesn't work so you try something else, etc. etc. etc., maybe even call for help.

The fact that you provide all these different alternatives indicates that you recognize "ought" belongs to the intention, "save the child" in this case, and not to any particular one of the specified means, which are dictated by the situation. "Ought" therefore, is not restricted by the situation, nor is it restricted by what is apprehended as what "can" be done. We must allow that it transcends the situation, as intention transcends the situation, inspiring us to find the means to get through seemingly impossible situations.

This issue of "ought" being restricted by the situation is very similar to the issue of "ought" being restricted by "the information which one has". This is a defeatist attitude which allows "the good" (what is intended), to be compromised unnecessarily by the way that one perceives "the situation". This is is conducive to cop outs, excuses, and rationalizations as to why one did not do what ought to have been done. Sorry, I was limited by the circumstances".

When you allow "ought" to be restricted by the situation, or by the information which one has, then you need a whole slew of other principles applicable in all the different circumstances, to determine, at what point do I stop trying to find ways to save the child, at what point do i stop seeking further information. To properly deal with this problem, we need to allow that "ought" transcends the situation. Therefore, "situation" is irrelevant, as I said.

It doesn't follow, for you, because you didn't follow the argument. That is evident from this misrepresentation. Allow me to restate it please.

The argument starts from the primary premise which you and I agreed on, "understanding of human actions implies some understanding of time". "Implies" here, indicates that "some understanding of time" is necessary to understanding "human actions", as an essential part of the concept indicated by "human actions". That word "implies" indicates the logical relation, some understanding of time is required for an understanding of human actions. Do you understand the premise?

Now the second premise is "a misunderstanding of time". "Misunderstanding" means something other than understanding, as we've discussed earlier. A person thinks oneself to understand, and appears to oneself as having an understanding, but the thing which appears to the person as an understanding, is not an understanding at all, it is something other than an understanding, and actually opposed to understanding, so it is properly called "misunderstanding".

The conclusion drawn from those two premises is that the person who has a misunderstanding of time will necessarily have a misunderstanding of "human actions". This is because the concept "human actions" is dependent on "some understanding of time", and "misunderstanding of time" signifies a lack of understanding, something other than understanding. which appears like understanding but is not. Therefore, what appears to the person as an understanding of "human actions" would really be a misunderstanding, according to the extent that "understanding time" is required, necessary, or essential to, "understanding human actions", indicated by that word "implies". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I don't agree that implies indicates necessity, but putting that to one side, are you suggesting that to misunderstand something is to not understand it at all surely there are degrees of understanding?

There you go, backing up your use of stupid assertions with more stupid assertions. We'll have an infinite regress of stupid assertions, with nothing justified. How is the statement "you are blatantly wrong" supposed to indicate anything to me other than how stupid you are?

Have you ever been in this situation? You demonstrate to someone what you believe to be sound logic, premises backed up with good evidence, and arguments of valid logic, and the person replies "you're blatantly wrong". So you provide more evidence and logic, and the person persists with "that's simply incorrect". Wouldn't it occur to you, that the person is just countering sound logic with stupid assertions? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll thank you to keep your rudeness to yourself.

Also, that isn't remotely the situation you find yourself in. I am denying obviously incorrect claims that you haven't backed up properly. You haven't provided logic and evidence, you have provided fallacious arguments, usually backed by improper definitions of terms. Further, I am often explaining why you are wrong, but you seem to not be listening. For example, your points about the is-ought gap. I pointed out this was wrong and then explained what the is-ought gap is, and that you were using it improperly. You then responded "well how can the situation one is in affect morality?". Which a) was obvious from what I had just said, and b) wasn't remotely related to the point I was making. I could address the original point you were taking issue with as well, but that is discussed in the next paragraph.

I made no such assertion, that's a complete misrepresentation. I said "the way something is" refers to something static, unchanging, as "the way", and "is" refers to the present time, now. I never said that this implies that it hasn't changed in the past, or that it implies that it will not change in the future. So your representation of what I said is clearly wrong.

But I also said that the proposition "there is a way the world is" is contrary to evidence. This is because evidence indicates that the world is changing at the present time, now, which is what "is" refers to. So your statement "the way something is" indicates something unchanging at the present, now, while allowing that this static condition of now, might change in the future, or past.

This statement is clearly contrary to reality. In reality, known by empirical evidence, things do not change in the past, nor do they change in the future, they change only at the present, now. That is the only time when change occurs, at the present. So the evidence is clear, you are the one who is blatantly wrong. Things are not static now, as "the way something is" indicates, with the possibility of change in the past and future, in reality things are changing now, with the possibility that the named thing might be the same in the past or future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this seems both pedantic in the extreme and probably just incorrect depending on how we flesh out "now". But let's take a fairly everyday usage of "now" and say that the physical properties of the universe (where things are, what state they are in, etc etc) are changing now. That is a claim about the way the world is. The way it is, assuming you are right, is a state of flux. Also, there are a bunch of features of the universe that presumably aren't changing, such as the laws of physics, and things that hold true across all possible worlds which aren't changing, such as the laws of logic. None of this means we can't talk sensibly about the way the world is.

Again, an unsupported assertion, which is the basis of the fallacy of begging the question, that you commit. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, that begging the question requires more than unsupported assertion. Second, I haven't committed that fallacy. Third, this is less an unsupported assertion, and more an explanation. I have pointed out the goal of metaphysics and ontology and explained that that is a goal directed at objective truth.

Are you presenting this as evidence of how important an understanding of time is to moral philosophy. That's what I argued since the beginning. And I also said that the biggest, most significant restriction on one's freedom is that the past cannot be changed. Both you and Amadeus dismissed this fact as irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Now I see that you are starting to understand how time actually does restrict one's freedom to act. You call it "the situation", but if you keep looking at your example, you'll see that the description names time as applying the restriction. This is indicated by the condition "I have no time machine". This shows that if you had a time machine, the restriction would not apply, therefore it is time rather than "the situation" which is limiting your freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am using this as an example of the situation I am in, which includes the time I am in, meaning I can't do something and how this relates to the principle of ought implies can.

There is not something I am starting to understand here, so much as something I have understood from the off and am trying to explain to you as you seemed to misunderstand what I was saying.

I don't see your argument. What you "ought to do" is determined by intention, not the situation. As I said, the context is the intention, the context is not the situation. Intention dictates the end, the situation dictates the means. So if "ought to save the child" indicates the good intention, then you ought to do this regardless of the situation. This means that if the situation limits your means, it only makes the task more difficult. You can't swim, so you think of the stick method. That doesn't work so you try something else, etc. etc. etc., maybe even call for help.

The fact that you provide all these different alternatives indicates that you recognize "ought" belongs to the intention, "save the child" in this case, and not to any particular one of the specified means, which are dictated by the situation. "Ought" therefore, is not restricted by the situation, nor is it restricted by what is apprehended as what "can" be done. We must allow that it transcends the situation, as intention transcends the situation, inspiring us to find the means to get through seemingly impossible situations — Metaphysician Undercover

No, ought is not determined by intention. Ought is determined by morality, regardless of your intentions.

The reason I provided other explanations was I thought you might immediately start trying to dispute the example rather than addressing the point, which I can see you have done as well.

This issue of "ought" being restricted by the situation is very similar to the issue of "ought" being restricted by "the information which one has". This is a defeatist attitude which allows "the good" (what is intended), to be compromised unnecessarily by the way that one perceives "the situation". This is is conducive to cop outs, excuses, and rationalizations as to why one did not do what ought to have been done. Sorry, I was limited by the circumstances".

When you allow "ought" to be restricted by the situation, or by the information which one has, then you need a whole slew of other principles applicable in all the different circumstances, to determine, at what point do I stop trying to find ways to save the child, at what point do i stop seeking further information. To properly deal with this problem, we need to allow that "ought" transcends the situation. Therefore, "situation" is irrelevant, as I said. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly sure I didn't say that ought was restricted by merely the information that one has, as I very much left room for people to be wrong due to ignorance.

Further, it isn't defeatist to say that you only ought to do things you are able to do. It is realistic. Are you suggesting that people ought to do things that are impossible for them to do?

I mean, I don't agree that implies indicates necessity, but putting that to one side, are you suggesting that to misunderstand something is to not understand it at all surely there are degrees of understanding? — Dan

In my understanding, there is two distinct senses of "implied". One means what is indicated by evidence, the other means what is indicated by logic. The first sense does not produce necessity, because "evidence" does not provide the required certainty. The other sense, being valid logic, produces logical necessity. So for example, All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, "implies" that Socrates is mortal, by logical necessity.

