I read your saying brain tells mind what to do. That sounded like your brain does everything, and even orders your mind to do all the things for you. Your point was not clear at all. — Corvus

Well, then allow me to clarify it to the best of my ability. Your brain is a res extensa and a res cogitans at the same time, to phrase it in Cartesian terms. The fatal flaw of Modern Philosophy ever since Descartes was to simply suppose, without further ado, that the mind is a res cogitans but not a res extensa, and that the brain is a res extensa but not a res cogitans. The brain is quite simply both. It is a physical thing that has an extension in space and a duration in time. It has a certain chemistry, it is connected with various chemical systems, and it is made up of specialized cells called "neurons", which fire off different signals, such that there is a series of events and processes that such object, -the brain-, is undergoing when it is engaged in any cognitive activity, including what you call "consciousness". I don't like the word "consciousness" myself, I prefer the word "awareness".

such that there is a series of events and processes that such object, -the brain-, is undergoing when it is engaged in any cognitive activity, including what you call "consciousness". I don't like the word "consciousness" myself, I prefer the word "awareness". — Arcane Sandwich

Sure, everyone knows that. But problem is what part of the chemistry and neurons in the brain represents your reasoning Socrates is mortal? and under what forms?

Sure, everyone knows that. But problem is what part of the chemistry and neurons in the brain represents your reasoning Socrates is mortal? and under what forms? — Corvus

You're asking a question that falls within the domain of one of the most cutting-edge sciences of today, cognitive neuroscience. I am not a neuroscientist. I cannot answer that question myself. And I'm not even sure that cognitive neuroscientists have figured that out yet, but there might be some promising research programs in that sense.

…..and then it joins a Forum. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know….it’s a bitch not being able to find any decent gymnasia these days.

Yeah, well, you know….it’s a bitch not being able to find any decent gymnasia these days. — Mww

Nah. Just join a book reading club or something, mate. Or play a tabletop game of some sort.

You're asking a question that falls within the domain of one of the most cutting-edge sciences of today, cognitive neuroscience. I am not a neuroscientist. I cannot answer that question myself. And I'm not even sure that cognitive neuroscientists have figured that out yet, but there might be some promising research programs in that sense. — Arcane Sandwich

Well, you posited brain as mind saying that brain tells your mind to do things, hence my point is that if you go to that direction, then that is what you are facing. As you say brain as a biological organ is for the neurology and biology, and their interest of the study is different from the philosophical point of view.

But Philosophy can still examine on all the subjects and topics under the sun, to investigate what they claim to be true is making sense from logical point of view.

Other than that, I think Mapping the Medium‘s response is pretty good. — Wayfarer

Thank you. I seem to remember our own discussions from long ago as being quite fruitful. ... Funny, how some us old-timers circle back around and land here again after venturing out into the wilds to gather more for all of us to chew on.

Well, you posited brain as mind saying that brain tells your mind to do things — Corvus

No Corvus, brain does not tell mind what to do. Brain does mind. Brain undergoes a process, and that process is mind. And that is what my brain is telling your brain, right now. You are free to disbelieve it. But I am just as free to believe it. Right?

But Philosophy can still examine on all the subjects and topics under the sun, to investigate what they claim to be true is making sense from logical point of view. — Corvus

Yes. Exactly. That is what philosophy does. At least, that is how I practice it.

Not quite. The brain is not identical to the mind, and the mind cannot be reduced to the brain. The mind (as a series of events, and as a series of complex processes) is itself a series of events and processes that a living brain is undergoing. — Arcane Sandwich

When you claimed your mind is simply what you brain does. It was not clear. It sounded like,

1) Your mind is your brain, or
2) Your brain does something to the mind, or
3) Your brain tells your mind to do all the things, or
4) Your mind is simply what your brain does.
5) So you have your brain, and also the mind which sounded like the Cartesian dualist.
6) But then you say, your mind is your brain.

Anyhow, you brought in brain into the discussion, hence my point was we get very little philosophical juice out of brain, because it is not really the central topic of the subject, and also even in the neurology and neurocognitive science, the researches on the hard gap between mind and brain is ongoing without resolute answers yet. Recall what you said on your previous posts?

