• JuanZu
    201


    HI,


    A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing.

    In this sense the simple thing becomes ontologically dependent on the parts and the whole. We must remember that we are speaking of parts and the whole. Therefore it can be said that a simple thing is contingent upon the whole of parts since otherwise we could not explain any mereological function of the simple thing.

    In order to relate the contingent to the necessary the necessary must be part in a relation. This is the dialectic of the master and slave seen in Hegel. The master needs the recognition of the slave in order to be master, which reduces him to a slave of recognition itself.
  • substantivalism
    311
    Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing.Bob Ross
    That is because you fail to actually define 'spatial' or 'temporal' so that is part of the problem.

    Think about it: how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? That would imply that it has some property which is distinct from any others of that particular; and this implies it has parts (for no absolutely simple thing can have properties proper—since it is literally one thing with no distinctions). What I am trying to get you to see, is that this philosophically makes no sense even if we posit it for the sake of science—just as much as the square root of -1 is not a real number but we use it in math anyways.Bob Ross
    As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.

    Philosophy is about extensive creativity and making stuff up without any requirement that it have anything to do with reality.

    This is why people have invented the notion of haecceitism contrary to your own personal feelings regarding it as unintuitive.

    That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.

    You seem to be doing a literal equivocation between the usages of these properties when the OP is outlining analogical equivocation—nothing more.
    Bob Ross
    This is another thing lacking from your posts or the OP which is any clarification on the proper metaphysical/philosophical approach to using metaphor and analogy.

    The ability to say that a thing has 'parts' or is a 'whole' only make sense relative to the experiences of things we have in declaring things from birth as 'made of parts' or as 'a continuum'. However, are we actually in fact stretching this experiential analogy too far?

    In fact, whenever I have said something is taken as a 'whole' or as a 'singular thing' I am in fact actually merely admitting my ignorance or mental inability to declare in clear terms all its parts. Not that it doesn't have any parts at all.

    WHOLE - defined as - as assertion meant to regard a multitude of things as a singular thing. Despite the fact that it isn't in fact a singular thing.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing.

    To say that the part is subordinate to the whole is to admit that the whole is real and independent of the parts; and I am not willing to accept that (I don’t think). It seems like, to me, parts make up wholes.

    In order to relate the contingent to the necessary the necessary must be part in a relation. This is the dialectic of the master and slave seen in Hegel. The master needs the recognition of the slave in order to be master, which reduces him to a slave of recognition itself.

    That’s different, I would say, because Hegel is talking about relations between two different beings (e.g., master and slave, individual and society, etc.) and NOT the composition of beings themselves. To say the whole influences the part is to accept some kind of realism about forms that I am now hesitant to admit.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space?

    No. Again, you cannot locate the pain in your finger in a literal sense. You are confusing the spatial reference in the phenomena of pain with the physical constitution of it.

    My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out.

    My point is just that interaction—causation—is not strictly about physical touch. E.g., convincing someone to do something with mere words, electromagnetism, etc.

    Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work?

    Of course not! It is impossible for humans to discuss in any substantive sense a thing which is non-spatiotemporal because we cognize in space and time. Also, it is worth nothing that if this OP succeeds, then this being—God—is uniquely in this position to create things from the standpoint of eternity….so asking for a different example is an impossible task.

    We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality.

    I provided a proof of the existence of such a being in the OP. What you are asking is for, beyond a proof of its existence, an complete understanding of its nature; and I don’t think that is possible.

    This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent

    Yes there is; but let’s assume you are right: the difference is that the OP demonstrates why God exists—it does not merely claim that the concept of God is internally coherent.

    A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind.

    This is just a straw man; for the OP gives an argument for how we can prove God exists from empirical data—so this is not analogous to an undetectable unicorn.

    You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic.

    No, the OP is saying that B is composed fundamentally by A; and A is such that it must be the ultimate cause of B existing. I am not claiming to know how A is able to subsistently keep things in existence nor how it creates them. I don’t know how anyone could know that.

    Again, you keep saying that any interaction between non-spatiotemporal and spatiotemporal things is ‘magic’ without any argumentation: you are just making an argument from ignorance. Likewise, I don’t believe you even believe this, because I think you would agree that physics has shown that space and time are not fundamental; so there must be things which are not in space and time which influences things within them.

    Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality

    Correct. So, going back to your OP, it cannot be that this is the same as an infinite series of causality which has no cause: that series having no cause cannot be equivocated with a first cause to a series (which is outside of it).

    The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being?

    A reconcilation implies that there is an incoherence, and you still haven’t demonstrated any incoherence. You keep blanketly asserting that ~”I don’t see how it could happen, therefore magic” or ~”I don’t think any of us knows how that works, so it must be impossible or incoherent”.

    At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B

    A causing B does not entail that A is caused; so there’s nothing incoherent going on here. A necessary being causing something contingent does not entail that it is contingent on that contingent thing.
  • JuanZu
    201
    To say that the part is subordinate to the whole is to admit that the whole is real and independent of the parts; and I am not willing to accept that (I don’t think). It seems like, to me, parts make up wholes.Bob Ross

    That is something that does not follow from what I have said. I have said that a simple thing must subordinate itself to the whole in order to acquire its mereological function as a constituent simple thing. Which is obvious because something is not constituent of a whole before the creation of the whole: a piece of rock, the simplest and most indivisible, does not form a whole until it is related to other pieces of rock and forms a satellite. This makes the simple thing contingent on the whole and the relations in which it participates.

    My argument debates the necessity, constitutive and superior level/role of simple and indivisible things. I show that, paradoxically, the simple and indivisible thing must subordinate itself to the whole (being contingent) in order to express its higher level with respect to other (lower order) things.

    In other words: How does god relate to the world if it is only by forming a whole with the world (pantheism)? An absolutely simple thing cannot enter into relation with the world, because it would be, so to speak, too pure to subordinate itself to a relation that assigns to it its constituent function (superior level of thing) . Just as in Hegel the master must subordinate himself to the relation and to the slave in order to show his superiority, wich means the Master is not a pure and absolute Master.
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that.Bob Ross
    There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists. To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to. It's irrelevant whether or not you agree there's circular reasoning involved; I'm just explaining why I said that.

    You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity. This points to the fundamental problem with your argument.

    Any reasonable person should agree that God's existence (and omniscience) is logically possible, without needing your argument to show that. The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible. Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?

    Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises. In particular, you'd need to show that all your premises are sufficiently probable that the conclusion (God exists) gains some warrant (i.e. more justified; gaining some epistemic probability) beyond being merely possible. If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

    That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.Bob Ross
    You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis. You're doing no more than asserting its logically possible that knowledge and will can exist without a physical medium. You need to show it's sufficiently plausible to remove it as a barrier to accepting the soundness of your argument.

    That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premiseBob Ross
    My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property. It seems like a logical contradiction, like saying "6=1", which would mean your argument is unsound. But even if you could show it's logically possible, but that still just makes your conclusion logically possible - no headway.

    I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple.Bob Ross
    This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model. You have the burden of showing this is better ontological model than the one I'm most familiar with. And if you can't, then you need to accept that your argument is pointless - it does no more than show that God's existence is logically possible, which is exactly where we are without the argument.

    how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular?Bob Ross
    Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular: a quark, a galaxy, the universe, and even the totality of existence. Anything we can point to, or assign a label to, is a particular. But I'm not debating who's metaphysical theory is better (although I'd be willing to, in another thread). I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true- so for the argument to be compelling, you have the burden of showing your metaphysical system is likely to be true - at least the axioms you depend on in your argument. Again, if your many assumptions are only possible, then your argument is pointless.

    Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.

    That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts.
    Bob Ross
    It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.

    Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (:Bob Ross
    Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed. I'm not the one claiming to prove something.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    That is because you fail to actually define 'spatial' or 'temporal' so that is part of the problem.

    They refer to extension and temporality respectively: they are pure intuitions—there is no way to define that properly, no different than defining the color blue.

    As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.

    This is a baseless assertion.

    Philosophy is about extensive creativity and making stuff up without any requirement that it have anything to do with reality.

