s it possible you mean something non-standard by protocol? Like, something like "the best available methods of achieving the desired ends based on all known information" or something to that effect? I mean, I think you'd still be wrong, but that would be at least less egregious than suggesting that following a protocol was the same thing as acting rightly. — Dan

No, "protocol" means something like "standard rules for any procedure". It does not mean "best available method", just the conventional or standard method. There may be other ways available if one seeks them, judgeable as better or worse.

The issue is that this is the common practise in many cases, to simply follow protocol. Since it is the common practise, and it is also very "morally acceptable" that it is the common practise, this means that it is "morally acceptable" to just follow standard rules rather than considering whether the standard rules represent the "best available method". Protocol therefore is the means by which we simplify decision making, and we increase efficiency of actions. by accepting that seeking other options is unnecessary. And, as I've been arguing, while you seem to disagree, following protocal is very clearly morally acceptable.

Compare this to what I said earlier about "habit". Following protocol is a sort of habit, a habit designated by social constructs as a good habit. What I said was that habit restricts our freedom, by inclining us away from considering options. What we have here is that the person follows protocol (acts by habit), and since this is the morally accepted way of acting, the good habit, it is morally acceptable that the person does not consider whether this is the "best available option". The person simply does not even consider other options, and therefore has one's freedom to choose other options restricted. By choosing "protocol", the person disallows other options to enter one's mind, to be considered, and therefore the choice for actions in the situation are restricted to the actions indicated by the protocol.

The point now is that the choice of using "protocol", which is a self-limiting of one's freedom to choose, is very much morally acceptable. In fact, it is often the norm. And, the things which we call "norms" often serve as a sort of protocol. So I think it is pointless for you to argue that following protocol is not the right thing to do, as what you claim is not consistent with reality. Any situation where it is claimed that protocol is wrong would require that such a claim be justification, because the correctness of protocol is otherwise taken for granted.

I mean, I've already explained this. They wouldn't seem like different actions from the perspective of the actor because they would have identical information. — Dan

I think this is impossible. Never does a person find oneself to be in the exact same situation twice. Even the experience of Deja vu has some differences. Furthermore, we are talking about the perspective of the person who is supposedly judging the act to be both wrong and praiseworthy, so this would be irrelevant anyway.

No, I am suggesting that in some cases we may conclude that the wrongful action should be praised and we should not try to avoid it happening again because doing so would have worse consequences. — Dan

This makes no sense. If not allowing the action to happen (I cannot allow the qualifier "again" because the same action cannot happen twice) would have worse consequences, how could the action be judged as "wrongful" in the first place. You explicitly state that not allowing it to happen would have worse consequences. Therefore we need to conclude that the action produced the best possible consequences, when the choices are restricted to 'make action A or do not make action A', and therefore it cannot be judged as wrong.

The only way to make it wrong is to propose that there was a better course of action. But this implies that the action is not praiseworthy.

No, "protocol" means something like "standard rules for any procedure". It does not mean "best available method", just the conventional or standard method. There may be other ways available if one seeks them, judgeable as better or worse.

The issue is that this is the common practise in many cases, to simply follow protocol. Since it is the common practise, and it is also very "morally acceptable" that it is the common practise, this means that it is "morally acceptable" to just follow standard rules rather than considering whether the standard rules represent the "best available method". Protocol therefore is the means by which we simplify decision making, and we increase efficiency of actions. by accepting that seeking other options is unnecessary. And, as I've been arguing, while you seem to disagree, following protocal is very clearly morally acceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean something non-normative by "morally acceptable"? I mean, it's very clear that following the standard procedure is not always morally acceptable in the sense that it is morally permissible, but perhaps you mean something like "people will generally be okay with it" or something to that effect. Is that the case?

Surely you would agree that what people would accept, or what people would think is the right thing to do, is not the same as what actually is the right thing to do, right?

I think this is impossible. Never does a person find oneself to be in the exact same situation twice. Even the experience of Deja vu has some differences. Furthermore, we are talking about the perspective of the person who is supposedly judging the act to be both wrong and praiseworthy, so this would be irrelevant anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, the consequences of praising the action are going to depend on the future actions of those that find themselves in the same situation, so their perspective is very relevant. Also, yes, the situations wouldn't be completely identical. They would be happening at different times for a start. But they may be identical in terms of relevant information that one might use to make the decision at hand.

This makes no sense. If not allowing the action to happen (I cannot allow the qualifier "again" because the same action cannot happen twice) would have worse consequences, how could the action be judged as "wrongful" in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sometimes the cost of trying to prevent something bad happening is worse than letting the bad thing happen. To use the same example I gave before, perhaps the call that the doctor made would be correct most of the time and, in the time-sensitive situation they find themselves in, checking for the niche circumstances which caused it to be the wrong call here would cost more lives than it saves. I'm not really sure what you are finding difficult about this.

Do you mean something non-normative by "morally acceptable"? I mean, it's very clear that following the standard procedure is not always morally acceptable in the sense that it is morally permissible, but perhaps you mean something like "people will generally be okay with it" or something to that effect. Is that the case? — Dan

There's nothing non-normative on my part. You are the one who has already admitted to having non-normative principles. Look, if people are ok with it, then it is morally acceptable. Isn't that obvious to you?

Surely you would agree that what people would accept, or what people would think is the right thing to do, is not the same as what actually is the right thing to do, right? — Dan

No. How could there be a difference?

I mean, the consequences of praising the action are going to depend on the future actions of those that find themselves in the same situation, so their perspective is very relevant. Also, yes, the situations wouldn't be completely identical. They would be happening at different times for a start. But they may be identical in terms of relevant information that one might use to make the decision at hand. — Dan

If the situations are not identical, then it is false to refer to them as "the same situation". You just contradict yourself by saying "the same situation... wouldn't be completely identical".

If you call it what it is, "a similar situation", then you ought to understand that what I said earlier applies.

What is required is to analyze the action and separate the good from the bad, such that the good can be praised and the bad condemned in order to avoid similar wrongful actions. But analyzing and separating good from bad is completely different from simply praising the wrongful action.

To use the same example I gave before, perhaps the call that the doctor made would be correct most of the time and, in the time-sensitive situation they find themselves in, checking for the niche circumstances which caused it to be the wrong call here would cost more lives than it saves. I'm not really sure what you are finding difficult about this. — Dan

You haven't provided me with the principle by which you judge the doctor's action to be wrong. You simple assume it to be wrong, and say that it is wrong by "an actual-value or some expected-value view", but this gives me no principle, therefore no reason to believe it was wrong. As far as I can see, the doctor followed protocol, therefore we can judge the actions as right, even though the person's life was not saved.

Are you suggesting that a doctor ought to look to see what is tattooed on the bottom of one's foot before attempting to save a person's life? What else do you think the doctor ought to do before proceeding, look through one's car, go to the person's house and rummage through all files and bookshelves? Your conclusion that the doctor's action was wrong makes absolutely no sense at all. The person died, but that does not make the action of the doctor trying to save that life, wrong.

You need to provide a reason why you think the doctor's action was wrong. I gave you the reason why I think the doctor's action was right, the doctor followed protocol. Now you need to give me the reason why you think the action was wrong. That the person died accidentally while the doctor was working, does not make the doctor's actions wrong. Otherwise every time a person died in surgery the doctor's actions would be wrong. A doctor's actions always involve risk of something bad happening, so probability dictates that a bad thing will happen from time to time. Unless there is negligence the doctor's action is not wrong.

There's nothing non-normative on my part. You are the one who has already admitted to having non-normative principles. Look, if people are ok with it, then it is morally acceptable. Isn't that obvious to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. What people are okay with and what is right are very often different. What's right is right regardless of whether people agree.

No. How could there be a difference? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the same way there is often a difference between what people think is true and what is actually true in any other context.

If the situations are not identical, then it is false to refer to them as "the same situation". You just contradict yourself by saying "the same situation... wouldn't be completely identical". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, it's the same in terms of relevant factors used to make the decision. I think that's what we'd normally call the same situation.