No Corvus, brain does not tell mind what to do. Brain does mind. Brain undergoes a process, and that process is mind. And that is what my brain is telling your brain, right now. You are free to disbelieve it. But I am just as free to believe it. Right? — Arcane Sandwich

Hmmm... but my mind is simply what my brain does, just as my digestion is simply what my gut does. Right? Or do you disagree? Feel free to disagree. — Arcane Sandwich

I am more interested in the discussions of perception, consciousness, reasoning, propositions, belief, truth and logical proof in philosophy. Not really into biology or neurology at all.

When you claimed your mind is simply what you brain does. It was not clear. It sounded like,

1) Your mind is your brain, or
2) Your brain does something to the mind, or
3) Your brain tells your mind to do all the things, or
4) Your mind is simply what your brain does.
5) So you have your brain, and also the mind which sounded like the Cartesian dualist.
6) But then you say, your mind is your brain. — Corvus

It's option (4). I am effectively saying that your mind is simply what your brain does, because the mind is a process (a neuro-cognitive process) that the brain undergoes.

I am more interested in the discussions of perception, consciousness, reasoning, propositions, belief, truth and logical proof in philosophy. Not really into biology or neurology at all. — Corvus

Fair enough. Is that what you would like to talk about? Explain your point of view to me, then, if that's what you would prefer to discuss.

It's option (4). I am effectively saying that your mind is simply what your brain does, because the mind is a process (a neuro-cognitive process) that the brain undergoes. — Arcane Sandwich

I am not sure if it is that simple. I also wonder if it would be much point to say mind is what brain does, when we don't know any details about the "does" part of brain. I mean when you say 2+2=4, what exactly is happening in the brain with which chemicals, which links to what cells.

Fair enough. Is that what you would like to talk about? Explain your point of view to me, then, if that's what you would prefer to discuss. — Arcane Sandwich

Those are just my main interests, but I would talk about anything if it is philosophical and interesting topic. Not limiting my self to just talk about certain topics at all.

But my point was that talking about brain as a biological or neurological point of view wouldn't get us very far trying to find out what mind is, and getting back to the OP - answering what the factual properties of a person are, and why the factual properties cannot be altered. Science will simply not be able to answer the questions.

we don't know any details about the "does" part of brain. I mean when you say 2+2=4, what exactly is happening in the brain with which chemicals, which links to what cells — Corvus

There's scientists working on those sorts of problems, that's all I can say about that, honestly. We don't know the exact, detailed mechanisms of such processes. But scientists do have more or less a general picture of what's going on. We know what parts of the brain are responsible for language, which parts are responsible for memory, which parts are responsible for feelings, etc.

getting back to the OP - answering what the factual properties of a person are, and why the factual properties cannot be altered. Science will simply not be able to answer the questions. — Corvus

I disagree, and not because I want to fight. I disagree here because I think that science does give the answers to those questions, but those answers are "unsatisfactory". As you correctly said, the reason why I have the factual properties that I have, is because of my two biological parents. That's the scientific explanation. But it's unsatisfactory. Why was I born in 1985 and not the Middle Ages, or the Future? It just makes no sense to me, from a First Person Perspective.

There's scientists working on those sorts of problems, that's all I can say about that, honestly. We don't know the exact, detailed mechanisms of such processes. But scientists do have more or less a general picture of what's going on. We know what parts of the brain are responsible for language, which parts are responsible for memory, which parts are responsible for feelings, etc. — Arcane Sandwich

That's interesting. If you would open a new OP for that topic, and analyse what the details of their findings are, I would be keen to read and jump in.

I disagree, and not because I want to fight. I disagree here because I think that science does give the answers to those questions, but those answers are "unsatisfactory". As you correctly said, the reason why I have the factual properties that I have, is because of my two biological parents. That's the scientific explanation. But it's unsatisfactory. Why was I born in 1985 and not the Middle Ages, or the Future? It just makes no sense to me, from a First Person Perspective. — Arcane Sandwich

If you are happy accepting the answer as the best answer available even if it is unsatisfactory, then I think we have arrived at somewhat meaningful point of the discussion. And I am happy with that.
But as all philosophical discussions has dialectical progress side, it might keep continuing for searching and finding better answers.

