A Thomistic Argument For God's Existence From Composition

For one, there are just too many steps for them all to have any hope of withstanding scrutiny.

I second this observation. Think of it like this, Bob: your argument has 41 potential targets.

This is the most controversial part of the argument, IMHO.

None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism.

Bob Ross

↪hypericin

Two things might be indistinguishable in their parts, and yet be numerically distinct. We don't distinguish two identical marbles by their parts, but by their distinct bodies occupying distinct spatial locations.

The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time.

Arcane Sandwich

None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism. — Bob Ross

They are recommendations. They are not intended as arguments, nor as rejoinders, nor as valid criticism. They are intended as helpful commentary, nothing more.

Bob Ross

But this is not a real argument.

:up:

The argument is reminiscent of classical theism, but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive. Where did you find this?

So it is an argument for classical theism—as opposed to theistic personalism—and I created it myself based off of various neo-Aristotelian arguments for a pure, unactualized actualizer. The three main one’s I read were Aristotle’s argument from motion, Acquinas’ argument from essences, and Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Argument”.

With respect to the first and third, I think the way Aristotle uses ‘motion’ is counter-intuitive now; so I didn’t want to word it that way.

With respect to the second, the essence vs. esse distinction works but I think it harder to explain to people.

This probably requires defense. It looks like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which Aristotle and Aquinas disagreed with (but others, such as Bonaventure or now William Lane Craig, uphold). I forget the common scholarly name, but it is the question of an infinite series of contingent beings ordered per accidens.

So, in the OP, I am referring to the composition of a being and not a temporal succession of causes; so it would be a per se series according to Aquinas because without the part you cannot have the whole: this is not like begetting children, where without the father the son can still beget children.

I can add in the concept of per se causal ordering into the OP if that helps clarify it.

The conclusion is too ambitious in my opinion:
…
but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive

But doesn’t it succeed in doing so? I get it is an informal pseudo-syllogism; but each point follows logically from the previous.

Bob Ross

Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument.

Arcane Sandwich

Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument. — Bob Ross

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack. It would also be easier for you to defend, and more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with, which is one of the reasons why your argument has 41 premises to begin with instead of simply 2.

Leontiskos

I created it myself — Bob Ross

Sorry, I thought you were just copying and pasting something you found elsewhere. I will look at it more closely given that you wrote it yourself. :blush:
(I thought you were pulling from elsewhere mainly because you said, "I am not entirely following the argument that God is all-loving...")

It's actually pretty creative, and I can see some of the things you are drawing from. I have never seen an argument phrased in quite this way. Interesting thread. I will respond again to the OP eventually.

---

Edit:

So, in the OP, I am referring to the composition of a being and not a temporal succession of causes — Bob Ross

So:

5. An infinite series of composed beings (viz., of parts which are also, in turn, composed) would not have the power to exist on their own. — Bob Ross

I am reading "infinite series of composed beings" as individual composed beings ordered in a series. That is, we can't just be referring to the composition of a being because we are talking about the way that multiple beings are related to one another in a series.

Going back to my suggestion that the premise requires defense, why should we accept it? What is the rationale?

Leontiskos

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack. It would also be easier for you to defend, and more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with, which is one of the reasons why your argument has 41 premises to begin with instead of simply 2. — Arcane Sandwich

But what is easy is not always good. I think the forum could use less easy. Three-premise arguments are almost necessarily superficial, especially in the context of an OP.

Arcane Sandwich

But what is easy is not always good. — Leontiskos

I agree, which is why I said this:

if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism (...) It would also be (...) more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with — Arcane Sandwich

A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take. In that sense, it would do Bob Ross much good if he could attempt to construct a simpler argument. Because simplicity, in this case, is more difficult to achieve than complexity. Hence, it is better for him. At least, that is my reasoning here.