You haven't provided me with the principle by which you judge the doctor's action to be wrong. You simple assume it to be wrong, and say that it is wrong by "an actual-value or some expected-value view", but this gives me no principle, therefore no reason to believe it was wrong. As far as I can see, the doctor followed protocol, therefore we can judge the actions as right, even though the person's life was not saved. — Metaphysician Undercover

The doctor acted wrongly because their actions led to bad consequences that were avoidable had they acted differently. On an actual-value view of consequentialism where an action is judged based on the actual value of it's consequences, this makes the action bad and also wrong (in that the doctor should have done something different). In this case, the doctor gave the patient something to which they were deathly allergic and which led to their death, and the doctor could have learned this and acted differently. So, the action turned out to be wrong. But, we might still say that the doctor acted as we would want them to act in the future, and so praise the action. None of this is incoherent or even very complicated.

Again, following protocol is not a reason to think an action is right. Protocol has very little to do with right or wrong.

No. What people are okay with and what is right are very often different. What's right is right regardless of whether people agree. — Dan

That "X is right" is a judgement, just like "this thing I'm typing on is a keyboard" is a judgement. Are you assuming "God" to make this judgement "regardless of whether people agree? If so, I will dismiss it, just like you dismissed my reference to religious principles earlier in our discussion. Therefore there is nothing to justify your claim "What people are okay with and what is right are very often different".

In the same way there is often a difference between what people think is true and what is actually true in any other context. — Dan

Again, "X is true" is a judgement. So this statement is dismissed on the same basis as the one above.

I mean, it's the same in terms of relevant factors used to make the decision. I think that's what we'd normally call the same situation. — Dan

We cannot use an appeal to common vernacular in the use of "same" to support rigorous logic. This is why we have a "law of identity" to support logical procedures.

The doctor acted wrongly because their actions led to bad consequences that were avoidable had they acted differently. On an actual-value view of consequentialism where an action is judged based on the actual value of it's consequences, this makes the action bad and also wrong (in that the doctor should have done something different). — Dan

This is untenable as a working principle. If this was an accepted moral principle, then any time which someone could apprehend a better possible outcome than what actually occurred, they'd have grounds to say that the action had "bad consequences", and was therefore wrong. And since there are always accidentals involved in any situation, every act would be arguably "wrong". Therefore, as a moral principle, your proposed "actual value" perspective is completely useless.

It's very clear that this type of consequentialism is absolutely inadequate to provide principles for moral judgement. What is actually required to make a moral judgement is to consider the situation of the person prior to the choice, one's intentions, the specifics of the circumstances, along with the consequences. As is very evident from your example, basing judgement solely on consequences is woefully inadequate, and may be considerably misleading.

In this case, the doctor gave the patient something to which they were deathly allergic and which led to their death, and the doctor could have learned this and acted differently. So, the action turned out to be wrong. — Dan

You paid no respect to my counter example. If "the doctor could have learned this" is a principle acceptable to the judgement of whether the doctor acted wrongly or not, then we'd have to allow that the doctor should have gone off and rummaged through the patient's car, one's house, all files on record anywhere, even keep searching all information in the universe, before acting. This principle is nonsense and completely unacceptable.

Again, following protocol is not a reason to think an action is right. Protocol has very little to do with right or wrong. — Dan

Wow! I've never heard that before, not even in the "In praise of anarchy" thread. Following rules has very little to do with right or wrong? What planet are you from Dan?

That "X is right" is a judgement, just like "this thing I'm typing on is a keyboard" is a judgement. Are you assuming "God" to make this judgement "regardless of whether people agree? If so, I will dismiss it, just like you dismissed my reference to religious principles earlier in our discussion. Therefore there is nothing to justify your claim "What people are okay with and what is right are very often different". — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not assuming any gods at all. What I am assuming is that there are moral truths objectively of our views. When we claim that something is right (in the moral sense), I suggest we are making an objective claim about that thing which can be either true or false.

Again, "X is true" is a judgement. So this statement is dismissed on the same basis as the one above. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't a subjective judgement though. It is a claim that can be objectively correct or incorrect. As a simple example, if I say that the world is round (or you know, roundish) and you say it is flat, we aren't both right.

We cannot use an appeal to common vernacular in the use of "same" to support rigorous logic. This is why we have a "law of identity" to support logical procedures. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is another case of you getting very concerned with language where it really isn't necessary. I could instead say that we should praise the initial action because we want other people in situations that seem identical with regard to relevant factors to act in the same way with regard to relevant features of the action. That's a bit of a mouthful, and I think saying "the same action" was pretty clear as to what I meant. Sure, if we are defining terms, we should try to be precise, but if we're just having a discussion on a forum, could you try to engage with the core point, rather than nit-pick over terms?

This is untenable as a working principle. If this was an accepted moral principle, then any time which someone could apprehend a better possible outcome than what actually occurred, they'd have grounds to say that the action had "bad consequences", and was therefore wrong. And since there are always accidentals involved in any situation, every act would be arguably "wrong". Therefore, as a moral principle, your proposed "actual value" perspective is completely useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you have suggested is a common criticism of maximizing consequentialism called the "Demandingness Objection". I agree it is a big problem for such theories. Satisficing forms of consequentialism can, potentially, avoid this problem by claiming that one need not act in the way with the best consequences, but simply good enough ones. There are some pretty big issues with this too, as you can see if you read Ben Bradley's paper "against satisficing consequentialism". However, if you read "solving satisficing consequentialism" you will see how these can be solved, though that solution leads to a few problems of it's own so I have adapted it for the primer I provided.

It's very clear that this type of consequentialism is absolutely inadequate to provide principles for moral judgement. What is actually required to make a moral judgement is to consider the situation of the person prior to the choice, one's intentions, the specifics of the circumstances, along with the consequences. As is very evident from your example, basing judgement solely on consequences is woefully inadequate, and may be considerably misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you don't need to consider any of that. If someone does the right thing for the "wrong reasons", it's still the right thing. In terms of deciding what we should do, obviously the consequentialist (including me) is going to say that we need to base our actions on the likely consequences of our actions, rather than the actual consequences of our actions (because they haven't happened yet).

You paid no respect to my counter example. If "the doctor could have learned this" is a principle acceptable to the judgement of whether the doctor acted wrongly or not, then we'd have to allow that the doctor should have gone off and rummaged through the patient's car, one's house, all files on record anywhere, even keep searching all information in the universe, before acting. This principle is nonsense and completely unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, what it means that someone could have done something is potentially an interesting thing to discuss, but not terribly relevant here. It seems pretty clear that the doctor could have given the patient a physical exam which, in this example, would have led to them discovering the problem. And, in this case, based on what happened, it seems reasonably to say that they should have (on an actual-value view. Of course, on some expected-value approaches to consequentialism, this isn't the case). To say that checking the patient themselves is the same as checking throughout the universe seemed somewhat disingenuous to me.

Wow! I've never heard that before, not even in the "In praise of anarchy" thread. Following rules has very little to do with right or wrong? What planet are you from Dan? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this is surely obvious. What's right is right regardless of whether there is a rule that says its right. What's wrong is wrong regardless of whether it is prohibited. I find it very difficult to believe that you haven't heard that sentiment before.

As a fairly easy-to-understand example, do you think that killing a child for fun would become less wrong if the laws prohibiting it were repealed or the social norms prohibiting it were no longer held by the majority?

I am not assuming any gods at all. What I am assuming is that there are moral truths objectively of our views. When we claim that something is right (in the moral sense), I suggest we are making an objective claim about that thing which can be either true or false. — Dan

"Truth" is a judgement we make of a statement. Without a god, who do you propose, makes these statements and judgements?

It appears we may have a similar issue with "truth" to the issue we had with "understanding". You assume a meaning which is completely incoherent to me, and continue to use the word that way as if I ought to understand you.

It isn't a subjective judgement though. It is a claim that can be objectively correct or incorrect. As a simple example, if I say that the world is round (or you know, roundish) and you say it is flat, we aren't both right. — Dan

I don't see how the example serves the purpose. In order for one of us to be correct, we need someone to judge the meaning of "world", and the meaning of "round", "flat", etc.. It is actually very possible that we both are correct, because I could be using "world" to refer to something which you would never agree to.

This is exactly what has happened in this thread. You use "understand" and "truth" in a way which makes no sense to me. And, you might actually be correct in your argument based on that meaning. The meaning is like a premise though, so to prove your argument unsound, I must prove the falsity of your meaning.

So in your example, if I say "the world is flat", and I hold a conception of "the world" in which it is flat, then "the world is flat" is correct, and to prove me wrong you need to prove that my meaning (conception) of "the world" is false. Likewise, to prove your moral position to be unsound, I am faced with the task of proving that the meaning you assume for words like "understand", and "truth" are false. This is a sort of dialectics. But if in such a debate, a person adheres to the false definition, fails to understand the falsity of it, or for some reason refuses to accept the falsity of it, argumentation becomes pointless.

