• 180 Proof
    15.6k
    [C]omposed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete.Bob Ross
    The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.

    Also, Bob, you (Aristotleans, Thomists & premodern / pseudo-science idealists) assert a false dichotomy: A Third Option – in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale – that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe – its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" – happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete [1]

    :smirk: kudos to classical atomists ...
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horror_vacui_(physics) [2]

    https://simple.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_epoch [3]
  • substantivalism
    311
    The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time.Bob Ross
    Depending on your conception regarding spacetime realism/anti-realism that would then make the argument dependent on spacetime realism or a form of platonic relationism so that these 'spatiotemporal' properties are 'things' that are ontologically real 'parts' of them. Not mere linguistic devices or fictions.

    A part of something should be a 'real' thing. Not a mere conventional or mental artefact.
  • Bob Ross
    2k
    Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self.

    The problem with your analysis of consciousness is that you are ignoring the phenomenal nature of it due to it being ontologically grounded in physical things. Hence why when I say a thought is non-spatiotemporal you respond noting that it is grounded in the brain.

    Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. If you deconstruct, e.g., my arm, then you will surely not find the phenomenal pain which I am describing there—you will find neurons and such.

    Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?

    That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no?

    Also, ‘zooming in/out’ is also an inherently spatial concept.

    Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises.

    That is true, it wasn’t meant to be.

    How does part composition relate to power?

    Let me outline a brief argument for 5: let’s call it A5. As always, by “composed being” I am meaning a “concretely composed being”.

    A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
    A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
    A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
    A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
    A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
    A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
    A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.

    What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else?

    Good question. For a thing to have the power to exist would be for it to be necessary—that is, not contingent on something else. For if it is contingent on something else, then it only exists insofar as it “borrows” being from that which it is contingent upon (insofar as we are talking about per se causation).
  • Bob Ross
    2k
    Corollary point: how can a being be both? If God is omnipotent, he can do anything. If omnibenevolent, then ony good things. And then, of course, since God is absolute, what exactly is an absolutely good thing - are not good things good with respect to something?

    Did you read the OP? I feel like you didn’t read it; because I outlined exactly what I mean by omnipotence and omnibenevolence and they are perfectly compatible with each other.

    The point is the proof of the OP is just an exercise in word games which only works if the required understandings are already in place and accepted, I.e., presupposed.

    If the OP is word games, then every argument is a word game. This makes no sense.

    Even going back to the first premise, how can I be composite? I am identical with myself: if of parts, then wherein do I exist? And if a part removed, then no longer myself but someone/thing different

    Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts. If you disagree with this, then I can’t help you: it’s painfully obviously true.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.

    That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void).
  • Bob Ross
    2k
    The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.

    I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy?

    A Third Option – in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale – that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe – its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" – happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.

    I am not follow about this, but this sounds like it still has parts unless you are saying it literally remains existing by its smaller parts popping in and out of existence—is that the idea?
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts.Bob Ross
    My body, sure, although any designation of parts is arbitrary. But I am not. Near as I can tell, I is a non-composite entity not mad of parts. I guess that makes me God, and it would seem I have a lot of company.

    By "word game," I mean an exercise in manipulating words according to rules - whether good rules or bad - and taking whatever conclusions that result as being true in contexts outside of and beyond the scope of the argument. Or another way, of taking an application as a metaphor, but then insisting that the metaphor is real.

    ...
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I don't think the self is made up of concrete parts: I think it is an emergent property of processes of the brain. Unless you are positing some sort of absolutely simple soul, then I don't think this is any issue for the OP.
  • substantivalism
    311
    That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void).Bob Ross
    Yes, they are separated by something that isn't stuff. It's not-stuff. It's the void. It's an old and well respected idea because the only response to it is to balloon ones ontology by adding in 'space' which is as metaphysical as platonic entities or insert matter between the matter we can see which may be entirely undetectable/unknowable.

    A shadow is not a thing its the absence of stuff but its still an aspect nature that we can point out while also not declaring it as a new entity. Are a hole or shadow considered 'objects' in your world view?

    If they are then that makes your own viewpoint largely unintuitive when it comes to what people mean by a 'physical thing' and if they are not then its conceptually possible for there to be a significant ontological roles for the mere absence of things.
  • substantivalism
    311
    I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy?Bob Ross

    In asserting the above response to another poster you admitted to the coherence of the notion of God being 'non-spatiotemporal'. I.E. he exists in a fashion similar to other platonic abstractions which is without space as if those things are separated by NOTHING. Add in the ability for these abstractions to exert casual action-at-a-distance and you have atoms with the void.

