So, going back, p→◇p is valid in S4 and S5, the systems almost universally used for metaphysical speculation. These systems are reflexive, meaning that they permit us to talk about the possible world we are in. Denying p→◇p, as you do, blocks that reflexivity. — Banno

As I said, your interpretation is incorrect. The world we are in is not a possible world.

Thanks for the diagnosis, and prescription, Dr..

We are stipulating that that one world is the actual world, not deducing it. Any world can counted as w₀. It's built in, not contradictory. There is no modal difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. The difference is metaphysical, not modal. — Banno

So within the modal model there is no actual world, just possible worlds. When you stipulate that one of the worlds is the actual world, that is metaphysics. But when you stipulate an actual world, then the others are no longer (metaphysically) possible.

Within the modal model there is not consistency between actual and possible, because all are possible and there is no actual. And within the metaphysics there is not consistency between the actual and the possible. You only claim that the actual is possible by incorrectly conflating the modal with the metaphysical.

You have yet to study modal logic, but insist on your opinion. That's why you are confused. — Banno

You have yet to study metaphysics, and that's why you continually confuse me.

The thing is, there is a system of modal logic which, I understand works reasonably well by the relevant standards. — Ludwig V

I agree.

However, it seems that it is not a question of two worlds, with a difference between them, but a difference in the same world. If the difference involved here is not a difference in the description of the possible world, it must be a difference in status of that same world. — Ludwig V

Ok, let's consider this perspective then. The representations of modal logic, are different possible descriptions of an independent actual world. It should be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual, independent world. Therefore it should also be clear to you that none of the possibilities is the actual. To think such would be a case of what is commonly called confusing the map with the terrain. We can establish some principles for judgement, criteria of truth or whatever, but that produces a judgement of truth, it does not make one of the possibilities into the actual.

H'm. Maybe. I agree, however, that more would need to be said about what "discover" means. But I like the implication that discovery presupposes an independent pre-existing something. It's not difficult with the empirical, but the a priori needs careful handling. — Ludwig V

Well, the issue is what exactly is the nature of what is termed here as "an independent pre-existing something". If we talk about discovering knowledge, then we imply that the independent something which we discover is knowledge. If we talk about discovering true statements, then it is implied that the independent something discovered is statements. If we talk about discovering information than it is implied that the independent something is information.

Conventionally, we would assign "matter" to the independent something. But Aristotle demonstrated that matter on its own is completely unintelligible, therefore unknowable. It is actually the form which the matter is in which is intelligible. But this poses the question of what exactly is "form", and how does it make something unknowable, matter, into something knowable.

It doesn't. — Banno

You yourself said:

"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... "

Therefore if we assign to one of the possible worlds the status of "actual world" by realist principles, (which would constitute a modal difference), we would be attributing a difference to this world which violates the modal system which dictates "no modal difference".

No wonder I'm so confused, you keep making contradictory assertions without backing any of them up. Without the proper support for these assertions, I can 't tell which of the contrary claims you actually believe. Therefore I can only conclude that you just don't understand what you're talking about.

I take your point. Perhaps we should restrict ourselves to talking of "the unknown". It might clearer to change tack and only talk about the possibilities of discovering new knowledge. — Ludwig V

This is good. Now we have the basic separation between Platonic realism and non-Platonic types of realism to navigate. Notice you mention "the possibilities of discovering new knowledge". That knowledge is something independent from human beings, which is "discovered" by us implies Platonism. This form of realism is conducive to the idea that there is unknown true propositions, which exist independently from us, which we "discover".

The alternative, non-Platonic realism would say that we create, produce or "construct" knowledge while something other than knowledge is what is independent from us. There are also forms of realism which blur the boundary between these two by invoking concepts like "information".

That's an example of using thing in a generously vague way. It is useful because it avoids annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not, etc; — Ludwig V

It might avoid such debates, but if we want to understand the metaphysics, and the possibility of the reality of an independent world, we need to engage these difficult subjects. Mundane life, and common language use in general, for communication, has no need for metaphysics. So habits of language usage are developed in ways of ambiguity, the ambiguity providing for a difference in underlying world-views. The ambiguity is effective in allowing me to interpret by my world-view, and you to interpret by your world-view, such that we can effectively communicate and move along in our day to day projects without the need for consistency between our ontological foundations.

