1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

Hey Bob! Its been a while, glad to see you again. There are a few clarifications I feel you need to give to address this.

1. What is bad? What is bad 'in-itself? Can you give an example of something that is is bad in itself, and why it is bad?

2. This is going to be important, because a person who doesn't have your set definitions can set up this scenario.

a. It is good to not starve.
b. It is bad to starve.
c. It is bad to steal.
d. It is good to not steal.
e. If you do not steal, you are going to starve.

Therefore if you do not steal and starve, you are doing both a bad and a good thing. But if you steal and don't starve, then you are doing both a good and a bad thing. If things are good or bad 'in themselves' then we reach a situation in which either choice is equally as good and bad as the other. But our intuitions, (and I'm sure deeper argumentation) justify stealing to not starve. So we have a situation by which things in themselves result in a coin flip outcome that I think many of us would not call a coin flip.

It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3.

What are your guys’ thoughts? — Bob Ross

I don't see stipulations1, 2, or 3 as cohering with my thinking very well. In any case, I would say there are times, when going with your fast thinking is crucial to the outcome of things, and a self defense situation is likely to be such a time. I'm inclined to think it is moral to be human, and act as one, without going around with one's head in the philosophical clouds at all times.

My man Le Rochefoucauld has that one covered:

Philosophy triumphs easily over past evils and future evils; but present evils triumph over it. — Le Rochefoucauld, maxim 22

Nice! :up:

I suppose there is the author of Ecclesiastes and The Byrds as well.

Hello Philosophim! I am glad to hear from you again.

1. What is bad? What is bad 'in-itself? Can you give an example of something that is is bad in itself, and why it is bad?

I purposely left out the analysis of the entire ethical framework which I implicitly imported in for the sake of the question (in the OP), because it would require a lot of writing (:

Irregardless, this is a fair and fine question to ask. The question in the OP is operating under the assumption that one accepts that a thing can be bad or good in-itself and simply that the action of harming someone is in-itself bad. There are many ethical theories that are compatible with these two claims, and I think the common man would agree with them (although that isn’t saying much).

In its most generic sense, I mean “bad” and “good” in the common man’s usage of the terms as it relates to morality. In a more technical sense, I would say “badness” is “negative intrinsic valuableness” and “goodness” is “positive intrinsic valuableness”; however, these technical definitions are not required to understand, more generally, what is meant by “bad” and “good” in the OP.

By something being bad or good in-itself, I mean that that something is bad or good all else being equal—i.e., taken by itself in isolation from all other circumstances and factors. An example of this commonly would be rape: rape is bad in-itself, because, when evaluated in isolation from any accidental factors, it is, per se, bad; and it is bad because it violates the autonomy of an individual and inhibits or decreases their well-being. We could say, equally, that it might be good per accidens to rape someone if they have to choose between raping them for 10 seconds or torturing them in a basement for 10 years (and assuming those are the only two options); but this would have no effect on the fact that rape itself is bad, when taken in isolation.

2. This is going to be important, because a person who doesn't have your set definitions can set up this scenario.

I don’t think they really have to: you understand fine, I would imagine, what the commoner means by “bad” and “good” in a morally relevant sense—even if they do not have a robust concept of it.

For me, what is good is what is (positively) intrinsically valuable; and what is most (positively) intrinsically valuable is well-being; because that is what we are physiologically determined to value for itself the most, being simply the result of one’s biological functions working in unison and harmony with one another to fulfill what they are designed to do (in a weak teleological sense). Again, one need not accept my ethical theory to participate in the OP. They just have to understand what is commonly notated as “bad” in a morally relevant sense, what it means for something to be bad in-itself, and to understand the stipulations.

a. It is good to not starve.
b. It is bad to starve.
c. It is bad to steal.
d. It is good to not steal.
e. If you do not steal, you are going to starve.

