I find being told to read something in lieu of a response is patronizing and consider it a withdrawal from discourse. I share your complaint.

I think naturalism is right, but I also think science forces upon us a very disillusioned “take” on reality. It forces us to say ‘No’ in response to many questions to which most everyone hopes the answers are ‘Yes.’ These are the questions about purpose in nature, the meaning of life, the grounds of morality, the significance of consciousness, the character of thought, the freedom of the will, the limits of human self-understanding, and the trajectory of human history.

That precisely outlines what science cannot provide and certainly cannot be described as "Platonist." But the statement is not "anti-philosophical" because it recognizes we have questions beyond what science tries to answer — Paine

My understanding is that human beings and other animals demonstrate purposiveness, but that science cannot show there to be any general or overarching purpose in nature. I don't see why a lack of overarching purpose and meaning should diminish the importance of general human and particular individual purpose and meaning.

The question as to how best to live, or to put it in Platonist terms the search for the Good, concerns us, or at least should concern us, all. I think it's not a question of what we specifically believe, but how we practice, when it comes to the "questions beyond what science tries to answer".

For example, in regard to the question of free will, I can be a full-blown determinist and still think it important for humans to be rationally self-governing.

I read that book many years ago but cannot recall much in the way of the impressions it left on me. I still have it on my shelves, so I may take a fresh look at it.

If by naturalism you mean the problems that have arise in the wake of European Enlightenment, then my answer is no, my interpretation is not influenced by the problems of European Enlightenment. — Fooloso4

I took it to be implied by your earlier declaration that 'modernity is our cave'.

To the extent that the claims of the earth-born line up with naturalism it is already present in Plato long before the European Enlightenment. — Fooloso4

Of course. Materialism is as ancient as philosophy itself. The Cārvāka of ancient India were materialists. Enlightenment materialism was represented by scholars such as Baron D'Holbach, who 'sees nothing but bodies in motion'. Like its opposite, it's a perennial theme in philosophy.

I find being told to read something in lieu of a response is patronizing — Paine

I'm sorry if it came across that way. It's more that, 'this is a deep and multi-faceted topic, which is extensively treated in this book.' As the thread is about the work of Lloyd Gerson, then I referred to another of his books, Platonism and Naturalism. And I did then proceed to provide a direct response.

Your approach is very reasonable. Would you say that Gerson's thesis is a tempest in a teapot regarding the limit of philosophy? Or is there something in his either/or that resonates with you?

I've responded to your post in a thread about purpose

It does come across that way sometimes.

Leaving all that to the side, the topic here is a particular thesis put forward by Gerson. How can that view be challenged by a different view? Are there other ways of viewing the question that differ from Gerson's suppositions?

What makes asking that question very difficult in the present situation is that Gerson is a highly respected participant in a difficult area of study. His decision to make his claim is different from the years of his life as a scholar. Or if they are not different, that is not a component of the theory.

It makes challenging the theory difficult because the problems of interpretation get mixed with theories of history. So, for example, when I question Gerson's reading of a text, that is not equivalent to challenging his view of history.

Would you say that Gerson's thesis is a tempest in a teapot regarding the limit of philosophy? Or is there something in his either/or that resonates with you? — Paine

I think the fact that thoughtful people all seek to live well, meaning that we all in that sense pursue the good and aim to be rationally self-governing rather than being slaves to our impulses, received opinions, addictions and so on, and that we thus participate in the dialectical search for the truth of the general human condition and of our own conditions in particular exemplifies what is best in Platonism.

I am no scholar of Plato, but I have read with interest what you and @Fooloso4, as much closer readers of Plato than I am, are having to say about seeing Platonism as being less a matter of fixed doctrine than it is of searching for what is good and beautiful and true and flourishing engendering while acknowledging that there can be no definitive answers to those questions.

I haven't read enough Gerson to form a clear opinion, but what I have read in the passages quoted in these forums make him look somewhat like a thinker with a predetermined agenda.