So we can avoid "annoying debates about what is a thing and what is not", and move along with our mundane communications without the need to address metaphysical differences. If however, metaphysics is the subject of discussion, then avoiding these annoying discussions is a mistake conducive to misunderstanding.

Risible.

One of the possible worlds is the actual world.

Either that, or the actual world is not possible. — Banno

Exactly.

Within the modal model, we now have two possibilities, "one of the possible worlds is the actual world", or "the actual world is not possible". Since it violates the rules of the model for one of the possible worlds to be the actual world, then within the modal model, the actual world is not possible. Therefore model logic is not consistent with realism.

I'm glad you are at least starting to consider this as a possibility.

That's why ontologies like model-dependent realism are not true realism. Here's an analogy which might help you to understand. Under relativity theory, any rest frame is a valid rest frame, and each frame is made to be consistent with each other, as a valid "possibility". Each is a "possible" frame of reference, but none provides a true rest frame, which would be the "actual rest frame". In order that all the frames of reference may equally be valid rest frames, it is imperative that none is the "actual rest frame". Likewise, in modal logic it is imperative that none of the possible worlds is the "actual world", or the possibility of the others is invalidated.

The person who flipped the coin knew it. — EricH

You are changing to a different definition of "know", a subjective one, claiming that one person knows what others do not. We have been discussing this issue under the premise that knowing is a property of "we", not the property of one individual subject. I cautioned against equivocating between these two senses of "know" a few days back, because the conditions are completely different.

So in your example, there is a number of people, and discrepancy between what one person thinks that they know, and what others think that they know. Therefore it does not qualify as "we know", and is not a valid example. Anytime that it is proposed that there is inconsistency between what one knows and another knows, or between what some know and others do not, it is not a case of "we know", and not a valid example for the purpose of this discussion.

Any of the possible worlds could be the actual world - hence, "there is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds". Modal theory does not tell us which possible world is actual. — Banno

That's an incorrect interpretation, for obvious reasons. None of the possible worlds could be the actual world, as that would constitute an invalid difference, within the collection of possible worlds, one would be the actual world. Therefore it is clearly not the case that one of the possible worlds is the actual world because that would invalidate the model. Therefore we must interpret that none of the possible worlds is the actual world.

So for some p, the possibility of p ends when p occurs and for other p it doesn't. — Ludwig V

Yes, this acknowledges the difference between a particular and a universal. So you use "p" in an equivocal way. "When p occurs" refers to a particular, while "other P" refers to a type. It is clear that "when p occurs" must refer to a particular, because if it was a type, an instance of p occurring would not preclude the occurrence of another instance of p. But, the occurrence of a particular precludes the possibility of that same particular occurring again. So, we must clear up the equivocation in that statement, where "p" refers to a particular, and also to a type.

So do you accept that there are some unknown things? — Ludwig V

I believe there is a lot which is unknown. Strictly speaking it would not be correct to call the unknown "things", because that implies some sort of knowledge of the unknown, knowledge that the unknown consists of things. In other words, saying that there is "unknown things" wrongly projects knowledge onto the unknown. This is similar to, but more subtle, than saying that there is unknown statements. "Unknown statements" is obviously a problem, even to those without metaphysical education. But "unknown things" requires metaphysical understanding to recognize as fundamentally incorrect.

Someone in the next room flips a coin. We cannot see the result. Now we ask the question - is it possible that the coin is showing heads? The answer is of course yes. Then we walk into the next room and indeed the coin is showing heads.

So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real/actual at the same time. — EricH

I went through this all, way back. When we know that the coin is showing heads, it is incorrect to saying it is possible it is heads. When we do not know that the coin is showing heads it s correct to saying that that it is possible the coin is showing heads. Your example refers to two different times, before walking into the room, and after, so your conclusion of "at the same time" is incorrect. Before walking into the room we say it is possible, and after, we say it is actually showing heads, and we can no longer say it is possible. There is no "at the same time" indicated.

I'll give you this - I cannot win the 2025 Kentucky Derby twice. But that's not because I won it, but because it has happened that the result - win or lose - is settled. But if whatever the result of the 2025 race, it remains possible for me to win the 2026 race. So the possibility of my winning the Kentucky Derby does not cease when I win it. — Ludwig V

How's that relevant? You change from a specific possibility to a more general, so it is a different referent.

That's true. But the fact that the existence of the statement that Mount Everest is 29,000 ft high depends on human beings, does not show that the existence of Mount Everest depends on human beings at all. — Ludwig V

Again, I don't see the relevance. What I was responding to was unknown true statements, not unknown things.