    Extreme forms of eliminative relationism do something similar demanding that fundamentally if space isn't a thing then 'action-at-a-distance' interactions are needed and out of only observable travel times or delays of casual interaction can we say there is a 'distance'.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves.Bob Ross

    Yes, I can see how your OP could be read that way.

    Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and “sew it back to together”, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frog’s pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again….no?Bob Ross

    I don’t think so. Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.

    What’s the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesn’t account for a soul?Bob Ross

    Well it’s not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesn’t “account for” a soul.

    That’s true, but I say that because Aristotle’s proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of ‘kalam cosmological argument’ where this being starts everything off moving.

    By ‘motion’, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. That’s the only reason, e.g., Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Proof” gets off the ground in the first place.
    Bob Ross

    Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?

    What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, “Things are in motion,” and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently “remain the same through time.”
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.

    I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly).

    Well it’s not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesn’t “account for” a soul.

    Why would we need to posit one for this “reverse mereological essentialism”?

    Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?

    Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15.

    What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, “Things are in motion,” and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently “remain the same through time.”

    Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]).
  • 180 Proof
    15.6k
    I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy.Bob Ross
    :roll:
  • Relativist
    2.9k
    I'll give you a few objections:

    knowledge = organized data;
    data entails encoding;
    encoding entails parts;
    Therefore omniscience would entail parts.

    6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
    7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
    Bob Ross
    This seems to be equivalent to argument I've made that there must be a "bottom layer" of reality, This is called metaphysical foundationalism. I agree with it, but...[

    8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.Bob Ross
    This is problematic. A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.

    9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
    non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:

    10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
    11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist

    This next one is loaded with metaphysical assumptions that I see no reason to accept:
    12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.Bob Ross
    This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).

    Suppose the bottom layer of reality consists of electrons and protons (pretend they are both non-decomposible). Protons would interact with because they have opposite electric charges, and would interact with each other because they have the same charge. Such a scenario seems logically possible - and it's inconsistent with your framework.

    A bottom layer of reality seems likely to be quantum based, and I suspect Thomist metaphysics isn't compatible with QM.

    Thomist is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I appreciate your input, Relativist. Let’s see if we can find common ground.

    knowledge = organized data;
    data entails encoding;
    encoding entails parts;
    Therefore omniscience would entail parts.

    It is vital to understand that omniscience in the pre-medieval sense does not entail a being with knowledge like a person has: God is not a person. Omniscience, rather, in this classical sense, would be knowledge in the sense of apprehending the abstract forms of things (being its first cause). Now this doesn’t negate your point per se, but I do need to prefix my response with this.

    Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation. In fact, I think that you are right to conclude that a being which computes cannot be absolutely simple.

    A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.

    So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other. Pure goodness is the same thing as pure actuality; pure power is the same as pure actuality; and pure actuality is the same as pure willing; and pure willing is the same as volition in correspondence with knowledge.

    God doesn’t have multiple properties other than analogically.

    non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:

    But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct!

    This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).

    I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.
  • substantivalism
    311
    I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.Bob Ross
    It seems however to depend on your metaphysics regarding spacetime, the substantivalism/relationism discussion, as well as the ontological nature of properties so let us discuss that as it seems significant.

    Also, at least under the notion of mereological nihilism along with an extreme form of relationism you can get both fundamental relations which hold between matter particles, not individual properties but relations, and the claim that the notion of a composed being is. . . well. . . nonsense as atoms never compose anything. Its merely our linguistic and mental laziness that we appeal to ordinary language acts talking about 'objects' being composed by others. In fact, there are no such ordinary objects only the fundamental simples together with their external mutually dependent relations.
  • Relativist
    2.9k
    Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation.Bob Ross
    So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.


    So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each otherBob Ross
    More circular reasoning.

    But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct!Bob Ross
    I'm referring to identical intrinsic properties. Example: the elementary particles. Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.

    This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).

    I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.
    Bob Ross
    So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Sorry, missed this reply initially.

    Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space.Bob Ross

    Isn't it though? When I feel a pain in my arm, isn't it there? When I feel happy, doesn't it spread through my body? If I feel, I don't feel in the other room, I have feelings where I am. Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.

    Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?

    That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no?
    Bob Ross

    True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space. Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists. Maybe one does, but I can't see how we can logically prove it does and can be dismissed as a valid possibility.

    A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.Bob Ross

    I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Sorry, missed this reply initially.

    No worries, and sorry for the belated response on my end!

    Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.

    What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case.

    True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space

    Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here?

    Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists

    We have no solid evidence that a unicorn exists, but if we did then we would be justified in believing it. The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that?

    I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.

    So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. Why?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.

    Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical?

    Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would.

    More circular reasoning.