    Philosophy is the objective study of wisdom.
  • PoeticUniverse
    1.5k
    Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objectsRelativist

    Good one! For how could that negligible monad act like a mind?

    In succession due does the large give way and rule
    To the ever smaller, the tiny, the minuscule,
    And onto the insignificant ‘awol’
    Of not really much of anything there at all.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.

    It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it. You asked about how an absolutely simple being could have properties (like omniscience) which presupposes in the very question that we are talking about such a being.

    To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to

    The argument I was commenting on was your argument, which was:

    1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
    2. God is simple;
    3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

    This argument you gave is not circular: it does not presuppose the conclusion in any of its premises. Likewise, my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part.

    You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.

    It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things.

    The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; and that requires that you demonstrate why it violates one of these three aforesaid modalities (or pick your own modality if you will).

    The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible.

    First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before).

    The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does exist.

    Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?

    That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them.

    In this OP, it is demonstrated that it is possible for a being to not have parts and have knowledge only insofar as it was demonstrated that an absolutely simple being exists and that it must apprehend the forms of things (in abstracta).

    Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially:

    P1. If every example we have of A requires B, then A always requires B.
    P2. Every example we have of a being with knowledge has parts (which facilitate its capacity to know).
    C: Therefore, A being with knowledge must have parts.

    I deny P1. Impossibility—in whichever modality we are referring to—is demonstrated by showing that the existence of the thing would entail a violation of that mode (e.g., it is actually impossible to jump to the moon from earth because it violates physics, it is logically impossible for a proposition to be both true and false because it violates the LNC, etc.). That we don’t have any other examples of a thing, does not entail that it is impossible for it to exist.

    This is also a cop-out, because this absolutely simple being is unique: so there literally can’t be other examples!

    Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises

    Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! Your critiques have not been about any of my premises: you are noting that you believe we have separate good reasons to believe something that is incompatible with the conclusion of the OP.

    If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

    That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t. To say it is possible that the premise is true is trivial to most arguments: that just means it is a proposition.

    You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis.

    I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist.

    This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model.

    What premise do you deny in the OP? The argument is pretty clear.

    My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property.

    Ah, yes, I have not; because they aren’t multiple properties and I have been focusing on getting you to see the issues with your critiques before trying to explain in detail how these analogical properties of God’s are identical with himself. I’ll do that once we find common ground with the above.

    Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular:

    A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. A part that is identical to the whole is not a part: it is just the itself.

    It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.

    That’s fine, as long as you explain what you mean by your terminology.

    I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true

    Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary.

    Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed

    Ehhh, it might be logically possible; but it is definitely not actually possible.
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    I'm starting with this point, because it has bearing on whether or not this discussion is worthwhile:

    If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

    That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t.
    Bob Ross
    The typical purpose of an argument is to change minds. A good argument might lead to someone fully accepting the conclusion, but even if it just results pushing someone in that direction, you've succeeded in making headway that you could potentially amplify with more arguments.

    Do you not have such a purpose in mind? If not, why did you bother? I'll address your other issues under the assumption you are hoping to have some success, but if this is incorrect - we won't need to go much further.

    [regarding a hypothetical argument for physicalism]That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them.Bob Ross
    By presenting an argument, I will have assumed the burden of proof. You would, of course, reject premises that you disagree with, but you wouldn't have the burden to prove me wrong. I would have the burden to prove to you my premises are true.

    Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially:Bob Ross
    You're reversing the burden of proof. You have it because you presented an argument. I explained why I reject your premise, and your response was that it's possible.

    There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.

    It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it.
    Bob Ross
    Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.

    The problem is that you are saying it is impossible;Bob Ross
    My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why. How is that a problem? You've given me no reason to think otherwise. You embraced the argument I created, suggesting to me that you choose to believe omniscience can be held by a simple being because you "know" God is omniscient and simple. I acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible. I have no burden to convince you of anything.

    my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part.Bob Ross
    You presuppose a theistic metaphysics.

    You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.

    It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things.
    Bob Ross
    It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts. It is metaphysically impossible if physicalism is true. To be metaphysically possible would require making some metaphysical assumption that simply ignores the intrinsic complexity of information- making the assumption far-fetched.