If we look at EricH's example of the coin, there is implied an unknown real thing, the coin before looking at it. But that is not a statement, it is simply something unknown.

As if we could not talk about the actual world. — Banno

Why does what I say to you indicate that we cannot talk about the actual world? How can you make such a conclusion from what I wrote? What I said, is that if we are realist, we cannot put "the actual" into a semantic model in which it is a possible world. That would contradict our realist principles. In no way does it imply that we cannot talk about the actual world. It only implies that we cannot talk about the actual world in that specific context, because that would contradict our realist principles.

Because, as explained many times, it's not the semantic model that shows which possible world is actual. — Banno

That doesn't matter. By the principle upon which the semantic model is produced, we cannot conclude that any of the possible worlds is the actual world without contradicting realist principles. If you take a set of possible worlds, and apply some realist principles to deduce "the actual world", then you must relinquish the claim that the others are possible. You are then not within the constraints of the semantic model, so the other worlds are no longer "possible". "Possible" is a word applied in a very specific way, within that model, and you have moved outside that model, so the application is not valid.

Look what you said already yesterday:

"There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... ".

That is the very issue with modal models, by what principles do we produce an actual world. When you apply some principles to designate "the actual world", you violate the modal model by assigning special status to one of the worlds, placing yourself outside the model, and no longer correct in referring those other worlds as "possible". We only have those "possible worlds" within that semantic model which denies any such special status to any world. Assigning special status violates the model.

Are you serious? — frank

Sure, you start the thread, I'll follow.

Why should a semantic model commit us to the existence of the things quantified over? — Banno

The semantic model does not commit us to the existence of its content. But if the actual world is affirmed to be a part of that semantic model, as you and others here continue to insist, then this is contrary to realism which assumes that the actual world is independent from any semantic model. Why is that difficult to understand? You can't have it both ways, assert that the actual world is a part of a semantic model, with no claims to existence, and also assert that there is a real independent, existing actual world.

Your whole edifice still depends on an equivocation between what is and what is said. — Banno

The point is, that when you claim that the actual world is one of the possible worlds, you deny that there is a distinction between what is said and what is. If you assert that there is another "actual world" which is independent from what is said (realism), as well as the "actual world" which is part of the semantic model, then you equivocate. The equivocation in my "edifice" is just a reflection of the equivocation in what you are telling me, which my edifice is built upon. You are telling me that there is a metaphysical "actual world" and an epistemic "actual world", and the use of these contradict each other.

The solution to this problem is to maintain the distinction between the actual world and the possible worlds, i.e. the actual world is not a possible world. But as soon as we accept the proposition "if it is actual, it is possible" we negate that distinction and we are left with either a denial of realism, or a contradictory equivocation.

Here's an example of the contradiction you fed to me in that link:

They [possible worlds] are semantic or metaphysical constructs used to interpret modal statements.

They exist (or are defined) independently of human imagination. — CHAT GPT

"Constructs" which are independent from human imagination. Who constructs these metaphysical constructs if not human beings?

From the fact that humans think about alternative possibility-structures, it does not follow that those possibility-structures depend on human thought. — CHATGPT

Duh, the possibility structures are the thought ("constructs"), produced by the minds that think them. Are you arguing Platonism now? 'From the fact that human beings think ideas, it doesn't follow that ideas are dependent on human thought''. What about the "construct" part boss?

Come on Banno, quit the bullshit and say something real.

I've answered already. Several times. Here's the best I am willing to do. — Banno

That's not very good. Where's the answer?

I've explained what possible worlds are and how the actual wold is a possible world. If there is a problem set it out. The view I've set out it quite standard. If you see it as problematic, set out how. — Banno

I did set it out. This will be the third time I post the very same paragraph. Please, could you read it and reply accordingly. This is it:

So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent. — Metaphysician Undercover

The possibility that it will rain tomorrow does not depend on whether we recognize it. — Ludwig V

Yes it does, very explicitly, it is something very specific, that human beings draw up in words, "the possibility that it will rain tomorrow".

The trouble is that we cannot know what they are. — Ludwig V

Of course we cannot know what they are because they cannot exist. The existence of statements is dependent on human beings. How could there be statements which we cannot know what they are, when a human being must have made the statement?