I took it to be implied by your earlier declaration that 'modernity is our cave'. — Wayfarer

Fair point. I think we can be in the situation of the prisoner who becomes unshackled but has not escaped the cave. We can be aware of the sources that shape our understanding of things and also be aware that there are earlier sources that differ from these. We can then address the problem of the extent to which we can lessen the influence of modernity on our understanding of those earlier sources.

... who 'sees nothing but bodies in motion'. — Wayfarer

The criticism of Forms in Plato's dialogues address the problem of their not being in motion - the problem of understanding the world in motion by positing something that is not in motion. I think Plato regarded flux as the natural starting point, and to the extent the cosmos is intelligible it must be understood in light of flux rather than by eliminating it.

the dialectical search for the truth — Janus

I think this is tricky because some regard dialectic as a method of establishing the truth rather than as a search for the truth. My impression is that Platonists regard the search as something that has reached a successful conclusion. Socratic philosophy, including both Plato and Aristotle, is about being wise in the face of ignorance, keeping our ignorance alive rather than eliminating it.

... Platonism as being less a matter of fixed doctrine than it is of searching for what is good and beautiful and true and flourishing engendering while acknowledging that there can be no definitive answers to those questions. — Janus

This is where I distinguish between Plato and Platonism. Plato is a Socratic, Platonists are not.

I am more familiar with Gerson as a commentator upon ancient writing than his thesis upon Ur-Platonism. He is also often cited by others doing the same work of interpreting texts.

Gerson has often objected to the term 'Neo- Platonism' because it prejudices the perspective of what differs between later scholars and the original expressions. I grant that he makes a good point about classification. But this is why I keep harping about Plotinus as the elephant in the room. In the essay I linked to above, no mention is made of using Plotinus cosmology to comment upon Aristotle's De Anima. He just uses it. In such cases, where will the differences be found from which to make comparisons?

I haven't read enough Gerson to form a clear opinion, but what I have read in the passages quoted in these forums make him look somewhat like a thinker with a predetermined agenda. — Janus

As a question of the future, I don't know what accepting his either/or would look like. We are being asked to stop mixing the two modes. I wonder if he has talked about the replacement somewhere.

I think this is tricky because some regard dialectic as a method of establishing the truth rather than as a search for the truth. My impression is that Platonists regard the search as something that has reached a successful conclusion. Socratic philosophy, including both Plato and Aristotle, is about being wise in the face of ignorance, keeping our ignorance alive rather than eliminating it. — Fooloso4

Is it a different sense of truth? It could be said that finding wisdom is finding truth, even though nothing in the propositional mode of truth might be possible to say about the wisdom that is found. Perhaps dialectic is a process of error elimination that enables the gaining of wisdom even if the wisdom gained is only to realize that one does not know what one thought one knew.

This is where I distinguish between Plato and Platonism. Plato is a Socratic, Platonists are not. — Fooloso4

Right, Socrates seems far from being an ideologue or purveyor of doctrines.

Until I have read more into these issues, I will have nothing worthwhile to contribute (and maybe not even then). In the meantime, I'll continue to follow along with interest.

We can be aware of the sources that shape our understanding of things and also be aware that there are earlier sources that differ from these. We can then address the problem of the extent to which we can lessen the influence of modernity on our understanding of those earlier sources. — Fooloso4

In this regard, my attempts to cleanly separate history and interpretation runs into a spot of bother.

The idea that ancient texts were saying something other than established interpretations was through a recognition of their development through time. Trying to reverse the flow is a new river mapped with conjecture and new methods of comparison.

I took it to be implied by your earlier declaration that 'modernity is our cave'.
— Wayfarer

Fair point. I think we can be in the situation of the prisoner who becomes unshackled but has not escaped the cave. We can be aware of the sources that shape our understanding of things and also be aware that there are earlier sources that differ from these. — Fooloso4

:pray:

The idea that ancient texts were saying something other than established interpretations was through a recognition of their development through time. — Paine

That's getting close to the point that I've been pressing all along. And the reason for my interest in Gerson: he's a dissenting voice in the modern academy. (Thomas Nagel is another.)

