Self-defense is usually defined in a way to include the defense of other innocents as well. — Bob Ross

I'm not familiar with such a (most especially "usual") definition. See for example self-defense as its defined by a global wiki.

What references do you have for the definition you present?

Did you read the OP? The OP is exploring what justification exists for self-defense's permissibility given certain stipulations. — Bob Ross

(Just saw your update in the OP.)

I might have not been clear enough:

I accept all three stipulations, though their interpretations might (I don’t yet know) somewhat differ between us. So I thereby endorse #3 in an ultimate sense of what is bad.

Yet my primary resolution to the issue (placing the issue of selfhood(s) and its comparative value aside) was expressed here, albeit in question form:

And is it not a good to choose the lesser of two wrongs whenever no other alternative is in any way available to you? — javra

In short, when the only available alternatives to one are all of differing degrees of wrongness, or of badness, then it is virtuous (and hence good) to choose that alternative which is the least wrong, or bad, among the available alternatives. This in contrast to choosing an alternative which is more or else most wrong, hence bad.

Choosing not to choose between the alternatives in this situation would also be, by my reckoning, a non-virtuous act - for, in so choosing not to choose, one then of one's own accord allows for the possibility of the more or else worst wrong to be actualized.

I deem this same reasoning to then likewise apply to abortions, to surgeries, etc.

Oh, I wasn't referring to the different subjective opinions on the "goodness" or "badness" of an action by various individuals, rather the reality that a single action which is (stipulated) objectively good for both the person performing the action and the person upon whom the action is performed can also be objectively bad for a third person whose bad effect may be downstream.

In short, when the only available alternatives to one are all of differing degrees of wrongness, or of badness, then it is virtuous (and hence good) to choose that alternative which is the least wrong, or bad, among the available alternatives. This in contrast to choosing an alternative which is more or else most wrong, hence bad.

Choosing not to choose between the alternatives in this situation would also be, by my reckoning, a non-virtuous act - for, in so choosing not to choose, one then of one's own accord allows for the possibility of the more or else worst wrong to be actualized. — javra

This is pretty stark consequentialism, is it not? Especially your final sentence?

This is pretty stark consequentialism, is it not? Especially your final sentence? — Leontiskos

Maybe I don't fully follow your quite terse reply - but in terms of all actions having their consequence ... sure, why not?

Is there any rational or ethical disagreement with what I've stated in the quote you provided?

For starters, I don't see how you can claim to accept all three stipulations and then argue for harm consequentialism. The stipulations logically entail the conclusion that harm cannot be done. You say you accept all three stipulations but then go on to say that harm can be done. It seems that if you want to hold to harm consequentialism then you will at least need to reject #2, no?

The stipulations logically entail the conclusion that harm cannot be done. You say you accept all three stipulations but then go on to say that harm can be done. It seems that if you want to hold to harm consequentialism then you will at least need to reject #2, no? — Leontiskos

We then obviously hold rather different interpretations of #2:

2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good; — Bob Ross

Is it a bad to choose - or else to intend the manifestation of - the lease bad from all alternatives that are available to oneself at the juncture of the given choice?

Irrespective of what your anticipated answer will be, I again deem the choosing of the least bad to be a good in an of itself, rather than a bad in and of itself. In so deeming, I then further deem the choice thus made to be the intentioning of something good - here in the sense of "best" - rather then the intentioning of something bad. The latter "intentioning of a bad" I strictly reserve for intentioning any alternative other than that which is least bad. Concrete examples are a dime a dozen. As one measly example: Ought I harm that farm animal by killing it as humanely as possible so as to eat and thereby live? Or ought I harm that farm animal by killing it in as inhumane way as possible so as to eat and thereby life? (Same could be said of plants by they way, lifeforms that they themselves are.) Or ought I harm no other living being so as to eat and thereby live and, in so not doing, basically commit suicide via starvation? These are all wrongs, but they vary in their degrees.

Feel free to comment on the last paragraph, of course, but please do provide an answer to the question I've asked.

Irrespective of what your anticipated answer will be, I again deem the choosing of the least bad to be a good in an of itself, rather than a bad in and of itself. — javra

Then you are directly denying #3.