This is another case of you getting very concerned with language where it really isn't necessary. — Dan

Based on what I presented above, "getting very concerned with language" is necessary. I can define "the world" as what can be seen within the horizon that extends 360 degrees around a person, and the world is "flat" by that definition, even if "the world" of multiple people overlap to make a universal flat world. Likewise, you can define words like "truth", "understand", and "same", in absurd ways to support your theory. The only way to show you that your theory is wrong, unsound, is to demonstrate that your use of language does not reflect reality, is therefore false.

I could instead say that we should praise the initial action because we want other people in situations that seem identical with regard to relevant factors to act in the same way with regard to relevant features of the action. — Dan

Sure, but if this is the case, then on what basis do you say the action was wrong? You are saying that people ought to be taught to always act "the same way" in any situation which appears to be to a significant extent "similar". But then you are also saying that in this particular case the person's act, who acted "that way" was wrong, yet you are using it as an example of how people ought to act. Can you not see the inconsistency? It's blatant, and blatant inconsistency is not productive in teaching because people dismiss it as ridiculous, and counterproductive.

I agree it is a big problem for such theories. — Dan

Another nail in the coffin. At what point do you give up on providing exceptions to the rule, trying to prop up a deficient rule, and simply bury the faulty rule?

No, you don't need to consider any of that. If someone does the right thing for the "wrong reasons", it's still the right thing. — Dan

That's a faulty judgement, based in your misunderstanding, of an objective, independent "truth", or "right", outlined above. You really need to work on this misunderstanding, figure out the reality of the situation.

It seems pretty clear that the doctor could have given the patient a physical exam which, in this example, would have led to them discovering the problem. And, in this case, based on what happened, it seems reasonably to say that they should have (on an actual-value view. — Dan

That is not clear at all. The person was dying. The doctor acted in an emergency situation. You only say that the doctor could have, and should have, "given the patient a physical exam" because that is consistent with discovery of the information, according to the contrived example. Maybe in another example, the patient's spouse was standing in the hall with the information, and the doctor 'could have and should have' asked the spouse. The problem is glaring. The doctor has no way of knowing which of the countless possible options are going to reveal the information, and cannot proceed toward pursuing them all until information is revealed, or the patient dies.

I mean, this is surely obvious. What's right is right regardless of whether there is a rule that says its right. What's wrong is wrong regardless of whether it is prohibited. I find it very difficult to believe that you haven't heard that sentiment before. — Dan

Again, clear indication of a faulty use of "right". I'll be waiting for you to either dispense with this idea altogether, or support it with some sort of god. I mean you might try to support it otherwise, but I've seen enough of that to tell you it's all smoke and mirrors of sophistry. So rather than have me make fun of your attempts, let's just get on with the either/or option.

As a fairly easy-to-understand example, do you think that killing a child for fun would become less wrong if the laws prohibiting it were repealed or the social norms prohibiting it were no longer held by the majority? — Dan

This is a question of do I believe in God or not. If I believe in God, then I assume an independent God who interprets, understands, and upholds judgement on this rule, "killing children for fun is wrong", as correct, regardless of what human beings think. If I do not believe in God, then so long as not every human being agrees that killing children for fun is wrong, then the proposed rule remains debatable. So the issue is more complicated than the way you present it, because even if the majority thinks that it's not wrong, and the laws are repealed, then it is not wrong by those laws, but to the minority who do not agree, it is still debatable.

I don't see any other possibility.

"Truth" is a judgement we make of a statement. Without a god, who do you propose, makes these statements and judgements?

It appears we may have a similar issue with "truth" to the issue we had with "understanding". You assume a meaning which is completely incoherent to me, and continue to use the word that way as if I ought to understand you. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can make a judgement of whether some claim is true, but whether it is true or not is a fact about that claim, not merely a judgement made by us.

I don't see how the example serves the purpose. In order for one of us to be correct, we need someone to judge the meaning of "world", and the meaning of "round", "flat", etc.. It is actually very possible that we both are correct, because I could be using "world" to refer to something which you would never agree to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely we can clarify that we are talking about the same thing though, can't we?

This is exactly what has happened in this thread. You use "understand" and "truth" in a way which makes no sense to me. And, you might actually be correct in your argument based on that meaning. The meaning is like a premise though, so to prove your argument unsound, I must prove the falsity of your meaning.

So in your example, if I say "the world is flat", and I hold a conception of "the world" in which it is flat, then "the world is flat" is correct, and to prove me wrong you need to prove that my meaning (conception) of "the world" is false. Likewise, to prove your moral position to be unsound, I am faced with the task of proving that the meaning you assume for words like "understand", and "truth" are false. This is a sort of dialectics. But if in such a debate, a person adheres to the false definition, fails to understand the falsity of it, or for some reason refuses to accept the falsity of it, argumentation becomes pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Definitions are not like premises, and rarely need to be disputed. You don't need to "prove someone's meaning incorrect". If someone was using terms in such as way as to make their claim meaningless, then you might point this out, but generally speaking what is much more interesting is to focus on the substantive claims being made. If someone says "the world is flat, and by the world I mean this piece of paper in front of me", then sure, they are probably right, but also that's a broadly meaningless claim. We can just clarify what is meant and then roll our eyes at someone being a prat.

What is almost always more interesting is to deal with substantive claims being made. If for example you say "the world is flat", me arguing that "world" really refers to a complete spacio-temporal manifold rather than a planet isn't really very helpful. Instead, I should show that the planet earth (as you hypothetically mean by the word "world" here) is not, in fact, flat but is rather shaped like an oblate spheroid. If you say "well, I define the world as something that's flat", then I might need to change my argument a little, and instead say that the thing you are referring to doesn't exist, and certainly isn't where we are living, but I still needn't spend all my time trying to convince you to define the word differently.

Based on what I presented above, "getting very concerned with language" is necessary. I can define "the world" as what can be seen within the horizon that extends 360 degrees around a person, and the world is "flat" by that definition, even if "the world" of multiple people overlap to make a universal flat world. Likewise, you can define words like "truth", "understand", and "same", in absurd ways to support your theory. The only way to show you that your theory is wrong, unsound, is to demonstrate that your use of language does not reflect reality, is therefore false. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you defined "world" in that way, then I might well point out that it's a very strange definition that isn't connected with how we normally use the word. But, if you persist, then it doesn't really matter. We can make clear exactly what you are arguing (that what can be seen to the horizon line is flatish) and discuss that claim specifically. We can also make clear that you aren't claiming that the planet itself is flat, or not roundish,

Also, I'm not defining these things weirdly at all. I am using "truth" in a fairly general sense, but I think I'd be happy with something like "corresponds to reality" as a basic definition for the purposes of this discussion. I don't think it's strange to suggest that claims really are true or false, and that this isn't merely a judgement made by people. I also think using "understand" in a similar way to "comprehend" is pretty normal and that using "the same action" to mean actions that are identical in their relevant features, even if they are not identical in all their features is pretty normal too. For example if you said "oh, I went to the mall yesterday and checked out the food court, then I went Christmas shopping" and I said "oh, I did the same thing" then you presumably wouldn't say "no, I went at noon, but you went at half-past, so those are different things". It's quite wordy to say "future actions that seem to share all morally relevant features from the perspective of the person making the decision," don't you think?

Sure, but if this is the case, then on what basis do you say the action was wrong? You are saying that people ought to be taught to always act "the same way" in any situation which appears to be to a significant extent "similar". But then you are also saying that in this particular case the person's act, who acted "that way" was wrong, yet you are using it as an example of how people ought to act. Can you not see the inconsistency? It's blatant, and blatant inconsistency is not productive in teaching because people dismiss it as ridiculous, and counterproductive. — Metaphysician Undercover

It really isn't. This is exactly the point I am trying to make here. From a consequentialist perspective (actual-value and some expected-value at least), then it is entirely consistent to say that this person acted wrongly but that we still want people to act the same way in the future. That sometimes you do something that looks like it's the right thing to do, but it turns out to be wrong due to circumstances you didn't know about. This is sometimes raised as a criticism of actual-value consequentialism generally, since the consequences of an action can ripple far into the future so it is sometimes charged with not being able to determine if an action was right or wrong, since the consequences of it have not been fully felt yet. You need not agree with actual value consequentialism, but there is not an internal inconsistency here.