Therefore if you do not steal and starve, you are doing both a bad and a good thing. But if you steal and don't starve, then you are doing both a good and a bad thing. If things are good or bad 'in themselves' then we reach a situation in which either choice is equally as good and bad as the other. But our intuitions, (and I'm sure deeper argumentation) justify stealing to not starve. So we have a situation by which things in themselves result in a coin flip outcome that I think many of us would not call a coin flip

Stealing is bad in-itself and starving is bad in-itself; but it does not follow that one ends up in a “coin toss” when having to decide whether to continue to starve and not steal or steal and stop starving.

One is not permitted to do something bad in order to achieve something good; and this is the scenario you have setup. E.g., one is actively starving and this is bad; they could perform the act of stealing to remove that bad situation; but they cannot do so because their action would be bad and one cannot do something bad to achieve something good. Moreover, if they starve to death because their only option to avoid it was steal, then they did not do anything bad—just because it is bad to starve it does not follow that one is acting by allowing something to happen. Allowing something to happen is inaction; and not doing anything is preferable to doing something wrong.

Irregardless, I am not entirely following your critique here; because even if I grant your point (that it is a coin toss), then it still would follow that both are bad in-themselves.

Bob

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense — Bob Ross

2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good; — Bob Ross

These two together seem to be question begging as well as a sort of separation fallacy.

That 2. is against self-defence seems to be based on the fact that self-defence involves harm ("something bad") towards the attacker. But it is not the case that everything that involves harm is bad:

Tetanus vaccination harms a child by cutting through a child's skin, to which they will have to put on a band-aid, and inflicting significant pain due to the liquid setting into the muscle. But vaccination is not bad, it is a necessary harm that leads to a greater good than otherwise, a otherwise which might imply death. Likewise, self-defence cannot be separated from the harm towards the attacker.

Of course, 2. says that we ought not to intend something bad even if for the sake of something good. But the vaccination example is clear counter-evidence of that: we must intend to vaccinate against tetanus.

If one could separate the immunisation against tetanus from the injection (like those droplets that are available for some diseases), injections against tetanus would be "something bad", especially for kids. But they are not separable yet, therefore they are not bad. Likewise, by definition of self-defence, harm towards the attacker is not avoidable; otherwise, in the case of no harm towards the attacker, we just escaped the attacker and the legal definition of self-defence doesn't even apply anymore to the situation, there is not need for it.

So, either self-defence — involving harm — is not bad, thus falls out of 2., or 2. ought to be rejected. Likewise, either vaccination — involving harm — is not something bad, or 2. is a plainly wrong normative principle.

The question in the OP is operating under the assumption that one accepts that a thing can be bad or good in-itself and simply that the action of harming someone is in-itself bad. — Bob Ross

Moreover, if they starve to death because their only option to avoid it was steal, then they did not do anything bad—just because it is bad to starve it does not follow that one is acting by allowing something to happen. — Bob Ross

I see. Isn't refusing to make an action that would prevent starvation a choice however? If I was starving and a pie was in front of me, the act of not eating the pie does seem to be choosing starvation. People go on hunger strikes all the time because they believe its essential to draw attention to the prisoner's inhumane treatment. Choosing not to eat, is a choice when you have the means in front of you to eat. So if this is the case, we still have the 50/50 scenario. The person can choose to steal the food in front of them the avoid starvation, or choose not to steal the food, and thus also choose to starve.

In its most generic sense, I mean “bad” and “good” in the common man’s usage of the terms as it relates to morality. In a more technical sense, I would say “badness” is “negative intrinsic valuableness” and “goodness” is “positive intrinsic valuableness”; however, these technical definitions are not required to understand, more generally, what is meant by “bad” and “good” in the OP. — Bob Ross

That is fine by me. For now we can assume that there is no reason behind what is good or bad intrinsically, only that they are. I am also assuming, and correct me if I'm wrong, that inherent goodness and badness don't have a 'rating'. For example, stealing isn't 2 badness, while murdering isn't 4 badness, they're just both intrinsically bad. Same for goodness. Helping a little old lady across the street is just as good as saving 1 million lives. While I see problems with this, I can accept this for now and discuss what it would be like to have such a system.