If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist. — Ludwig V

That's nonsense. The possibility for something, precedes in time the actual existence of that thing. Once it is actualized, it is not longer a possibility, but an actuality. Suppose president Trump is actually assassinated. At this time, Trump has been assassinated, is a true statement of the actual world. At this point it is not possible for him to be assassinated, because he already has been.. So it's nonsense to think that if, in the actual world, Trump has been assassinated, it must be possible that Trump could be assassinated, because it is actually impossible, as he has already been assassinated. The same must be true of every actuality, and "the actual world" in general. Once it is actual, it is false to claim that it is possible.

There is no modal difference between the actual world and the other possible worlds... That'll confuse Meta no end. — Banno

It doesn't confuse me, I fully understand this, and it is the base of my argument. If you understand this, then it is undeniable that realism is incompatible with modal logic. Obviously, realism requires a difference between possible worlds and the actual world.

ecause the difference is not modal. It's metaphysical.

And Meta, as I've pointed out, has failed to see this distinction. — Banno

As I've told you, to have inconsistency between your metaphysics and epistemology is to have contradictory philosophy. To say that in my epistemology "the actual world is the same as any other possible world", but in my metaphysics "the actual world is completely independent and different from possible worlds", is nothing but contradiction within your concept of "actual world".

The philosophy behind actual versus possible is lengthy and complex. If you want to walk through two SEP articles on it we can examine the views of all the interested parties. There's even a tie-in to negative dialectics!!! — frank

Whatever you wish, I'm willing to follow.

You have not addressed the issue. That is to define "the actual world" in a way which is consistent with "a possible world", and also realism. I explained it to frank here:

So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not addressed this question:

Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements. — Banno

What does a possible world consist ofthen?

You said:
" A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false."

Doesn't that mean to you, that a possible world consists of a set of statements? No wonder I'm confused, you keep contradicting yourself.

Real? They're both abstract objects. :lol: — frank

Abstractions aren't real for you, frank?

It makes sense to realists. Apparently you aren't one. — frank

I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real).

Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"?

All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking). — Outlander

Knowledge is the property of knowers. Is this knowledge which no human beings possess supposed to be possessed by God?

If so, how does that make the "actual world", as known by God, consistent with "possible worlds" which are statements made by human beings?

An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering). — Outlander

Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time?

Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings?

A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge. — frank

Can you clarify this? What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? It doesn't make any sense to me.

I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.

The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations. — Banno

The following is based on your latest description of possible worlds and actual world. Can you point out what's wrong with my reasoning?

A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world.

I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it. — Banno

See below.

Take a moment to read through the first two paragraphs of the SEP article on possible worlds: — frank

Can you explain the point you are trying to make with that passage?

Anyway, the realist assumes that there is a world, and a way that the world is, which is independent from us, the human knowers.

So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.

That the actual world is a possible world is contrary to the realist assumption stated above.

Banno argues that Metaphysician Undercover fundamentally misunderstands modal logic and conflates distinct concepts. The core errors are: — Claude

1. "For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it."
That speaks for itself.
2. Just because we can consider counterfactuals, doesn't indicate that it's possible that what is false could be true.
3.No demonstration here, just appeal to authority, and disregard of my logical demonstration.
4.Doesn't make sense, or perhaps is just irrelevant.
5.False.

Poor effort Claude, so I'll have to give you an F for failure. And please do not try again.



In all that AI babble you haven't yet addressed my reasoning. Are you going to show me errors in my reasoning, or just continue with the misrepresentations.

Start with the following, which follows directly from your definitions:
Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.

Please show me where that reasoning is erroneous. Or, is it the case that your definitions are erroneous?

However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible. — frank

As I said to Ludwig V in the prior post, we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds, but this contradicts realism. Banno wants both, realism, and the actual world to be one of the possible worlds, and doesn't seem to understand the incompatibility. So he continues to define "actual world" in a way which contradicts how he defines "possible world", to support his realism, but also making it impossible that the actual world is one of the possible worlds.

And your reasoning has been repeatedly shown to be in error. — Banno

Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please.

Your posts are becoming increasingly confused. — Banno

That's a direct reflection of what you are telling me. You are confusing me with nonsense.

Notice the two differing modalities, metaphysical and epistemic. Your account, as I've said before, fails to differentiate these. — Banno

From everything that I've read, one's metaphysics must be consistent with one's epistemology, or else there is contradiction within the person's philosophy. So the distinction between "metaphysical" and "epistemic" does not excuse your contradiction.