For your why question, you could ask first, why do you find the question compelling too i.e. what made you to ask the question first place. If you could answer that, and I am sure, only you could answer that question, then maybe it would help finding the answers for the other question? Just guessing. :)

That's interesting. If you would open a new OP for that topic, and analyse what the details of their findings are, I would be keen to read and jump in. — Corvus

Honestly, I don't want to monopolize the Main Page of the Forum. I already started three OP, and I'm actively discussing in about half a dozen or so. So, I'm reluctant to open a new OP, about anything. Besides, why not start that OP yourself? It might be better, since you can start it with your own question, and ask for the best answer to it. I can then contribute to the best of my ability.

For your why question, you could ask first, why do you find the question compelling too i.e. what made you to ask the question first place. — Corvus

A feeling of oddness, is what made me ask the question in the first place. It's just an odd thing to talk about, it's an odd thing to even think, and even more so it's very odd to become aware of it, to experience it "in the flesh", so to speak.

If you could answer that, and I am sure, only you could answer that question — Corvus

Science says that the answer is my parents. That's not enough for me. Again, I ask myself this question: why am I aware now, in the 21s Century? Why wasn't I aware in the Middle Ages? "Because I didn't exist in the Middle Ages", science will say. And science is right. But why? In principle, in theory, I could have been born in the Middle Ages. Science will say "no, because your parents were not born in the Middle Ages, they were born in the 20th Century". Right, but they could have been born in the past. Right? See where I'm getting at with this? There is a modal conflict here, there is a conflict of modalities. There are two modalities that are directly clashing with each other, and those modalities are: contingency, on the one hand, and necessity, on the other hand.

Honestly, I don't want to monopolize the Main Page of the Forum. I already started three OP, and I'm actively discussing in about half a dozen or so. So, I'm reluctant to open a new OP, about anything. Besides, why not start that OP yourself? It might be better, since you can start it with your own question, and ask for the best answer to it. I can then contribute to the best of my ability. — Arcane Sandwich

I am too lazy. :D

There are two modalities that are directly clashing with each other, and those modalities are: contingency, on the one hand, and necessity, on the other hand. — Arcane Sandwich

If you talk about modality, that's interesting.  I did some experiments with modal thinking before. I concluded that all modal thinking is only practical for the future applications in life.  Once the event has passed, and becomes past, modal thinking just becomes imagination.  Even if there were good conclusions from the modal thinking, it was only useful for the lessons for future applications or situations.

When we are all locked up and bound by space and time and heading forward to the future in a linear universe, doing anything about the past events is not an option.

What if thinking and stories are not meaningful for human lives once it has passed the event. Even God cannot intervene.

But modal thinking could be useful for perhaps the other applications such as planting trees, or cutting grass - what if an apple tree was planted instead of birch, what if grass was left uncut for the whole year?  It could be done in real life, and the result will be available in reality.

But why was I born in 1985 instead of 1700?  Why was I born in South America instead of Australia? These What-If, and Whys will never be altered no matter how you tried (for the reason you are a physically bound being into space and time, I have already told you), and the why questions could only be answered either by Science in the most commonsensical way, or by the religion in the esoteric way. These are some of the factual properties and events in the universe that the PSR doesn't apply by another principle.

That is just my opinion of course, which might be not true. Whatever the case, I think this is an interesting topic, and we could keep thinking on until the best answer was found and mutually agreed. I am sure someone in the forum will have more to contribute for coming up to better answers for your questions.

doing anything about the past events is not an option. — Corvus

Are scientists sure about this? Time travel is not possible at all? Like, imagine a professional physicist, who understands theoretical physics to the utmost degree. Time travel is not even possible at the level of theoretical physics? Maybe it would be technologically impossible to fabricate a time-travelling machine, but are we really sure that it's completely impossible from a theoretical standpoint?

Even God cannot intervene. — Corvus

But that's what I'm saying. God, if He (or She, or They, or whatever) existed, that (divine) Being could indeed intervene. Think of God like a character in a novel. God is not really a character, but the author. The author can do anything with the novel (with the fictional world that such a Being has authored). I don't believe in God though, I'm an atheist. But is there no scientific equivalent to the notion of "something", whatever that may be, that makes physical time-travel possible?