The latter sense, the one of logical necessity is the one used in the argument about the relation between understanding time and understanding human actions. When we say that an understanding of human actions "implies" some understanding of time, it is a logical relation being referred to. We are saying that any understanding of human actions necessarily consists of some understanding of time, through a logical relation between "the understanding of human actions" and "the understanding of time". In the example above, when we say Socrates is a man "implies" that Socrates is mortal, we are referring to a relation of logical necessity between "man" and "mortal", in the very same way. Understanding human actions implies, due to logical necessity, some understanding of time.

With respect to the relation between degrees of understanding, and misunderstanding, this is what I tried to explain to you earlier, as two distinct things. When we are learning things, mathematics in school for example, we go through degrees of understanding as we increase our knowledge. Never can this be classified as "misunderstanding" unless the student learns a wrong thing, goes in a faulty direction. "Misunderstanding" consists of mistaken knowledge, when someone learns something which is wrong. Since it is mistaken, and wrong, it cannot be any degree of understanding.

'll thank you to keep your rudeness to yourself. — Dan

I'll try, but since it is the lounge, inhibitions loosen, then spontaneity and habit guide the tongue.

I am denying obviously incorrect claims that you haven't backed up properly. You haven't provided logic and evidence, you have provided fallacious arguments, usually backed by improper definitions of terms. — Dan

Uh, continuing with the ...assertions. Look Dan, you assert that what I say is incorrect, and my arguments are fallacious, but you do not address them. You just assert, assert, assert.

I pointed out this was wrong and then explained what the is-ought gap is, and that you were using it improperly. — Dan

This is incorrect for the following reasons. You explained how you interpret the meaning of the "is-ought gap", and I proceeded to show you how that understanding of the principle was completely consistent with what I was arguing, how I was "using" the is-ought gap..

See, I produced an application of that principle, the is-ought gap, I applied it to what we were arguing. Then you provided an understanding of the is-ought gap, and I showed you that your understanding is consistent with my application. However, instead of accepting my application, or even trying to demonstrate that it is not consistent with how you understand the principle, you simply denied my application, and asserted that I am wrong. Then you topped that off with something extremely rude, and downright stupid:

"I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean."

How can you proceed from the premise that you cannot understand me, to the conclusion that I do not understand myself?

But let's take a fairly everyday usage of "now" and say that the physical properties of the universe (where things are, what state they are in, etc etc) are changing now. That is a claim about the way the world is. — Dan

This is an invalid implication. Consider how I explained the logical sense of "implies" above. Now, take a look at your proposition "the physical properties of the universe are changing now". Your claim is that this proposition implies something about "the way the world is". It does not, for the reasons I've already explained to you. Simply put, "the way the world is" implies that there is a way that the world is, while "the properties of the universe are changing" implies that there is not a way that the universe is, because it is in a condition of changing. There is no logical relation, therefore no logical necessity, because the two are incompatible.

See, you simply ignore the logic applied to the meaning of the terms, and insist and assert things which if accepted, render the words incoherent and meaningless. What's the point? We wouldn't be able to get anywhere if we accepted things like that.

You say this is pedantic, but pedanticism is extremely necessary here. We are trying to get a handle on moral principles, a field in which the deeper we delve into it, the less relevant empirical evidence becomes, due to the is-ought gap. Therefore the only thing we have to guide us, to keep us on the straight and narrow, is strict adherence to rigorous principles. Without that, we can claim anything as ought, right, good, etc..

I have pointed out the goal of metaphysics and ontology and explained that that is a goal directed at objective truth. — Dan

No, you have merely asserted that. It is nothing but your opinion, and as I said, it's a principle you assert for the purpose of begging the question. If you know Plato, you would see that goals are named as "the good". And, you'd understand that "the good" is distinctly other from "objective truth". Again, the difference between the two denies the possibility of logical implication.

In my understanding, there is two distinct senses of "implied". One means what is indicated by evidence, the other means what is indicated by logic. The first sense does not produce necessity, because "evidence" does not provide the required certainty. The other sense, being valid logic, produces logical necessity. So for example, All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, "implies" that Socrates is mortal, by logical necessity.

The latter sense, the one of logical necessity is the one used in the argument about the relation between understanding time and understanding human actions. When we say that an understanding of human actions "implies" some understanding of time, it is a logical relation being referred to. We are saying that any understanding of human actions necessarily consists of some understanding of time, through a logical relation between "the understanding of human actions" and "the understanding of time". In the example above, when we say Socrates is a man "implies" that Socrates is mortal, we are referring to a relation of logical necessity between "man" and "mortal", in the very same way. Understanding human actions implies, due to logical necessity, some understanding of time.

With respect to the relation between degrees of understanding, and misunderstanding, this is what I tried to explain to you earlier, as two distinct things. When we are learning things, mathematics in school for example, we go through degrees of understanding as we increase our knowledge. Never can this be classified as "misunderstanding" unless the student learns a wrong thing, goes in a faulty direction. "Misunderstanding" consists of mistaken knowledge, when someone learns something which is wrong. Since it is mistaken, and wrong, it cannot be any degree of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case I don't think I would agree that understanding human action implies understanding time in the sense you have said here.

I mean, one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally. It seems that we can understand something reasonably well, but still misunderstand part of it, can't we?

I'll try, but since it is the lounge, inhibitions loosen, then spontaneity and habit guide the tongue. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I suggest keeping your tongue off the keyboard.

Uh, continuing with the ...assertions. Look Dan, you assert that what I say is incorrect, and my arguments are fallacious, but you do not address them. You just assert, assert, assert. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have addressed them again and again. If you wish for evidence of this, I suggest looking at my many posts replying to you. You will find many examples of me addressing your assertions, pointing out dubious uses of words, etc.

This is incorrect for the following reasons. You explained how you interpret the meaning of the "is-ought gap", and I proceeded to show you how that understanding of the principle was completely consistent with what I was arguing, how I was "using" the is-ought gap..

See, I produced an application of that principle, the is-ought gap, I applied it to what we were arguing. Then you provided an understanding of the is-ought gap, and I showed you that your understanding is consistent with my application. However, instead of accepting my application, or even trying to demonstrate that it is not consistent with how you understand the principle, you simply denied my application, and asserted that I am wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

You really shown that so much as made a bunch of dubious assertions about normative claims vs descriptive claims which seem to be rooted in misunderstanding and the implication that descriptive claims must be about something static, rather than something that may be dynamic/changing. If you did not mean to imply this, feel free to correct me and explain what you meant instead.

Then you topped that off with something extremely rude, and downright stupid:
"I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean."
How can you proceed from the premise that you cannot understand me, to the conclusion that I do not understand myself? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say you didn't understand yourself, I said you don't understand what many of these words mean. These are clearly not the same claim (you are not equal to the definitions of words, in case that needed justifying). If you are using them in some way completely divorced from how they are generally used, feel free to provide definitions.

This is an invalid implication. Consider how I explained the logical sense of "implies" above. Now, take a look at your proposition "the physical properties of the universe are changing now". Your claim is that this proposition implies something about "the way the world is". It does not, for the reasons I've already explained to you. Simply put, "the way the world is" implies that there is a way that the world is, while "the properties of the universe are changing" implies that there is not a way that the universe is, because it is in a condition of changing. There is no logical relation, therefore no logical necessity, because the two are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you want "the way the world is" to mean more than it does. And, again, the condition of changing is a claim about the way something is, because "the way something is" does not imply that the thing is not changing.

"Is" can be used to refer to the state something is in at a particular time, or it can be used to refer to the state of something throughout time. On the first definition, it is entirely reasonable to say a number of things about the way the world is (for example it contains chairs). On the second, that it is in a state of constant flux (assuming that it is) would be a claim about the way the world always is. Further, as mentioned previously, there are a number of features of the world that do not change

See, you simply ignore the logic applied to the meaning of the terms, and insist and assert things which if accepted, render the words incoherent and meaningless. What's the point? We wouldn't be able to get anywhere if we accepted things like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not ignoring the meaning of words, you're just incorrect about them both in the particular case of assuming that "the way something is" must refer to something that is unchanging and in the general case of assuming that words can only have a single meaning, rather than being context sensitive and capable of picking out multiple concepts depending on how they are used.