Note that in all cases the actual world is one of the possible worlds. — Banno

For the reasons I explained in prior posts, this is contradictory. You provided a distinction. Possible worlds consist of stipulations, the actual world does not consist of stipulations. Therefore it is contradictory to say that the actual is one of the possible worlds. Will I have to point this out to you an infinite number of times before you accept it?

If we apply Meta's logic to the example I just gave, then because it did not snow last night in Jindabyne, we cannot give any consideration to what may have been the case had it snowed in Jindabyne last night. — Banno

Why not? What's your problem here? We could give the very same consideration to "what may have been the case if it had snowed", while still acknowledging that it is impossible that it actually did snow. Is that difficult?

If we do not know whether it snowed or not, we consider that both are "possibilities". If we know that it did not snow, then that is known as an actuality; and the alternative is known as a counterfactual. There are no possibilities with respect to this situation in that case, because what is actual is known. I think that is what already pointed out to you

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by "the danger of contradiction". I'm used to contradictions existing or not - contradictions as a risk are new to me. — Ludwig V

There is an implied contradiction, in saying that the actual is also possible. This is the one I've been explaining to Banno, who continues to refuse to acknowledge this. Check the above. I called it a "danger of contradiction" because I am still giving Banno the benefit of the doubt, to see if he can provided definitions which would establish consistency.

The point is that "actual" can be made to be one of the possibilities, but that annihilates realism. We must instill principles other than realist principles to distinguish the actual from the possible, if the actual is to be one of the possible. This is the case with model-dependent realism for example, which claims "realism" in the name, but is not realism. The glaring problem being that realism denies the priority of the possible, therefore the actual cannot yield logical priority to the possible, which is required to conceive of the actual as one of the possible. The actual, real, must be distinct from, and logically prior to, the possible, for true realism.

Banno's problem is that he does not want to relinquish his realist ontology, but he wants at the same time to accept the priority of modal logic. Now he is starting to propose a division, a boundary, between metaphysical principles and epistemic principles, so he can hide the contradictory principles, one on each side of that boundary, thereby having an epistemology which is inconsistent with his metaphysics. "The actual world" means something different in Banno's metaphysics, from what it means in his epistemology.

Thanks, I think I'll take a look at his music theory when I get a chance.

Towards the end of the metaphysics lectures he mentions a manuscript he's published called "Reflections of metaphysics". I glanced at it, and there's a lot of talk about Kant, and what he calls "Kant's block". I'll probably read that, because I'm interested to see exactly how he manages to get around the block.

The actual world is the one in which we may empirically verify statements as true, as opposed to other possible worlds, where we stipulating them to be true. — Banno

So "the actual world" is not the world we live in, (where we live, work, and play, does not consist of statements), it is a world of empirically verifiable statements. And the actual world is not one of the possible worlds which consist of stipulations rather than empirically verifiable statements. Therefore the actual world is not a possible world. Agree? Obviously, it would be a mistake to say that what is actual is also possible, because you've provided clear principles to distinguish the two, and the actual is known to be actual, and distinct from the possible.

But are your principles really clear? "We may empirically verify statements"? Are you saying that "the actual world" consists of statements which are possible to verify empirically, but are not necessarily verified empirically? If we do not actually verify the statements, how would we distinguish a statement of the actual world, from a stipulation of a possible world? Suppose I present you with two statements/stipulations, S1 "it snowed here yesterday", and S2 "it did not snow here yesterday". How would we know which one is an empirically verifiable statement of actuality, and which one is a stipulation of possibility?

Furthermore, if we do actually empirically verify the statements, then how are the "stipulations" truly "possible"? Do you see the dilemma? If we do not empirically verify S1 or S2, then we have two stipulations of possibility. If we empirically verify S1 or S2, we have a statement of actuality, but the other has been ruled as contrary to actuality, and no longer possible.

Your proposal of empirically verifiable statements sucks, as completely useless.

I'll have to read it. — Jamal

Definitely a very good read. It's a bit simpler than ND, so it flows well, but it provides very good background material. This is especially so, concerning the concept "mediation". But it's like an incomplete concept in those lectures so I'm looking forward to seeing how he develops it further in ND.

Keep going. — Banno

Going where? I've laid bare your contradictions and now you say no more. Seems you can't write anything without it being contradictory, so you've shut up.

