The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.[C]omposed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete. — Bob Ross
Depending on your conception regarding spacetime realism/anti-realism that would then make the argument dependent on spacetime realism or a form of platonic relationism so that these 'spatiotemporal' properties are 'things' that are ontologically real 'parts' of them. Not mere linguistic devices or fictions.The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time. — Bob Ross
Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self.
Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?
Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises.
How does part composition relate to power?
What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else?
Corollary point: how can a being be both? If God is omnipotent, he can do anything. If omnibenevolent, then ony good things. And then, of course, since God is absolute, what exactly is an absolutely good thing - are not good things good with respect to something?
The point is the proof of the OP is just an exercise in word games which only works if the required understandings are already in place and accepted, I.e., presupposed.
Even going back to the first premise, how can I be composite? I am identical with myself: if of parts, then wherein do I exist? And if a part removed, then no longer myself but someone/thing different
I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.
The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.
A Third Option – in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale – that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe – its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" – happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.
My body, sure, although any designation of parts is arbitrary. But I am not. Near as I can tell, I is a non-composite entity not mad of parts. I guess that makes me God, and it would seem I have a lot of company.Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts. — Bob Ross
Yes, they are separated by something that isn't stuff. It's not-stuff. It's the void. It's an old and well respected idea because the only response to it is to balloon ones ontology by adding in 'space' which is as metaphysical as platonic entities or insert matter between the matter we can see which may be entirely undetectable/unknowable.That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void). — Bob Ross
I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy? — Bob Ross
What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves. — Bob Ross
Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and “sew it back to together”, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frog’s pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again….no? — Bob Ross
What’s the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesn’t account for a soul? — Bob Ross
That’s true, but I say that because Aristotle’s proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of ‘kalam cosmological argument’ where this being starts everything off moving.
By ‘motion’, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. That’s the only reason, e.g., Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Proof” gets off the ground in the first place. — Bob Ross
Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.
Well it’s not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesn’t “account for” a soul.
Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?
What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, “Things are in motion,” and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently “remain the same through time.”
This seems to be equivalent to argument I've made that there must be a "bottom layer" of reality, This is called metaphysical foundationalism. I agree with it, but...[6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3) — Bob Ross
This is problematic. A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts. — Bob Ross
non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist
This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other. — Bob Ross
knowledge = organized data;
data entails encoding;
encoding entails parts;
Therefore omniscience would entail parts.
A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.
non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:
This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).
It seems however to depend on your metaphysics regarding spacetime, the substantivalism/relationism discussion, as well as the ontological nature of properties so let us discuss that as it seems significant.I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition. — Bob Ross
So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation. — Bob Ross
More circular reasoning.So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other — Bob Ross
I'm referring to identical intrinsic properties. Example: the elementary particles. Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct! — Bob Ross
So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).
I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition. — Bob Ross
Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. — Bob Ross
Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?
That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no? — Bob Ross
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself. — Bob Ross
Sorry, missed this reply initially.
Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.
True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space
Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists
I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.
So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.
More circular reasoning.
Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.
So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.
Here's what I inferred to be your reasoning:Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical? — Bob Ross
You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain. Deliberation entails access to memories which are stored in the brain (possibly in the form of action potentials of neurons). A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would. — Bob Ross
No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations). Perhaps that's inconsistent with your ontology, but that's my point: your argument depends on some specific assumptions about ontology.This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross
Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location. It's persisting identity is uniquely identified by it's location in space across each point of time. (Locations in space are relative, but in this case, we can consider it relative to itself).then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple. — Bob Ross
Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.I understand they say quarks have no parts in science — Bob Ross
Ed Feser was also an atheist, and he says he converted because Thomist metaphsyics "made sense" to him. I've read a couple of his books, and these suggest that he just thinks Thomism is coherent and answers the questions he felt important. I haven't seen him make a case for Thomism vs (say) metaphysical naturalism (his polemical attack on "new atheists" is irrelevant).I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here — Bob Ross
. . . but the notions of space and time factor into the identity of things and whether the notion of a 'part' is even coherent at all may depend entirely on the definitions one gives to space or to time.Like I said before, the argument is on ontological parts. That could be in time and space or not; it doesn't matter to me. Some of the OP would have to be adjusted though, but I think most people are realists about space and time (so I'll leave it how it is). — Bob Ross
What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case. — Bob Ross
Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here? — Bob Ross
The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that? — Bob Ross
So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. — Bob Ross
I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly). — Bob Ross
Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15. — Bob Ross
Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]). — Bob Ross
But you feel them in space.
The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another
Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things.
or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.
A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist
Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality.
We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space. — Bob Ross
Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch. — Bob Ross
Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross
Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true. — Bob Ross
If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). — Bob Ross
1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts
You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain
A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.
I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple")
You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.
To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.
No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations)
Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.
Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.
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