'Turning the other cheek' is certainly the more consistent school of thought - ergo, hurting someone in self-defense is not morally permissable.

However, I think there remains some case to be made for self-defense being a neutral act in some situations.

Perhaps the most convincing argument for this is that when one enters a real self-defense situation, one is not in a position to rationally weigh their options. A loss of control can reasonably be argued here. Panic and survival instincts take over.

Secondly, if it can reasonably be argued that the victim's intention was not to harm the assailant, but simply to protect themselves, the question arises to what degree an unintended bad side-effect can be considered fully an immoral act on the victim's part.
Obviously pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger clearly has an intent to grievously harm or even kill, but for example attempting to break free from someone's hold may not.

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

Self-Defense can also be classed as a form of staving off harm committed to others. If one does not defend oneself then the perpetrator of the violence will likely be more emboldened to repeat their harm on multiple others.

So #2 is a no goer.

And #3 is trying to smuggle in 'bad in-itself' as being equivalent to 'bad'.

I say the above because you seemed to frame rape as being 'bad in-itself' whereas I do not see defending one's self, or others, with a 'bad' act (eg. violence to suppress violence) to be 'bad in-itself'. This is clearly false equivalence.

I can get onboard with stating that some acts are 'morally impermissible' (barring utterly ridiculous hypothetical situations that entail one having to act in a horrendous manner in order to save others). It is certainly not morally impermissible to punch someone in the face, but it is without a damn good reason to do so. The REASON adds weigh to the permissibility of an act.

I am not beginning with moral principles with respect to my ethical theory: I am a virtue ethicist. — Bob Ross

Whatever your moral principles may be, in this thread you are beginning with moral principles. In addition, virtue ethics is often cited as an alternative to principle based ethics.

I think you’re right. Under those stipulations one cannot justify self-defence. But it also reveals how counterintuitive pacifism is. It is the sort of reasoning that led Gandhi to think the Jews in Nazi Germany would have been better off had they offered themselves to the murderers, or otherwise commit mass suicide.

And harming the child's skin to immunise it is not a part of the means?

No. A means is something that facilitates the end: causing pain to the child is not a part of what facilitates the end of giving them immunity; which is self-apparent when one considers if the end would still be facilitated properly on a child with an inability to feel pain.

Couldn't harm towards the attacker be called a bad side effect of self-defence?

No, because harming the attacker is what facilitates the end (of saving oneself).

The problem you are having is that you don’t have a refined conceptual understanding of what a means is.

It seems your phrase "directional flow" refers to causal flow?

I mean the flow of intention—e.g., an archer aiming at their target.

If so, I don't think that matters at all.

Whether or not one directly intends something matters, because moral agency is agent-centric. It is about what one ought to or ought not to do.

Ethical egoism is a theory that argues for the person who is doing the action -- what is best for this person.
Other consequentialism argues for the common good.

I am not making an argument from ethical egoism: if you would like to import it to explain how one can justify self-defense given the OP’s stipulations, then I am more than happy to entertain it.

Or how about someone trying to commit rape then becoming the rape victim? Are these equally 'bad'?

A non-consequentialist does not need to accept that all bad acts are equal: that simply doesn't follow from not being a consequentialist. The difference in severity of the immoral act is based off of how severe it is in-itself vs. the other is in-itself. E.g., raping someone, as per its nature, is worse than saying something insulting.

Moreover, to answer your question directly: this just goes back to my earlier statement that I am in no way endorsing the view that self-defense is morally impermissible.

I apologize Philosophim: I ran out of time to respond earlier.

Your action is to stay in the chair. An action is simply a decision of what to do as a living being from moment to moment.

The biggest problem with your analysis is that you see no difference between making a choice and acting; and if you cannot tell what or simply disagree with making such a distinction between the two, then you will fail to understand how an inaction is treated differently than an action when considering moral responsibility. The best I can do to get the ball rolling, is expound the relevant concepts as I understand them.

An action is a volition of will with an intention; a choice is the decision reached through a process of rational deliberation; an intention is an end set after as the final cause (in the sense of a “why”)(of what is to happen); an inaction is a lack of action; and what is voluntary is what is done in correspondence with one’s will.

Couple’s a things worth noting:

1. Not all actions are choices: some are merely voluntary. One may very well do something that is in correspondence with their will (i.e., do something voluntarily) without rationally deliberating about it (i.e., choose it) (e.g., punching a wall in pure rage).

2. A choice is an action: one is deliberating (viz., thinking), and this is a volition of the will with the intention of contemplation (about something).

3. An inaction is not an action: this is obvious, so I will leave it there.

4. One can choose something (viz., reach a conclusion) without further acting on it. Viz., the action of thinking is separate from any action taken based off of that thinking.