You say this is pedantic, but pedanticism is extremely necessary here. We are trying to get a handle on moral principles, a field in which the deeper we delve into it, the less relevant empirical evidence becomes, due to the is-ought gap. Therefore the only thing we have to guide us, to keep us on the straight and narrow, is strict adherence to rigorous principles. Without that, we can claim anything as ought, right, good, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It really isn't. What is important is careful consideration of concepts, not nit-picking over words. I could have, by the same token, pointed out that the universe is not changing "now" if "now" is taken to be a specific moment, since everything is always exactly equal to itself so whatever state the universe is in within a specific moment is exactly what state it is in. Alternatively, I could have disputed the idea of a present moment by way of relativity. Neither of these would have been good points though. Better to deal with what you meant, rather than fretting over your word usage.

No, you have merely asserted that. It is nothing but your opinion, and as I said, it's a principle you assert for the purpose of begging the question. If you know Plato, you would see that goals are named as "the good". And, you'd understand that "the good" is distinctly other from "objective truth". Again, the difference between the two denies the possibility of logical implication. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting aside to what extent Plato's views matter, are you genuinely claiming that Plato was not concerned with or aiming at objective truth?

Also, I've already explained to you that any worthwhile discussion relies on the assumption of objective truth. When Plato claims that the form of the good exists in the realm of the forms, he is claiming that this is objectively true, not just that he finds it fun to believe so. Whether he is right or not has an answer. There either is a form of the good somewhere in a Platonic realm, or there isn't.

Again, you want "the way the world is" to mean more than it does. And, again, the condition of changing is a claim about the way something is, because "the way something is" does not imply that the thing is not changing. — Dan

It seems this is a hang up in the last couple of pages.

Fwiw, this (Dan's description) is patently true. Reducing "the way X is" to only ever apply to static description is not reasonable - particularly in the face of the user of the phrase telling you that's not baked in.

The digression has helped me to understand why you've spent the better part of a decade trying to do something which I quickly apprehended as impossible. Your approach is to 'loosen up' definitions, or the meanings of words, when two principles are incompatible, believing that using words in this sloppy way will make the two incompatible principles compatible. So for example, (I'm not saying that this is what you have done, I'm saying it's a similar example), if the traditional way to understand "free will" is incompatible with the traditional way of understanding "determinism", then if one could 'loosen up' the meaning of one or both of these terms, that person might create the appearance that the two are compatible. And so we have what is called "compatibilism".

I think that this is best described as sophistry. But the loosening up of definitions allows ambiguity and equivocation, which propagates misunderstanding. Further, the loosening up of the meaning of "understanding" allows you to say that you have a good understanding even though misunderstanding inheres within what you assume to "understand" ( "one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally").

What you demonstrate is that you allow the incoherency of contradiction to penetrate deep within what you assume to be "understanding". You allow that a person might be judged as having a good understanding of X even though there are elements of misunderstanding within that supposed "understanding". This is a sneaky, sophistic way of violating the law of noncontradiction, by allowing that the contradictory property inheres within the affirmed one. 'Blackness inheres within the white of that objects.'

By not performing a proper analysis, and distinguishing which elements are understood, from which are misunderstood, and simply allowing the incoherent notion that misunderstanding inheres within understanding, you deny yourself the possibility of a true (real) understanding. You refuse to purge yourself of misunderstanding by accepting this incoherent idea that misunderstanding may be a part of a good understanding.

So, in summary, what you have demonstrated is that you "loosen up" definitions in the sophistic way. You do this to make opposing, incompatible principles appear to be compatible. This produces misunderstanding of basic, fundamental, and foundational, ontological principles. Then you argue that even if there is misunderstanding hidden deep within my claimed "understanding" it might still be a good understanding.

Back to the op. Succinctly stated, your belief that there is such a thing as "objective right" is incompatible with your belief that there is value in free choice. If there is such a thing as "objective right" then there must be an objectively right thing to do in every situation, and the objectively right thing to do would be assigned the highest value. Freedom of choice, which would allow a person to choose something other than the objectively right thing, therefore cannot be assigned any value.

So you 'loosen up' the meanings of these terms, to use them in a way which promotes the appearance of compatibility, but all this does is foster misunderstanding. The misunderstanding which is evident within your use of terms like "free choice", and "freedom", disables you from recognizing the incompatibility because it was designed to hide that incompatibility. However, the incompatibility cannot be vanquished by hiding it, so it persists and prevents you from adequately resolving the problem you present n the op. Now, instead of recognizing that this sloppy use of words has propagated misunderstanding, and this misunderstanding has veiled the true nature of that problem, you choose to argue that your "understanding" might still be a good one, even though misunderstanding inheres within it.

Reducing "the way X is" to only ever apply to static description is not reasonable - particularly in the face of the user of the phrase telling you that's not baked in. — AmadeusD

Sure, someone can use "square" in a way which does not exclude a circle from being a type of square, and assert "this is the way I choose to use that term", insisting that the other person in the discussion must accept such incoherency if they want to continue discussion, but what's the point? How could this be conducive to understanding?

In reality, if understanding is our goal, we must seek out such sloppy usage, define the boundaries of contradiction and adhere to them, thus annihilating the sloppy usage. So if someone insists that they want to use "state" or "the way X is" as a descriptive term which would include "actively changing" into the category of being a "state", I would simply dismiss myself from the discussion, recognizing it as conducive to misunderstanding rather than understanding, therefore not a productive discussion.

The matter of what the user of the phrase is demanding is not relevant. Each individual must make the judgement of what is reasonable, and what is not reasonable, for oneself. You judge what I am insisting on, two incompatible categories, as unreasonable. But I judge what you and Dan are insisting on, describing (what I apprehend as) two incompatible features of the world by the same terms, as unreasonable. We judge each other to be unreasonable, refuse to agree, and this makes discussion of that subject pointless.

As evidence of the pointlessness of accepting Dan's demands, and adhering to my principles, I point to Dan's claim of having spent close to a decade trying to resolve this problem. I argue that it is Dan's failure to establish clear boundaries of contradiction, thereby allowing contradiction and incoherency to permeate the usage of words which is being demanded, which creates the illusion to Dan, that an unresolvable problem might be resolved. Therefore Dan obliviously trudges onward failing to recognize where the unreasonableness really lies.

I'm not using words in a sloppy way. I'm using them in a precise way, just not the way you want them to be used.

My difficulties solving the problem of weighing freedom over different things do not come from dubious definitions, but from difficulty. Moral philosophy is hard and, while I am not dismissing the possibility of incompatibility completely, the reasons you have given for thinking that weighing freedoms is impossible in the way I have described are grounded in fundamentally misunderstanding the claims being made and the words used to make them, as well as untenable meta-ethical and meta-physical beliefs.

Objective right also does not conflict with freedom being valuable. For example, if the thing which is objectively right is the thing which protects the most freedom (which is not my view, but is an example of a maximizing view with the same measure of value) then that is surely treating freedom as valuable.

Further, I am not using terms in a way similar to defining square in a way that can include circles (though there are certainly contexts in which this could be entirely reasonable, eg "a square meal"), I am using words in a fairly common way to communicate sensible points.

I'm not using words in a sloppy way. I'm using them in a precise way, just not the way you want them to be used. — Dan

You have not used "understand" in a precise way at all. In fact, you complained about my request for precision in meaning when we discussed what it means to understand one's own choice. You wanted to allow 'understand" to mean anything from being able to provide a reason for the choice, after the fact, to simply being able to describe the choice with words. Now, you state that a good understanding can consist of elements of misunderstanding. That's incoherency, and clear evidence of sloppy usage.

Objective right also does not conflict with freedom being valuable. For example, if the thing which is objectively right is the thing which protects the most freedom (which is not my view, but is an example of a maximizing view with the same measure of value) then that is surely treating freedom as valuable. — Dan

Your example only demonstrates the incoherency which results from the incompatibility. If "objectively right" is taken as a general principle, "protect the most freedom", then each person in each situation which one finds oneself in, must have the most freedom to choose, and this implies that there is not an objectively right choice to be made.

The incompatibility is between the general and the particular. If there is an objectively right choice in particular circumstances, then the value of freedom must be denied in favour of the value of the objectively right choice. The freedom to choose can have no value relative to the need for the objectively right action. And if "objectively right" is taken as a general principle to state "the most freedom is what is objectively right", then the person must be allowed the most freedom, to choose whatever one wants to do in any circumstances. This leaves us no principles to determine what is "the right choice".