This also leads to the point that the 50/50 scenario doesn't need to be explicit. Maybe you don't like the steal/starve scenario, but that doesn't mean that there won't be a good/bad conflict of some kind. We can assume through the varieties of life experience, its going to happen. You can use a starve/steal example to make it less abstract, but any scenario will do. How does your moral framework handle such a scenario? A 60/40? Does a scenario have to be 100% good for a person to act, that even a 99% good choice should not be done if there is 1% evil involved?

We could say, equally, that it might be good per accidens to rape someone if they have to choose between raping them for 10 seconds or torturing them in a basement for 10 years (and assuming those are the only two options); but this would have no effect on the fact that rape itself is bad, when taken in isolation. — Bob Ross

There seems to be a bit of an answer to my above question in here. Again though, what about degrees of badness? If its rape, but the rape is your husband. Lets not make torture 10 years, but ten seconds to be more comparative. What if that torture is water boarding vs toe nail removal? The problem I'm getting at is that intrinsically good or bad without degrees of value overly simplifies morality. Morality is complex and can lead to some controversial and odd situations. A framework that cannot handle that is not strong.

And to not stray too far from your topic, this leads us back to:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad.

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross

Which if a moral framework claims you can never defend yourself, this seems like the moral framework is unable to handle a fairly common moral scenario that is generally agreed upon by people across the world. Most of the world has determined that defending yourself is a moral right. Not that this means they're correct, but there's a high burden of reason for any framework to state that it is immoral to do so.

So in sum:

1. Does this framework have degrees of moral good and evil? If not, you run into a problem of oversimplicity, and an inability to handle moral complexities.
2. I don't think one can easily discount that 'not doing something' is 'not a choice', and a 50/50 scenario of some kind is unavoidable. How does this framework handle these scenarios?

As always, feel free to correct me if I've misunderstood anything. :)

rewriting

Very well said. :up:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

So we should stand by and watch someone brutally murder several innocent people because it is 'bad' to harm the murderer. :D

So we should stand by and watch someone brutally murder several innocent people because it is 'bad' to harm the murdered. :D — I like sushi

Having, once upon a time, taken a piece of brass rod (well suited to wrapping my fist around) to what I was afraid might become a gun fight, the OP does suggest a tendency towards scrupulosity to me.

The vaccination example is disanalogous to the self-defense example: the principle of double effect can easily resolve the dilemma in the case of the former. One vaccinates a child with the good effect of protecting them from harm in mind, and the means is to vaccinate them. The means has a side effect, a bad effect, of causing some immediate harm—this is indirectly intended. The allowance of the bad side effect is permitted because:

1. The action is in-itself neutral or good (viz., injecting someone with something to boost their immune system is good);
2. There is a directly intended good effect (viz., protecting a person from harm from a disease);
3. The good effect cannot be achieved without the bad effect (viz., injecting them with something to boost their immune system simultaneously produces the bad effect of pain);
4. The good effect cannot be achieved with a lesser bad effect (viz., the way they are injecting it is the least painful way); and
5. The good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect (viz., protecting them from a life-threatening disease outweighs avoiding the bad effect of the minor pain they will have from being injected).

One need not reject any of the OP’s stipulations to accept the permissibility of vaccination (of some circumstances).

The reason I don’t make an analogous argument for self-defense, is that it seems like harming the person, unlike in the vaccination example, is a part of the means of achieving the good end; as opposed to being a bad side effect.

I am not suggestion with this OP that self-defense is impermissible: I am questioning how one justifies it with the stipulations made therein.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/926405

Isn't refusing to make an action that would prevent starvation a choice however?

It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad.

In the example you gave, it is 100% the case that one should allow themselves to starve; because you have setup the situation where they cannot avoid it without doing something wrong.

I am also assuming, and correct me if I'm wrong, that inherent goodness and badness don't have a 'rating'.

I was assuming, for the OP, that they do have degrees. Rape is worse than saying something insulting because rape is more negatively intrinsically valuable than saying something insulting (in terms of the effects they have on the well-being of the victim).

Which if a moral framework claims you can never defend yourself, this seems like the moral framework is unable to handle a fairly common moral scenario that is generally agreed upon by people across the world

I agree. That’s why I am trying to see if anyone knows of a good justification, under the OP’s stipulations, of self-defense. I am not suggesting that self-defense is impermissible; on the contrary, I find it obviously permissible but have found the peculiarity of seeing no real justification for it under my theory—which indicates I messed up somewhere.