EDIT: (I forgot to add)5. Not all actions are voluntary. E.g., If you hold a gun up to my head and tell me to eat a bowl of ice cream or die and I do it; then I am not doing this because it corresponds to my will in any meaningful sense (if I am doing it to avoid dying).

From your statement that “your action is to stay in the chair” in the case of choosing to not get up from the chair, I find if self-evident that you are lacking a robust analysis of what “action” is. It is manifestly incoherent to posit that not doing something is doing something—which is literally what you said. If I do not get up, then I performed the act of not getting up; which is just to say that I didn’t perform an act at all. In order to not get up, I don’t have to do anything.

An omission is generally understood as "Not doing the right thing"

Not quite; although that is one of the common definitions, and of which is the synonym for “negligence”. I mean it in the more prominent sense of omitting something or someone. E.g., I consider it morally omissible to not do something and let something bad happen if the only way to prevent that bad thing from happening is to do something bad.

If I five people about to get run over by a train and the only way to save them is to push a fat person onto the tracks (knowing that fat person will get run over), then I should do nothing; because it would be immoral for me to (directly) intentionally kill that fat person in order to bring about the good effect of saving the five. I would find this morally omissible, in the sense that they are not going to be held morally responsible for not taking the measures to save the five.

If I didn't choose to act, how did I act?

Again, a choice is an act of rational deliberation. We do things all the time which are not acts of rational deliberation—e.g., wanting more ice cream (without thinking about it all), punching a wall in pure rage, nervously fidgeting, etc.

Some voluntary acts which are not chosen, may be chosen indirectly by means of choosing to instill a habit which tends to produce that act—e.g., one may install the habit of eating healthy by way of choice (i.e., by rationally deliberating about it), and once that habit has a strong hold one may find themselves wanting and eating a healthy meal without thinking about it all.

If I choose to go on a hunger strike, I am acting purposefully not to eat.

It is purposeful, but not an action. Again, there’s nothing being actualized: on the contrary, you are purposefully not actualizing anything to achieve your goal. You are not doing anything; just like if you decide to not pull the lever and let the five get run over by the train: did you do anything by not pulling the lever? No.

Bob

Also, I think I can anticipate the response you may give and I think it may be fruitful for me to anticipate it a bit (;

I think you are going to say that sometimes not doing something requires an act of volition with an intention in mind (such as concentrating to stop one's hand from shaking); and this is the sort of not doing something which you would classify as an action. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, this is what you had in mind with the idea of concentrating on abstaining from eating food.

In some of these cases you would be partially right, insofar as preventing something can be an action (such as concentrating on stopping one's hand from shaking); but this is an action exactly because it actualizes something (such as the hand going from shaking to not shaking). Whereas, truly not doing something doesn't actualize anything; e.g., if I make the decision that my phone should continue to lie on the table exactly where it is, then me not picking it up is not an action. If I were to take measures of protecting it from getting moved (by other people or what not), then those would be actions.

There's not a volition of will (towards my intention of leaving the phone where it is) by not picking it up (all else being equal); but there is in stopping my shaking hands from continuing to shake. Likewise, there's no volition of will in not picking up a sandwich and eating it; but there is in meditating to help calm the appetites.

I am not making an argument from ethical egoism: if you would like to import it to explain how one can justify self-defense given the OP’s stipulations, then I am more than happy to entertain it. — Bob Ross

Given the OP's stipulations, there isn't going to be an intelligent discussion here. Just so you know. And that's because the OP's argument is laid down to fail.

I asked that it should be put in context as this is a situational argument -- we need deliberation, not a proof.

And this?

with a 'bad' act (eg. violence to suppress violence) to be 'bad in-itself'. This is clearly false equivalence. — I like sushi

You use 'bad' and 'bad in-itself' in two seemingly distinct ways. Or should they both be taken as 'bad in-itself'.

Given the following stipulations, I am wondering if there is a way to salvage the principle of self-defense; and would like to here all of your responses. — Bob Ross

This is an interesting and culturally relevant topic. It is also a well-written OP. In general I think @Lionino has the right approach.

No. A means is something that facilitates the end: causing pain to the child is not a part of what facilitates the end of giving them immunity; which is self-apparent when one considers if the end would still be facilitated properly on a child with an inability to feel pain. — Bob Ross

Does it then follow that it is okay to "harm" an attacker who cannot feel pain? And that because the end is still achieved in such a case, therefore the infliction of "harm" is a side effect?