I was thinking the "established interpretations" include the series presented through centuries of accounts given upon these writings. Those views changed over time. It is only fairly recently, however, that talk about how different the past was from the present became a reason to question the meaning of a text.

On that basis, your view of what happened from then and now is more reliant upon recent scholarship than those who see no reason to question previous descriptions.

your view of what happened from then and now is more reliant upon recent scholarship than those who see no reason to question previous descriptions. — Paine

I've been upfront about my motivation and background, which is that I came to philosophy from a counter-cultural perspective, the quest for philosophical or spiritual illumination. My view is that some form of Platonism (specifically, realism about universals) is the real mainstream of Western philosophy, but that the tradition has been hijacked or subsumed by philosophical materialism. Hence my response when I saw the abstract of Gerson's Platonism and Naturalism (which I'm still only half-way finished):

Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek a rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.

Consequently, I'm with 'the friends of the forms', whereas I think the predominant voice in modern philosophy is that of the 'earth-born ancestors'. As a result, much of what is taught in philosophy departments is in conflict with classical philosophy per se. (Which is why I said that Gerson is a 'dissident voice' in respect of many of his academic peers.)

Here's Gerson presenting the core of the ideas in that book, for those interested.

I ask you to consider separating what you view as a field of modern philosophy from the terrain of interpreting ancient text as carried out by academic scholars.

In that realm, Gerson is not a dissident but a well-received figure who many support and many others do not. He is far from being a voice in the wilderness. The way he is represented in your quote as a hero of historical understanding has very little to do with why he has a seat at the table of his colleagues.

Of course he's no 'voice in the wilderness', he's a highly-respected scholar in his field. But don't you think that his declaration of the incompatibility of Platonism and naturalism might be considered 'dissident', or at least 'dissenting'? Banno often refers to surveys of academic philosophers who's views are overwhelmingly in favour of one or another form of naturalism. He's using his very well-earned seat at the table to question the mainstream.

- Okay, I finally caught up in this thread. I think you are talking past me a bit. This is how I see it:

• Leontiskos: You said, "I agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive in how the practice is conceived" (link). How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy?
• Paine: Gerson incorrectly lumps Rorty and Rosenberg together.

I'm not sure what you wrote in your post addresses my question. If you agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive, then what sort of corrective would you provide to Rorty?

[Gerson] then says:

"What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other."

In presenting this statement, there is more than a little sleight of hand in play with Gerson joining Rorty and Rosenberg together as fellow "anti-Platonists": — Paine

Has Gerson said that Rorty and Rosenberg are fellow anti-Platonists, or has he merely said that they are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy? It seems to me that he has said the latter, and it does not follow that both are anti-Platonists (or that both are anti-Platonists in the same sense).

[Rorty and Rosenberg are different] — Paine

I agree that they are different, and I don't see that Gerson has claimed they are not. Still, I am curious what corrective you would offer to "this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy" ().

That is a very sharp either/or. I don't know what that does not exclude from the pursuit of natural causes. — Paine

I think it will not exclude a pursuit of natural causes in line with Gerson's five points of Ur-Platonism.

2) Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day? — Leontiskos

This is where I think Gerson should not quit his day job before becoming a philosopher of history. He establishes himself in that role but not in a way that can be compared with other attempts. That is why I had to agree with your observation about the futility of comparing Ur-Platonism with Heidegger. — Paine

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day?

What "naturalism" refers to is the loosest ball in this discussion. Gerson has said what he understands by that. I have been questioning the basis of that description as given in the thesis. I need more convincing before receiving the term as a known value in the discussion.

.

What "naturalism" refers to is the loosest ball in this discussion. — Paine

What do you think is at stake in that passage you cited from The Sophist? Anything?

