That is because you fail to actually define 'spatial' or 'temporal' so that is part of the problem.Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. — Bob Ross
As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.Think about it: how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? That would imply that it has some property which is distinct from any others of that particular; and this implies it has parts (for no absolutely simple thing can have properties proper—since it is literally one thing with no distinctions). What I am trying to get you to see, is that this philosophically makes no sense even if we posit it for the sake of science—just as much as the square root of -1 is not a real number but we use it in math anyways. — Bob Ross
This is another thing lacking from your posts or the OP which is any clarification on the proper metaphysical/philosophical approach to using metaphor and analogy.That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.
You seem to be doing a literal equivocation between the usages of these properties when the OP is outlining analogical equivocation—nothing more. — Bob Ross
A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing.
In order to relate the contingent to the necessary the necessary must be part in a relation. This is the dialectic of the master and slave seen in Hegel. The master needs the recognition of the slave in order to be master, which reduces him to a slave of recognition itself.
If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space?
My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out.
Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work?
We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality.
This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent
A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind.
You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic.
Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality
The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being?
At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B
To say that the part is subordinate to the whole is to admit that the whole is real and independent of the parts; and I am not willing to accept that (I don’t think). It seems like, to me, parts make up wholes. — Bob Ross
There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists. To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to. It's irrelevant whether or not you agree there's circular reasoning involved; I'm just explaining why I said that.I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that. — Bob Ross
You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis. You're doing no more than asserting its logically possible that knowledge and will can exist without a physical medium. You need to show it's sufficiently plausible to remove it as a barrier to accepting the soundness of your argument.That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours. — Bob Ross
My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property. It seems like a logical contradiction, like saying "6=1", which would mean your argument is unsound. But even if you could show it's logically possible, but that still just makes your conclusion logically possible - no headway.That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise — Bob Ross
This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model. You have the burden of showing this is better ontological model than the one I'm most familiar with. And if you can't, then you need to accept that your argument is pointless - it does no more than show that God's existence is logically possible, which is exactly where we are without the argument.I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple. — Bob Ross
Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular: a quark, a galaxy, the universe, and even the totality of existence. Anything we can point to, or assign a label to, is a particular. But I'm not debating who's metaphysical theory is better (although I'd be willing to, in another thread). I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true- so for the argument to be compelling, you have the burden of showing your metaphysical system is likely to be true - at least the axioms you depend on in your argument. Again, if your many assumptions are only possible, then your argument is pointless.how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? — Bob Ross
It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.
That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts. — Bob Ross
Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed. I'm not the one claiming to prove something.Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (: — Bob Ross
That is because you fail to actually define 'spatial' or 'temporal' so that is part of the problem.
As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.
Philosophy is about extensive creativity and making stuff up without any requirement that it have anything to do with reality.
Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects — Relativist
There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.
To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to
1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts
You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.
The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible.
Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?
Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises
If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.
You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis.
This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model.
My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property.
Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular:
It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.
I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true
Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed
The typical purpose of an argument is to change minds. A good argument might lead to someone fully accepting the conclusion, but even if it just results pushing someone in that direction, you've succeeded in making headway that you could potentially amplify with more arguments.If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.
That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t. — Bob Ross
By presenting an argument, I will have assumed the burden of proof. You would, of course, reject premises that you disagree with, but you wouldn't have the burden to prove me wrong. I would have the burden to prove to you my premises are true.[regarding a hypothetical argument for physicalism]That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them. — Bob Ross
You're reversing the burden of proof. You have it because you presented an argument. I explained why I reject your premise, and your response was that it's possible.Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially: — Bob Ross
Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.
It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it. — Bob Ross
My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why. How is that a problem? You've given me no reason to think otherwise. You embraced the argument I created, suggesting to me that you choose to believe omniscience can be held by a simple being because you "know" God is omniscient and simple. I acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible. I have no burden to convince you of anything.The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; — Bob Ross
You presuppose a theistic metaphysics.my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part. — Bob Ross
It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts. It is metaphysically impossible if physicalism is true. To be metaphysically possible would require making some metaphysical assumption that simply ignores the intrinsic complexity of information- making the assumption far-fetched.You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.
It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things. — Bob Ross
I never suggested you were arguing for the possibility of God, but I'm pointing out that it only does that if it is sound: all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones. You can't show all the premises are necessarily true. A more realistic goal would be that you could make a compelling case for soundness by supporting each premise.First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before)....The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does exist — Bob Ross
Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! — Bob Ross
Per my metaphysical framework, all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. You have the burden of showing your metaphysical framework is correct, or at least showing it's better than mine. Coincidentally, I've outlined it on another forum. It's in 3 parts:I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist. — Bob Ross
I never said they could be identical. I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties. The properties that distinguish two electrons are their differing extrinsic properties, such as their location in space, bonds to other particles, etc.A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. — Bob Ross
I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true
Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary — Bob Ross
Could you not be so vague?They refer to extension and temporality respectively: they are pure intuitions—there is no way to define that properly, no different than defining the color blue. — Bob Ross
Its an opinion of mine, sure.This is a baseless assertion. — Bob Ross
Define wisdom. . .Philosophy is the objective study of wisdom. — Bob Ross
Do you not have such a purpose in mind?
…
If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.
You're reversing the burden of proof.
Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.
My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why
acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible.
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.
all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones
…
8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.
all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist.
I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties
I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it?
Blue is difficult to define. . . but it has to do with certain brain states, wavelengths of light, biological/physical interactions, consciousness, etc.
Define wisdom. . .
“Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.
Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.
Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).
This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.
I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.
To say more, the argument necessitates either A. a simple part, or B. something other than the parts that the composed composition is composed of that is itself simple. In that case, any composed composition having infinite parts would itself require something other than itself, or its parts, for its existence, namely God.
I understand what you are saying, and I see that the idea of knowledge being imparted to an absolutely simple being epistemically counts against the theory for you; but that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in. — Bob Ross
Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also possibly false. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. — Bob Ross
Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: — Bob Ross
It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are. — Bob Ross
So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.Relativist: "You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible".
It is right here:
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.
First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:
Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics — Bob Ross
I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in. — Bob Ross
Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. I already demonstrated this is false — Bob Ross
you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical
That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties
Which, again, makes them non-simple. — Bob Ross
A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible — Bob Ross
That wasn't a scientific definition of blue. I was just listing what things pop to mind and therefore are related to what people understand the concept of blue as related to it.A scientific definition of blueness is not a valid definition of blueness. I does not account for the phenomenal property of blue: see Mary’s room thought experiment. — Bob Ross
1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.
A composition dependence cannot go to infinity of its own power. — NotAristotle
matter has the potential to be divided endlessly — Gregory
Why must this prove that matter ends in a supernatural mind? — Gregory
Why is this the only explanation? Can calculus offer some light? Can modern physics? — Gregory
Also, how familiar are you with Kant's second Antimony? — Gregory
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