Leontiskos

- That's an understandable argument. :up:

Arcane Sandwich

If I were to phrase my argument differently, I would ask @Bob Ross the following questions: do you really need 40 odd premises to begin with? It's not possible to simplify this argument of yours? Everything about it is essential? It seems to me (though I could be wrong, sure) that the argument can be "trimmed down", so to speak, so that only what is essential remains. In other words, remove all of the "accidental stuff" that the argument has. Why is it even there? It doesn't add any aesthetic quality to the argument. In fact, I would argue that it makes it uglier in some sense. Or, stated differently: An argument that has 40 or so premises is not elegant. Of course, this doesn't mean that the argument should be rejected, since it's not valid to reject an argument on aesthetic grounds alone. However, this does not mean that aesthetics must be thrown in the philosophical trash bin just because "aesthetics don't really add or subtract anything from an argument". Ok, if that last part is true, then I would kindly request that we now speak in the language of First-Order Predicate Logic. But no one cares to do that, so, let's not.

Leontiskos

- I can sort of make your argument work, but most people who are not familiar with the metaphysical background are going to have questions in many different places.

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts. — Bob Ross

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

180 Proof

5. An infinite series of composed beings (viz., of parts which are also, in turn, composed) would not have the power to exist on their own. — Bob Ross

Why not?

6. ~~Therefore~~, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.

This statement does not follow (e.g. numbers are infinite and each is an infinite composite). Besides, classical atomists argue otherwise.

7. ~~Therefore~~, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts ~~as its first cause~~. (6 & 3)

"Cause" here is undefined, which invalidates this premise; but even so, this idea corresponds in conception to atoms in void.

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.

i.e. Democritus' void.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.

Insofar as "two beings" lack identical properties and/or relationships, and if by "exist" what's meant is .. spatiotemporal, then such non-identical "beings" – even if both "lack parts" they do not occupy the same positions simultaneously in space and time – necessarily "exist separately".

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).

This statement does not make sense since there are "two" which implies differentiation by more than just internal composition. "Parts" (i.e. internal compositions) are a necessary but not sufficient condition either for describing or of existing (see my reply to #9 above).

11. ~~Therefore~~, only one purely simple being can exist.

This statement does not follow (see my reply to #10 above).

42. ~~Therefore~~, God exists.

Caveat: though I've not bothered to read past premise #11, it is abundantly clear to me, Bob, that the conclusion presented here in #42 does not follow from undefined, incoherent or false premises (e.g.) #5, 6, 10 & 11 above.

:up: :up:

Arcane Sandwich

if anyone understands the Thomistic argument for that part I would much appreciate an explanation — Bob Ross

Bob, I say this with no disrespect, I don't even understand what's Thomistic about your argument to begin with. Thomas Aquinas famously stated five arguments, also known as five ways, for one to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. He did not resort to 40 or so premises in any of the five proofs that he gave. That, is the essence of Thomism, as far as I'm concerned. And even if it isn't, what is it about your argument that can be characterized as "Thomistic"?

Bob Ross

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack.

If it were a proper syllogism, then it would be utterly superficial and meaningless for an OP.

A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take

No it isn’t. It is much easier to formulate two premises that necessitate a conclusion than to provide a substantive argument for something. A proper syllogism is vague and usually frail.

I could see your point if you wanted it trimmed down to like 10 or something; but 2 is over-simplification. In this case, I went with just enough premises for a laymen to follow the argument.

do you really need 40 odd premises to begin with?

Yes.

It's not possible to simplify this argument of yours?

If you don’t think some of the premises are necessary, then I am all ears to hearing which ones and why. So far you are just saying “well, it seems like 41 is a lot”. Again, keep in mind that this OP is meant to outline robustly each step to getting to God’s existence.

Thomas Aquinas famously stated five arguments, also known as five ways, for one to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. He did not resort to 40 or so premises in any of the five proofs that he gave.

First of all, none of the five ways in their common form try to prove all of God’s attributes: this one is supposed to and given that Thomas needs about 10 premises for each of the five ways just to prove one aspect of God, I think 41 is pretty short for proving all of them.

what is it about your argument that can be characterized as "Thomistic"?