Of course you try to find your way around this problem by restricting "freedom of choice" to "freedom to make one's own choice", where the meaning of "one's own choice', we've already seen, gets lost in sloppy usage.

Further, I am not using terms in a way similar to defining square in a way that can include circles (though there are certainly contexts in which this could be entirely reasonable, eg "a square meal"), I am using words in a fairly common way to communicate sensible points. — Dan

"The way the world is" indicates a static unchanging thing signified as "the way". To affirm that you use "the way" with meaning which could include change, is no different, in principle from saying that you use the word "square" in such a way so that it could include circles. If we say that there is such a thing as circles, then it would be contradictory to say that all figures are squares. Likewise, if the world is said to be changing then it is contradictory to say that there is such a thing as "the way the world is". What would be the purpose of the usage you propose, if not to create misunderstanding and/or to deceive?

You have not used "understand" in a precise way at all. In fact, you complained about my request for precision in meaning when we discussed what it means to understand one's own choice. You wanted to allow 'understand" to mean anything from being able to provide a reason for the choice, after the fact, to simply being able to describe the choice with words. Now, you state that a good understanding can consist of elements of misunderstanding. That's incoherency, and clear evidence of sloppy usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not want that. You were the one that claimed I was including "providing reasons after the fact". That is not something I claimed at all. Also yes, I think you can have a good understanding of something that you misunderstand elements of. However, that is discussing understanding in a general sense, rather than the specific sense of understanding one's choices, which I gave you a precise definition for, which you completely ignored.

Your example only demonstrates the incoherency which results from the incompatibility. If "objectively right" is taken as a general principle, "protect the most freedom", then each person in each situation which one finds oneself in, must have the most freedom to choose, and this implies that there is not an objectively right choice to be made. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of that is correct. First, I'm not sure what it means to take "objective right" as a general principle. There being a right choice does not limit one's freedom.

The incompatibility is between the general and the particular. If there is an objectively right choice in particular circumstances, then the value of freedom must be denied in favour of the value of the objectively right choice. The freedom to choose can have no value relative to the need for the objectively right action. And if "objectively right" is taken as a general principle to state "the most freedom is what is objectively right", then the person must be allowed the most freedom, to choose whatever one wants to do in any circumstances. This leaves us no principles to determine what is "the right choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

The objectively right action would be the action which protects the most freedom. There isn't two different measures of value here, there is one measure of value to determine what is action is right (and again, this isn't what I would say, as I am a satisficing consequentialist, so I would say there are often multiple morally permissible actions, I'm just simplifying it for you).

Of course you try to find your way around this problem by restricting "freedom of choice" to "freedom to make one's own choice", where the meaning of "one's own choice', we've already seen, gets lost in sloppy usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sloppy at all. Really quite clear. I would indeed limit the right to only protecting the person's own choices, but that isn't necessary in order for the two not to be incompatible. The reasons for doing that are different.

"The way the world is" indicates a static unchanging thing signified as "the way". To affirm that you use "the way" with meaning which could include change, is no different, in principle from saying that you use the word "square" in such a way so that it could include circles. If we say that there is such a thing as circles, then it would be contradictory to say that all figures are squares. Likewise, if the world is said to be changing then it is contradictory to say that there is such a thing as "the way the world is". What would be the purpose of the usage you propose, if not to create misunderstanding and/or to deceive? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you're just wrong. That doesn't imply that. It doesn't imply that not just when I use it, but when people use it generally. If someone says "the river near your house is polluted, I know you may not like it, but that's just the way it is" that does not suggest that said river has always been or will always be that way. That being said, I have also made numerous claims about the features of the world that presumably do not change, but you have ignored those points and instead focused on how I am using the words "is" and "the way". In both cases, the way I am using them is consistent with common usage as well as coherent for explaining the points I was trying to make, which you seem to have largely ignored.

Also yes, I think you can have a good understanding of something that you misunderstand elements of. — Dan

That's incoherent. "Misunderstanding" explicitly indicates the incorrectness of one's assumed understanding. It does not signify an incompleteness of understanding, it signifies an incorrectness of understanding. By acknowledging that there is incorrectness within the proposed understanding, you implicitly acknowledge that it is not a good understanding.

This is very similar to your idea that the doctor's action (in your example) might be the correct choice from the doctor's perspective prior to the action, but the wrong choice from a perspective posterior to the action. Just like the person with the supposed "good understanding" does not recognize and acknowledge that aspects of this understanding are incorrect, and therefore it is not a good understanding, the doctor does not recognize and acknowledge the information which makes the choice wrong.

However, you, in presenting the examples do recognize the misunderstanding which inheres within the proposed understanding, and you do recognize the doctor's failure to ascertain the patient's condition. Therefore you, are making an incoherent description when you judge the understanding which contains elements of misunderstanding, to be "good", just like you are making an incoherent description when you say that the doctor's action is both correct and wrong.

What is indicated by the nature of these examples, is that you are consistent in your incoherency. This demonstrates a deeply entrenched habit of illogical thinking. You have a way of thinking which accepts contradiction and incoherency. I suggest that this is likely the result of many years of attempting to reconcile incompatible ideas. When an individual takes up the challenge of attempting to reconcile contradictory ideas (which is really to do the impossible), the resolution to the problem often appears to the person to be a sloppy use of words (which I've exposed), so that the incoherency of uniting two contradictory ideas is hidden underneath that sloppy use of words. It then appears like contradictory ideas have been united We might conclude that the person appears to have "a good understanding", in uniting incompatible ideas, but what lies underneath is a misunderstanding of the elements, which makes such a union impossible, so it is not a good understanding at all.

The objectively right action would be the action which protects the most freedom. There isn't two different measures of value here, there is one measure of value to determine what is action is right (and again, this isn't what I would say, as I am a satisficing consequentialist, so I would say there are often multiple morally permissible actions, I'm just simplifying it for you). — Dan

I really can't believe that you do not see the incoherency here. I think you are glossing it over, in an attempt to hide it under a sloppy use of words. Let me state the situation clearly and succinctly. If it is the case that "the most freedom" is what is valued the highest, then it is impossible that there is an "objectively right" choice in any situation. Absolute freedom, which is what is signified by "the most freedom", if assigned the highest value, denies the possibility that any value can be assigned to any choice for being "the right choice". This is because that value, assigned to "the right choice" would detract from the person's freedom to choose anything (which is stated as the most valuable by "the most freedom"), by making that specific choice 'weighted' with more value than any of the other possibilities. Therefore assuming a "right choice" negates the value assigned to "the most freedom". The two are simply incompatible.

If someone says "the river near your house is polluted, I know you may not like it, but that's just the way it is" that does not suggest that said river has always been or will always be that way. That being said, I have also made numerous claims about the features of the world that presumably do not change, but you have ignored those points and instead focused on how I am using the words "is" and "the way". — Dan

You have a very strange way of misrepresenting what I say, to deny the logic of my argument, and then you persist with your incoherent way of using words.

In the phrase "the river near your house is polluted", the static "way" that the river is, signified by "polluted", is indicated by "is", to exist at the present time, now. This in no way implies that the river always will be, or always has been polluted (as your strawman), it indicates that at the present time, there is a static, unchanging condition, signified by "polluted".

This is simple predication. "the river is polluted". The predicate "polluted" is assigned to the subject "the river", and "is" signifies that there is a specific time, now, at which the proposition is meant to apply. By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot make the opposing predication with the same time, now, indicated. We cannot say that the river is not polluted. However, the law of noncontradiction provides for us to make the opposing predication at a different time. We can say "yesterday the river was not polluted". If we take these two propositions as true, it is implied that "a change" occurred between the two times which are indicated, yesterday, and now. Yesterday there was a static condition of "not polluted" and now there is a static condition of "polluted", and a change occurred in between.

What is important for you to recognize, is that the two predications each signify a static condition "is polluted", and "was not polluted". That is the nature of predication, a "stated" property is assigned to the subject. The subject cannot be changing with respect to that property or else it could both have and not have. or neither have nor not have, the same property at the same time. So in order for the law of noncontradiction (which states that the opposing property cannot be assigned for the same time), and the law of excluded middle, to be applicable, a time must be indicated. The present, now, is indicated by "is".