Banno said we are int he actual world. He also said that we can stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - a bit of semantics. We do not get to stipulate that we are in the actual world. — Banno

What do you mean we don't get to stipulate that we are in the actual world? You personally, have stipulated that we are in the actual world, numerous times just today.

You are playing on the difference between the metaphysical truth that we are in the actual world, and the semantic truth that we can stipulate whatever possible world we want. That failure to recognise the difference between semantics and metaphysics runs right through the confusion you show here. — Banno

If you stipulate (say) that we are in the actual world, which is an unstipulated world, and you also stipulate (say) that the actual world is one of the stipulated possible worlds, you very clearly contradict yourself.

Which do you have it to be? Are we in the actual world, or is the actual world one of the possible worlds? You cannot have both without contradiction.

Near the beginning of these lectures on metaphysics, he distinguishes between metaphysics and theology. Metaphysics is the broader field, so that theology is a branch of metaphysics. He then explains how even criticizing and denouncing metaphysics is self-defeating, because that is itself metaphysics. In this way we can't really avoid metaphysics, because to reject metaphysics is to do metaphysics. That sort of sets the stage for the idea that metaphysics is something natural, which human beings will do, and it cannot be prevented.

After going through Aristotle's metaphysics, he provides some ideas for modern metaphysics. We need to consider the possible reality of life without meaning, and if that can even be life. Also he mentions something worse than death, torture. These both point toward suicide and the question, "Is it still possible to live?". People, have become superfluous, the meaning of one's life is that the person has no meaning.

Further, we find joy in philosophy because thinking is an illusion which takes us away from this reality. But by the same illusion we rationalize ourselves away from real feeling, physical pain etc.. The true basis of morality is to be found in bodily feeling, but this is the opposite direction to those who rationalize ideals. Then he speaks about the narrow mindedness of culture and how it suppresses nature.

So in lectures 16 17 he discusses the intertwining of culture and metaphysical questions. And this gets difficult. The two are in a way, inseparable, each being mediated by the other, but he speaks of them as if they are somehow separate things. What comes out in Lecture 17 is that death is what distinguishes them. Death relates to each of these in a completely different way. He says for example "culture has not integrated death", while "death is the true spur to metaphysical speculation".

So he discusses the failures of the metaphysics of death, the inability to make us "conscious of death", and then turns to the ideas of time, and wholeness, in relation to death, and his paradoxical notion of immortality.

The important, and final point seems to be that thought is always mediated by history. In other words, it is never the case that thought is a pure abstraction, as if floating free from all time and space, it always has a spatial-temporal context in the world, and it is always mediated, conditioned by that context. This plays into what he calls metaphysical experience, and Hegel's principle of determinate negation, which he rejects. He says that if negation of the negative produced something positive, this would create a deceptive type of certainty which would make mistake appear to be impossible. That would leave us hopelessly lost because the truth of the idea is its fallibility.

There's something wrong with saying that the actual world is possible and something wrong with saying that it is not possible. — Ludwig V

That's what I said, it's categorically distinct.

You are missing the point. You cannot stipulate which possible world is actual. — Ludwig V

That's Banno's claim. Banno said we stipulate which world is the actual world. I addressed that in my last post. If one of the possible worlds is supposed to represent the actual world, this needs to be justified rather than stipulated. But then the justification will be be judged.

That is why Banno's claim that modal logic gives us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is incorrect. To apply rigor to the way that we talk about the actual world requires strict rules on the use of descriptive language, and also for justifying the claims of "actual". But this is outside the purveyance of modal logic.

A god logician will understand that they can only know what it is possible to know. — Banno

Sure, all of us atheists will agree with that. We know that "god" itself is inherently contradictory.

This is a metaphysical point. — Banno

A very important metaphysical point, I might add. Failure to recognize this might lead one to think that the actual world is one of the possible worlds. And one might think that what is actually known is also possibly known. But a good metaphysician will recognize the category division, and the danger of contradiction if we allow that the actual is also possible.

Speaking semantically, the actual world can be stipulated. Which is just to say we can talk about the actual world as one of the possible words. — Banno

Sure, but this is problematic due to the possibility of mistake. If we stipulate that a specific possible world represents the actual world, then we take that special status assigned to "the actual world", for granted, even though it might not be a correct representation. Therefore, the title "the actual world" requires more than simple stipulation, it requires justification.

The error I mean is to treat the "observer" as in a separate world from the "observed." — Ciceronianus

It is a mistake to separate the observer from the observed. The nature of an experiment is that we do something to the world, in a precisely designed way, and we observe how the world responds. Understanding the design, and the procedure, is just as important as observing the effects.