It is literally his argument from essence vs. esse and his conclusions about God’s attributes that can be deduced from Him being absolutely simple. Aquina's didn't just argue for God's existence with the five ways: those were more of a cheat sheet for laymen.

Arcane Sandwich

Aquina's didn't just argue for God's existence with the five ways: those were more of a cheat sheet for laymen. — Bob Ross

And how are we, here, different from laymen? One does not cease to be a layman when one philosophizes, as much as one would like to believe the contrary.

Bob Ross

Sorry, I thought you were just copying and pasting something you found elsewhere. I will look at it more closely given that you wrote it yourself. :blush:

Thank you, I appreciate that :smile:

I know you know more about Thomism and Aristotelianism than I do; so your input is much appreciated.

It's actually pretty creative, and I can see some of the things you are drawing from. I have never seen an argument phrased in quite this way. Interesting thread. I will respond again to the OP eventually.

Yeah, I wanted to write it in a way that made the most sense to me and was less entrenched in Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts. For example, change, as far as I understand, for Aristotle is any actualization of a potential and everything around us has passive potency; so a thing persisting as it were through time is considered change for him, which to the modern mind sounds bizarre.

Ed Feser still keeps in line with this tradition, and talks about the need for a cause for the, e.g., apple persisting as it were on the table (without being affected by other things); and from which he draws essentially from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover argument.

The closest to it I found, and which inspired the argument from composition over motion, was Aquinas’ argument that if all essences do not in-themselves necessitate esse than none of them could exist; and so there must be an essence which is identical to its existence—God. It makes more sense to me to formulate it in terms of ‘composed being’ than forms and matter.

I am reading "infinite series of composed beings" as individual composed beings ordered in a series. That is, we can't just be referring to the composition of a being because we are talking about the way that multiple beings are related to one another in a series.

I am not sure I followed this. The infinite series of composed beings I was referring to is an infinite regress of composition for any given, single, composed being. Sorry, I see how that might be confusing in the OP: I will rewrite that part.

Going back to my suggestion that the premise requires defense, why should we accept it? What is the rationale?

The idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

For Aquinas’ essence version, it is the idea that the essence of a thing normally does not imply its existence, and so the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. If there were an infinite per se series of composition of things sorts of essences, then none of them could exist; for they are all contingent. There would have to be some essence—which he argues is only one of this kind—where it just is identical to its existence (i.e., is a necessary being).

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

Arcane Sandwich

@Bob Ross why are you even advancing a new "Thomistic" argument, if Thomas Aquinas himself already advanced five? So what if they're meant for the layman. That doesn't mean that they're not valid or sound. And yeah, I say that as an atheist. So what? My atheism achieves a methodological goal that no theism can: I am entirely democratic towards religions, from a theological point of view.

PoeticUniverse

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings (viz., of parts which are also, in turn, composed) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.
13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.
14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13)
15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.
16. The purely actual being is eternal, because it is changeless and beyond time (as time’s subsistence of existence).
17. The effect must be some way in the cause.
18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts.
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being. — Bob Ross

We note the simpler and simpler, unto the suspected simplest; such as a quantum fields, figured as so by an estimated guess that proves to work: various waves put through a Fourier transform grants the quanta of the elementary 'particles'.

All forms, as temporaries, including composed beings, are inherent in the permanent purely simple and actual being as transient arrangements of it.

Good so far!

PoeticUniverse

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.
24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient.
25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will.
26. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must have a will. — Bob Ross

No 'mind' or 'will', for that would be a composite system that has memory, foresees, plans, designs, implements forms, etc.

Rather, it is energetic, and so stillness is impossible, and higher and higher forms come forth from the elementary 'particles', unto our complex minds that have doing - this at the opposite end of the spectrum, but not as the simplest. Higher being lies in the future.

The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being.

Wayfarer

The original text probably would have had ‘created’ where this text has ‘composed’, would it not? I think it reads more authentically:

1. Created beings are made up of parts.
2. A created being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a created being is either created or uncreated.
4. A part that is a created being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.