Another nail in the coffin. At what point do you give up on providing exceptions to the rule, trying to prop up a deficient rule, and simply bury the faulty rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea what you mean by this. This is a big problem for maximizing consequentialism. I am not a maximizing consequentialist.

That's a faulty judgement, based in your misunderstanding, of an objective, independent "truth", or "right", outlined above. You really need to work on this misunderstanding, figure out the reality of the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, do you not think that things are objectively true at all? Or do you not think moral claims are objectively true (or false)? There is a big assumption hiding behind this statement, and I'd like to get it out in the open.

That is not clear at all. The person was dying. The doctor acted in an emergency situation. You only say that the doctor could have, and should have, "given the patient a physical exam" because that is consistent with discovery of the information, according to the contrived example. Maybe in another example, the patient's spouse was standing in the hall with the information, and the doctor 'could have and should have' asked the spouse. The problem is glaring. The doctor has no way of knowing which of the countless possible options are going to reveal the information, and cannot proceed toward pursuing them all until information is revealed, or the patient dies. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, that is very much the point of the example, and why we don't want people to do that in the future.

Again, clear indication of a faulty use of "right". I'll be waiting for you to either dispense with this idea altogether, or support it with some sort of god. I mean you might try to support it otherwise, but I've seen enough of that to tell you it's all smoke and mirrors of sophistry. So rather than have me make fun of your attempts, let's just get on with the either/or option. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly certain gods don't help. They aren't a tenable solution at all. But it seems we are getting to the assumptions behind some of these misunderstandings. You seem to think morality is not objective true (or false) at all, is that fair to say? As mentioned above, I'd like to get this assumption out in the open, because I think I've been pretty clear about my meta-ethical assumptions here. So, could you please state for the record what your meta-ethical position is. Do you think morality is constructed? Subjective? Relative? What's the story?

Also, as linguistic claims go, "right" and "wrong" being objective facts about actions is probably the standard usage. I think moral objectivism is still the standard pre-theoretical position, though I will admit that this is in flux at the moment with a reasonable amount of relativist nonsense floating around.

This is a question of do I believe in God or not. If I believe in God, then I assume an independent God who interprets, understands, and upholds judgement on this rule, "killing children for fun is wrong", as correct, regardless of what human beings think. If I do not believe in God, then so long as not every human being agrees that killing children for fun is wrong, then the proposed rule remains debatable. So the issue is more complicated than the way you present it, because even if the majority thinks that it's not wrong, and the laws are repealed, then it is not wrong by those laws, but to the minority who do not agree, it is still debatable.

I don't see any other possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

It really has nothing to do with any gods, but I think we have gotten to some dodgy meta-ethical assumptions underlying your views. I have some questions about how you can argue that there is anything wrong with any moral views if you hold in the meta-ethical beliefs that you appear to, but I'll let you state them explicitly before ripping into them too much.

if people are ok with it, then it is morally acceptable — Metaphysician Undercover

HUGE yikes.

We can make a judgement of whether some claim is true, but whether it is true or not is a fact about that claim, not merely a judgement made by us. — Dan

As I said, this is incomprehensible to me because whether or not a statement of claim is true, is dependent on interpretation of the statement, and comparison with reality. Such comparison only minds can perform.

As I said, whether a statement of claim is true or not is a judgement. In no way can truth or falsity be understood as the property of the claim itself, which is simply an ordered collection of symbols.

If someone was using terms in such as way as to make their claim meaningless, then you might point this out, but generally speaking what is much more interesting is to focus on the substantive claims being made. — Dan

You seem to be missing the point. What I claim is that you use terms in such a way as to make your claim valid, but if analyzed, the meaning required is really unintelligible, such as your use of "true" above.

If you defined "world" in that way, then I might well point out that it's a very strange definition that isn't connected with how we normally use the word. — Dan

Right, and that is what I am pointing out about your use of "understand", it is not comprehensible. And now, your use of "true", and "right", are simply unintelligible.

I am using "truth" in a fairly general sense, but I think I'd be happy with something like "corresponds to reality" as a basic definition for the purposes of this discussion. I don't think it's strange to suggest that claims really are true or false, and that this isn't merely a judgement made by people. — Dan

Can you not see that "corresponds to reality" refers to a type of judgement? Whenever someone says "that corresponds to reality", this indicates a judgement. How could it mean anything other than this?

it is entirely consistent to say that this person acted wrongly but that we still want people to act the same way in the future. — Dan

OK, you're saying that you want people to act wrongly. That's exactly why I am arguing that this type of consequentialism really does not suffice for providing moral guidance.

Sorry, do you not think that things are objectively true at all? Or do you not think moral claims are objectively true (or false)? There is a big assumption hiding behind this statement, and I'd like to get it out in the open. — Dan

As I said, such objectivity requires God. Since truth is a judgement, we need something other than a human mind to make that judgement, if we assume such "objectivity".

The issue is not whether or not I agree with objectivity, the issue is that it is incoherent to believe in such objectivity, without a belief in some type of god for ontological support.

I'd like to get this assumption out in the open, because I think I've been pretty clear about my meta-ethical assumptions here. — Dan

You've been clear, but the assumptions which you clearly assert prove to be incoherent.

So, could you please state for the record what your meta-ethical position is. Do you think morality is constructed? Subjective? Relative? What's the story? — Dan

This is not about what I believe, we are discussing the coherency of your theory. My beliefs are only relevant so far as they bear on your theory. Whether or not I personally believe in God is irrelevant here.

Also, as linguistic claims go, "right" and "wrong" being objective facts about actions is probably the standard usage. I think moral objectivism is still the standard pre-theoretical position, though I will admit that this is in flux at the moment with a reasonable amount of relativist nonsense floating around. — Dan

Again, "right" and "wrong" are judgements. If you want to provide support for your claim that a judgement can be objective, without a God who makes that objective judgement, then be my guest.

HUGE yikes. — AmadeusD

HUGE yilkes,
Is what I LIKES

can’t argue with that.
I would just suggest to you that if morality is objective, this is plainly false to claim.
If it is subjective, that’s a strange framework I’d think. Heh

As I said, this is incomprehensible to me because whether or not a statement of claim is true, is dependent on interpretation of the statement, and comparison with reality. Such comparison only minds can perform.

As I said, whether a statement of claim is true or not is a judgement. In no way can truth or falsity be understood as the property of the claim itself, which is simply an ordered collection of symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

The claim is the meaning of the symbols or vocalizations, not the symbols of vocalizations themselves, and a claim can indeed be a true or false.

You seem to be missing the point. What I claim is that you use terms in such a way as to make your claim valid, but if analyzed, the meaning required is really unintelligible, such as your use of "true" above. — Metaphysician Undercover

The way I am using "true" is a pretty standard usage.

Right, and that is what I am pointing out about your use of "understand", it is not comprehensible. And now, your use of "true", and "right", are simply unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say I was very much using them in the normal way here.

Can you not see that "corresponds to reality" refers to a type of judgement? Whenever someone says "that corresponds to reality", this indicates a judgement. How could it mean anything other than this? — Metaphysician Undercover

When someone says it, that is them making a judgement. But whether it does or not is not a judgement, but a fact. When I claim the world is round(ish) that is a judgement, but my claim is either true or false depending on the actual shape of the planet, and would be true or false regardless of whether I (or anyone else) judged it as such.

OK, you're saying that you want people to act wrongly. That's exactly why I am arguing that this type of consequentialism really does not suffice for providing moral guidance. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am saying that in circumstances that were identical from the point of view of the actor (since the doctor didn't know about the weird niche circumstances at play here), the same action (by which I mean the same in all relevant regards) would not be wrong, but right. At least from an actual-value consequentialism view. It's really not that complicated.

As I said, such objectivity requires God. Since truth is a judgement, we need something other than a human mind to make that judgement, if we assume such "objectivity".

The issue is not whether or not I agree with objectivity, the issue is that it is incoherent to believe in such objectivity, without a belief in some type of god for ontological support. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that a) is basically all incorrect, and b) isn't really an answer.

This is not about what I believe, we are discussing the coherency of your theory. My beliefs are only relevant so far as they bear on your theory. Whether or not I personally believe in God is irrelevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, God, a god, or gods have nothing to do with it, but it seems that a lot of your issues with my theory come down to issues with some fairly basic assumptions of moral objectivism and moral realism.