Now consider the predication "is changing", "the river is changing". Again, a static condition, a property, is indicated by that predication, according to the nature of predication as described above. And, a time is indicated as now. We cannot propose the opposing predication, "not changing", for the same time. That's fine, we can predicate "changing", as a static property, all we want, but to understand what is being said by this predication we need to understand what "changing" means.

If "change" is understood as becoming different, and becoming different is understood as what happens in that time period between having some property and not having that property, then "changing" as a predication, presents us with very peculiar difficulties. What it means is that a period of time is indicated as the present, now, with "is", and within that period of time, the same subject may be said to both have, and also have not, some property, or properties, or to neither have, nor have not, that property or those properties which support the predication "changing" (becoming different).

I propose to you that this is a very sloppy form of predication. It is sloppy because it is a form of predication specifically designed to avoid the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Instead of determining whether it is correct or incorrect to say whether the subject has a certain property at a specific time, we simply predicate that the subject "is changing" at that time. This is meant to imply that the proper predication is not required, thereby averting the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

That's incoherent. "Misunderstanding" explicitly indicates the incorrectness of one's assumed understanding. It does not signify an incompleteness of understanding, it signifies an incorrectness of understanding. By acknowledging that there is incorrectness within the proposed understanding, you implicitly acknowledge that it is not a good understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that misunderstanding implies an incorrectness in one's understanding. What I am saying is that you can have an incorrectness in your understanding and still have a good understanding of the thing as a whole. Every expert in every field worth discussing will have incorrect beliefs about that field, but they could still be said to have a good understanding of it.

This is very similar to your idea that the doctor's action (in your example) might be the correct choice from the doctor's perspective prior to the action, but the wrong choice from a perspective posterior to the action. Just like the person with the supposed "good understanding" does not recognize and acknowledge that aspects of this understanding are incorrect, and therefore it is not a good understanding, the doctor does not recognize and acknowledge the information which makes the choice wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, that isn't what I said at all. What I said was that it might be wrong (on an actual-value consequentialist approach) but the doctor might have every reason to think it's right and we may want future doctors to continue to act in the same way in the same (in terms of relevant features) situation.

What is indicated by the nature of these examples, is that you are consistent in your incoherency. This demonstrates a deeply entrenched habit of illogical thinking. You have a way of thinking which accepts contradiction and incoherency. I suggest that this is likely the result of many years of attempting to reconcile incompatible ideas. When an individual takes up the challenge of attempting to reconcile contradictory ideas (which is really to do the impossible), the resolution to the problem often appears to the person to be a sloppy use of words (which I've exposed), so that the incoherency of uniting two contradictory ideas is hidden underneath that sloppy use of words. It then appears like contradictory ideas have been united We might conclude that the person appears to have "a good understanding", in uniting incompatible ideas, but what lies underneath is a misunderstanding of the elements, which makes such a union impossible, so it is not a good understanding at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no incoherence in what I said. But what I said and what you are claiming I said are different things. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are adding in extra claims which I haven't made or implied.

I really can't believe that you do not see the incoherency here. I think you are glossing it over, in an attempt to hide it under a sloppy use of words. Let me state the situation clearly and succinctly. If it is the case that "the most freedom" is what is valued the highest, then it is impossible that there is an "objectively right" choice in any situation. Absolute freedom, which is what is signified by "the most freedom", if assigned the highest value, denies the possibility that any value can be assigned to any choice for being "the right choice". This is because that value, assigned to "the right choice" would detract from the person's freedom to choose anything (which is stated as the most valuable by "the most freedom"), by making that specific choice 'weighted' with more value than any of the other possibilities. Therefore assuming a "right choice" negates the value assigned to "the most freedom". The two are simply incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, what I said wasn't the same as "the most freedom", but that's not really the point here so I'll move past it. A choice being right does not impinge on anyone's freedom. That is similar to saying that there being a right answer to questions impinges on people's freedom of thought.

I propose to you that this is a very sloppy form of predication. It is sloppy because it is a form of predication specifically designed to avoid the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Instead of determining whether it is correct or incorrect to say whether the subject has a certain property at a specific time, we simply predicate that the subject "is changing" at that time. This is meant to imply that the proper predication is not required, thereby averting the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I put it to you that it is entirely reasonable to say that something is changing and that if you think this violates the law of non-contradiction, then you are not using "changing" appropriately. Off the top of my head, I'd suggest that we might understand changing as being in an intermediate stage of some process that will continue toward some state that is different from the current one in the future. For example, we might say that something is at a certain temperature, but we might also say that it's temperature is increasing. This seems like an entirely sensible claim to make and not one that violates any of the laws of logic, so long as it is properly understood.

Also, and again, I have also pointed out many features of the world which seem not to be changing, which we could describe as features of the way the world is without any reference to a specific time period. You must agree, even on your restrictive use of "is" and "the way" that unchanging facts about the world can be considered facts about the way it is, right?

We're getting nowhere.

Every expert in every field worth discussing will have incorrect beliefs about that field, but they could still be said to have a good understanding of it. — Dan

This is a sloppy use of words designed to cover up or veil the incoherence in your belief. You use "field" which has a very broad an ambiguous meaning to produce the equivocation required to accept your statement. The equivocation is between the specific "field" which the person is an expert "in", and the more general "field" which the expert has beliefs "about".

An expert "in" a field has a specific area of expertise and this is known as one's field of expertise. Within that field of expertise, there can be no misunderstanding or else we cannot say that the supposed expert has a good understanding of that field, and is therefore an expert. However, the "field" in general extends far beyond the expert's specific field of expertise, and so the expert's knowledge "about that field" in general, may contain misunderstanding concerning areas which are not a part of the specific field of expertise.

In other words, if we clear up the ambiguity you introduce with your use of "field", "in a field" and "about that field", we'll see that your claim cannot be accepted. A person may claim to have a "field of expertise", or may be judged to have a "field of expertise". If the person is judged to have misunderstanding within that field we cannot also judge the person to be an expert in that field. The one judgement excludes the other. The judgement of misunderstanding excludes the judgement of expert, and the judgement of expert excludes the judgement of misunderstanding.

Again, that isn't what I said at all. What I said was that it might be wrong (on an actual-value consequentialist approach) but the doctor might have every reason to think it's right and we may want future doctors to continue to act in the same way in the same (in terms of relevant features) situation. — Dan

This does nothing to validate your incoherency. You are claiming that we ought to encourage others to carry out an act which has been judged as wrong.

A choice being right does not impinge on anyone's freedom. — Dan

What I said is that we cannot value both principles, "there is an objectively right choice", and also the principle "a person ought to choose freely". The two principles are implicitly incompatible.

If there is an objectively right choice, then the person ought to make that choice and no other choice. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the person ought to choose freely.

Also, and again, I have also pointed out many features of the world which seem not to be changing, which we could describe as features of the way the world is without any reference to a specific time period. You must agree, even on your restrictive use of "is" and "the way" that unchanging facts about the world can be considered facts about the way it is, right? — Dan

I agree that people state things about the world, laws of physics, etc., which are intended to be eternal unchanging facts about the world. However, I would also argue that the latest evidence, and what numerous physicists agree to, is that this is not an accurate representation.

This is a sloppy use of words designed to cover up or veil the incoherence in your belief. You use "field" which has a very broad an ambiguous meaning to produce the equivocation required to accept your statement. The equivocation is between the specific "field" which the person is an expert "in", and the more general "field" which the expert has beliefs "about".

An expert "in" a field has a specific area of expertise and this is known as one's field of expertise. Within that field of expertise, there can be no misunderstanding or else we cannot say that the supposed expert has a good understanding of that field, and is therefore an expert. However, the "field" in general extends far beyond the expert's specific field of expertise, and so the expert's knowledge "about that field" in general, may contain misunderstanding concerning areas which are not a part of the specific field of expertise.

In other words, if we clear up the ambiguity you introduce with your use of "field", "in a field" and "about that field", we'll see that your claim cannot be accepted. A person may claim to have a "field of expertise", or may be judged to have a "field of expertise". If the person is judged to have misunderstanding within that field we cannot also judge the person to be an expert in that field. The one judgement excludes the other. The judgement of misunderstanding excludes the judgement of expert, and the judgement of expert excludes the judgement of misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not using words in a sloppy manner. We absolutely can and do consider people to be experts in a specific field in which they misunderstand (or misunderstood) some element of that field. One judgement does not preclude the other at all. There is a big difference between knowing a lot about a subject and having a good understanding of it, and having a perfect knowledge of a subject and not being wrong or misunderstanding any part of it. I suggest you go ask scientists about their area of expertise and ask whether they think it is likely that they are wrong about some element of that area, or that something they have thought they understand will one day turn out to be misunderstood, I think you will find that those who are intellectually honest will say that this is very likely indeed.