See:

Is harm thought to be synonymous with injustice? Or can harm occur which is not unjust? For example, if someone enters your house with a gun and you sneak up behind them and knock them unconscious in order to incapacitate them, would the negative utilitarian say that you have harmed them? If this does not count as harm, then it is presumably because the act is not unjust, and in that case injustice (in the classical sense) would be coextensive with harm (in the negative utilitarian sense). — Leontiskos

The key here is that when it comes to self-defense harm is not a precondition for success. Because of this, incapacitation is always to be morally preferred to incapacitation via harm. It also raises the question of whether the aggressor is ever harmed by strict self-defense, even when they are physically injured. Or in other words, one must consider a distinction between moral harm and physical harm.

I admit, though, that this is only an indirect and incomplete answer to the OP. For example, one relevant difference between your case and the nurse who vaccinates or the surgeon who makes an incision, is that this is presumably done with consent or at least implied consent on the part of the patient. Classically speaking, the categorical (3) should [be] qualified by the innocence of the victim: "Do not harm the innocent." For whatever reason, in our age this qualification is seldom included. And then it becomes a question of which premise to prefer.

I apologize Philosophim: I ran out of time to respond earlier. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! As always this is a hobby where we squeeze in time, and I know we have a habit of making longer posts to one another. :)

This is true. And if

The biggest problem with your analysis is that you see no difference between making a choice and acting — Bob Ross

Its not that I don't see a difference, its that an action of agency is a choice. You can't act, and then as a person with agency say, "I chose not to act, but acted anyway." Basically not all choices are actions, but all agency actions are choices.

An action is a volition of will with an intention — Bob Ross

If we call it an action of agency, yes. An autonomous reflex for example could be called an action, but not an action of agency.

a choice is the decision reached through a process of rational deliberation — Bob Ross

It doesn't have to be through a process of rational deliberation, but could be instinctual or emotional. It is the determination of what you are going to 'do', or act.

an inaction is a lack of action — Bob Ross

Yes, on a set of choices. But just because one does not act on certain choices does not mean they don't act on others. To truly be inactive is to be in a deep coma or dead. Inaction is generally meant as "That which a person does not act on." It does not mean that an awake and aware person literally makes no actions. I feel this is a language issue here, and probably our source of disagreement.

1. Not all actions are choices: some are merely voluntary. One may very well do something that is in correspondence with their will (i.e., do something voluntarily) without rationally deliberating about it (i.e., choose it) (e.g., punching a wall in pure rage). — Bob Ross

Because you note that a choice is made though rational deliberation only, I understand where you're coming from. I don't believe choices need to be rational deliberations, and would simply call this an emotional choice. Again, this seems to just be a definition disagreement.

A choice is an action: one is deliberating (viz., thinking), and this is a volition of the will with the intention of contemplation (about something). — Bob Ross

I would say more that a choice is the intention to commit an action. I could choose to go out and eat, but my car won't start. However, I also understand that it could be argued that a choice is an action as well, in the fact that it is a process of a person with agency. But where I feel the words really do separate is that a choice is the intention, the action is the end result. A choice is what we are going to do, while an action is what we do. Thus I can say, "I chose to walk over there, and I acted on it."

An inaction is not an action: this is obvious, so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. If you would, I would like you to explain why the following is wrong. An inaction is a choice to not act on one or more possible actions. And in this, I am using using the logic that if one acts on A, one is not acting on B. Total inaction, is for all possible letters, you did not act on them. That means the removal of actionable agency. This is if we are using the terms consistently and logically.

Yes, in the context of what other people might find meaningful in our lives we can say, "I didn't do anything today." But the person did not take any actions in the logical sense, they just didn't act on b-e, which are boring to talk about. What one 'does' is an action. If I 'do nothing', that is a slang term for 'not acting on anything we would consider important'. It does not mean, "I entered into a comatose state this weekend and emerged back into consciousness Monday at 7."

4. One can choose something (viz., reach a conclusion) without further acting on it. — Bob Ross

Agreed. There can be things that get in the way of our choices, or while we may intend to act on something, the opportunity never comes around. An action is ultimately what we do though. While we may have intentions to do something different, when we act with agency, that is ultimately what we have chosen to do. So I might intend to walk over there and sit in a chair, but my ultimate choice was to not walk over there instead. I might not like my choice (what I ultimately decided to act on) but all actions of agency are choices.

Not all actions are voluntary. E.g., If you hold a gun up to my head and tell me to eat a bowl of ice cream or die and I do it; then I am not doing this because it corresponds to my will in any meaningful sense (if I am doing it to avoid dying). — Bob Ross

What you're describing is duress, or the limitation of actionable choices to those that you would normally not want to do. So lets say I would normally choose not to break my diet, but the alternative is to die. I don't want that either. But I can't choose the act of 'lying on the ground,' without getting killed. Without the duress, that I can only eat ice cream or die, I would choose the actions of "Not eating ice cream and taking a walk." And again this is equivalent to, "The inaction of A, the action of B".