These What-If, and Whys will never be altered no matter how you tried — Corvus

And that means, technically, that they are necessary. But at the same time, since they could have been different, they are contingent. That's what I'm saying. And it's an odd thing to contemplate, from a philosophical POV.

These are some of the factual properties and events in the universe that the PSR doesn't apply by another principle. — Corvus

And that's the scary part. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, it seems to me (I could be wrong, though), is an "all or nothing" deal. Either it applies to everything, or it applies to nothing. It cannot apply to some things, but not to other things. That just makes no sense to me. It just strikes me as an odd thing to say, from an ontological POV.

Or can it (apply to some things but not to others)? What is your opinion on that?

Time travel is definitely possible, but only to the future, not the past.

I meant traveling to the past. It's not possible even at the level of theoretical physics?

I am not a theoretical physicist, but my understanding is that there is no "past" to travel to. That is, the concept of continuous time is an inaccurate lay person model.

I am not a theoretical physicist, but my understanding is that there is no "past" to travel to. That is, the concept of continuous time is an inaccurate lay person model. — LuckyR

But that's my point. How can there not be? A past, that is. There was a past just yesterday. It was December 29, of the year 2024. That's a fact. How can there not be continuous time? Today is December 30, of the year 2024. There's a continuum of time between those two days.

I don't even know what I'm saying at this point. Do I believe in time travel? I've no idea. It sounds like a purely Sci-Fi notion. Is it?

Indeed. I’ve discovered your site via your profile and will continue to delve ;-)

I’ve discovered your site via your profile and will continue to delve ;-) — Wayfarer

Thanks. I look forward to reading your contributions to threads here.

This OP seems littered with opaque concepts. Dare I say, I think you will find answers for yourself if you disambiguate your questions.

Why is my existence as a person (and as an "Aristotelian substance") characterized by the factual properties that I have, instead of other factual properties?
…
By the way, how would you even define the term “factual properties”?

If you want to be able to work through your thoughts here, then you will need to come up with a definition of what a “factual property” is itself. To me, it makes no sense (and no offense meant): a ‘factual property’ implies the possibility of a ‘non-factual property’. A non-factual property would just be any property, to wit, which a thing doesn’t have (viz., it is non-factually the case that a cat has laser beaming eyes); which would entail that a ‘factual property’ collapses into the normal meaning of a ‘property’ simpliciter….

If you are just asking why one is defined into terms of the properties they have instead of what they don’t, then it would be because, by my lights, a property that isn’t attributed to a thing cannot possibly be a part of its nature. E.g., that’s like saying a cat can be defined in terms of having laser beaming eyes while equally admitting that a cat does not need to have laser beaming eyes.

The other point worth mentioning, is that the essence, nature, and Telos of a thing are separate concepts; and depending on which one you mean by “characterized by”, the answer differs. E.g., I am characterized by having extreme introvertness, but this is not a part of my essence nor my Telos but is a part of my nature.

This is my "Love Letter" to Speculative Materialism, especially as developed by Quentin Meillassoux (particularly in his first book, After Finitude

I haven’t read that book, so if I am just completely missing the point of the OP then just ignore me (: .

The origin of the preceding question is the following one: It just feels odd (to my mind) to have no good reason, other than brute facts, to explain why I have the factual properties that I have had since birth, especially since I didn’t choose to be born

A brute fact is any statement about reality which agrees appropriately with reality (with respect to what it references) and itself has no sufficient reason for why it is the case. The fact that you were born, is not a brute fact: you were born because, e.g., your parents wanted a child, they had sex, etc. There’s is a sufficient reason (or are sufficient reasons) for why you were born, so it is not a brute fact.

You seem to think that biological facts, historical facts, etc. are brute facts when none of them are (although it is possible, technically, for one to be). The color of your skin, e.g., is not a brute fact: you have that color pigmentation because of the biological makeup you have—which provides the sufficient reasons for why you have it. There’s nothing brute about it.

all of the aforementioned brute facts are contingent

A brute fact cannot be contingent: that’s baked into the concept. If a fact is contingent, then it is contingent upon other reasons (and presumably other facts); and so it must have a sufficient explanation for why it is true—thusly it is not a brute truth.