This does nothing to validate your incoherency. You are claiming that we ought to encourage others to carry out an act which has been judged as wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, not incoherent at all. A little odd to consider, but entirely coherent and consistent.

What I said is that we cannot value both principles, "there is an objectively right choice", and also the principle "a person ought to choose freely". The two principles are implicitly incompatible.

If there is an objectively right choice, then the person ought to make that choice and no other choice. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the person ought to choose freely. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, this isn't true, as we might think that it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely. I imagine Kant would take this view for example. Second, I'm fairly sure what I said was that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value, which is rather different to "a person ought to choose freely". In this case, the objectively right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom (again, this is a simplified maximizing verison, which I don't agree with, I'm just pointing out that these things aren't inconsistent)

I agree that people state things about the world, laws of physics, etc., which are intended to be eternal unchanging facts about the world. However, I would also argue that the latest evidence, and what numerous physicists agree to, is that this is not an accurate representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what this means. Further, laws of physics which adhere in our world are the very least of the truths we might point to as unchanging. For example, we might point out that the laws of logic are true in all possible worlds (if they are true at all).

e absolutely can and do consider people to be experts in a specific field in which they misunderstand (or misunderstood) some element of that field. One judgement does not preclude the other at all. — Dan

Speak for yourself then. If I knew that a particular person misunderstood some elements, or even one element, of a specific field, I would never call that person an expert in that field.

It appears like you would. And that is why I say you use words in a sloppy way. You see no sloppiness in speaking this way. And that's why I judge you as unreasonable.

There is a big difference between knowing a lot about a subject and having a good understanding of it, and having a perfect knowledge of a subject and not being wrong or misunderstanding any part of it. I suggest you go ask scientists about their area of expertise and ask whether they think it is likely that they are wrong about some element of that area, or that something they have thought they understand will one day turn out to be misunderstood, I think you will find that those who are intellectually honest will say that this is very likely indeed. — Dan

The issue is not a question of whether the person might be called an expert even when there is the possibility of that person being "wrong about some element" in that field. The issue is having judged the person to actually be wrong, about a specific element in that field.

First, this isn't true, as we might think that it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely. — Dan

You are missing the point. If the person apprehends the choice as the objectively right choice, then they must choose it necessarily, according to the apprehension that it is objectively right. So when you say "it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely", it is implied that the thing chosen is not the "objectively right" thing, because it is chosen freely. So "right" here does not mean objectively right, and "objectively right" would remain irrelevant.

This is the principle which produces the incoherency in your doctor example. The doctor chooses freely to do what is believed to be "the right thing". However, from the actual-value (objectively right) perspective, it is the wrong thing. You refuse to acknowledge the incoherency and insist that it can be both, the right thing to do, from the free choice perspective, and also the wrong thing to do, from the objectively right perspective.

Second, I'm fairly sure what I said was that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value, which is rather different to "a person ought to choose freely". In this case, the objectively right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom (again, this is a simplified maximizing verison, which I don't agree with, I'm just pointing out that these things aren't inconsistent) — Dan

This makes no sense. If, "a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value", how do you make this consistent with what you posit as the objectively right choice, "the most freedom"? The 'most freedom" implies not being restricted by those conditions, "understanding", and the restriction you described earlier as the person's "own" choices.

Speak for yourself then. If I knew that a particular person misunderstood some elements, or even one element, of a specific field, I would never call that person an expert in that field.

It appears like you would. And that is why I say you use words in a sloppy way. You see no sloppiness in speaking this way. And that's why I judge you as unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a ridiculous bar to set. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are using them in a way that is divorced from both common usage and, in this case and others, reality.

The issue is not a question of whether the person might be called an expert even when there is the possibility of that person being "wrong about some element" in that field. The issue is having judged the person to actually be wrong, about a specific element in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

When it turns out that someone was wrong about some aspect of their field, and they come to a better understanding, we don't say that they weren't an expert previously. Expertise, and indeed understanding, is not the same as perfection. There is a story that Richard Dawkins tells about a colleague zealously defending a view on some niche aspect of in evolutionary biology and then, one day, being shown to be wrong by a visiting academic and thanking the academic in question for showing that he was wrong all these years. The point of the story is about science admitting it can be wrong, but it would be a very different story indeed if all those present said "well, I guess he wasn't an expert in evolutionary biology after all". Again, this is not a sensible bar to set when it comes to expertise.

You are missing the point. If the person apprehends the choice as the objectively right choice, then they must choose it necessarily, according to the apprehension that it is objectively right. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, this just isn't true. Knowing the right thing to do and actually doing it are entirely different things. Also, while we're on the subject, there being a right thing to do and knowing what the right thing to do is are also different things, but that's secondary to my point here.

So when you say "it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely", it is implied that the thing chosen is not the "objectively right" thing, because it is chosen freely. So "right" here does not mean objectively right, and "objectively right" would remain irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

All incorrect because knowing what the objectively right thing to do is does not mean they must choose it necessarily. It means they should, but not that they will.

This is the principle which produces the incoherency in your doctor example. The doctor chooses freely to do what is believed to be "the right thing". However, from the actual-value (objectively right) perspective, it is the wrong thing. You refuse to acknowledge the incoherency and insist that it can be both, the right thing to do, from the free choice perspective, and also the wrong thing to do, from the objectively right perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actual-value consequentialism isn't the same thing as claiming there is objective right at all. These are not the same claim. Both actual-value consequentialism and expected-value consequentialism can claim there is an objective right and, likewise, neither of them are any more required to than the other (though I may suggest they are both required to depending on how "objective" is fleshed out here)

Also, I'm not in any way claiming it is the right thing to do. If you're going to keep putting words in my mouth, I'm going to start asking for quotes where I have said these things.

how do you make this consistent with what you posit as the objectively right choice, "the most freedom"? The 'most freedom" implies not being restricted by those conditions, "understanding", and the restriction you described earlier as the person's "own" choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, again, I'm not a maximizing consequentialist so I wouldn't say this, but for simplicity's sake: The right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom of persons over their own choices where "freedom" is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices. And no, the most freedom does not imply this if freedom is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices and specifically only freedom over those choices that belongs to persons is taken to be the measure of value.

That is a ridiculous bar to set. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are using them in a way that is divorced from both common usage and, in this case and others, reality. — Dan

Common usage would not say that the doctor's action was wrong, yet we ought to encourage others to act this way because it was also right. Nor would common usage say that an expert has misunderstanding within the field which one is an expert in.

When it turns out that someone was wrong about some aspect of their field, and they come to a better understanding, we don't say that they weren't an expert previously. — Dan

That's exactly what we do say. "I thought that guy was an expert, but he fucked up, now I know otherwise."

Expertise, and indeed understanding, is not the same as perfection. — Dan

You somehow seem incapable of understanding the issue. The point is not that we exclude the possibility of misunderstanding from the judgement of "expert", to hold that the person must be proven to perfection to be called an expert. The point is that we don't judge the person to be an expert, and also judge the person to have misunderstanding in the same respect, at the same time. This is an implicit violation of the law of noncontradiction. "Expert" implies understanding. "Misunderstanding" is the predication opposed to "understanding". By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot judge the person to have both these properties, understanding and misunderstanding, in the same respect, at the same time. The "same respect" refers to the specific field of study. If we judge one to be an expert in some field, we judge that person to have understanding in that field. We cannot also judge that person to have misunderstanding in that field without contradiction..

The point of the story is about science admitting it can be wrong, but it would be a very different story indeed if all those present said "well, I guess he wasn't an expert in evolutionary biology after all". Again, this is not a sensible bar to set when it comes to expertise. — Dan

People don't say things like that, because they are polite. I'll say it here though. Clearly the guy fucked up. Everyone thought he was an expert until some smart ass came along and proved him wrong. Then the truth was revealed, he was not an expert at all, and inside, everyone was laughing at him, but too polite to say anything rude.