Again, "right" and "wrong" are judgements. If you want to provide support for your claim that a judgement can be objective, without a God who makes that objective judgement, then be my guest. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not judgements, but properties.



A lot of what you are claiming seems to be steeped in highly dubious meta-ethical assumptions, possibly ontological ones as well. So I'll ask you again, what are the assumptions that are hiding behind these points? Are you claiming that there is no objective truth at all? Or that there is simply no objective truth regarding morality?

The claim is the meaning of the symbols or vocalizations, not the symbols of vocalizations themselves, and a claim can indeed be a true or false. — Dan

The meaning of symbols, is as interpreted by an individual mind, and is therefore subjective. Therefore true or false is a subjective judgement. I explained this already, with the examples of the meaning of "understand", "truth", and "world". But you don't seem to understand.

When someone says it, that is them making a judgement. But whether it does or not is not a judgement, but a fact. — Dan

This would be a useless fact, if true. Whether or not the claim actually does correspond, as "fact", would be impossible for anyone to know, so even if this were true, these "facts" would be useless and irrelevant to our discussion. Furthermore, also if what you claim is true, then as human beings, only having access to our subjective judgements, we could never know whether it is a fact that what you claim is a fact. So the claim does nothing for us.

So we have a dual level of irrelevance. We could never know the truth (the fact) of any claim, so our subjective judgements would guide us anyway. On top of this, we could never know whether the claim that there is such facts is itself true. So the claim is completely useless and does nothing to aid us in finding truth because it makes truth necessarily beyond our grasp.

When I claim the world is round(ish) that is a judgement, but my claim is either true or false depending on the actual shape of the planet, and would be true or false regardless of whether I (or anyone else) judged it as such. — Dan

You are completely ignoring what I explained. The words "world", "roundish", need to be defined, interpreted for meaning, and the reality itself needs to be judged as fulfilling the conditions of the interpreted meaning. Therefore your claim here is completely incoherent.

No, I am saying that in circumstances that were identical from the point of view of the actor (since the doctor didn't know about the weird niche circumstances at play here), the same action (by which I mean the same in all relevant regards) would not be wrong, but right. — Dan

Then it's incoherent to judge the doctor's actions as wrong. By "all relevant regards" the doctor's actions were right. See, you excluded the consequences, (the patient's death) from "all relevant regards". However, it is the consequences by which you made the judgement "wrong", so clearly the consequences cannot be irrelevant. You are providing a very good demonstration of incoherency, and why you need to accept the fact that you employ two distinct, and incompatible, valuation systems..

A lot of what you are claiming seems to be steeped in highly dubious meta-ethical assumptions, possibly ontological ones as well. So I'll ask you again, what are the assumptions that are hiding behind these points? Are you claiming that there is no objective truth at all? Or that there is simply no objective truth regarding morality? — Dan

The ontological principle involved here, is the conclusion that the assumptions of "objective truth", and "objective right", require God for justification. This conclusion is derived as I've explained, from the true premise that "true" and "right" are judgements. I invite you to propose another form of justification, other than God, but simply asserting that this is "fact" is not justification.

The meaning of symbols, is as interpreted by an individual mind, and is therefore subjective. Therefore true or false is a subjective judgement. I explained this already, with the examples of the meaning of "understand", "truth", and "world". But you don't seem to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

True and false is not a subjective judgement. Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think (in many cases. There are of course subjective matters).

This would be a useless fact, if true. Whether or not the claim actually does correspond, as "fact", would be impossible for anyone to know, so even if this were true, these "facts" would be useless and irrelevant to our discussion. Furthermore, also if what you claim is true, then as human beings, only having access to our subjective judgements, we could never know whether it is a fact that what you claim is a fact. So the claim does nothing for us.

So we have a dual level of irrelevance. We could never know the truth (the fact) of any claim, so our subjective judgements would guide us anyway. On top of this, we could never know whether the claim that there is such facts is itself true. So the claim is completely useless and does nothing to aid us in finding truth because it makes truth necessarily beyond our grasp. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, that is the world we live in. We are behind the veil of perception and certainty about the truth of the world (in at least most cases) is forever denied to us.

Second, it isn't quite as hopeless as you make it out to be. We may never know for sure if we are seeing the world as it is, but we can certainly take steps to make better guesses about it. Also this really applies to observable facts more than deductive arguments, so presumably isn't such an issue for discussions of morality.

You are completely ignoring what I explained. The words "world", "roundish", need to be defined, interpreted for meaning, and the reality itself needs to be judged as fulfilling the conditions of the interpreted meaning. Therefore your claim here is completely incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

The words do indeed need to be defined in order to have a coherent discussion with someone else, but the claim itself (the meaning of the words) is either true or false regardless of anyone's judgement.

Then it's incoherent to judge the doctor's actions as wrong. By "all relevant regards" the doctor's actions were right. See, you excluded the consequences, (the patient's death) from "all relevant regards". However, it is the consequences by which you made the judgement "wrong", so clearly the consequences cannot be irrelevant. You are providing a very good demonstration of incoherency, and why you need to accept the fact that you employ two distinct, and incompatible, valuation systems — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you being facetious here? I also said "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Do you think that perspective involves knowing the future? I'm not employing two valuation systems at all, I am explaining a fairly simple point about actual-value consequentialism.

The ontological principle involved here, is the conclusion that the assumptions of "objective truth", and "objective right", require God for justification. This conclusion is derived as I've explained, from the true premise that "true" and "right" are judgements. I invite you to propose another form of justification, other than God, but simply asserting that this is "fact" is not justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, true and right are not judgements. They are properties which we often make judgements about. Just like we make judgements about the chemical composition of a substance. It's actual atomic makeup is not the same thing as our judgement of it, and our judgement can be more or less accurate depending on how closely it matches reality.

Whether things are true, or right, is a matter of fact that exists independantly of anyone's judgement. Even if it weren't, God wouldn't help with this as that would be just another person making a judgement, rather than something being objective. God couldn't even be correct in His judgement because there would be no objective fact of the matter so correctness would be nonsensical. Unless of course you are defining true and right as just whatever God says, which leads to Euthyphro problems immediately as this would be horribly arbitrary at best.

There are a whole host of reasons why not believing in objective truth is not a viable position, but the easiest to explain is that there is no point in anyone talking to you about anything if you don't think there is an objective fact of the matter. You say the world is flat, I say it's round. I can try to convince you using various pieces of evidence, but if you don't think that there is a world out there that contains the answer and we can at least try to compare our beliefs to (though of course there are challenges to doing so given that we cannot see outside of our own perceptions), then there is no point having the discussion in the first place. Or any discussion for that matter.

True and false is not a subjective judgement. Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think (in many cases. — Dan

I'm sorry to keep pestering you on this matter, but that is an assertion which needs to be justified. You can claim this over and over again, but repetition does not constitute justification. So you give me no reason to even consider this claim: "Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think".

First, that is the world we live in. We are behind the veil of perception and certainty about the truth of the world (in at least most cases) is forever denied to us. — Dan

If, the truth about the world is forever denied from us, then how do we know that there is such a thing. This is the problem. You assume, and claim, that there is such a thing as "the truth of the world", but since it is denied from us, we have no real evidence that there is such a thing. This renders your claim as completely unsupported, nothing but a baseless assertion. Furthermore, theories in modern physics, "multiverse", "model-dependent reality" etc., are contrary to this assertion.

That claim you make is most likely just a reflection of your intentions. You want it to be, that there is a "truth of the world", because that would represent a very complex reality in a simplistic way, facilitating an easy moral philosophy for you. But if that assumption you make is wrong, then so too is your moral philosophy.

Therefore we need to start with a principle which is a recognition that the assumption that there is a "truth of the world" is not a known fact. And this is why religion provides a better starting point than what you propose. Religion proposes that we have "faith" that there is such a thing as "the truth of the world", and this is distinctly different from what you propose, that there is such a thing as the truth of the world.

Also this really applies to observable facts more than deductive arguments, so presumably isn't such an issue for discussions of morality. — Dan

Deductive arguments need to be grounded in premises which will be judged to be true, or else the arguments will be dismissed as unsound. Therefore discussions of morality which are based in principles which will be judged as false (eg "there is a truth of the world") will be dismissed accordingly. The solution is to replace the faulty premises with better premises (eg "we can have faith that there is a truth of the world").