    You clearly don’t know what circular reasoning is…

    Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.

    This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. Ok. But then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple.

    Now, I understand they say quarks have no parts in science, but I don’t take that literally; as they used to say atoms were like that. Scientifically, we posit things as absolutely simple for the sake of science until we discover smaller parts. Philosophically, we can know that it is impossible for there to be a thing ontologically distinguishable from another thing which has no parts. That is absurd.

    So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.

    I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here. Every premise is pretty clear and follows from what has been said (albeit a psuedo-syllogism).
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Like I said before, the argument is on ontological parts. That could be in time and space or not; it doesn't matter to me. Some of the OP would have to be adjusted though, but I think most people are realists about space and time (so I'll leave it how it is).
  • Relativist
    2.9k
    Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical?Bob Ross
    Here's what I inferred to be your reasoning:

    1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
    2. God is simple;
    3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

    But you didn't explicitly make this argument, so I haven't been fair. Perhaps you can show it's very reasonable to assume knowledge does not entail parts. Please do so.

    Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would.Bob Ross
    You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain. Deliberation entails access to memories which are stored in the brain (possibly in the form of action potentials of neurons). A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.

    I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple") You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.

    So make an objective case for the claim that an object with seemingly multiple properties is actually an object with a single property in your ontology, and show that this is more reasonable than considering multiple properties to be distinct. To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.

    This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal.Bob Ross
    No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations). Perhaps that's inconsistent with your ontology, but that's my point: your argument depends on some specific assumptions about ontology.

    then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple.Bob Ross
    Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location. It's persisting identity is uniquely identified by it's location in space across each point of time. (Locations in space are relative, but in this case, we can consider it relative to itself).

    Regarding "being simple": I'm simply assuming they are not decomposible into other things. If you wish to equate undecomposible with "simple" - I have no objection.

    I understand they say quarks have no parts in scienceBob Ross
    Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.

    I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions hereBob Ross
    Ed Feser was also an atheist, and he says he converted because Thomist metaphsyics "made sense" to him. I've read a couple of his books, and these suggest that he just thinks Thomism is coherent and answers the questions he felt important. I haven't seen him make a case for Thomism vs (say) metaphysical naturalism (his polemical attack on "new atheists" is irrelevant).

    I've admitted that I've made assumptions. They're based on the assumptions I've seen others (including Feser) make when arguing for deism. In all my years debating arguments for deism with theists, I've found that 100% of the time, they depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions - so when I see a debatable metaphysical assumption, I shine a light on it. But I'll try to avoid jumping to conclusions with you, and give you the opportunity to make an objective case for each of the metaphysical assumptions I've identified so far.
  • substantivalism
    311
    Like I said before, the argument is on ontological parts. That could be in time and space or not; it doesn't matter to me. Some of the OP would have to be adjusted though, but I think most people are realists about space and time (so I'll leave it how it is).Bob Ross
    . . . but the notions of space and time factor into the identity of things and whether the notion of a 'part' is even coherent at all may depend entirely on the definitions one gives to space or to time.

    Further, the notions of part and whole are abstracted from things we acknowledge in no fashion are themselves part-less so the notion of a true 'whole' might not actually be coherent given there are no natural examples one could give it. Same as the notion of space or time which many rightfully acknowledge as mere idealizations. The notion of a part also presumes another thing that it is a part of which many positions also deny level by level such eliminative materialism or mereological nihilism.

    Why don't you give me an example of a REAL THING THAT IS A WHOLE without parts so I can then assess whether nature does or doesn't abhor it. Simple, we can solve this and move on.

    In fact, your arguments seem to be lacking phenomenological definitions or postulates regarding where we get these concepts or how they are formed. As well as further epistemological principles to motivate their coherency and what I presume is an unsupported un-naturalized form of metaphysics that you are indulging in.

    Finally, I feel you'd need to solve the problem of how one can make strong proclamations about a world merely from the arm-chair. Metaphysics as a discipline and its focus on certain methods from a-prior reasoning to thought experiments have gotten their own criticism extensively in recent times.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case.Bob Ross

    But you feel them in space. You feel them in a place. You might experience red, but that's due to the red wavelength of light being interpreted by your brain. Just because I can't open up the brain and see redness doesn't mean the objective form of redness doesn't exist through neurons. Same with feelings.

    Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here?Bob Ross

    The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another. To my mind I know no other definition.

    The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that?Bob Ross

    Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things. If you say the universe comes from a God, then in some way that God must have imparted upon space and time. To say it cannot have any space or time, then say it can interact with space and time, is either a contradiction, or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.