A brute fact would, perhaps, be God’s existence; or the Universe’s existence; or a set of Platonic Forms; or a set of natural laws; etc.

If I am allowing myself some leniency in my interpretation of your OP, then I would say, and correct me if I am wrong, you are fundamentally questioning why your identity is shaped by the historical and biological context in and of which you live and are. The answer, to me, is simple: you cannot escape what you are. Nosce te ipsum is the beginning of wisdom for a reason...

This OP seems littered with opaque concepts. Dare I say, I think you will find answers for yourself if you disambiguate your questions. — Bob Ross

Hi @Bob Ross, thanks for joining the Thread that I started. Forgive me if I answer point-for-point, or tit-for-tat, in what follows. Try to read it like a Platonic dialogue, if you will.

If you want to be able to work through your thoughts here, then you will need to come up with a definition of what a “factual property” is itself. — Bob Ross

But that's not an easy thing to do. Really, honestly, I don't think it is.

To me, it makes no sense (and no offense meant): a ‘factual property’ implies the possibility of a ‘non-factual property’. — Bob Ross

You're quite right. It makes no sense to me either.

A non-factual property would just be any property, to wit, which a thing doesn’t have (viz., it is non-factually the case that a cat has laser beaming eyes); which would entail that a ‘factual property’ collapses into the normal meaning of a ‘property’ simpliciter…. — Bob Ross

Exactly, I'm with you, still.

If you are just asking why one is defined into terms of the properties they have instead of what they don’t, then it would be because, by my lights, a property that isn’t attributed to a thing cannot possibly be a part of its nature. E.g., that’s like saying a cat can be defined in terms of having laser beaming eyes while equally admitting that a cat does not need to have laser beaming eyes. — Bob Ross

Exactly. More or less, that would be one of the most solid counter-arguments, so far. No offense taken, by the way.

The other point worth mentioning, is that the essence, nature, and Telos of a thing are separate concepts; and depending on which one you mean by “characterized by”, the answer differs. E.g., I am characterized by having extreme introvertness, but this is not a part of my essence nor my Telos but is a part of my nature. — Bob Ross

Hmmm...

I haven’t read that book, so if I am just completely missing the point of the OP then just ignore me (: . — Bob Ross

No, I will not ignore you, I am speaking (unofficially, of course) for Speculative Materialism here, more or less as Quentin Meillassoux understands it. It's good that you stopped by. Let's continue.

A brute fact is any statement about reality which agrees appropriately with reality (with respect to what it references) and itself has no sufficient reason for why it is the case. — Bob Ross

This, this right here, is the deal breaker as far as I'm concerned. I don't think it's necessary to quote you any further (but I do wish to continue to engage in conversation with you on this point). Meillassoux says exactly what you just said there: that The Principle of Sufficient Reason is, at the very least, not universally applicable. But how could it not be? That just makes no sense to me. Or, take the other, more extreme claim (which is Meillassoux's very own personal claim) that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false, tout court. That, to me, is an insane thing to say, in addition to being false. I believe in the PSR. How could I not? I mean, if the PSR is false (let's suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that it is) does that mean that a squid can suddenly pop up into existence in my living room? I mean, if there is no reason for anything, then how could we rule out such insane-sounding possibilities?

This, this right here, is the deal breaker as far as I'm concerned

Well, I wasn’t commenting on which version, if any, of the PSR one should accept: I was noting that in the OP you referenced a plethora of facts which are not brute as if they are. This leaves me a bit confused, because you are now defending some (presumably strong) version of the PSR when in the OP you said many things are just brute facts (such as where you were born or your race). Perhaps that was just an outline of this “Speculative Materialism” that you don’t quite agree with but want to discuss.

Meillassoux says exactly what you just said there: that The Principle of Sufficient Reason is, at the very least, not universally applicable.

No, that is not what I was saying. I was saying two things with regard to brute facts:

1. The kinds of facts you spoke of (such as biological facts) are not brute facts, although you referenced them as such; and

2. Brute facts cannot be contingent.

Whether or not brute facts exist is a separate question, which I will go ahead and address since you brought it to our attention.