Are you being facetious here? I also said "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Do you think that perspective involves knowing the future? I'm not employing two valuation systems at all, I am explaining a fairly simple point about actual-value consequentialism. — Dan

I really can't believe that you do not see that you employ two distinct valuation systems. It's so clear and blatant, how can you not understand this? Are you so deep in denial, that you cannot even stop to look at, and understand the meaning of what you write?

You have one system which evaluates from the perspective of what you call "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Evaluation from this perspective does not involve knowing the future, i.e. the consequences of whatever act is chosen. From this perspective, (this proposed evaluation system), your judgement renders the chosen act as "right". However, you also apply a judgement produced from the evaluation system described as the perspective of "actual-value consequentialism". From this evaluation system, the consequences, therefore the future of whatever act is chosen is known. And from this perspective you judge the act as "wrong".

This demonstrates very clearly what I argued much earlier. A clear understanding of the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy.

Since the two judgements here, "right" and "wrong", (one including the future from the act, the other not) are contrary, it is impossible that both could be the product of the same system of evaluation. That would imply contradiction within that system, and incoherency. Therefore we must conclude that there are two distinct systems of evaluation being employed, and the contrariness of the respective judgements implies that the two are incompatible.

I mean, true and right are not judgements. They are properties which we often make judgements about. Just like we make judgements about the chemical composition of a substance. It's actual atomic makeup is not the same thing as our judgement of it, and our judgement can be more or less accurate depending on how closely it matches reality. — Dan

These are all judgements. "Properties" are judgement we make about things. That X is "the chemical composition of that substance", is a judgement, "the sky is blue" is a judgement, "the grass is green" is a judgement. These judgements reflect our perceptions, and our usage of words, such that if we agree, we conclude that we are saying something true about the world. But "truth" in this case is dependent on agreement, convention in word usage, corresponding with our perceptions. There is nothing to prove that the said properties are actually independent of our perception. (This is a common theme here a TPF, you ought to look over some other threads, like Wayfarer's "The Mind-Created World" for example).

There are a whole host of reasons why not believing in objective truth is not a viable position, but the easiest to explain is that there is no point in anyone talking to you about anything if you don't think there is an objective fact of the matter. You say the world is flat, I say it's round. I can try to convince you using various pieces of evidence, but if you don't think that there is a world out there that contains the answer and we can at least try to compare our beliefs to (though of course there are challenges to doing so given that we cannot see outside of our own perceptions), then there is no point having the discussion in the first place. Or any discussion for that matter. — Dan

This is not at all reflective of reality, and it is actually a very clear indication of how your misunderstanding greatly misleads you in your approach to moral philosophy. Human beings are intentional creatures. We move around with wants, desires, aims and objectives. What you call "objective truth" is irrelevant to most human choices and actions. In most cases, we don't care about any supposed objective truth, we just want to get what we need or desire. Therefore our interactions, communications, are shaped and formed around these intentional activities rather than any assumption of an objective truth.

So the above paragraph of yours expresses the opposite of the reality of the situation. Human beings can, and do in most cases, have all sorts of discussions and other sorts of interactions, with the belief of whether or not there is an objective truth about the matter of their interactions remaining completely irrelevant. As long as we have adequate understanding of meaning, allowing us to communicate our wants, desires, and goals, also allowing us to produce, and work together toward common goals, "objective truth" is irrelevant.

The question of "objective truth" generally only arises when there is disagreement. So our moral philosophy needs to reflect this. Our choices, actions, and consequently interactions, are based in our wants, desires, and intentions. They are not based in a belief in "objective truth". As it is very clear that moral philosophy deals with human choices, actions, and interactions, it is also very clear that moral philosophy needs to be based in an understanding of human wants, desires, and intentions, rather than a belief in an "objective truth". The faith in "objective truth" is a mechanism employed to deal with disagreement.

I'm sorry to keep pestering you on this matter, but that is an assertion which needs to be justified. You can claim this over and over again, but repetition does not constitute justification. So you give me no reason to even consider this claim: "Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, few ways we could go about this. Probably the easiest way is to entertain the idea that the idea that opposite proposition is correct and realize that this would be self-defeating (saying that "truth is subjective" would itself be a claim that would be, if truth were indeed subjective, be objectively true). This also works for "there is no objective truth" and other similar propositions

If, the truth about the world is forever denied from us, then how do we know that there is such a thing. This is the problem. You assume, and claim, that there is such a thing as "the truth of the world", but since it is denied from us, we have no real evidence that there is such a thing. This renders your claim as completely unsupported, nothing but a baseless assertion. Furthermore, theories in modern physics, "multiverse", "model-dependent reality" etc., are contrary to this assertion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely no theory in physics is contrary to the idea that there is an objective truth about the nature of reality. If it is the case that the observer effect is more than just the effect of relatively clumsy measuring tools and that someone observing something does in a real way change the thing (for example) then that would be a fact about the world that is true. If there is really more than one universe (though exactly what that means is a bit messy and it's not clear that we are all using the same meaning when we talk about a "multiverse") then that would be a true fact about the world.

More generally, I think we can get at some truths about the world, as the veil of perception is only really relevant when it comes to empirical knowledge. We might still be able to determine, for example, mathematical truths without this causing any problem.

You have one system which evaluates from the perspective of what you call "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Evaluation from this perspective does not involve knowing the future, i.e. the consequences of whatever act is chosen. From this perspective, (this proposed evaluation system), your judgement renders the chosen act as "right". However, you also apply a judgement produced from the evaluation system described as the perspective of "actual-value consequentialism". From this evaluation system, the consequences, therefore the future of whatever act is chosen is known. And from this perspective you judge the act as "wrong".

This demonstrates very clearly what I argued much earlier. A clear understanding of the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy.

Since the two judgements here, "right" and "wrong", (one including the future from the act, the other not) are contrary, it is impossible that both could be the product of the same system of evaluation. That would imply contradiction within that system, and incoherency. Therefore we must conclude that there are two distinct systems of evaluation being employed, and the contrariness of the respective judgements implies that the two are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just a misunderstanding. A better way of describing this is that instead that from the point of view of the agent, it appears right. In fact, it isn't, but I think "do what appears to be right based on the information you have" is a pretty good rule of thumb, and so one we might want to promote, even if sometimes it leads to doing things that are wrong (in an actual-value consequentialist sense at least).

This is also my response to your comment regarding me pointing out that the person doesn't know the future. Again, I think you're assumptions are getting in the way of you understanding here. I suggest that you try reading what I have said again while assuming that I am not in denial and that what I am saying is coherent.

This is not at all reflective of reality, and it is actually a very clear indication of how your misunderstanding greatly misleads you in your approach to moral philosophy. Human beings are intentional creatures. We move around with wants, desires, aims and objectives. What you call "objective truth" is irrelevant to most human choices and actions. In most cases, we don't care about any supposed objective truth, we just want to get what we need or desire. Therefore our interactions, communications, are shaped and formed around these intentional activities rather than any assumption of an objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is bollocks. We (or at least, a lot of us) absolutely do care about whether what we believe is true. You can see this when, for example, asking why people would not want to be hooked up to an experience machine.

So the above paragraph of yours expresses the opposite of the reality of the situation. Human beings can, and do in most cases, have all sorts of discussions and other sorts of interactions, with the belief of whether or not there is an objective truth about the matter of their interactions remaining completely irrelevant. As long as we have adequate understanding of meaning, allowing us to communicate our wants, desires, and goals, also allowing us to produce, and work together toward common goals, "objective truth" is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Certainly we have some. We do talk about subjective things. But a) I think you're just wrong about human's attitudes on this front. And b) if you were right (which I'm fairly sure you're not) then that would be so much the worse for humanity.

The question of "objective truth" generally only arises when there is disagreement. So our moral philosophy needs to reflect this. Our choices, actions, and consequently interactions, are based in our wants, desires, and intentions. They are not based in a belief in "objective truth". As it is very clear that moral philosophy deals with human choices, actions, and interactions, it is also very clear that moral philosophy needs to be based in an understanding of human wants, desires, and intentions, rather than a belief in an "objective truth". The faith in "objective truth" is a mechanism employed to deal with disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making claims about the world while also claiming that objective truth isn't important. This is nonsensical. Imagine that I agreed with you that there is no objective truth in the world, how would we discuss whether people believed this or not? We can't check the world, since there would be no objective truth to it. Further, how could you be sure that we don't agree? Sure, you could check the things you think I've written, but there would be no objective truth to a) whether I wrote them, b) whether I believe or don't believe what I wrote, c) whether I'm right or not about what I might or might not believe. So the discussion would quickly become completely meaningless.