    First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before)....The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does existBob Ross
    I never suggested you were arguing for the possibility of God, but I'm pointing out that it only does that if it is sound: all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones. You can't show all the premises are necessarily true. A more realistic goal would be that you could make a compelling case for soundness by supporting each premise.

    Give me the premise you are disagreeing with!Bob Ross

    8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
    39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.

    In short, I disagree with your entire metaphysical framework. I chose to focus on omniscience and simplicity because it was impractical to discuss everything.

    I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist.Bob Ross
    Per my metaphysical framework, all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. You have the burden of showing your metaphysical framework is correct, or at least showing it's better than mine. Coincidentally, I've outlined it on another forum. It's in 3 parts:

    https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-i-the-scientific-method/

    https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-2-a-naturalist-metaphysical-theory/

    https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-3-why-its-the-best-answer/

    A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical.Bob Ross
    I never said they could be identical. I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties. The properties that distinguish two electrons are their differing extrinsic properties, such as their location in space, bonds to other particles, etc.

    I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true

    Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary
    Bob Ross

    I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it? (This gets back to my first point of this post). The fundamental disagreement is the metaphysical framework. Everything else is entailment.
  • substantivalism
    311
    They refer to extension and temporality respectively: they are pure intuitions—there is no way to define that properly, no different than defining the color blue.Bob Ross
    Could you not be so vague?

    Blue is difficult to define. . . but it has to do with certain brain states, wavelengths of light, biological/physical interactions, consciousness, etc.

    Time and space are difficult to define because they overlap with numerous unrelated conceptual cousins that you may not be concerned with: Such as operational/instrumental definitions of spacetime, definitions from the phenomenology of experience, metaphysical definitions making use of a plethora of metaphors, physicist definitions of spacetime, casual theories of spacetime, other assortments of constructive definitions of spacetime, etc.

    The literature is deep but your response clearly was not. So try again.

    This is a baseless assertion.Bob Ross
    Its an opinion of mine, sure.

    Philosophy is the objective study of wisdom.Bob Ross
    Define wisdom. . .
  • NotAristotle
    396
    Excellent.

    My only quibble is to discard premise 6. I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.

    That is to say, physically, we may be constituted by an infinite series, but as you said, such a series cannot existon its own.
  • NotAristotle
    396
    To say more, the argument necessitates either A. a simple part, or B. something other than the parts that the composed composition is composed of that is itself simple. In that case, any composed composition having infinite parts would itself require something other than itself, or its parts, for its existence, namely God.
  • JuanZu
    201


    In my view the simple thing, at the end of the series of composition is contingent upon the whole in terms of ratio cognoscendi:

    "A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing."

    This means that retroactively the whole (the parts) explains the simple thing that composes it qua superior explainer. Which in turn makes the simple thing contingent to the whole.


    The counter-argument would be as follows


    1. The composite things (the whole) exist contingently to their parts in order to be explained.
    2. The simple thing at the end of the series of composition is, retroactively, contingent to the whole wich explains the cognoscendi superiority of the simple thing.
    3. God cannot be contingent on anything (the whole), therefore we cannot relate a simple thing in a chain of composition to God.
  • NotAristotle
    396
    I absolutely agree with what you said in the counterargument conclusion, #3. God cannot be a mere part within the created order.

    I think the original argument can be revised with some small adjustments so that the simple that the composed relies on is external to that composition and not a part of it.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Do you not have such a purpose in mind?

    If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

    My purpose is, indeed, to sway minds and to hear critiques of my position; but my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. Every premise of every argument that is a proposition is possible (in some mode of thought); and so this is trivially true.

    You're reversing the burden of proof.

    I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: like I said before, the OP demonstrates that knowledge must exist in something absolutely simple—not how that happens.

    Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.

    Yes, that is true; but that “God” being imported in was just the absolutely simple being I was referring to before.

    My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why

    That’s fine, and I think, for what it is worth, is a reasonable rejoinder. My point is that it sidesteps the discussion.

    Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are.

    acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible.

    It is right here:

    20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
    21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
    22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

    It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

    First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

    Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics.

    all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones

    8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
    39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.