But how could it not be? That just makes no sense to me

If the PSR is not universally applicable, then there is at least one thing which has no reason for it being the way it is; and if the PSR is universally applicable, then every thing has a reason for the way it is.

It is important to understand, that this is tantamount to saying that a strong version of the PSR results in all entities, and there properties, being contingent (upon other entities and there properties); and a weak version allows for at least some entities which are necessary.

To answer your question, someone that believes in a weak version of the PSR and believes that there are brute facts fundamentally (ontologically) will say that something about the way reality is that is fundamental to it just is that way with no further explanation. This could be God; it could be some set of natural laws; some set of Platonic Forms; etc.

Let’s take God for example: if classical theism is correct, then God exists necessarily and has, therefore, always existed without any reason for why God exists. If there was a reason for God’s existence, then that would mean that something else is more fundamental than God—which undermines the whole idea that God is God in the first place. So if God exists, then God must be a necessary being; and so God’s existence is a brute fact.

Personally, I find essential equal credence in the idea that there are an infinite regress of ‘things’ just as much as there are fundamental, necessary ‘things’. I think reason makes us search for a reason for why everything is the way it is; and I have no clue why we should believe that it really is the case that everything is ‘causal’. What reasons do we have to believe that no where in the universe, or beyond the universe, there is something which exists without being caused by anything in any manner? We don’t; just as much as we don’t have any good reasons to believe they do exist.

I believe in the PSR. How could I not? I mean, if the PSR is false (let's suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that it is) does that mean that a squid can suddenly pop up into existence in my living room?

I think most people would agree that the Nature in which we live has shown herself to abide by the PSR, but more fundamentally we aren’t so sure. It’s not that a squid will pop into existence all of the sudden; but more about if there are any fundamental aspects to reality which just always have been. However, technically, what reasons do we have to believe that at the quantum level things don’t just pop into existence and back out for no reason at all?

I mean, if there is no reason for anything, then how could we rule out such insane-sounding possibilities?

One can reject that the PSR applies universally without accepting that the PSR doesn’t apply at all.

Well, I wasn’t commenting on which version, if any, of the PSR one should accept: I was noting that in the OP you referenced a plethora of facts which are not brute as if they are. This leaves me a bit confused, because you are now defending some (presumably strong) version of the PSR when in the OP you said many things are just brute facts (such as where you were born or your race). — Bob Ross

Exactly. In technical terms, I'm asking what is the relation of metaphysical grounding, here. What grounds the facts about, or of, my existence? For example, why was I born in 1985? "Because your parents had sex the year before, mate. Are you stupid or what?" Ok, so that fact (that I was born in 1985) is metaphysically grounded by another fact? Yes? no? Aristotle would say that my parents are my efficient cause. But efficient causes are contingent. And yet the fact that I was born in 1985 can't be changed. So it's not contingent, it's necessary. And this is where it gets odd, because you can more or less start to say whatever bullshit you feel like saying if some restrictions aren't placed here. Who puts those restrictions? The Principle of Sufficient Reason? How could it not? How can the PSR work for physics but not for cultural, moral matters? Do you see what I'm saying? And if there is no PSR at all, then what do we make of that? Again, can a squid, technically speaking, pop up into existence in my living room?

Are scientists sure about this? Time travel is not possible at all? Like, imagine a professional physicist, who understands theoretical physics to the utmost degree. Time travel is not even possible at the level of theoretical physics? Maybe it would be technologically impossible to fabricate a time-travelling machine, but are we really sure that it's completely impossible from a theoretical standpoint? — Arcane Sandwich

Time travel had been discussed before in the forum, but I am not sure what the conclusion or agreement on the topic was.  My thought was that time travel is not possible physically.  Theoretically anything is possible, but to prove it is meaningful you must prove it physically.  As far as I know, no time travel has ever been conducted physically since the beginning of the universe.  Hence my idea on it was,  inductively not a possible or feasible concept.

But more importantly, my stance is that time is an illusion i.e. it doesn't exist.  Time is like numbers. It is only in the mind of folks, not in the real world.  In the real world, there are only motions, and some motions are regular and constant like the sunrise and sunsets.  From the motions, folks made up the concept of time i.e. the calendar.   Outside of the earth in the other planets, the sunrise and sunsets motions have different intervals, hence they will have different length for 1 year, month, and hours, if any folks lived there.  