Perhaps dialectic is a process of error elimination that enables the gaining of wisdom even if the wisdom gained is only to realize that one does not know what one thought one knew. — Janus

I agree, but think there is another related connection between dialectic and wisdom. The art of making and evaluating opinion. In a word, the art of the enthymeme.

In the thread on Aristotle's Metaphysics I argued that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical. He says:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

(982a)

then:

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom.

but rather stating what these causes and principles are he says in the next sentence:

Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man. (982a)

Why the shift from the causes and principles to opinions about the wise man? Can those who are not wise have wise opinions about the wise man?

Prior to this he said:

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach ...

(981b)

If Aristotle is wise can he teach us to be wise, to know the causes and principles? Now we all learn that Aristotle said there are four causes. It would be unwise to think that knowing this makes us wise. He does not teach us the causes and principles are whose knowledge is wisdom. He can, however, teach us to think dialectically about opinions and their claims and premises.

In this regard, my attempts to cleanly separate history and interpretation runs into a spot of bother. — Paine

It is is a large problem. I think the best we can do is be aware of our own prejudices and assumptions and try not to impose them on writings that are at once foreign and our own. We can only jump into the river from where we are, but can question the boundary marks that have been set.

[added]: If one is a Platonist then there is no boundary separating Plato from Platonism or even for some Platonism and us.

I agree, but think there is another related connection between dialectic and wisdom. The art of making and evaluating opinion. In a word, the art of the enthymeme.

In the thread on Aristotle's Metaphysics I argued that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical. He says:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.
(982a)

then:

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom. — Fooloso4

Do you think he is referring specifically to practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than some kind of metaphysical or transcendent wisdom. I'm not trying to imply anything about a correct answer to this question, as I'm not that much familiar with Aristotle's works.

If Aristotle is wise can he teach us to be wise, to know the causes and principles? Now we all learn that Aristotle said there are four causes. It would be unwise to think that knowing this makes us wise. He does not teach us the causes and principles are whose knowledge is wisdom. He can, however, teach us to think dialectically about opinions and their claims and premises. — Fooloso4

I wonder whether Aristotle's wise man is a generic or universal wise man or whether he rather refers to those who are wise in various contexts or fields.

It seems right to think that the important lesson from Aristotle would be to understand the dialectical mode of thinking rather than to hold any particular beliefs.

I'm not sure what you wrote in your post addresses my question. If you agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive, then what sort of corrective would you provide to Rorty? — Leontiskos

When Rorty says "the distinction between the past and the future can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions", he is going to have to tell a story about it. One story he tells is:

Insofar as a person is seeking solidarity, she does not ask about the relation between the practices of the chosen community and something outside community. Insofar as she seeks objectivity, she distances herself from the actual persons around her not by thinking of herself as a member of some other real or imaginary group, but rather by attaching herself to something which can be described without reference to any particular human beings. — Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?

The zero-sum game presented here seems pretty objective for someone who eschews absolutes and representations of the real. I recognize that there are different ways of looking at our shared experience. To link them as categorical antagonists, however, has history revealing a psychological truth. But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. Sometimes, it seems like he demands admission to a club he denies exists.

If one frees the two perspectives from Rorty's fight to the death, they become more like Nagel's objection to "the view from nowhere", a narrative Wayfinder regards highly. Rorty shares the critical view of science in some places but has complained that Nagel is too mystical in others. So, 'materialist' by comparison but not on the basis of claiming what nature is. He resists saying what that is. As I review different examples of his work, it is confusing to sort out what he objects to from an alternative to such. It is not my cup of tea.

As an American I hear his anti-war view that ideas should not force one to fight. I don't know if he talks about Thoreau but that is the register I hear the objection. A democracy of no. But that is its own discussion, or if is not, that becomes a new thesis. I fear the infinite regress.

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible. I take your point that Gerson is not joining Rorty and Rosenberg at the hip. That allows me to ask what they have to do with each other.