From your statement that “your action is to stay in the chair” in the case of choosing to not get up from the chair, I find if self-evident that you are lacking a robust analysis of what “action” is. — Bob Ross

That was a fair point, and I hope my above points gave a better analysis of what an action is from my viewpoint.

If I do not get up, then I performed the act of not getting up; which is just to say that I didn’t perform an act at all. — Bob Ross

A = "Getting up"
~A is "Not getting up"
But ~A does not entail ~everything

The action that was committed was B, or what you did. Did you contemplate? Simply lie there and zone out? If one has agency from second to second, 'doing' or 'acting' is the expression of that agency. To do 'nothing' or ~anything is to have no agency at all.

I mean it in the more prominent sense of omitting something or someone. E.g., I consider it morally omissible to not do something and let something bad happen if the only way to prevent that bad thing from happening is to do something bad. — Bob Ross

Wouldn't it be better to say "Morally permissible to not do something?" And remember, the something that we are not doing is, "The action that would stop X from happening." It doesn't mean that we aren't doing anything else. So I can see, "It is morally permissible not to throw a fat person on the train tracks to stop the train from running over five other people". That makes sense. Using the word omissible would imply that you made the wrong choice, but didn't realize that you made the wrong choice. Omissible just doesn't seem to work here with what I think you want.

I would find this morally omissible, in the sense that they are not going to be held morally responsible for not taking the measures to save the five. — Bob Ross

Again, I think 'morally permissible' conveys your intention clearly, whereas morally omissible implies you made a mistake though ignorance, and aren't going to be held accountable for it. Your action was ~A, which could have saved those people. You acted in another way, such as watching, leaving, or humming a tune in your head as the chaos errupted. :)

Some voluntary acts which are not chosen, may be chosen indirectly by means of choosing to instill a habit which tends to produce that act—e.g., one may install the habit of eating healthy by way of choice (i.e., by rationally deliberating about it), and once that habit has a strong hold one may find themselves wanting and eating a healthy meal without thinking about it all. — Bob Ross

Habits are ways we can act with less deliberation and effort. But one can have a habit and act with, or against that habit. Choices and actions can be influenced, pressured, or coerced, I'm not arguing against that. But ultimately what a person does, is an act of agency if it is not something like an autonomous reflex.

If I choose to go on a hunger strike, I am acting purposefully not to eat.

It is purposeful, but not an action. — Bob Ross

If an action is what one does, is this not a purposeful action?

You are not doing anything; just like if you decide to not pull the lever and let the five get run over by the train: did you do anything by not pulling the lever? No. — Bob Ross

Of course you did something. You chose not to pull the lever, and did something else. I think what you're trying to say is that "Its ok if I take another action besides not pulling the lever." That you made the choice not to intervene. Which that's a fine conversation to have. But what you seem to be saying is, "Because I didn't pull the lever, I am absolved of moral judgement." That doesn't work. If you're in a moral situation, understand you have actionable options, how you acted is always open open for moral judgement. "Do nothing (to stop the situation from happening) was the the choice you made by acting in some other manner than pulling the lever.

Whereas, truly not doing something doesn't actualize anything; e.g., if I make the decision that my phone should continue to lie on the table exactly where it is, then me not picking it up is not an action. — Bob Ross

Correct. But you acted in some other manner. And in a moral scenario, 'not acting on the choices which would stop X from happening," means you acted in some other way. One cannot escape moral judgement through such actions.

Its an interesting break down. Having gone over this again, I have a feeling the real goal here is that you want a person to have a 'get out of jail free card' on moral situations by claiming 'not acting' means they weren't involved. If someone is aware of a moral situation, and has a choice to alter that moral outcome, choosing not to alter the moral outcome is the action they take. I'm not here to judge whether that person was right in doing so or not, but that is the action they took in that moral situation. Once a person knows and understands their options in a moral situation, they cannot stop being a part of the equation by simply 'doing nothing'. In the end, their 'inaction' to alter a situation is fully within the choices that are being judged.

Once a person knows and understands their options in a moral situation, they cannot stop being a part of the equation by simply 'doing nothing'. In the end, their 'inaction' to alter a situation is fully within the choices that are being judged. — Philosophim

:up:

CC: @Leontiskos

I say the above because you seemed to frame rape as being 'bad in-itself' whereas I do not see defending one's self, or others, with a 'bad' act (eg. violence to suppress violence) to be 'bad in-itself'. This is clearly false equivalence.

I see why you would say this, but let’s break down what is the act and what is the effect; because you are lumping them together here.

Let’s take the example that you have to punch someone in the face to defend yourself from getting punched (by them). The punch is the act, and there are (at least) two effects: physical harm to the attacker and (assuming you knock them out before they land any blows) the prevention of physical harm to oneself.