I put it to you that if you walk into the road when a car is coming it won't matter whether you believe that the car is going to hit you, whether you judge that the car hitting you will kill you, or whether you define getting hit by a car the same way I do: you will be just as dead.

I mean, few ways we could go about this. Probably the easiest way is to entertain the idea that the idea that opposite proposition is correct and realize that this would be self-defeating (saying that "truth is subjective" would itself be a claim that would be, if truth were indeed subjective, be objectively true). This also works for "there is no objective truth" and other similar propositions — Dan

Haha, that's funny, but obviously incorrect. If the claim "truth is subjective" is true, that in no way implies that the claim is objectively true. Such a conclusion would require defining "true" as "objectively true", which of course is what "truth is subjective" denies. So your stated conclusion implies self-contradiction, or at best requires begging the question by proceeding from the premise that "true" is defined as objectively true.

Absolutely no theory in physics is contrary to the idea that there is an objective truth about the nature of reality. — Dan

Are you serious? Have you heard of "relativity", "multiverse", "model-dependent realism"? These theories are all based in principles which assume no objective truth.

If there is really more than one universe (though exactly what that means is a bit messy and it's not clear that we are all using the same meaning when we talk about a "multiverse") then that would be a true fact about the world. — Dan

This is an indication of the inclination to beg the question as explained above. If you start with the assumption (premise) that "truth" means "objective fact about the world", then any time that someone claims to make a true statement you will conclude that this means that the person has stated an "objective fact about the world". However, this would simply be a misunderstanding, caused by the inapplicable, and unstated premise which you decide to insert just to support your ontology.

In other words, you take a principle which supports your ontology "truth means objective fact about the world", and you apply it toward understanding another ontology which is incompatible, based in principles which contradict this principle of yours. The result can be nothing other than a misunderstanding of the ontology which you apply the incompatible premise toward understanding. So, in the example which you state, "multiverse" implies a multitude of worlds, therefore it is impossible that statements referring to a "multiverse" are statements about "the world". You have simply applied an ontological premise which is inconsistent with the ontology proposed, and the incoherency produced by the contradiction demonstrates that it is impossible for you to understand the "multiverse" ontology in this way.

This is just a misunderstanding. A better way of describing this is that instead that from the point of view of the agent, it appears right. — Dan

Now you are saying something completely different. You are no longer judging the act as "right" ("you" being the third party observer to the doctor's act), You are judging the act as wrong, and saying that it appeared to be right to the person making the choice, at that time. This is very different from saying that the act "is" right from that perspective, it is saying that the act "appears to be right" from that perspective.

If you are familiar, this is the ancient distinction outlined by Aristotle, between "the apparent good", and "the real good". The goal of the moral philosopher is to shape (conform, or in terms of this thread "restrict") an individual's mind so as the apparent good becomes consistent with the real good. Now, the problem is as we've discussed, that the real good always stays in the category of unknown, at the time of decision making, because we cannot foresee the future. And, as the theologians demonstrate with their ontology, and what I'm trying to impress on you, the concept of "the real good" requires a divine mind "God" to support the validity (justification) of the concept.

In fact, it isn't, but I think "do what appears to be right based on the information you have" is a pretty good rule of thumb, and so one we might want to promote, even if sometimes it leads to doing things that are wrong (in an actual-value consequentialist sense at least). — Dan

From the principles described above, the distinction between real good and apparent good, you are taking things in the wrong direction here. Moralists do not encourage people to "do what appears to be right based on the information you have". That would encourage rash judgement, proceeding immediately without taking any time to look for other options. This is exactly the issue I pointed to concerning habitual actions. The information which comes immediately to mind is very limited, inclining one to act quickly according to the habit, without seeking any other information, even though further information is very often right in the memory somewhere, it is just not brought to bear on the immediate problem due to the force of habit. Instead, the moralist encourages individuals to recognize and acknowledge the difference between the apparent good and the real good, and make a judgement as to the likelihood of it being the case that what appears to be right in the current situation, is consistent with what is really right.

For your reference, "what is really right" needs to be grounded in sound arguments, or else the entire system breaks down. In theology "God" provides the ground. Your portrayal of consequentialism does not provide such a ground. This is because "what is really right" is based in the outcome, the effects of the act, and there is always an element of "unknown" due to accidents. So in the example, the doctor's actions will always be judged as "wrong" if the patient dies, no matter what precautions are taken. This means that there are cases where there is no "right" choice. Furthermore, to acknowledge that there is a "right choice" in any situation requires applying determinist principles, 'X will necessarily cause Y', and this denies the reality of freedom of choice. In short, because of the determinist principles, consequentialism is defeatist, fatalist.

This is also my response to your comment regarding me pointing out that the person doesn't know the future. Again, I think you're assumptions are getting in the way of you understanding here. I suggest that you try reading what I have said again while assuming that I am not in denial and that what I am saying is coherent. — Dan

What are you insinuating here? Are you saying that the fact that no one can know the future with certainty, is irrelevant? If I read your work with this assumption, and that assumption makes your work appear to be incoherent, and I explain this to you, then the onus is on you to dispel this assumption. Prove to me that this assumption is irrelevant, or false, like I prove your assumption of "objective truth" is false. The problem is that proving my premise false requires determinism, which renders choice making irrelevant, and proving my assumption irrelevant requires a false representation of choice making. So we are left with the conclusion that you are in denial.

This is bollocks. We (or at least, a lot of us) absolutely do care about whether what we believe is true. You can see this when, for example, asking why people would not want to be hooked up to an experience machine. — Dan

Sure, there is a vast multitude of situations within which the idea of "what we believe is true" is given priority. And so, it is not hard to find examples. What I pointed out, is that in the vast majority of time, what we want or desire is given priority over "what we believe is true". In general, "what we believe is true" is only prioritized in cases of disagreement.

It's hard to see how your example demonstrates that "what we believe is true" is prioritized over "what we want or desire". We would have to actually examine the reasons why the decision was made,

Certainly we have some. We do talk about subjective things. But a) I think you're just wrong about human's attitudes on this front. And b) if you were right (which I'm fairly sure you're not) then that would be so much the worse for humanity. — Dan

This is consistent with the majority of your replies now. You simply assert that you think I am wrong, but you provide no support or justification, the reasons why you think I am wrong. And, it's becoming increasingly clear that these reasons are that you are applying faulty premises, as explained above. These are ontological premises about reality, "objective truth", and faulty premises about how a person's belief in "objective truth" ("what we believe is true") effects one's choices and actions.

You are making claims about the world while also claiming that objective truth isn't important. This is nonsensical. — Dan

I don't see why you claim this. People express opinions all the time, and others recognize them as opinions. A problem arises when people express opinions as fact, and people wrongly recognize the opinions of others as fact. Once you acknowledge that opinions about "the world" are opinions, and opinion will never obtain to the level of "objective truth", then you will understand that "objective truth" is irrelevant when discussing opinions about "the world".

Imagine that I agreed with you that there is no objective truth in the world, how would we discuss whether people believed this or not? We can't check the world, since there would be no objective truth to it. Further, how could you be sure that we don't agree? Sure, you could check the things you think I've written, but there would be no objective truth to a) whether I wrote them, b) whether I believe or don't believe what I wrote, c) whether I'm right or not about what I might or might not believe. So the discussion would quickly become completely meaningless. — Dan

i don't see any of these problems. You are making up imaginary problems, by misapplying faulty premises as explained above. We do not need to make any of those judgements which you claim are required. Those are only required under your faulty premise, that objective truth is necessarily important to discussion. But this is clearly not the case. We can discuss what we want, our goals, agree and produce common goals, we can proceed to discuss opinions about the nature of reality, while recognizing that these are opinions, and we can agree on these opinions when this is conducive toward achieving our goals, all without ever considering anything about "objective truth".[

quote="Dan;948828"]I put it to you that if you walk into the road when a car is coming it won't matter whether you believe that the car is going to hit you, whether you judge that the car hitting you will kill you, or whether you define getting hit by a car the same way I do: you will be just as dead.[/quote]

That's your opinion, but you clearly haven't considered all the possibilities. The driver of the car may hit the brakes, or swerve, to mention a couple other possibilities. What you've demonstrated with this example is how the force of habit restricts your thinking and decision making (limits your freedom), so that you jump to a conclusion ("you will be just as dead"), without considering all the relevant information.