We are in the actual world. Metaphysics. — Banno

OK, let's get this straight. I hope you are not trying to confuse me.

We are in the actual world.
Possible worlds are stipulated though.
The world we are in is not a stipulated world
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.

Agree?

This shows your error nicely. Semantically, we can of corse stipulate that we are talking about the actual world - one in which Branson's wife is dead. Metaphysically, the actual world is the one we are in. Your neat syllogism mixes the two. — Banno

You stipulate that you are talking about the actual world, and this means that the world you are talking about is a possible world, it is stipulated. By your own words, the actual world is "not stipulated".

What you propose here is just ridiculous, because one could just as easily stipulate that the world which Branson's wife did not die, is the actual world. How do you propose that in any stipulated world (possible world), stipulating "I'm talking about the actual world", makes that stipulated world (possible world) into a not stipulated world?

Well, the actual world is either possible or impossible (necessarily not actual) - this is the equivalent of the law of excluded middle in standard modal logic. It would be absurd to maintain that the actual world is impossible, so you are left with the actual world being possible (indeed, this is a theorem in all but the weakest modal logics). And yes, the actual world is different from all the other possible worlds - it is actual! — SophistiCat

What is actual is not possible in the sense that it is a distinct category. Since "impossible" is defined relative to "possible", what is actual is just as much not impossible as it is not possible. If we try to bring "actual into the category of "possible" as Banno does, and you do, this results in the contradiction which I've been demonstrating to Banno.

That seems to me a bit confusing, because it suggests that the actual world is merely a possible world. Surely one needs to say something to the effect that the actual world is different from all the possible worlds. — Ludwig V

This is the issue. Banno's been arguing that if it is actual it must be possible. I've been trying to show him how we must accept that this is contradictory. But Banno seems to be influenced by some sort of common language intuition which makes him think that it's nonsense to say that what is actual is not possible.

You are already in the actual world, Meta. — Banno

Possibly, as that is what you stipulate, but we're right back to where we were, days ago. Remember, I told you how "actually known" is distinct from "possibly known", incompatible because the two are contradictory? You could not understand that and kept arguing otherwise. Maybe you'll understand the logic now:

Possible worlds are stipulated.
The actual world is not stipulated.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.

While semantics talks about many possible worlds, metaphysics tells us that only one is the actual world - the one that is fixed by empirical facts. The actual world is one in which Branson's wife died. — Banno

By the logic above, if there is an actual world, it is not one of the possible worlds. That would be contradictory.

You seem to think that somehow the actual word ought be deducible form a modal logic. — Banno

If the actual world is one of the possible worlds, then it ought to be deducible from modal logic. However, the actual world could not be one of the possible worlds because that would be contradictory. That appears to be a problem with your metaphysics, you accept contradiction.

The best way to think of possible worlds is not as imagined, but as stipulated. — Banno

Sure, "stipulated". But I don't see how this change of words makes any significant difference. A stipulated world is nothing other than a special type of imagined world, one put to words, and proposed for agreement. But I'll use your word if you think it adds some significance.

We can consider the possible world in which we did not know Bransons wife had died, and consider the consequences thereof - such as that I would not be using it in this example. That's quite sensible. — Banno

So you are suggesting two distinct stipulated worlds, one in which Branson's wife died and one in which Branson's wife did not. I have no problem with this, those are two possible worlds.

The question is how do we get to an actual world?

And, to add to your confusion, we make such stipulations in the actual word... As indeed, I just did. — Banno

Yes, that definitely confuses me. The way you phrase that, "to add to your confusion", creates the appearance that you are doing this intentionally. Why would you strive to confuse rather than to clarify?

You are stipulating that we make such stipulations in the actual world. But that stipulation you make, just produces another stipulated world. Just because you stipulate that we make stipulations in the actual world, doesn't give that stipulated world any special status as anything other than another stipulated world, just like all the rest of the stipulated worlds. I could stipulate that there is another world, "the real world", within which you make the stipulation that we make such stipulations in the actual world. Then someone might stipulate that there is a "physical world" within which I made the stipulation about the real world. And someone could stipulate an "existing world" within which the stipulation about the physical world was made. As long as people could keep coming up with new terms, we'd approach an infinite regress. All the while, we'd only be dealing with stipulated worlds, which are just a special type of imaginary world.