2. I don't think one can easily discount that 'not doing something' is 'not a choice'

You are confusing choosing with acting: one can choose to not act.

I know, I know. Sorry for the glib comment :)

I guess you could also argue that #1 is impossible and therefore irrelevant. Meaning there is no instance that is in-itself bad. The 'badness' is only existent within specific contexts.

If you stipulated different moral principles then you might come to the opposite conclusion. This demonstrates the futility and impotence of moral deliberation based on stipulated conditions.

No worries :smile:

That solution has been grave consequences, though--e.g., rape is no longer bad in-itself, which seems absurd. It seems like we can evaluate the ethicality of an action, independently of any accidental circumstances, and note that some of them are bad; and if some of them are bad, then it shouldn't matter what accidental circumstances arise.

Not at all. Everyone who adheres to an ethical theory imports principles into any moral conversation.

It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad. — Bob Ross

This is a hard sell. In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B. If I were to grab A, it means I'm grabbing not B. To say that choice isn't an action seems odd to me. If you choose something but don't act on it, did you really choose? So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean? If I choose not to starve, but don't take an action to prevent starvation when that option is presented, didn't I act by not stealing, thus actionably starving?

The times that I see where we have no choice or ability to act, is when there is no agency. Agency can be defined as knowledge plus the ability to act. So if I have knowledge of a way to avoid starving, and the choice to act on it, then I have agency. If you choose not to steal to prevent starvation, you are actionably starving by agency. Just as if you chose to steal to avoid starving, you would act by agency.

If of course you were simply starving, and there was no way to stop it, you had no choice, and did not actionably starve. But if a person has knowledge, and the ability to act, acting on A means not acting on B, your other choice.

If you disagree that this specific scenario does not seem to fit the 50/50 scenario, its fine, but a 50/50 is going to happen. By choosing one, you will commit an evil act. By choosing the other, you will also commit an evil act. However, you do have relative evil, which I think resolves this major problem. In the face of a 50/50, you would choose the less evil act, and I think that's a good enough solution for the framework. Still, this does lead into two other considerations.

1. If there is relative evil, how do we determine the level of evil.
2. Logically, if there is relative evil, there is relative good.

In the second case, you may have your solution to the OP. Lets say intrinsically it is good to not be harmed. Then in the case of self-defence, it is less good to hurt another person, but not if they are being even less good by trying to harm you. The question of how you evaluate the relative good is the next question you have to tackle, but if there is relative evil, then logically there must be relative good. The same language can be used if you just change everything to being relative degrees of evil. Harming others is evil, but it is less evil if you are defending yourself from them trying to hurt you.

This does not counter your idea of intrinsic good/evil. We can still say that harming a person is a rating of 6 evil, or -6 good, while defending yourself is a 3 evil, or -3 good. You can still say that rape is intrinsically evil at a level of 10, while torture is intrinsically evil at a level of 9. How you determine the intrinsic level is the next step, but I don't think you run into an contradictions in your current framework as long as you allow relative comparisons and note that intrinsic good/bad has levels to compare.

As you see, relative ratings of good and evil are necessary to tackle complex moral issues, and this does not counter intrinsic values. Whether your values or intrinsic or not, relative measurements are going to be need to accurately make the most moral decision. What really comes next is how do we determine if something is intrinsically good/evil, and to what degree? I think in general the idea of, "Do the least harm/greatest good" is uncontroversial enough. How we determine what that is, is the next challenge.

Everyone who adheres to an ethical theory imports principles into any moral conversation. — Bob Ross

Treating questionable stipulations as if they are established moral foundations can only lead to the collapse of the edifice.

There is a difference between a principle and a moral principle. Those who begin with ethical theory based on moral principles begin, in my opinion, at the wrong end, as if where the inquiry might lead has already been determined before we begin.