In that vein, I agree with:

quote="Leontiskos;911088"]I think it will not exclude a pursuit of natural causes in line with Gerson's five points of Ur-Platonism.[/quote]

They require the logic Rorty would expel. It is whatever else that is said that I cannot imagine.

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day? — Leontiskos

I do not. But I need to think about how to frame the question as its own thing. In my defense, it is not like Gerson explains the sameness. His enemies never change.

Do you think he is referring specifically to practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than some kind of metaphysical or transcendent wisdom. — Janus

I think that with regard to phronesis knowledge of principles and causes is not sufficient. In so far as good judgment involves action it depends on good character. What is at issue here is not 'principles' in the sense of rules. In his translation of Metaphysics Joe Sachs says that 'arche is a "ruling beginning"'.

He translates it as 'source'.

In more contemporary terms Aristotle's inquiry into the arche or source of things is ontological rather than epistemological. If we consider that:

... it is through experience that men acquire science and art ...

. (981a)

then either wisdom is unattainable for human beings or, as the Platonists would have it, it is attained through mystical or transcendent experience. Some might find or import mystical experience in Aristotle but I don't.

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day? — Leontiskos

I think the best way to approach this is through Aristotle discussing the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake :

It is because of this indeed that the possession of this science might be justly regarded as not for humans, since in many ways the nature of humans is enslaved, so that, according to Simonides, “a god alone can have this |982b30| privilege,” and it is not fitting that a human should not be content to inquire into the science that is in accord with himself. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine, it would probably occur in this case most of all, |983a1| and all those who went too far [in this science] would be unlucky. The divine, however, cannot be jealous—but, as the proverb says, “Bards often do speak falsely.” Moreover, no science should be regarded as more estimable than this. For the most divine science is also the most estimable. And a science would be most divine in only two ways: if the [primary] god most of all would have it, or if it were a science of divine things. And this science |983a5| alone is divine in both these ways. For the [primary] god seems to be among the causes of all things and to be a sort of starting-point, and this is the sort of science that the [primary] god alone, or that he most of all, would have. All the sciences are more necessary than this one, then, |983a10| but none is better. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b29, translated by CDC Reeve

This argument that it is okay to pursue first causes extends to all who attempt it. When Aristotle makes arguments against others employing what Gerson calls Ur-Platonism principles, that doesn't make his interlocutors unqualified to speak upon it. They are all pursuing the nature of the world because it is their nature to do so.

The reference to Simonides invokes a struggle with tradition that is ever present in Plato's dialogues. An excellent essay on this topic is written by Christopher Utter.

What do you think is at stake in that passage you cited from The Sophist? Anything? — Wayfarer

To answer that, several features of the Sophist need to be taken into account. It begins with Socrates asking what kind of authority the Stranger will be speaking with:

Socrates: In that case, Theodorus, are you unwittingly bringing in some god rather than a stranger, as Homer’s phrase would have it, when he says that the gods 216B in general, and the god of strangers in particular, become the companions of people who partake of true righteousness, to behold the excesses and the good order of humanity? So perhaps this companion of yours may indeed be one of those higher powers who is going to watch over and refute our sorry predicament in these arguments, as he is a god of refutation.

Theod: That is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates, no; he is more moderate than those who take controversies seriously. Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For 216C I refer to all philosophers as divine. — Plato, Sophist, 216A, translated by Horan

The way Theodorus puts it, taking controversies seriously means putting up a fight. Throughout the dialogue, the Stranger draws comparisons between that method and others. The contrast between the violent and the gentle becomes the means of division in many cases. The method of division itself is a vehicle of being self-aware of its limits. There is a lightness of touch with starting the dialogue by comparing the sophist to an angler. That is combined with more strict limits to the method:

Str: They certainly are, Theaetetus. However, it is of no particular concern to the method based on arguments whether purification by washing or medication benefits us much or little. For it endeavours to discern the inter-relation and non-relation of all the skills, with the aim of acquiring intelligence, 227B and to that end it respects them all equally. Indeed, because of their similarity, this method does not believe that one is more ridiculous than another, and it does not regard a person as more important if he exemplifies his skill in hunting, through general-ship, rather than louse-catching, though it will probably regard him as more pretentious. — ibid. 227A

The method can be used strictly while permitting other observations. Maybe even to the extent of cracking jokes. But the Stranger brings up a challenge that directly concerns Socrates' opening statement regarding the giants who have spoken:

Str: It seems to me that Parmenides has conversed with us quite casually, and so has anyone who has ever set about specifying which and how many are things that are.