The latter effect is the per se intention, because it is the end which you have in store as the final end; however, unlike a legitimate double effect situation, the former effect is what produces the latter effect—they are not simultaneously produced from the means but, rather, the means (which is your arm and fist swinging in a punch-like fashion) is producing the effect of physical harm and, thereby, producing the effect of preservation of oneself.

It is certainly not morally impermissible to punch someone in the face, but it is without a damn good reason to do so. The REASON adds weigh to the permissibility of an act.

This seems very consequentialist. If punching someone is in-itself, qua action, bad; then it shouldn’t be done for the sake of doing something good—no?

Why is it bound to fail? That is what I want you to elaborate on, and provide justification for. Are you agreeing that self-defense cannot be justified with the OP's stipulations? If so, then which stipulation would you reject and why?

They are same thing: what you are referring to is when I refer to a thing as in-itself vs. per accidens bad--e.g., an action that is in-itself bad.

Does it then follow that it is okay to "harm" an attacker who cannot feel pain? And that because the end is still achieved in such a case, therefore the infliction of "harm" is a side effect?

No, because “harm” is more than just physical pain. My point with @Lionino was that the relevant difference between punching someone in self-defense and injecting someone with a needle to provide immunity is that the latter case has a means which has a double effect whereas the former has one effect that produces the other effect. Viz., me punching that perp in the face directly produces only the effect of causing harm and only indirectly (as a subsequence) the effect of preserving myself—which is not a double effect proper. It is the 7 diagram as opposed to the V.

That’s what makes self-defense so tricky in the OP, and I am unsure how to account for it without disbanding from stipulation 2 and replacing it with “it is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad towards an innocent living being—even for the sake of something good”.

The key here is that when it comes to self-defense harm is not a precondition for success.

This is true and I agree: self-defense itself is merely the direct intention to defend oneself from an assault and this does not necessitate causing harm to someone; but I am thinking of cases of self-defense which would require it, as is the case for the vast majority (e.g., punching someone in the face, knocking them out, engaging in a shootout, etc.). In those cases, self-defense requires using physical harm as a means towards a good effect (of saving oneself); and so it seems as though one must either reject that (1) one should not do bad things as means towards good ends or (2) physical harm is not bad in-itself.

For example, one relevant difference between your case and the nurse who vaccinates or the surgeon who makes an incision, is that this is presumably done with consent or at least implied consent on the part of the patient.

That is true as well; but, like I said, the needle is the means and it produces two simultaneous effects: physical harm and immunity. This is NOT the case when one punches someone legitimately in self-defense: the physical harm is effectively the means (by being the effect of the punch) which, in turn, produces the good effect: the good effect is not produces simultaneously with the bad effect. Punching someone legitimately in self-defense is analogous, to an extent, to shoving someone into the train to save the five: the good effect is an effect of the effect of the action.

the categorical (3) should qualified by the innocence of the victim: "Do not harm the innocent."

Yes, this is true: I could say it is not bad in-itself to harm another but, rather, it is bad in-itself to harm an innocent person; and this is honestly probably the solution. The problem is that if we are analyzing harm in-itself, then it does seem bad irregardless—which comes to light when we consider using excessive force in self-defense.

It seems like the best bet is to refactor stipulation 2 and say that doing something bad a means towards a good end is not necessarily impermissible; because the bad action is permissible if it is a proportionate response towards a guilty agent.

Unfortunately, I am still not following exactly what you are arguing. I responded with an analysis of “action” and you responded to that response shifting the goal post towards “action of agency”. I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view?

Again, what do you mean by “action”? It doesn’t seem clear what you mean at all, and of which is very clear with this:

An inaction is not an action: this is obvious, so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. If you would, I would like you to explain why the following is wrong.

an inaction is a lack of action — Bob Ross

Yes, on a set of choices.

If an inaction is a lack of action, then an inaction is the negation of an action; and the negation of something cannot be identical to that something.

An inaction is a choice to not act on one or more possible actions. And in this, I am using using the logic that if one acts on A, one is not acting on B. Total inaction, is for all possible letters, you did not act on them. That means the removal of actionable agency. This is if we are using the terms consistently and logically.

I don’t understand what you mean by “if one acts on A, then one is not acting on B”. Again, A could entail B: there’s nothing logically impossible about that. Likewise, do you mean to say “if one performs action A, then one does not perform action B”? Again, action A may be identical or imply or contain B; and nothing about that conditional statement relates to the other statement that “if one does not perform action A, then they have not acted”. Likewise:

"The inaction of A, the action of B".

That isn’t a coherent sentence. What do you mean?

I think what you are trying to note is that, somehow, agents always are doing something; but the point is that not doing something is not itself an action. Not picking up a phone is not itself an action; just as much as:

Of course you did something. You chose not to pull the lever, and did something else.