Is it a bad to choose - or else to intend the manifestation of - the lease bad from all alternatives that are available to oneself at the juncture of the given choice? — javra

It is impermissible to choose harm on such a basis given the three stipulations. (1) and (2) form an exhaustive division: ends and means. According to (3) harm is bad, according to (1) what is bad cannot be done for its own sake, and according to (2) what is bad cannot be done for the sake of something else. The three stipulations logically entail pacifism. There is no way around this given that every act is either a means or an end. It is contradictory to accept the three stipulations without being committed to pacifism, and therefore you are contradicting yourself.

Edit: Here is a more formal version, which may help you see your contradiction:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is X.
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something that is X—even for the sake of something good.
3. Harming someone is X.
4. Therefore, pacifism is true.

(2 is strictly speaking superfluous, but I think Bob was going for the exhaustive division noted above.)

Then you are directly denying #3. — Leontiskos

Nope, I uphold it. But then, once again, we're likely interpreting it in significantly different ways,

When would harm be an ultimate, absolute, pure, complete, etc. "good"? Oh, here presuming a lack of subjectivism ... wherein it can so be because some subjective being so declares it to be. I liken the likes of Hitler and Stalin to such beings.

BTW, you latch onto your individual understanding of the three stipulations and the perceived logic that then ensues, but you have not yet answered the question I've asked.

To be more blunt about it: is it good to choose the least of all wrongs or is it bad to choose the least of all wrongs?

A simple and direct question that ought to hold a simple and direct answer.

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

I think what we can conclude from this is that self defense cannot be justified without accounting for intent.

This, to me, is less a problem with the principle of self defense and more another argument for why intent is crucial in any moral philosophy.

On the contrary, in the 1v5 trolley case we don’t have an analogous situation when a person pulls the lever as the means to saving the five: unlike shooting someone in self-defense, the bad effect is not a part of the directional flow of the end being aimed at. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure I buy this distinction. It seems to me you're trying to reintroduce intentionality through the back door here, by ascribing the intention to the "directional flow". But casual chains do not inherently have goals. The goal stems from the intention of actors. From a purely casual perspective, changing the lever in the trolley scenario causes harm to the one specific person. This harm did not previously exist as part of the causal chain.

Edit: Here is a more formal version, which may help you see your contradiction:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is X.
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something that is X—even for the sake of something good.
3. Harming someone is X.
4. Therefore, pacifism is true.

(2 is strictly speaking superfluous, but I think Bob was going for the exhaustive division noted above.) — Leontiskos

In reply to this edit: Since you're being ultra-formal in reasoning, what pacifist (either directly or indirectly) causes no harm to other life in their persisting to live by consuming nutrients via food?* In the absence of such a pacifist, your reasoning (maybe in the interpretation of premises affirmed) can only be fallacious (... goodness intending though it might be) - for even the most stringent of pacifists will indeed by necessity engage in the harm of selfhood pertaining either to other living things or to their own life.

* This as per my previously given example:

Ought I harm that farm animal by killing it as humanely as possible so as to eat and thereby live? Or ought I harm that farm animal by killing it in as inhumane way as possible so as to eat and thereby life? (Same could be said of plants by they way, lifeforms that they themselves are.) Or ought I harm no other living being so as to eat and thereby live and, in so not doing, basically commit suicide via starvation? These are all wrongs, but they vary in their degrees. — javra

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I'd still appreciate answers to my two previous questions regarding your views, to be found here and here.

BTW, I'm leaving the debate open, but if the counter hinges on the notion of "someone" in the third assertion (harming someone is X) this will open a can of worms as to what "someone" gets to be denoted as.

One one hand, for one example, here strictly addressing humans: Are those which some humans deem to be sub-human humans, such as slaves, on a par to the someones that are not slaves but slave owners? So, can a pacifist flagellate a slave and still be a genuine pacifist - this in respect to those who are someone on a par to themselves?

Else, can a pacifist engage in psychologically torturing another someone on ground that they in no way violently harm the other's physical being? Presuming not, what then about nagging (as one type of mind/brain fuc*ing) another someone; is this not a milder form of the same type of harm to the other that can be expressed via the concept of "psychological torture"? So, is a pacifist still a pacifist if they perpetually nag others about certain issues; say, maybe, such as about needing to be pacifists (which do no harm whatsoever) themselves?