The difference with the actual world is that it is not stipulated. It's already there. — Banno

I don't understand this at all. How could that even be a "world", what's already there? Very clearly, a world is what is stipulated. If there is anything which has not been stipulated, then this is very obviously categorically distinct from what "a world" is. We cannot now use "world" to refer to something "not stipulated", when "a world" very clearly refers to what is stipulated. I agree that there is much more to reality than what is stipulated, but if worlds are what is stipulated, we sure as heck cannot talk about what is not stipulated as if it is a world. That would be extremely confusing.

That's pretty hopelessly confused. — Banno

Now I think I understand very clearly why I am hopelessly confused. You use the word "world" in an extremely confusing way. You suppose worlds which are stipulated, and also a world, or perhaps a multitude of worlds (I really can't know, because everything you say about this "world" would just be stipulated, therefore a stipulated world) which is/are not stipulated. How could we even know that there is such a world, or worlds?

Can you see the inherent contradiction here, which is confusing me immensely? You are stipulating that there is an actual world, which is not stipulated, but is already there. If we remove this stipulation, of an actual, not stipulated world, which is already there, because it is self-contradicting, a stipulated not stipulated world, how can we know, or even say, anything about this supposed contradictory world, because that would be to make the contradiction of stipulating the not stipulated?

What I suggest to you Banno, is that it is actually you who misunderstands modal logic. In modal logic there cannot be any such thing as the actual, not stipulated world, which is already there. This realist assumption contradicts the very principles of modal logic. This is why we have ontologies like model-dependent realism, which the adherents recognize is not consistent with traditional realism, but they give it that name anyway, to create the illusion of consistency. And, you either get deceived by this illusion, or grasp it, and propagate it in intentional deception, by insisting that modal logic is consistent with realism.

But your "rigorous way to talk about it" assigns truth to the talk not the actual world, and it provides no principles to even support the reality of an actual world. Look at the definition of "possibly" you gave me:

In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk. — Banno

Clearly these are "imaginary worlds". Consider that I may produce a world based on my experience, and you may produce a world based on your experience. Despite each of us claiming that mine is the actual world, based on my experience, they are both imaginary worlds derived from our memories and other parts of our minds, and there may very well be contradiction between us. So we may establish modalities, and ways to cross reference between your world, my world, and numerous others, to produce "a model". This model which is produced is just another imaginary world though.

You say "The whole point of model-theoretic semantics is precisely not to replace the actual world, but to give us a rigorous way to talk about it", but that is not correct. It gives us a rigorous way to talk about our experiences, compare them, apply logic, and seek consistencies and inconsistencies. It does not give us a way to talk about the actual world, nor do the principles of modal logic claim we talk about the actual world. That's why it leads to ontologies like model-dependent realism. It provides principles to talk about possible worlds, and produce conclusions concerning these possible worlds, and then we might stipulate some principles whereby we'd choose the best possible world (the one we think could qualify as the actual world), but it is not working with descriptions of the actual world. Nor does it claim to be. It cannot, or the possible worlds structure would be negated.

Notice the inversion. Modal logic does not provide a way to talk about the actual world. It provides a way to talk about possible worlds. Then, through principles, and logical proceedings, it stipulates "the actual world". So instead of the classic approach, talking about the actual world (propositions judged for truth and falsity), and proceeding logically from there to determine what is possible within that actual world, modal logic talks about possible worlds, and proceeds to make a logical determination about the actual world. That is not a matter of giving us a rigorous way to talk about the actual world. It is a way to make logical conclusions about the actual world. The descriptions, therefore what we are talking about is possible worlds, not the actual world. Therefore, a rigorous way to talk about the actual world is what is really missing here.

Can you explain how you think it isn't? — Banno

I did that already.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1027665

Truth is determined by the model,, The model is a product, imaginary. Unless you are assuming something like model-dependent realism, (which isn't actually realism, it just has that word in the name), there is no place for a real, independent world.

Here you go: Boxes and Diamonds: An Open Introduction To Modal Logic. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 cover truth at a world and truth as a model. There's a couple of sections on accessibility relations, but you might find 15.5, "Accessibility Relations and Epistemic Principles", most useful. — Banno

OK, so truth is defined as within the model, so we haven't gotten to anything to support the assumption of a real, or actual world, or truth by correspondence to the actual world. How do you claim to be realist if you believe in the principles of modal logic? How do you assume to make modal logic consistent with realism?