With respect to the situation of the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem, you didn’t do anything else—that’s the point! You did something insofar as you rationally deliberated (viz., made a decision) to not pull the lever; but not pulling the lever is not itself an action—and this is what I want to see if we agree on or not.

Again, I think 'morally permissible' conveys your intention clearly

Moral omissibility is not the same as moral permissibility; and the former is not standardly the same as “doing something impermissible”: it is separate moral category of thought. This is important for my analysis, because of this:

I have a feeling the real goal here is that you want a person to have a 'get out of jail free card' on moral situations by claiming 'not acting' means they weren't involved

Something that is morally permissible is something which is not bad; whereas something that is morally omissible is bad but is exempt from moral responsibility—that is an important distinction. All else being equal, one should be held responsible for failing to act in a reasonable manner to prevent something bad from happening, because failing to reasonably prevent a bad effect or act is in-itself bad, but in some cases it is exempt from moral scrutiny; and one such example is when one cannot act in any morally permissible way to prevent the bad act or effect from happening. E.g., if I could reasonably and easily grab someone who is starting to drown out of a river into my boat, then me failing to do so would constitute negligence and be punishable; whereas, if I can only reasonably grab that person and put them in my boat if I push you overboard, then that is morally omissible (exactly because I cannot save this person without doing something bad, and doing something bad is worse then letting something bad happen).

The absurdity in your view, so far, is that there is no such thing as allowing or letting something bad happen; as opposed to doing something bad; because you completely lack the vocabulary to notate a choice to not act, since you think inaction is action.

My point with Lionino was that the relevant difference between punching someone in self-defense and injecting someone with a needle to provide immunity is that the latter case has a means which has a double effect whereas the former has one effect that produces the other effect. — Bob Ross

And my point is that it has not been proven that injecting someone with a neddle has a double effect while self-defence has one effect after the other. In fact, Aquinas says self-defence has a double effect, and vaccination seems instead to have only one effect, where the harming comes before the healing, instead of simultaneously.

And if it is proven, one wonders why in this case that would even be relevant on whether I shall pursue X or Y course of action. Is the principle of double effect one of your stipulations?

It seems worth adding, that in the case of a vaccination, there only some probability of the vaccinated individual receiving any benefit. After all, the vaccinated person might never encounter the pathogen. targeted by the vaccine.

It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3. — Bob Ross

Maybe you could weasel out like this: "If someone is doing something bad, and I stop them, then I'm not really harming them. It's better for someone to be killed in self-defense than to successfully become a burglar."

Some weird virtue-ethical argument like that.

No, because “harm” is more than just physical pain. — Bob Ross

But could Lionino not say the same thing, namely that the child who does not feel the needle penetrating their skin is still being harmed by the needle?

That is true as well; but, like I said, the needle is the means and it produces two simultaneous effects: physical harm and immunity. — Bob Ross

Simultaneous in what sense?

My point with Lionino was that the relevant difference between punching someone in self-defense and injecting someone with a needle to provide immunity is that the latter case has a means which has a double effect whereas the former has one effect that produces the other effect. Viz., me punching that perp in the face directly produces only the effect of causing harm and only indirectly (as a subsequence) the effect of preserving myself—which is not a double effect proper. It is the 7 diagram as opposed to the V. — Bob Ross

It's not so clear to me that self-defense involves an intent to harm. Aquinas says that one can apply lethal force in self-defense, so long as one is not intending to kill. Self-defense aims at self-preservation, and this could be done by fleeing or incapacitating the aggressor. But:

but I am thinking of cases of self-defense which would require [causing harm], as is the case for the vast majority (e.g., punching someone in the face, knocking them out, engaging in a shootout, etc.). — Bob Ross

So if an intruder comes into my house with a gun, and I am quietly standing behind him with a baseball bat, is it permissible for me to incapacitate him by hitting him in the head? In such a case have I used harm as a means to incapacitate him, or have I sought to incapacitate him while accepting a certain degree of harm? This is a fine-grained distinction.

When we consider self-defense in the context of double effect, and scrutinize the criterion that the bad effect may not be a means to the good effect, it becomes crucial to determine what we mean by a means. Is it a causal or temporal means? Or an intentional means? We are apparently asking about the relation of the incapacitation of the aggressor to the harming of the aggressor. Is the harming of the aggressor a means to the incapacitation of the aggressor in such a way that double effect is precluded?

When I look through Aquinas it would seem that he does not view harm as a proper act. More information is required. The act could be punishment, repelling/self-defense, maiming, torturing, etc. Each deserves its own analysis. Because Aquinas does not view harm as a proper act, it does not function for him as an intentional means. For Aquinas a means when considered in a moral sense would presumably need to be a proper act, with its own specifiable, volitional nature. I think this is right.