Haha, that's funny, but obviously incorrect. If the claim "truth is subjective" is true, that in no way implies that the claim is objectively true. Such a conclusion would require defining "true" as "objectively true", which of course is what "truth is subjective" denies. So your stated conclusion implies self-contradiction, or at best requires begging the question by proceeding from the premise that "true" is defined as objectively true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree it implies self-contradiction, because the position that truth is subjective is itself contradictory.

Would you instead say that your claim, that truth is subjective, is false for me? If so, why are you trying to convince me of something false?

Are you serious? Have you heard of "relativity", "multiverse", "model-dependent realism"? These theories are all based in principles which assume no objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

So model-dependent realism isn't a theory of physics so much as the philosophy of science, and it doesn't assume a lack of objective truth so much as thinks its the wrong thing to be focusing on. As for relativity and the multiverse, neither of these assume a lack of objective truth at all. You have badly misunderstood these theories.

This is an indication of the inclination to beg the question as explained above. If you start with the assumption (premise) that "truth" means "objective fact about the world", then any time that someone claims to make a true statement you will conclude that this means that the person has stated an "objective fact about the world". However, this would simply be a misunderstanding, caused by the inapplicable, and unstated premise which you decide to insert just to support your ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we assume that truth is subjective, then what the heck do any of these claims mean? What are you claiming when you claim I am begging the question? Are you claiming I am actually begging the question, or just that you believe I am?

I am very happy to state right now that whenever I make any claim about the world or logic, I am assuming that objective truth exists. I think that assumption underlies any sensible discussion, as I have mentioned earlier.

Now you are saying something completely different. You are no longer judging the act as "right" ("you" being the third party observer to the doctor's act), You are judging the act as wrong, and saying that it appeared to be right to the person making the choice, at that time. This is very different from saying that the act "is" right from that perspective, it is saying that the act "appears to be right" from that perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said the action was right. I said the action was wrong. I would suggest that a way to check your belief here against morality would be to go back and read what I said again, but if you don't think there is any fact of the matter about what I said, then I'm not sure what use this would be.

From the principles described above, the distinction between real good and apparent good, you are taking things in the wrong direction here. Moralists do not encourage people to "do what appears to be right based on the information you have". That would encourage rash judgement, proceeding immediately without taking any time to look for other options. This is exactly the issue I pointed to concerning habitual actions. The information which comes immediately to mind is very limited, inclining one to act quickly according to the habit, without seeking any other information, even though further information is very often right in the memory somewhere, it is just not brought to bear on the immediate problem due to the force of habit. Instead, the moralist encourages individuals to recognize and acknowledge the difference between the apparent good and the real good, and make a judgement as to the likelihood of it being the case that what appears to be right in the current situation, is consistent with what is really right.

For your reference, "what is really right" needs to be grounded in sound arguments, or else the entire system breaks down. In theology "God" provides the ground. Your portrayal of consequentialism does not provide such a ground. This is because "what is really right" is based in the outcome, the effects of the act, and there is always an element of "unknown" due to accidents. So in the example, the doctor's actions will always be judged as "wrong" if the patient dies, no matter what precautions are taken. This means that there are cases where there is no "right" choice. Furthermore, to acknowledge that there is a "right choice" in any situation requires applying determinist principles, 'X will necessarily cause Y', and this denies the reality of freedom of choice. In short, because of the determinist principles, consequentialism is defeatist, fatalist. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Do what appears right based on the information you have" is pretty reasonable advice and is not the same as "rush to judgement and don't gather more information".

No, God does not provide the grounds. Even if he existed, that wouldn't show anything about morality at all. That being said, if truth were subjective, I'm not really sure what the claim "God exists" would mean. Would he just exist to the faithful, but not to the nonbeliever?

What are you insinuating here? Are you saying that the fact that no one can know the future with certainty, is irrelevant? If I read your work with this assumption, and that assumption makes your work appear to be incoherent, and I explain this to you, then the onus is on you to dispel this assumption. Prove to me that this assumption is irrelevant, or false, like I prove your assumption of "objective truth" is false. The problem is that proving my premise false requires determinism, which renders choice making irrelevant, and proving my assumption irrelevant requires a false representation of choice making. So we are left with the conclusion that you are in denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, no, that isn't what I'm saying at all. I am saying exactly what I said: that you are jumping to strange conclusions again and that perhaps you are making some unhelpful assumptions.

Second, you haven't provided the assumption of objective truth to be false. What the heck would that even mean? Wouldn't it mean, in your view, that it is just false to you? What the heck does it mean to prove something on a worldview where there is no objective truth?

Sure, there is a vast multitude of situations within which the idea of "what we believe is true" is given priority. And so, it is not hard to find examples. What I pointed out, is that in the vast majority of time, what we want or desire is given priority over "what we believe is true". In general, "what we believe is true" is only prioritized in cases of disagreement.

It's hard to see how your example demonstrates that "what we believe is true" is prioritized over "what we want or desire". We would have to actually examine the reasons why the decision was made, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not entirely sure what point you are making here. You said that objective truth is irrelevant to most human actions, I pointed out it isn't. Are you saying that what you really mean is not that it is irrelevant, but that people care more about what they want than what is true? That is a less obviously wrong claim, though I'm still not sure it's correct. Also, again, I'm not sure what it even means for it to be correct or not on a world view where there is no objective truth. When you say "this is what human beings care about" what does that even mean? Does it mean "this is what I think they care about" or "this is what they care about, in my world". If the truth is subjective, then aren't we just arguing about our favorite dinosaurs here (and everywhere)? If I think that this isn't what people care about, aren't I right? In what sense could I be wrong?

This is consistent with the majority of your replies now. You simply assert that you think I am wrong, but you provide no support or justification, the reasons why you think I am wrong. And, it's becoming increasingly clear that these reasons are that you are applying faulty premises, as explained above. These are ontological premises about reality, "objective truth", and faulty premises about how a person's belief in "objective truth" ("what we believe is true") effects one's choices and actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have made a claim with no evidence and now seem annoyed that I am dismissing it just as easily. If you want to make a point about what people believe, I suggest you back it up with some form of evidence. Though, again, I'm not sure why you would be trying to convince me of anything if truth were subjective. Are you just trying to recruit me to your worldview? Not a matter of correct or not, but just a kind of intellectual tribalism?

I don't see why you claim this. People express opinions all the time, and others recognize them as opinions. A problem arises when people express opinions as fact, and people wrongly recognize the opinions of others as fact. Once you acknowledge that opinions about "the world" are opinions, and opinion will never obtain to the level of "objective truth", then you will understand that "objective truth" is irrelevant when discussing opinions about "the world". — Metaphysician Undercover

"Opinion" here is a little vague, so I'm going to clarify. Do you mean to suggest that everything you have been saying up until now amounts to nothing more than a matter of taste? You may as well have been telling me why I should like tomatoes? Is that your position here? I want to be sure.

i don't see any of these problems. You are making up imaginary problems, by misapplying faulty premises as explained above. We do not need to make any of those judgements which you claim are required. Those are only required under your faulty premise, that objective truth is necessarily important to discussion. But this is clearly not the case. We can discuss what we want, our goals, agree and produce common goals, we can proceed to discuss opinions about the nature of reality, while recognizing that these are opinions, and we can agree on these opinions when this is conducive toward achieving our goals, all without ever considering anything about "objective truth".[ — Metaphysician Undercover

How exactly do we discuss goals if there is nothing to judge against whether the goal has been met beyond opinion? What the heck does "reality" mean without objective truth? This is not a faulty premise, this is very much the premise that underlies any sensible conversation. Otherwise, we are essentially arguing with the hypothetical turtle, that can accept all the premises but deny the conclusion. Without the assumption of objective truth, all inquiry and logic is meaningless.

That's your opinion, but you clearly haven't considered all the possibilities. The driver of the car may hit the brakes, or swerve, to mention a couple other possibilities. What you've demonstrated with this example is how the force of habit restricts your thinking and decision making (limits your freedom), so that you jump to a conclusion ("you will be just as dead"), without considering all the relevant information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to borrow your worldview here to demonstrate how it prevents sensible discussion:

I did consider that and in fact wrote all of those assumptions out in full. My post is seven pages long and details all possibilities surrounding this. If you don't think so, perhaps on the basis of reading it, then that's just your opinion and it isn't true for me.