1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross
It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3.
What are your guys’ thoughts? — Bob Ross
Philosophy triumphs easily over past evils and future evils; but present evils triumph over it. — Le Rochefoucauld, maxim 22
1. What is bad? What is bad 'in-itself? Can you give an example of something that is is bad in itself, and why it is bad?
2. This is going to be important, because a person who doesn't have your set definitions can set up this scenario.
a. It is good to not starve.
b. It is bad to starve.
c. It is bad to steal.
d. It is good to not steal.
e. If you do not steal, you are going to starve.
Therefore if you do not steal and starve, you are doing both a bad and a good thing. But if you steal and don't starve, then you are doing both a good and a bad thing. If things are good or bad 'in themselves' then we reach a situation in which either choice is equally as good and bad as the other. But our intuitions, (and I'm sure deeper argumentation) justify stealing to not starve. So we have a situation by which things in themselves result in a coin flip outcome that I think many of us would not call a coin flip
It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense — Bob Ross
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good; — Bob Ross
The question in the OP is operating under the assumption that one accepts that a thing can be bad or good in-itself and simply that the action of harming someone is in-itself bad. — Bob Ross
Moreover, if they starve to death because their only option to avoid it was steal, then they did not do anything bad—just because it is bad to starve it does not follow that one is acting by allowing something to happen. — Bob Ross
In its most generic sense, I mean “bad” and “good” in the common man’s usage of the terms as it relates to morality. In a more technical sense, I would say “badness” is “negative intrinsic valuableness” and “goodness” is “positive intrinsic valuableness”; however, these technical definitions are not required to understand, more generally, what is meant by “bad” and “good” in the OP. — Bob Ross
We could say, equally, that it might be good per accidens to rape someone if they have to choose between raping them for 10 seconds or torturing them in a basement for 10 years (and assuming those are the only two options); but this would have no effect on the fact that rape itself is bad, when taken in isolation. — Bob Ross
1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad.
It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross
1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross
So we should stand by and watch someone brutally murder several innocent people because it is 'bad' to harm the murdered. :D — I like sushi
Isn't refusing to make an action that would prevent starvation a choice however?
I am also assuming, and correct me if I'm wrong, that inherent goodness and badness don't have a 'rating'.
Which if a moral framework claims you can never defend yourself, this seems like the moral framework is unable to handle a fairly common moral scenario that is generally agreed upon by people across the world
2. I don't think one can easily discount that 'not doing something' is 'not a choice'
It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad. — Bob Ross
Everyone who adheres to an ethical theory imports principles into any moral conversation. — Bob Ross
is that it seems like harming the person, unlike in the vaccination example, is a part of the means of achieving the good end — Bob Ross
as opposed to being a bad side effect — Bob Ross
Those who begin with ethical theory based on moral principles begin, in my opinion, at the wrong end, as if where the inquiry might lead has already been determined before we begin. — Fooloso4
My opinion is that even coming up with a normative ethical theory is already missing the point of what ethics is supposed to be. — Lionino
It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad. — Bob Ross
In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B.
To say that choice isn't an action seems odd to me. If you choose something but don't act on it, did you really choose?
So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean?
If I choose not to starve, but don't take an action to prevent starvation when that option is presented, didn't I act by not stealing, thus actionably starving?
By choosing one, you will commit an evil act.
1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross
It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3. — Bob Ross
In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B.
This is not a logical truth whatsoever. Choosing A may entail simultaneously choosing B — Bob Ross
The act of rational deliberation is the act of making a choice, and one can certainly rationally deliberate such that they decide not to do anything. E.g., I can choose to not get up from my chair, and not getting up from my chair is NOT an action. — Bob Ross
This is important in order to understand my theory, because omissions and commissions evaluated differently. — Bob Ross
So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean?
It would mean you are acting irrationally; and that you chose to not act, but acted anyways. — Bob Ross
If you make the decision that you are want to change the fact that you are starving such that you aren’t anymore but don’t actually do anything to change it, then you haven’t acted to change the fact that you are starving. — Bob Ross
What I was noting is that not doing something and doing something are nor morally calculated equally; and your response here is full of equivocating the two. — Bob Ross
If you are currently in the state of starvation, then choosing to remain in that state produces no action pertaining to it—no different than me choosing to not move doesn’t cause movement. — Bob Ross
By choosing one, you will commit an evil act.
Again, you don’t commit an evil act by allowing something bad to continue to happen; exactly no different than how I don’t do anything to not get up from the chair that I am in—there’s a choice being made, but some choices require inaction. — Bob Ross
By allowing yourself to continue to starve, you have committed an omission (an inaction); whereas if you steal you have committed a commission (an action). — Bob Ross
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