But perhaps the difficulty remains insofar as we are judging a relation of effects, not acts. Harm is an effect of our act whether or not it is an act in itself, and there are obviously acts which are impermissible on account of the harm they bring about.

Yes, this is true: I could say it is not bad in-itself to harm another but, rather, it is bad in-itself to harm an innocent person; and this is honestly probably the solution. The problem is that if we are analyzing harm in-itself, then it does seem bad irregardless—which comes to light when we consider using excessive force in self-defense. — Bob Ross

...More precisely, this comes back to our difference over natural evil vs. moral evil. We are morally prohibited from injuring others in the sense of doing injustice to them, not in the sense of causing any kind of harm whatsoever. Along these lines, I would want to say that there is no absolute prohibition on causing harm, but only a kind of relative prohibition. Put differently, harm in the sense we are considering it is a consequence, and a non-consequentialist moral approach will not be directly concerned with harm in the same way that a consequentialist approach would be. Aversion to an act on the basis of a harm consequence is, at least for the non-consequentialist, a kind of indirect aversion, which is a legitimate consideration but not a central duty.

For me the heart of this thread is the question of the moral status of harm simpliciter. Supposing we have a duty to not harm or minimize harm, in what does this precisely consist?

I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter. — Bob Ross

An action 'simpliciter' is simply what your being is at any moment in time. As I noted, you can have autonomous reactions. For example, breathing. An action of agency is when we commit an action through choice, ie, intent.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view? — Bob Ross

A decision to make an action. Once you have made that action, you have fulfilled your choice. Assuming agency, if you choose to do A, but at the last second, pick B, you changed your choice to B.

I don’t understand what you mean by “if one acts on A, then one is not acting on B”. Again, A could entail B: there’s nothing logically impossible about that. — Bob Ross

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios. Of course you can choose A and B if they aren't mutually exclusive. You can't walk and run at the same time. If you run, you chose not to walk. If you walk, you chose not to run. And vice versa.

With respect to the situation of the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem, you didn’t do anything else—that’s the point! You did something insofar as you rationally deliberated (viz., made a decision) to not pull the lever; but not pulling the lever is not itself an action—and this is what I want to see if we agree on or not. — Bob Ross

Perhaps what you want is to argue that a person who doesn't pull the lever didn't take a moral action? Because they clearly did. In a simple scenario you can pull the lever, or not pull the lever. They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else. You either decide and act by pulling the lever, or by not pulling the lever in the moral situation. You don't get out of it. Of course, pulling or not pulling the lever alone does not entail moral judgement. This can only be determined after moral evaluation.

Moral omissibility is not the same as moral permissibility; and the former is not standardly the same as “doing something impermissible”: it is separate moral category of thought. — Bob Ross

Something that is morally permissible is something which is not bad; whereas something that is morally omissible is bad but is exempt from moral responsibility — Bob Ross

I see. Omissibility in itself neither necessarily exempts or makes the person responsible; that's more of a case by case basis. Omission is simply that a person did something incorrect without understanding that they shouldn't have done that. Whether this deserves judgement or not is separate. So I'm still not sure that the term fits the situation you're trying to describe. If I understand it right, what you're saying is that if a person does something wrong, but only because doing something would cause further harm, its ok. I think that's pretty uncontroversial as long as the harm was seen either equal or greater than not pulling the lever. No need to call it an omission, that's just traditional moral justification.

because failing to reasonably prevent a bad effect or act is in-itself bad, but in some cases it is exempt from moral scrutiny; and one such example is when one cannot act in any morally permissible way to prevent the bad act or effect from happening. — Bob Ross

I don't think its exempt from moral scrutiny, but exempt from moral judgement. As we spoke about earlier, if we had a 50/50 situation, in which you only had two choices and both were equally bad, no one could judge you for your choice. If however your choice to not pull the lever results in more wrong than if you had, and you knew that, you would be morally negligent. The way people are morally exempt traditionally is if they lack active agency, or had ignorance that wasn't do to negligence. IE, "The power plant failed because I was never told to push a certain button" vs "The power plant failed because I didn't bother to read the new manual that came out last week".

The absurdity in your view, so far, is that there is no such thing as allowing or letting something bad happen; as opposed to doing something bad; because you completely lack the vocabulary to notate a choice to not act, since you think inaction is action. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not saying that at all. My point is that "letting something happen" when you could choose to stop it, does not absolve you of moral consideration. And in the situation of moral choice, 'not acting' is the action you take. I can see in some situations, it would be better to 'do nothing' or 'do any other action' then interfere in the situation. And in some situations, its not. But no one gets a free pass from moral scrutiny if you are aware of the situation and you could have made a choice to alter its outcome.

Pacifism is pacifism. It works sometimes.