The true situation is exposed by the phrase "zealously defending a view". What drives a person to zealously defend a view, is an unhealthy type of self-confidence, often known as "conceit". The conceited person creates an air of expertise, which is a false expertise. This is a deceptive attitude designed to give others the impression that one is an expert, when it's not really the case. In the example, it required a special individual to demonstrate the conceit to the person who had it. That's not an easy task, to get someone to see oneself as conceited. The others most likely could already see through the conceit, so it probably came as no surprise to them when the guy was outed as phony, and the false expertise was demonstrated.

All incorrect because knowing what the objectively right thing to do is does not mean they must choose it necessarily. It means they should, but not that they will. — Dan

I know, this is exactly the problem with your dual evaluation system approach. If you value free choice, ('the ability to make one's own choice' or however you represent it), then you also value the ability to choose something other than the "objectively right" choice. But this robs the value from "objectively right", by allowing that the possibility of choosing something other than what is objectively right has a higher value than actually choosing what is objectively right. Then how would the concept "objectively right" be supported as a valid concept, if there is something of higher value (freedom to choose)?.

The two valuation systems are incompatible, yet you want to employ them both. This results in incoherency, contradiction throughout your examples. The doctor's action was both right and wrong, depending on the valuation system employed. The person ought to be able to choose, even when that means choosing what is wrong.

If we employ "objective right" as the value system, then the highest goal is to do what is objectively right. But you also want to assign value to making one's own choice", and this would mean often choosing other than what is objectively right. If doing what is objectively right is the highest value, then you cannot also hand value to the possibility of doing something other than what is objectively right, without contradiction. The two values are simply incompatible.

Common usage would not say that the doctor's action was wrong, yet we ought to encourage others to act this way because it was also right. Nor would common usage say that an expert has misunderstanding within the field which one is an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, common usage is useful for definitions, but not so much for actual claims of what is correct and isn't. Second, common usage would absolutely allow for an expert to have a misunderstanding within the field they are an expert in. That is absolutely how people use "expert". There is a big difference between knowing and understanding a lot about something and having no misunderstandings about that thing.

That's exactly what we do say. "I thought that guy was an expert, but he fucked up, now I know otherwise." — Metaphysician Undercover

We absolutely don't do this. If you stop thinking someone is an expert in a field when they get something wrong about that field, then I suggest you should not think there are any experts in science, or for that matter any field broad enough to be worthy of the title of "expert" in the first place. Everyone gets things wrong. Everyone misunderstands things. What you are looking for is not expertise, but perfection, and you will not find it amongst humans.

You somehow seem incapable of understanding the issue. The point is not that we exclude the possibility of misunderstanding from the judgement of "expert", to hold that the person must be proven to perfection to be called an expert. The point is that we don't judge the person to be an expert, and also judge the person to have misunderstanding in the same respect, at the same time. This is an implicit violation of the law of noncontradiction. "Expert" implies understanding. "Misunderstanding" is the predication opposed to "understanding". By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot judge the person to have both these properties, understanding and misunderstanding, in the same respect, at the same time. The "same respect" refers to the specific field of study. If we judge one to be an expert in some field, we judge that person to have understanding in that field. We cannot also judge that person to have misunderstanding in that field without contradiction.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand what you are claiming, I am telling you it's wrong. We absolutely do judge people to be experts while knowing that they are probably wrong about/misunderstand some aspects of their field. Again, it isn't a violation of the law of non-contradiction because having a good understanding of some subject does not preclude misunderstanding some element of that subject. There's not a logical issue here, just an issue with your use of words.

People don't say things like that, because they are polite. I'll say it here though. Clearly the guy fucked up. Everyone thought he was an expert until some smart ass came along and proved him wrong. Then the truth was revealed, he was not an expert at all, and inside, everyone was laughing at him, but too polite to say anything rude — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you're just badly mistaken about what it means to be an expert. Also, I think you're badly mistaken about what bar people who aren't you are holding others to.

The true situation is exposed by the phrase "zealously defending a view". What drives a person to zealously defend a view, is an unhealthy type of self-confidence, often known as "conceit". The conceited person creates an air of expertise, which is a false expertise. This is a deceptive attitude designed to give others the impression that one is an expert, when it's not really the case. In the example, it required a special individual to demonstrate the conceit to the person who had it. That's not an easy task, to get someone to see oneself as conceited. The others most likely could already see through the conceit, so it probably came as no surprise to them when the guy was outed as phony, and the false expertise was demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of that is accurate. This isn't a story of someone who didn't know what they were talking about being exposed as a fraud, it's a story of someone being shown to be wrong and accepting that because every expert in every field worth discussing is likely to be wrong about some of their beliefs. This is especially the case in empirical pursuits. It certainly doesn't make those people not experts. What you are claiming here is just silly.

I know, this is exactly the problem with your dual evaluation system approach. If you value free choice, ('the ability to make one's own choice' or however you represent it), then you also value the ability to choose something other than the "objectively right" choice. But this robs the value from "objectively right", by allowing that the possibility of choosing something other than what is objectively right has a higher value than actually choosing what is objectively right. Then how would the concept "objectively right" be supported as a valid concept, if there is something of higher value (freedom to choose)?. — Metaphysician Undercover

The ability to choose is the measure of value here. It is very much the thing which determines what is objectively right. Objective rightness isn't some other system. I could offer some specific examples that may clarify this if you'd like, but you'll need to stop asserting that I claim things that I don't.

The two valuation systems are incompatible, yet you want to employ them both. This results in incoherency, contradiction throughout your examples. The doctor's action was both right and wrong, depending on the valuation system employed. The person ought to be able to choose, even when that means choosing what is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are inventing the idea that there are two systems here. There really aren't.

If we employ "objective right" as the value system, then the highest goal is to do what is objectively right. But you also want to assign value to making one's own choice", and this would mean often choosing other than what is objectively right. If doing what is objectively right is the highest value, then you cannot also hand value to the possibility of doing something other than what is objectively right, without contradiction. The two values are simply incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again "objective right" isn't a value system. What is objectively right is determined by reference to the freedom of persons to understand and make the own choices (though again, this isn't quite my view as I'm a satisficing consequentialist, this is just for simplicity's sake).

Sure, someone can use "square" in a way which does not exclude a circle from being a type of square, and assert "this is the way I choose to use that term", insisting that the other person in the discussion must accept such incoherency if they want to continue discussion, but what's the point? How could this be conducive to understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is, I think, a pretty clear indicator you're either not connecting with what's being said, or are simply avoiding it.

Your analogy is entirely inapt, to the point of ridiculousness.

"the way it is" simply has no static restriction. Plain and simple.

The matter of what the user of the phrase is demanding is not relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

This explains the entire exchange. So be it.

We absolutely don't do this. If you stop thinking someone is an expert in a field when they get something wrong about that field, then I suggest you should not think there are any experts in science, or for that matter any field broad enough to be worthy of the title of "expert" in the first place. Everyone gets things wrong. Everyone misunderstands things. What you are looking for is not expertise, but perfection, and you will not find it amongst humans. — Dan

I don't know what you are talking about. A "field" is not something broad like "science". When we say that a person is an expert in one's field, we mean the subject of one's study or education, so even within the various branches of science, like biology, chemistry, or physics ,there are many fields of study, which an individual can be an expert in.

You are not making any sense, because you still want to make "the field" something broader than the person's area of expertise, like "science" in general, so that the person can misunderstand things in "the field" which are outside the person's area of expertise. But if the misunderstanding is not part of the person's area of expertise, then it is not part of the person's field of expertise, even if it might be in the same branch of science. And if the misunderstanding is within the person's field of study, then that person is obviously not an expert in that field.

We absolutely do judge people to be experts while knowing that they are probably wrong about/misunderstand some aspects of their field. — Dan

Again, you strawman me. How many times do I have to repeat myself, concerning the same misrepresentation?

I am not talking about believing that an expert "probably" has some misunderstanding. I am talking about judging that the person actually does have misunderstanding, and also judging at the same time, that the person is an expert in that field within which the person has misunderstanding. This implicitly violates the law of noncontradiction, because expert in the field implies understanding in that field.

The reason why your strawman is irrelevant is as follows. To say that a person is an expert in a specific field implies that the person understands that field. To say that the person has misunderstanding in that field contradicts this. To say the person is an expert in such and such field, but probably misunderstands something in that field, is simply a way of stating that you judge the person to be an expert, while admitting that you are probably wrong in judging the person to be an expert. So all you do by stating that the expert probably has some misunderstanding, is to devalue your own capacity for judgement, by saying that you make that judgement but also asserting that the judgement you've made is probably wrong.