Theae: In what way?

Str: Each of them appears to me to be telling us a story, as though we were children. One says that things that are, are threefold, and some of them on occasion conduct some sort of battle with one another 242D and at other times become friends, marry, have children and look after their offspring. Another says there are two factors, wet and dry or hot and cold, and he sets up a household for them and marries them off. While we Eleatic folk, beginning with Xenophanes or even earlier, recount our stories as though what we refer to as “all things” are actually one. But some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses, consider it safest to combine both stories, 242E and say that “what is”, is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship.

“Though it is separating, it is continually combining”

say the more severe of these Muses. But the milder ones relaxed the requirement that it always be this way, and they say that it alternates, and that the all is sometimes one and is friendly on account of Aphrodite 243A and at other times it is many and at war with itself due to some strife. Now some of these men may have spoken the truth in all this, or they may not, though it is difficult and problematic to attribute such a serious failing to famous men of old. But we can say one thing without reproach.

Theae: What is it?

Str: That they have shown no regard for common folk, and they despise us. For each of them pursues his own line of argument, without considering at all whether we are following what they say or are being left behind. 243B — ibid. 215e

The Stranger no longer seems so gentle. He wants to interrogate the giants:

Theae: Which one do you mean? Or is it obvious that you are saying that we must first examine “what is” and what exactly those who use the phrase think that it signifies?

Str: You have understood precisely, Theaetetus. For I am saying that this is indeed the approach we should adopt; we should resort to close questioning, as though the men were actually present and say: “Come on, all you who say that hot and cold or any pairs like that are all things, what precisely 243E are you attributing to both, when you say that both are and each is? What should we understand by this ‘is’ of yours? Is it a third factor in addition to the other two, and should we propose, on your behalf, that the all is no longer two but three? For, presumably, you do not take one of the pair and call it being and say that both of them equally ‘are’, for in either case they would effectively be one and not two. — ibid. 243d

But the importance of the distinction between gentle and violent comes back into the fore in reference to the battle of the gods and giants:

Str: Well, some are dragging everything from heaven and the unseen down to earth, literally grabbing trees and rocks in their hands. Indeed, they lay hold of all such objects and strenuously maintain that, that alone is, which gives rise to some contact and touch. 246B They define body and being as the same, and if any of the others say that there is anything without a body, they are utterly contemptuous, and they want to hear no more.

Theae: Yes, you are describing fearsome men, and indeed, I myself have met many of them before.

Str: Yes, that’s why those who oppose them conduct their defence, very cautiously, from above, from the unseen, maintaining forcibly that true being consists of certain bodiless forms which can be known by reason. And they gradually break the bodies of those other men into little pieces in their discussions, and what the others maintain to be true 246C they refer to as a sort of becoming in motion, rather than being. And there is always a huge battle going on between both parties about these issues, Theaetetus. — ibid. 246b

The difference between what you might say in a fight is different from the problems that belong to an idea as that idea.

That is what I think is at stake in the passage I quoted.

The gentle way of looking at the difference between Being and Becoming leads to this statement:

Str: Well, I am saying that anything actually is, once it has acquired some sort of power, 247E either to affect anything else at all, or to be affected, even slightly, by something totally trivial, even if only once. Indeed, I propose to give a definition, defining things that are, as nothing else except power. — ibid. 247d

The vivacity of this statement is like waking up from a dream. For those with a little Greek in their quiver, consider how close this is to the translation:

τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.