Etc.

Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the ‘creator-created’ distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument. But the metaphysical background is very different to today’s. It is set against the background of the Scala Naturae, the ‘great chain of being’, which recognises the distinction between creator and created, and various levels of created being, such as mineral, plant, animal, human, and angel (in ascending order). It also, and not coincidentally, was implemented in the hierarchical ecclesiastical and political order of medieval culture.

As naturalism rejects the created-creator distinction as a matter of principle, this style of argument is incommensurable with their basic premisses; there’s really nothing in the naturalist lexicon that maps against it notwithstanding the attempts to find equivalences between quantum fields and the divine intelligence.

In other words, It’s the kind of argument that will appeal to those with a predilection for it, and not at all to those who don’t.

As we see ;-)

Gregory

Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.
13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.
14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13)
15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.
16. The purely actual being is eternal, because it is changeless and beyond time (as time’s subsistence of existence).
17. The effect must be some way in the cause.
18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts.
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being.
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.
24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient.
25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will.
26. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must have a will.
27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is.
28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual.
29. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-good.
30. To will the good of another independently of one’s own good is love.
31. The purely simple and actual being wills the good of all composed beings by willing their existence.
32. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-loving.
33. Power is the ability to actualize potentials.
34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.
35. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipotent.
36. The existence of all composed things subsists through this purely simple and actual being.
37. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipresent.
38. A being which is absolutely simple, absolutely actual, eternal, immutable, all-loving, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-good, one, unique, and necessary just is God.
39. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is God.
40. The world we live in is made up of composed beings.
41. The composed beings must subsist through an absolutely simple and actual being.
42. Therefore, God exists. — Bob Ross

1) Composed beings are made up of parts."

No. They are the parts as whole

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement."

It doesn't rely on its parts, is IS all the parts as whole. You can think of a composite thing as a number with it's parts fractions. The sum is a convergence

3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed."

Of course, but this doesn't follow from 1) and 2)

4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement."

False. It is not separable like that from it parts

5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own."

Zeno?

6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.

Then show me something discrete

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)

So it must BE God?

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts."

And is nothing

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts."

False. They can be diiferent in identity. Why are you invoking Leibniz?

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none)."

Ok

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist."

False. See 9)

12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.

Why is God death the answer to divisibility?

13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.

Existence needs potency in order to be. Hence there can be incarnations?

18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts."

What do you mean by "in". This one is dubious

19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being."

Form and matter are the same thing seen from different angles

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

Who says he knows human qualia?

23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.'

Only if the world is infinite

24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient."

False

25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will."

True but what if there are infinite wills?

28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual."

No because before you tried to say God was simple because he is empty. Now your trying to sneak in the full part. Typical Thomism

29. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-good.
30. To will the good of another independently of one’s own good is love.
31. The purely simple and actual being wills the good of all composed beings by willing their existence."

Maybe he is only kind of good

34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.

But deism

42. Therefore, God exists."

False. Thomism is inferior philosophy

180 Proof

Higher being lies in the future.

The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being. — PoeticUniverse

:fire: À la natura naturans ...

That doesn't mean that they're not valid or sound. — Arcane Sandwich

Certainly, the Thomist "Five Proofs" are not sound.

34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.

But deism

42. Therefore, God exists."

False. Thomism is inferior philosophy — Gregory

:up: :up:

Arcane Sandwich

Certainly, the Thomist "Five Proofs" are not sound. — 180 Proof

Why not? What false premises do they contain, if they are not sound?

Gregory

Thomism doesn't establish a substance. Ok so some power holds the universe together. There is no proof of a God beyond in simple-state doing just this for us. It's like the form/matter distinction: good for praticing though, but not establising duality in a composite thing. Outside experience is a nonsensical hence there is no time for God to exist (see Hawking on this). Games about an accidental series vs a substantial one don't establish that what our senses consider nothing is the true reality

Gregory