This, again, to me gets into issues of what selfhood consists of. Which I find difficult. But, maybe unlike some others, I do maintain that lesser lifeforms are endowed with their own selfhood ... which they too defend as best they can and which can likewise be harmed.

This post being neither here nor there. It's been mentioned just in case the issue of harm were to be declared only pertinent to "someones" as this term is typically understood, such that harm could then only be validly claimed of persons, i.e. humans.

In reply to this edit: Since you're being ultra-formal in reasoning, what pacifist (either directly or indirectly) causes no harm to other life in their persisting to live by consuming nutrients via food? — javra

So then you think pacifism fails for two reasons: both because it is permissible to intentionally harm others, and because pacifism is impracticable. Either way you disagree with conclusion (4) and the stipulations that undergird it.

The question here is whether you contradict yourself in claiming to accept all three stipulations while simultaneously claiming that it is okay to intentionally harm others (or, put differently, whether the stipulations entail pacifism). As I have shown, the three stipulations do logically entail the conclusion <It is always impermissible to harm others>, and therefore you contradict yourself by claiming that you accept the three stipulations while maintaining that it is sometimes permissible to (intentionally) harm others.

Now you want me to enter into a debate about whether one should choose the least of all wrongs. I am not a consequentialist, and because of this I do not think one should do what is wrong. I would counsel others to abstain from acting if the only possible actions are wrong. But I am not going to enter into this debate in full. Showing your contradiction was my aim.

The question here is whether you contradict yourself in claiming to accept all three stipulations while simultaneously claiming that it is okay to intentionally harm others (or, put differently, whether the stipulations entail pacifism). As I have shown, the three stipulations do logically entail the conclusion <It is always impermissible to harm others>, and therefore you contradict yourself by claiming that you accept the three stipulations while maintaining that it is sometimes permissible to (intentionally) harm others. — Leontiskos

As I've previously explained and illustrated via example, it is not contradictory to maintain the three stipulations of the OP - for intending the least of all wrongs when no other alternative is in any way available to you is a good, and not a bad. Maintaining the three stipulations can become contradictory when reinterpreted in the fashion you have. But, as I've previously expressed and exemplified, this is not how I myself interpret the OP's three stipulations.

<It is always impermissible to harm others> — Leontiskos

This, though, to me is incomprehensible, for it entails things such as the following: it is - this at the same time and in the same respect - always impermissible to both a) eat food and thereby harm other selves by requiring their death so as to sustain one's own life and b) harming one's own self via the self-murder (i.e., suicide) of starvation by not eating food. And this so far to me is a clear-cut case of contradiction irrespective of how it's interpreted.

Now you want me to enter into a debate about whether one should choose the least of all wrongs. — Leontiskos

No. I was merely interested in your answer to the questions I've asked of you, and this repeatedly.

I am not a consequentialist, and because of this I do not think one should do what is wrong. — Leontiskos

Again: Is it right to choose the least of all wrongs when no other alternatives are available to you? If so, then so choosing the least of all wrongs is doing what is right - rather then doing what is wrong.

But I am not going to enter into this debate in full. — Leontiskos

I will not plead for you to give your honest answer to the simple question I've asked. And I'm interested in honest debates where both understand themselves and their views to be fallible - this rather than infallible. So, unless there will be further need to reply, I'll call it quits for my part.

As I've previously explained and illustrated via example, it is not contradictory to maintain the three stipulations of the OP - for intending the least of all wrongs when no other alternative is in any way available to you is a good, and not a bad. Maintaining the three stipulations can become contradictory when reinterpreted in the fashion you have. But, as I've previously expressed and exemplified, this is not how I myself interpret the OP's three stipulations. — javra

At this point in the thread you have the burden of proof to show that the three stipulations are consistent with your claim that <it is sometimes permissible to (intentionally) harm others>.

I will not plead for you to give your honest answer to the simple question I've asked. — javra

I've answered your question. Did you not see the answer?

I've answered your question. Did you not see the answer? — Leontiskos

Nope. Care to re-quote it?