The only exception would be in acting in self-defense in a non-violent manner. Pinning someone on the ground before running away would not be 'harmful' other than it harms their intentions.

The first rule of self-defense is certainly not to attack first, it is to run away. Self-defense can also involve disarming and incapacitating your attacker in a non-violent/non-harmful manner.

So self-defense is still possible. If you are saying self-defense requires bodily harm to the attacker then you say this is impermissible, then it is impermissible!

:up:

But could Lionino not say the same thing, namely that the child who does not feel the needle penetrating their skin is still being harmed by the needle? — Leontiskos

I could, but then we are simply establishing that the word 'harm' includes 'milimetrically ripping skin with or without pain'. It is a semantic move. There is some precedent for that. We do say that someone eating junk food or drinking alcohol is harming themselves for ingesting toxins, even if they don't feel the harm at a physical level.

Not only that, that harm is more than just physical pain seems to say very little. Physical pain is surely not necessary for harm, but we could say that it is sufficient for harm, because any noticeable pain, no matter how small, could be said to inflict mental harm — also a semantic move.

Semantic moves are done to establish clarity, they don't establish informative arguments. I think my communication has had clarity, so I was thinking past that.

Simultaneous in what sense? — Leontiskos

Idk, but they don't seem simultaneous at all. The vaccine's liquid setting into the muscle can cause a lot of pain, but it is the vaccine's liquid setting into the muscle that allows for immunity to be developed. They are not simultaneous: one precedes, and is necessary for, the other in the causal chain.

But then one might say "Well, the pain is a neurological effect of the muscles' reaction..." but then I go back to the question that will be stated for the third time now: why does any of this matter for whether I shall do X or Y?

I thought the claim to have acted in self defence was the way one justified an act of harm. You want a justification of the justification?

I thought the claim to have acted in self defence was the way one justified an act of harm. You want a justification of the justification? — unenlightened

Maybe there is a difference between justifying to society and justifying to oneself that is relevant here?

Maybe there is a difference between justifying to society and justifying to oneself that is relevant here? — wonderer1

Possibly. But probably not, given that society just is a number of selves interacting and justifying stuff to each other. I guess I want a justification for looking for a justification of a justification. I'm not sure if that is an allowable move in the language game, but if it isn't, then maybe the opening move is illegitimate too.

But keeping it simple, supposing one has a general duty of care to one's fellow beings, one who is bent on harming his fellows thereby forfeits his own right to be cared for. Is this a justification or merely a restatement in other words? I might talk about a 'necessary mutuality' of moral behaviour, such that the thief forfeits his right to possess his own property, or the kidnapper his right to his own freedom. I'm struggling in the end to make sense of the question in terms of what sort of thing would count as an answer; if the principle of self defence cannot stand alone, how could it be defended by another principle?

causing pain to the child is not a part of what facilitates the end of giving them immunity — Bob Ross

It is not just pain, injections cut through the child's skin.

The reply applies all the same to self-defence: are you harming someone who feels no pain if you break their legs, stopping them from hurting you? Well, you broke their legs, but they will heal; you cut through the child's skin, but it will heal. Both cutting through the skin and breaking their legs are means to the end of immunisation and self-defence.

The problem you are having is that you don’t have a refined conceptual understanding of what a means is. — Bob Ross

A means is something that facilitates the end — Bob Ross

That is not really what "means" means, as the dictionary will show, but I can fly with whatever definition you prefer. The usage of "facilitate" however is definitely troublesome, I take it you mean "enables the end"; whether is made easier or harder is unimportant.

I mean the flow of intention—e.g., an archer aiming at their target. — Bob Ross

I don't know what the phrase "flow of intention" is supposed to mean, you will have to be more specific. Someone either intends something at a moment or not, it doesn't flow. An archer aiming at their target is an action, an action which can be intentional or not.

Whether or not one directly intends something matters, because moral agency is agent-centric. — Bob Ross

So is the problem that we intend to harm the attacker for the sake of our self-defence, while we don't intend to cause pain for the sake of vaccination but that we intend to vaccinate and it happens to cause pain?

People who vaccinate know about the pain. In a self-defence situation we know what is going to happen if we shoot the assailant. I will say again that whether it is idiomatic in English to say we "intend" one while not intending the other seems unimportant, we know of the consequences of our actions, they happen.

Take for example if we had no clue how vaccines worked. We just knew that they did work and that they are painful. In that case, our intention would be to cause this specific kind of pain that is only caused by vaccines, because we thought that the pain is what gave immunity. So we are intending to harm for the sake of something good, it is morally fine.

I will say again that it is 2 that is problematic and ought to be rejected. 3 is not. Harming someone is, in itself, bad, but the harm might be outweighed by a good.

You could reject 3, but there are reasons against it.