My argument is that your 1-5 applies to self-defence all the same:

is that it seems like harming the person, unlike in the vaccination example, is a part of the means of achieving the good end — Bob Ross

And harming the child's skin to immunise it is not a part of the means?

as opposed to being a bad side effect — Bob Ross

Couldn't harm towards the attacker be called a bad side effect of self-defence?

It seems your phrase "directional flow" refers to causal flow? If so, I don't think that matters at all. Whether something is a direct or indirect consequence of our course of action — or even part of the course of action — shouldn't weigh on our duties, only whether the consequence happens or not. In other words, the distinction does not seem important to the context.

Those who begin with ethical theory based on moral principles begin, in my opinion, at the wrong end, as if where the inquiry might lead has already been determined before we begin. — Fooloso4

In another thread:

My opinion is that even coming up with a normative ethical theory is already missing the point of what ethics is supposed to be. — Lionino

It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad. — Bob Ross

I don't see much difference between the person who pushes the child in the pond and the person who stands at water's edge laughing while they drawn.

In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B.

This is not a logical truth whatsoever. Choosing A may entail simultaneously choosing B (e.g., if I choose to go to the grocery store in my car and I am aware that my car emits CO2, then I also choosing to emit CO2 to get to the grocery store—albeit the intention is different).

To say that choice isn't an action seems odd to me. If you choose something but don't act on it, did you really choose?

Making a decision is an act, and I may have confused you on that; but you were conflating it with the action that was ethically in question. I can choose to do nothing, and doing nothing is not an action.

The act of rational deliberation is the act of making a choice, and one can certainly rationally deliberate such that they decide not to do anything. E.g., I can choose to not get up from my chair, and not getting up from my chair is NOT an action. This is important in order to understand my theory, because omissions and commissions evaluated differently.

So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean?

It would mean you are acting irrationally; and that you chose to not act, but acted anyways.

If I choose not to starve, but don't take an action to prevent starvation when that option is presented, didn't I act by not stealing, thus actionably starving?

If you make the decision that you are want to change the fact that you are starving such that you aren’t anymore but don’t actually do anything to change it, then you haven’t acted to change the fact that you are starving.

What I was noting is that not doing something and doing something are nor morally calculated equally; and your response here is full of equivocating the two.

If you are currently in the state of starvation, then choosing to remain in that state produces no action pertaining to it—no different than me choosing to not move doesn’t cause movement.

By choosing one, you will commit an evil act.

Again, you don’t commit an evil act by allowing something bad to continue to happen; exactly no different than how I don’t do anything to not get up from the chair that I am in—there’s a choice being made, but some choices require inaction.

By allowing yourself to continue to starve, you have committed an omission (an inaction); whereas if you steal you have committed a commission (an action). Your entire analysis assumes that something wrong is being done either way, when it is not.

I am not beginning with moral principles with respect to my ethical theory: I am a virtue ethicist.

All else being equal, both are being immoral; but one is an omission and the other a commission, and this can be morally relevant in some circumstances.

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3. — Bob Ross

This is a situational argument, so context is everything.

You will need to redo your steps.
Ethical egoism is a theory that argues for the person who is doing the action -- what is best for this person.
Other consequentialism argues for the common good. So, it's not just the person doing the action, but for everybody. I'm sure you are not talking about the utilitarianist point of view (common good), but for the one person who needs to use a self-defense.

I think you should re-write your argument so that it is specific to that person -- after all it is a self-defense.

Argue from ethical egoism. An argument can be made that satisfies both the individual's immediate need for protection and the common good.

In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B.

This is not a logical truth whatsoever. Choosing A may entail simultaneously choosing B — Bob Ross

I'm talking about the context of steal or starve, or mutually exclusive choices.

The act of rational deliberation is the act of making a choice, and one can certainly rationally deliberate such that they decide not to do anything. E.g., I can choose to not get up from my chair, and not getting up from my chair is NOT an action. — Bob Ross

It is though. Your action is to stay in the chair. An action is simply a decision of what to do as a living being from moment to moment. You cannot choose not to take an action as long as you live. The moment you cannot take any action, is death.