    I understand what you are saying, and I see that the idea of knowledge being imparted to an absolutely simple being epistemically counts against the theory for you; but that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in.

    all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist.

    I already demonstrated this is false. This is non sequitur: you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical. Impossibility is a mode of thought whereby something violates some principle determinable relative to that mode. Lacking examples is not a violation of that mode.

    I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

    Which, again, makes them non-simple.

    I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it?

    Because that is nonsense. That could be posited for every argument for everything: do you say “why bother” for everything else?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Blue is difficult to define. . . but it has to do with certain brain states, wavelengths of light, biological/physical interactions, consciousness, etc.

    A scientific definition of blueness is not a valid definition of blueness. I does not account for the phenomenal property of blue: see Mary’s room thought experiment.

    Define wisdom. . .

    Here’s a quote of myself that elaborates on that:

    “Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.

    Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.

    Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).

    This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.

    I completely agree. I realized, after making this argument, that I am really just arguing:

    P1. Reality is either an infinite series of contingent beings or a series that contains at least one necessary being.
    P2. Reality as an infinite series of contingent beings cannot exist (for each member lacks the ability to subsistently exist).
    C: Therefore, reality must contain at least one necessary being.

    Then we can determine it is one, absolutely simple, purely actual, etc. in the same manner.

    I also realized that I am committed to the idea that there are infinite series’ of contingent beings because I believe that the representation of objects in space and time—by our brains—indicates (or at least suggests) that each object is infinitely divisible into smaller parts.

    To say more, the argument necessitates either A. a simple part, or B. something other than the parts that the composed composition is composed of that is itself simple. In that case, any composed composition having infinite parts would itself require something other than itself, or its parts, for its existence, namely God.

    Very true.
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    184
    I understand what you are saying, and I see that the idea of knowledge being imparted to an absolutely simple being epistemically counts against the theory for you; but that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in.Bob Ross

    Then dont put up such an asanine argument with so many obnoxiously annoying parts that you know is Bull...

    Fact is faith isn't knowing a damn thing about God's existence as real or false ... that's how it works -- let it go and focus your energy elsewhere. The only logic you need is "God is real." Anything less shows you doubt...
    The preoccupation with arguments for God only speaks to a lack of faith. Faith drives religion, not logic. And the benefits of faith are the biggest gains from religion, no? If you want to believe in God, do it, anyone who wants to stop you is just jealous you can achieve such a level of faith honestly.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    This response was merely a random rant that introduced nothing substantive into the conversation.
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense.Bob Ross
    Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also possibly false. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.

    Think more granularly than possible/impossible. Instead consider there's an epistemic probability (P) to any statement. It's subjective and somewhat vague, but it relates to levels of certainty.

    Each premise has a probability: pn is the probability of premise n. C = the conclusion, P(C) is the probability of the conclusion:

    P(C)=p1& p2 &p3 &...&pn
    Which implies:
    P(C)= p1*p2*p3...*pn

    Probabilities are <=1, so P(C) is <= the probability of each individual proposition..

    Where P(G) = the prior subjective epistemic probability of God's existence (i.e. prior to encountering your argument). You said your propose was to sway a person with your argument, so that means convincing him that P(C) > P(G). Your "burden" is to succeed at that.

    I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple:Bob Ross
    Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.

    Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are.Bob Ross
    It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.

    Relativist: "You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible".

    It is right here:

    20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
    21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
    22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

    It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

    First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

    Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics
    Bob Ross
    So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.

    Even if physicalism is false, my intuitions are grounded in what I know about the world- and that includes the intuition that knowledge =organized data, data is encoded, and this entails complexity. I judge it a small probability (<.1) that knowledge can exist without parts. Your defense is just an assertion that my intuitions don't apply because it's not physical. That seems equivalent to saying it's magical, and magic can account for anything. That has no effect on my judgement.

    You mentioned "simple data". The simplest data is a bit (value is 0 or 1). Knowing this would require at least one part: the bit. Conceivably, there could exist a being with 1 bit of knowledge. I don't see how a being could know the value without, in some sense, having this encoded as a bit of data.