Out of the solar planetary space, in the other stars and galaxies, the sunrise and sunset motions won't be available, hence there is no such thing as time.

Therefore time doesn't exist.  Time is an illusion, hence it would be sound to conclude that you cannot travel in time.

But that's what I'm saying. God, if He (or She, or They, or whatever) existed, that (divine) Being could indeed intervene. Think of God like a character in a novel. God is not really a character, but the author. The author can do anything with the novel (with the fictional world that such a Being has authored). I don't believe in God though, I'm an atheist. But is there no scientific equivalent to the notion of "something", whatever that may be, that makes physical time-travel possible? — Arcane Sandwich

If God existed, why do you believe he/she must intervene? It is like saying, if God existed, he must make everyone on the planet, lottery jackpot winner. Why shouldn't? - Well why should he/she? But the point is that God may not exist. Even if he existed, there is no reason why God has to intervene for anything. Especially if God existed, he would have known (being omniscient) time doesn't exist. He would know it would be a total waste of time even talking about time travel.

And that's the scary part. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, it seems to me (I could be wrong, though), is an "all or nothing" deal. Either it applies to everything, or it applies to nothing. It cannot apply to some things, but not to other things. That just makes no sense to me. It just strikes me as an odd thing to say, from an ontological POV.

Or can it (apply to some things but not to others)? What is your opinion on that? — Arcane Sandwich

The PSR is not something that comes with every event in the universe. That is what the PSR believers seem to believe, which is a groundless and irrational belief.

When events happen, folks would perceive them, and think about the reasons. That is how reasoning works. It is not the case that reasoning happens and then the corresponding events happen afterwards.

If we accept that, then you know that on some events in the universe, we know the reasons because we have enough data for the events for us to reason. But in some cases, there is no data available for us to reason such as the beginning of the universe, because no one was standing on the earth observing the event. But we see the universe existing solidly, and things happening in space. We infer on the beginning of the universe suggesting various theories, but none are concrete. We have many reasons for the universe's existence, but at the same time, none are definite reasons. We can only conclude that some events have no reasons.

Likewise why you were born in 1985 not 1700, has no reason apart from your parents having given birth to you at the year, which is just so obvious. If you accepted that answer, then maybe you were not seeking philosophical answers.

The squids might suddenly jump and dance in your room. You ask what is the reason for that? Under no circumstances would such an event happen unless someone secretly placed some lively caught squids from the sea, and placed them in your room while you were asleep. This event definitely has reasons, and can be verified by investigation. While the reasons for the beginning of the universe, and birth of you in 1985 cannot be found apart from the fact that some events have no compelling reasons.

What grounds the facts about, or of, my existence?

What you are.

For example, why was I born in 1985? "Because your parents had sex the year before, mate. Are you stupid or what?" Ok, so that fact (that I was born in 1985) is metaphysically grounded by another fact?

The fact and the explanation for why what factually happened happened are separate things.

The proposition “You were born in 1985” is true IFF you were born in 1985. That you were born in 1985, is what ontologically grounds the truth the statement “You were born in 1985”. The truth of the claim “You were born in 1985” is not relative to the facts which explain why it is the case. Either you were born then or you weren’t. Why you were born in 1985 is a separate question; and your parents having sex will, in part, be the explanation.

Aristotle would say that my parents are my efficient cause. But efficient causes are contingent. And yet the fact that I was born in 1985 can't be changed.

That’s because it is in the past: that has no bearing on the fact that your parents were the physical cause of your creation—nor that that fact is contingent on other facts (like them falling in love, etc.).

So it's not contingent, it's necessary.

What you are saying here, is that if a fact about the past cannot be changed then it isn’t a contingent fact: that doesn’t make sense.

It is true that “I stubbed my toe yesterday” and that that only happened because I was busy walking with my head glued to my phone and that I cannot change that it is true that “I stubbed my tow yesterday”, and yet your conclusion is false that me stubbing my toe was necessary—I could have not stubbed my toe if I wasn’t glued to my phone.

The more important issue, is that you are confusing necessary existence with brute existence. Some things could be necessarily the way they are but yet have an explanation for why they are the case; thereby being necessary but not brute.