This is important in order to understand my theory, because omissions and commissions evaluated differently. — Bob Ross

Ok, I see where you're going with this then. An omission is generally understood as "Not doing the right thing". And generally, this is a descriptor of ignorance. At a very basic level, I had a choice to go right or left, I chose left on a whim, but the correct choice was to go right. Omissions generally means a choice that didn't turn out to be the right one, but the person involved didn't know that when they made the choice.

A commission on the other hand is when you know you should go right, but you go left instead. You have knowledge of the correct outcome, but do not choose it. This mirrors my explanation of agency earlier. No one is faulted for starving if there is no option that can alleviate starving. Or if someone offered you a poison apple, but you didn't know it was poison. You chose not to starve, but you didn't know the apple would kill you instead.

In the case of starve vs steal, we have full information. You can either choose to steal and not starve, or not steal and starve. The question is whether it is worse to starve or steal. And if you willingly choose the worse choice, its a commission. If you don't know what the worse choice is, and accidently choose it, its an omission. Actively deciding to starve is neither an omission or commission in this scenario as we don't know what is worse.

So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean?

It would mean you are acting irrationally; and that you chose to not act, but acted anyways. — Bob Ross

If I didn't choose to act, how did I act? Was it unconscious or did some other force move my hand? We can have all sorts of wishes or opinions on how we act, but at the end of the day, our actions are our choices if it was in our power to have acted in a different way.

If you make the decision that you are want to change the fact that you are starving such that you aren’t anymore but don’t actually do anything to change it, then you haven’t acted to change the fact that you are starving. — Bob Ross

I'm going to respectfully disagree with you here, and I think you'll find most will as well. If I choose to go on a hunger strike, I am acting purposefully not to eat. What you seem to be implying is that if I purposefully lie on my back for three days, I took no actions for three days. An action is 'a lived choice'. This is not the same thing as the colloquial term, "I did nothing today." No, you did something today, just not anything that's worthy of sharing in a conversation with another person. The action was, "I didn't get out of bed today."

What I was noting is that not doing something and doing something are nor morally calculated equally; and your response here is full of equivocating the two. — Bob Ross

Its not an equivocation. I'm not noting the morality of doing something vs not doing something. I'm just pointing out that if you make a choice, and go through with it in your lived experience, that's an action. It can be boring like sitting on the ground, but its still an action.

If you are currently in the state of starvation, then choosing to remain in that state produces no action pertaining to it—no different than me choosing to not move doesn’t cause movement. — Bob Ross

No, your action is to not move. But not moving doesn't mean you haven't taken an action.

By choosing one, you will commit an evil act.

Again, you don’t commit an evil act by allowing something bad to continue to happen; exactly no different than how I don’t do anything to not get up from the chair that I am in—there’s a choice being made, but some choices require inaction. — Bob Ross

This is again, an inaccurate use of the term for what we're discussing. If I am told to pick a card out of deck, I have 52 possibilities to pick a card. If I decided to take the action of simply leaving the table, I would be inactive in making a choice to pick a card, but I would actively be walking away from the table to do something else. Just like, "Currently I'm an inactive soldier". Its not that "I'm not taking actions", its simply a term that states, "I'm not taking any actions as a soldier anymore." In the case of steal vs starve, there are only two choices to act on. Steal or starve. Starving is not an inaction, it is a conscious choice made by not stealing.

"I would rather starve then steal".

By allowing yourself to continue to starve, you have committed an omission (an inaction); whereas if you steal you have committed a commission (an action). — Bob Ross

Again, this is not the correct use of the term 'omission'. An omission is when an action you have taken results in something bad happening, and you didn't know that was going to be the outcome. This term is used outside of morality as well. "I omitted my signature from the form because I didn't see the line. My form was rejected". Vs "I saw the line for the signature on the form, but decided not to sign it. My form was rejected". Here I have committed an improper act vs having an improper act happen because I omitted something. You cannot avoid making an action as long as you have agency.

A pure consequentialist would disagree. There could be a rather bizarre circumstance when some generally perceived 'bad' act was essential to prevent several million other 'bad' acts on even more vulnerable people.

Or how about someone trying to commit rape then becoming the rape victim? Are these equally 'bad'?