    You asked: "what is complex data"? The data is propositions (more precisely: some metaphysical grounding for those propositions). You refer to each thing's "form", which strikes me as a lot of bits of information. The complexity comes from the logical relations within this information.

    that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in.Bob Ross
    I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).

    all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. I already demonstrated this is falseBob Ross
    Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).

    you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical

    Given my metaphysics, it is trivially metaphysically impossible. Here's a snippet of the theory that establishes what I said:

    Existence consists of the objects that exist, and the relations between them. I will use these terms interchangeably: object=thing=existent=particular=State of Affairs (SOA)

    “State of Affairs” is the most meaningful descriptor because it refers to the structure of objects/things/existents/particulars. A state of affairs has 3 types of constituents: a thin particular, it’s intrinsic properties, and it’s relations (AKA relational properties AKA extrinsic properties).

    Objects do not exist without properties, and properties do not exist unattached to objects. Properties exist in their instantiations. Example: the -1 electric charge exists as a property that all electrons have. The -1 electric charge does not exist independently. Now consider an electron: the ‘-1’ charge is intrinsic; any object that lacks a “-1 charge” is necessarily something other than an electron.


    You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model. But as you implied, there are no examples of such things. My theory is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to account for all uncontroversial facts, and does so parsimoniously. It's unparsimonious to add another sort of existent based solely on it being logically possible. Possibilities are endless.

    I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

    Which, again, makes them non-simple.
    Bob Ross
    That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    184
    This whole OP brings nothing substantive is the point.
  • NotAristotle
    396
    A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
    A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
    A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
    A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
    A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
    A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
    A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible
    Bob Ross


    Here is another way of arguing for premise 5 from the original argument:

    1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
    2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
    3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
    4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
    5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
    6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
    7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.

    A composition dependence cannot go to infinity of its own power.
  • substantivalism
    311
    A scientific definition of blueness is not a valid definition of blueness. I does not account for the phenomenal property of blue: see Mary’s room thought experiment.Bob Ross
    That wasn't a scientific definition of blue. I was just listing what things pop to mind and therefore are related to what people understand the concept of blue as related to it.

    Those have to serve as a part of the conceptual foundation of the concept of blue even if they do not exhaust it.

    THAT IS WHY I LISTED CONSCIOUSNESS after you all those SCARY science terms and left in the phrase ETC!

    It seems your philosophical views are clouding you judgements here.
  • Gregory
    4.8k
    1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
    2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
    3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
    4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
    5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
    6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
    7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.

    A composition dependence cannot go to infinity of its own power.
    NotAristotle

    I object that you are turning a mathematical question into ontology here
  • NotAristotle
    396
    Very well Gregory, then I object to your objection on the grounds that the mathematical question that my argument is accused of misrepresenting has not yet been stated. I contend that the existence of said mathematical question ought to be considered dubious in lieu of its actually being stated or of a proof of the existence of that mathematical question in place of an explicit statement of the purported question.
  • NotAristotle
    396
    I further suggest that any mathematical question may well be ontological already so that the expression of a mathematical matter in ontological terms is not of itself problematic.
  • Gregory
    4.8k


    Ok say matter has the potential to be divided endlessly. Why must this prove that matter ends in a supernatural mind? Why is this the only explanation? Can calculus offer some light? Can modern physics?
  • Gregory
    4.8k


    Also, how familiar are you with Kant's second Antimony?
  • NotAristotle
    396
    matter has the potential to be divided endlesslyGregory

    Perhaps.

    Why must this prove that matter ends in a supernatural mind?Gregory

    Whether matter is infinitely composite (and similarly whether or not it is infinitely divisible) or not, anything composite requires a composer. Maybe something composite could be composed by something else composite. However, all composites have to be grounded in something simple or else nothing would ever be composed.

    Why is this the only explanation? Can calculus offer some light? Can modern physics?Gregory

    If there is anything in the universe that everything else is composed by, I think we would all like to know about it, especially physicists.

    Also, how familiar are you with Kant's second Antimony?Gregory

    Kant's second antinomy has perplexed me before. I am now quite sure that there is no reason to think the thesis of that antinomy is true. On the other hand, the antithesis seems to also lack any basis (unless the notion of a "simple part" is problematic).
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