This isn't a story of someone who didn't know what they were talking about being exposed as a fraud, it's a story of someone being shown to be wrong and accepting that because every expert in every field worth discussing is likely to be wrong about some of their beliefs. — Dan

Irrelevant due to your strawman.

This is, I think, a pretty clear indicator you're either not connecting with what's being said, or are simply avoiding it. — AmadeusD

I am both, not connecting with it, and avoiding it like the plague, because, as I've demonstrated, it is nothing but contradiction.

This explains the entire exchange. — AmadeusD

Yes, Dan is demanding that I accept contradiction, and I refuse. We have freedom of choice, and we do not need to give what the other person demands. If this leaves me incapable of connecting with what Dan is saying, then so be it.

I don't know what you are talking about. A "field" is not something broad like "science". When we say that a person is an expert in one's field, we mean the subject of one's study or education, so even within the various branches of science, like biology, chemistry, or physics ,there are many fields of study, which an individual can be an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I definitely didn't intend to suggest that someone would be an expert in "science".

You are not making any sense, because you still want to make "the field" something broader than the person's area of expertise, like "science" in general, so that the person can misunderstand things in "the field" which are outside the person's area of expertise. But if the misunderstanding is not part of the person's area of expertise, then it is not part of the person's field of expertise, even if it might be in the same branch of science. And if the misunderstanding is within the person's field of study, then that person is obviously not an expert in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would say a field of study might be something like evolutionary biology, astrophysics, biochemistry, etc. I don't want it to be something like "science". This is just a misunderstanding. I was just saying that there would be no experts in any field worthy of the term, I wasn't suggesting that we should consider someone an expert in "science". And of course people have misunderstandings within their own field and are still experts, what you are asserting here is just silly.

I am not talking about believing that an expert "probably" has some misunderstanding. I am talking about judging that the person actually does have misunderstanding, and also judging at the same time, that the person is an expert in that field within which the person has misunderstanding. This implicitly violates the law of noncontradiction, because expert in the field implies understanding in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand what you are claiming, and it's silly. We absolutely do say that someone is wrong about something, and yet they are an expert in the field. Having an understanding of some topic does not imply not being wrong about or misunderstanding any aspect of that topic, so there is no contradiction here.

The reason why your strawman is irrelevant is as follows. To say that a person is an expert in a specific field implies that the person understands that field. To say that the person has misunderstanding in that field contradicts this — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. There is no contradiction here because having a misunderstanding about your area of expertise does not contradict either having expertise in that field or having a good understanding of that field generally.

To say the person is an expert in such and such field, but probably misunderstands something in that field, is simply a way of stating that you judge the person to be an expert, while admitting that you are probably wrong in judging the person to be an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I might go as far as to say that all experts in all fields worthy of study misunderstand aspects of their field.

Irrelevant due to your strawman. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not a strawman, it's just that the point you are making is very weak. To suggest that someone cannot both be an expert in a field and misunderstand some aspect of that field is to set a bar that essentially no one can clear. To know something very well, to be an expert in it, is not to be wrong about no aspects of it. You are confusion expertise, or understanding, with perfection.

No, I would say a field of study might be something like evolutionary biology, astrophysics, biochemistry, etc. I don't want it to be something like "science". This is just a misunderstanding. I was just saying that there would be no experts in any field worthy of the term, I wasn't suggesting that we should consider someone an expert in "science". And of course people have misunderstandings within their own field and are still experts, what you are asserting here is just silly. — Dan

Ok, I suggest the misunderstanding lies within ambiguity in these terms, "field", and "expert". So "field" can be used to refer to anything from "science" in general, as a field of study, down to a much more specific branch of biochemistry, like the study of "nucleic acids". This difference is a type of ambiguity.

Furthermore, there is similar ambiguity in the use of "expert". When a person develops an expertise, it is usually cited as a very particular aspect of a specific branch of a field. So we might say, "the person is an expert in the way that nucleic acids convey genetic information". The field of expertise is usually stated as a very narrow practise which the individual is involved in, and this way of speaking which narrows down the area of expertise, is the result of intentionally avoiding the problem I've been showing you.

So for example, when a person takes a doctorate, one chooses a specific area of a field, and "specializes" in that area, then becomes a "specialist". Notice, that if a person is a "specialist" in the study of the activity of nucleic acids, someone might still be say of the person, that they are "an expert in biology". That would be a very sloppy use of "expert", because there would be much in the broad field of biology where the person lacked understanding, and likely even had demonstrated misunderstanding. Such a judgement of "expert", where the person's area of expertise is stated as broader than it really is, would be a faulty judgement of "expert", as explained above. Therefore it is sloppy usage.

It is far better to know the person as a "specialist", as this avoids such faulty judgements. We can call the person a specialist by reference to the specific area that the person specializes in, without the value judgement which "expert" implies. "Expert" implies a quality of understanding, 'goodness', and this excludes "misunderstanding, which is 'badness'. But when we say that the person is a specialist we just acknowledge that the person's attention is focused on a very specific aspect of a field, so it is implied that the person is possibly an expert in that specific aspect. An accurate judgement of "expert" though, is much more difficult than a judgement of "specialist", because the latter only requires that the person has specialized one's study, but the former judgement, "expert", is best reserved until after the person proves oneself through experience, practise. Notice the difference between theory and practise here. The judgement of "expert", if rigorous standards are employed, requires practise as acts of proof, to demonstrate the quality of the person's education. And this is why many fields employ apprenticeships and internships.

I understand what you are claiming, and it's silly. — Dan

I know you think it's silly. You think adhering to strict rules of definition is unnecessarily pedantic, and doing such in the field of moral philosophy is a ridiculous way of proceeding. So you'd rather go around in your circles of vagueness and principles with self-referential definitions which lead nowhere. This enables your intention of hiding contradictory statements in your illogical endeavour of attempting to show how two incompatible systems of evaluation are compatible.

I might go as far as to say that all experts in all fields worthy of study misunderstand aspects of their field. — Dan

I will readily grant you this, "every expert has aspects of misunderstanding within one's area of expertise". To claim that understanding in the area of specialization excluded the possibility of misunderstanding in the parts, would be a sort of inverted composition fallacy, a division fallacy.

However, if I agreed that this is relevant I would just be supporting your strawman. How many more times must I reiterate? This strawman is irrelevant!!! Please read, and at least make an attempt to understand the following.

We all know that "expert", a predication of quality as described earlier in this post, does not imply perfection. However, what is at issue is the situation where a defect of understanding is exposed, and
known as "misunderstanding". Since "expert" signifies the highest possible quality, then, when a defect of understanding (misunderstanding) is exposed, it is illogical to judge the individual as an "expert". This is the point of programs like apprenticeship and internship, to expose misunderstandings, and deny the judgement of "expert" to someone who is already a specialist.

The fact that we make the general judgement that experts are not perfect, and all experts have misunderstanding, is irrelevant to the judgement of whether an individual with a known misunderstanding ought to be called an "expert". This is because the former is concerned with unknown misunderstandings while the latter is concerned with known misunderstandings. This makes the type of :misunderstanding of the two examples categorically different. Because of this difference it is acceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of unknown misunderstandings, yet unacceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of the person's known misunderstandings.

I recommend that you learn, understand, and consider this principle very closely, because it is extremely relevant to your example of the doctor's actions, and probably other issues you've pointed to. Notice, we can judge the doctor's actions as good, right, and correct, the actions of an expert, acknowledging that no expert is perfect, and the patients death was accidental. And, we can judge that when there is a lack of information there was an accidental, or incidental, misunderstanding of the situation, where these terms, accidental, incidental, refer to the doctor's area of expertise, because "misunderstanding" refers to the situation, not the field of expertise.

However, when the lack of information (misunderstanding of the situation) is exposed, after the fact, we are obliged to review the judgement of good, right, and correct, and therefore the judgement that the doctor is an expert, to confirm that the misunderstanding truly was accidental or incidental.. This calls the doctor's practice into question. We can either conclude that the doctor did follow protocol, did do what is good, right, and correct, and is an expert, or we can revise our judgement, and say that the misunderstanding was not accidental or incidental, the doctor should have done something different, therefore did not do what is good, right, and correct, and is therefore not an expert. But we cannot do as you propose, and have it both ways, saying that the doctor's actions were both right and wrong, that in itself would constitute misunderstanding in the field of moral philosophy.