    So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible.Bob Ross

    No, something being necessary has to be clearly defined here. A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist. But that doesn't mean that it was necessary that A exist. Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality. Once you introduce the concept of something that can exist outside of causality, you introduce the fact that anything could have, or will, happen. That is because something outside of causality has no reason for its being, and no reason that it should not be either. Thus all things are equally possible.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly).Bob Ross

    Well, suppose life is just the result of an accidental collection, such that when the parts are in place there is life. So as an analogy, if my jigsaw puzzle is complete, then there is life. If I take away one piece or another, then there is not life. On this view life is somehow structural.

    For Aristotle you need more than just parts. You need a whole. And maybe "parts interacting with each other properly" is enough to represent that whole.

    Your engine counterargument is interesting, though. Certainly Aristotle would say that the car is an artificial whole, not a real or organic whole. What this means in part is that the parts are not just interacting with one another. They are interacting with a whole of which they are a part. This is why we say, "I see with my eyes. I walk with my legs. I punch with my fist. I think with my brain." The parts are relating to some whole that is employing them and on which they rely.

    Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15.Bob Ross

    :up:

    So it is something like the actualization involved in the normal force that upholds a desk on the floor, which is more than what we think of as change or motion. Gotcha, that makes sense.

    Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]).Bob Ross

    Okay, I have a better sense of what you are saying now.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    But you feel them in space.

    We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space.

    The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another

    Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch.

    Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things.

    Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. You just keep blanketly asserting it; and this sort of interaction does not imply physical touch (as seen above in my sun example).

    or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.

    This is a straw man. We have no evidence that a unicorn exists and it would blatantly defy physics: nothing about God is analogous to that.

    A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist

    Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true.

    Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality.

    I am glad you said this, because this was what I was going to point out in the other thread discussion we are having, as I wasn’t sure if you agreed or not. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space.Bob Ross

    If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space? When I prick my finger, I feel the pain locally to the wound, not in my foot. Its not some other dimension. The most simple way of understanding that is that pain is tied to places in time and space.

    Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch.Bob Ross

    Good point actually, I hadn't considered that! My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out. We still don't know how it all works though, so this is a pretty good approach to the idea of indirect touch. Still, gravity originates at a point in time and space, so we still don't have a good example of something outside of time and space.

    Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal.Bob Ross

    Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work? We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality. This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent. A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind. But its impossible to demonstrate it exists in reality, therefore its not a sound concept to use when talking about reality.

    The same with an entity that does not exist in time and space. If I were to say a unicorn uses its magic to keep the world rotating, this is again not necessarily incoherent, there's just no way to show this exists. The same with saying a being outside of time and space interacted with and created time and space. You've invented a being that cannot be shown to exist that did something which violated the currently known laws of time and space or 'magic'.

    Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true.Bob Ross

    True, but we're talking about causation. You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic. You haven't shown that A must necessarily exist for B to exist, so you need something more to show that A can exist and must exist.

    If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality).Bob Ross

    Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality. The issue here is not that the being you describe is impossible. The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being? At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B. This is of course if we're trying to prove that A is a necessary existence for B to be. If we're just saying, "Its an option", I have no qualm with this as anything imaginable and beyond could be an option.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I apologize for the belated response: I intended to respond earlier but got busy and forgot.

    1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
    2. God is simple;
    3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

    I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that.

    You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain

    That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.

    You seem to be doing a literal equivocation between the usages of these properties when the OP is outlining analogical equivocation—nothing more.

    A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.

    I was using it as an example of willing in a more primitive sense: the plant is willing—just not in the sense of willing like a human.

    I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple")

    That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise.

    You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.

    If the OP succeeds, then we know there is an absolutely simple being with these attributes (insofar as we analogize it); and so it follows that this being’s attributes must be literally identical. God cannot be said to “have omniscience” or “be omnipotent” but, rather, is omniscience or is omnipotence; for an absolutely simple being cannot have parts and to have literally separate properties is to imply a thing has parts—a simple being is one and the same with itself with no real distinctions.

    To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.

    I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple.

    No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations)

    Think about it: how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? That would imply that it has some property which is distinct from any others of that particular; and this implies it has parts (for no absolutely simple thing can have properties proper—since it is literally one thing with no distinctions). What I am trying to get you to see, is that this philosophically makes no sense even if we posit it for the sake of science—just as much as the square root of -1 is not a real number but we use it in math anyways.

    Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.

    That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts. Likewise, anything in space and time is infinitely divisible, which implies that all spatiotemporal things are made up of parts.

    Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (:

    Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.

    Sure, but we also thought atoms were absolutely simple and it was very attractive at the time. Science uses models to map reality—irregardless if the model is actually true.
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