E.g., if you deny the possibility that I could have done otherwise by not being glued to my phone, then it is necessarily the case, ceteris paribus, that I stubbed my toe (yesterday); but yet that is not a brute fact, because the sufficient explanation of why I stubbed my toe is still there: I was glued to my phone.

This is the opacity in your OP that I was alluding to earlier.

This is the opacity in your OP that I was alluding to earlier. — Bob Ross

Sure, and it's a great observation. I agree with you. But allow me to make a methodological claim, to see if you agree or not. Think of opaqueness or opacity from artistic POV, if that makes any sense. Imagine that an opaque OP is comparable, metaphorically speaking, to a sketch. The discussion that follows, in the series of posts, is an attempt to clarify and correct the opaqueness of the OP. We add some things, we erase others, we reformulate what needs to be reformulated. We then add some tonality, like dark grays and light grays in the case of an illustration, and finally we add some color, as if it were a painting. You don't paint a painting perfectly from the get-go, unless you're extremely confident in your skills and in your understanding of the subject matter that you're painting.

Do you agree or disagree with me, up until that point?

Earlier you said:

To me, it makes no sense (and no offense meant): a ‘factual property’ implies the possibility of a ‘non-factual property’. — Bob Ross

And I said:

You're quite right. It makes no sense to me either. — Arcane Sandwich

So, we agree on something here: that some things make sense, and some things don't. And by "things" in this case, I mean the things that people sometimes say. But the problem with our view (yours, mine, and anyone else that agrees with us) on this topic is that some folks will tell you that we're appealing to the stone, and that's a fallacy. And those folks are right: technically speaking, it is a fallacy. Now, there are some instances in which it isn't. If someone who takes solipsism seriously were to ask me "How do you know that you're not a disembodied brain in a vat that is hallucinating?", I would simply reply in the manner of Moore: here's a hand, mate. Why should I take your nonsense seriously to being with?

So, I take it that you and I believe in good common sense, yes? I know I do. How about you?

Theoretically anything is possible — Corvus

I disagree with this, honestly. I think that there are things that are not possible even at the level of theory. I'm a realist about modality: some things are metaphysically impossible. For example, it is metaphysically impossible that demons exist. The same goes for unicorns, basilisks, ghosts, etc. Scientism, to me, is not just a series of epistemic claims, it is also a series of metaphysical claims, and some of the latter use the language of modal logic (i.e., terms like "possible", "impossible", "contingent", "necessary").

If God existed, why do you believe he/she must intervene? — Corvus

I'm an atheist. I hold that it's metaphysically impossible for beings of a divine nature to exist. But if such beings, or such a being, existed, then we would be debating theology: does God have the moral obligation to intervene in reality, in every act? That's what the occasionalists believed, in matters of theology.

The PSR is not something that comes with every event in the universe. That is what the PSR believers seem to believe, which is a groundless and irrational belief. — Corvus

Of course it's a groundless and irrational belief. But to abandon it is to say that a dragon or a squid can suddenly pop up into existence, anywhere, at any time, for no reason whatsoever (since we've abandoned the strongest version of the PSR, which is the only version of the PSR that "makes sense", and yes, the appeal to good common sense is a fallacy, it's an "appeal to the stone").

The squids might suddenly jump and dance in your room. You ask what is the reason for that? Under no circumstances would such an event happen unless someone secretly placed some lively caught squids from the sea, and placed them in your room while you were asleep. — Corvus

Why not? Why do you say that it would not happen? The circumstances of the case, of every case, become irrelevant if you abandon the PSR in its strongest form. And that's the only way to sensibly deny it. You can't have a weak version of the PSR and still expect to be able to explain some things but not others. Because, why do some things have a sufficient reason, but others don't? Either everything has a sufficient reason, or nothing does, because why would you arbitrarily "draw the line" somewhere in these matters? Here's a parity argument to that effect (inspired by Dan Korman's version of the argument from vagueness against restricted composition):

(AV1) If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.
(AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of sufficient reason.
(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of sufficient reason.
(AV5) So, either everything has a sufficient reason, or nothing does.

Whoever wishes to resist this argument must deny one of the premises. @Bob Ross which premise would you deny, if any?