Isn't there always a presumed link between virtue and ethical behaviour throughout the Platonic-Aristotelian corpus?

The same man [cannot] have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for it has been shown that a man is at the same time practically wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the incontinent man is unable to act - there is, however, nothing to prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our first discussions, and are near together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in respect of their purpose - nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or drunk. — Nichomachean Ethics

Put another way, practical wisdom is manifested in virtuous action, not simply in verbal description. The old saw, 'actions speak louder than words'. (Incidentally, I am presuming the reference to 'incontinence' is actually to celibacy or lack thereof.)

Why the detour into the opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4

You got it incorrectly. It's not "the opinion of the wise man". It is "the opinions which we hold about the wise man". Big difference. That's why you got lost there for a second.

Is Aristotle wise? Can he teach us these principles and causes? He will identify four causes, but this is not sufficient for making us wise regarding knowledge. — Fooloso4

Yes, Aristotle was wise, and yes he could teach us the principles and causes. The four causes are supposed to be the complete explanation of everything there is. He was a teacher after all -- educated in almost everything in the academy.

You got it incorrectly. It's not "the opinion of the wise man". — L'éléphant

Thanks for pointing that out. I corrected it. Not the wise man's opinions but opinions about the wise man.

That's why you got lost there for a second. — L'éléphant

Not lost. Jut a typo. The question about whether Aristotle is wise is related to the question of our opinions about the wise man. I will have a bit more to say about this.

So, is this a thread about Aristotle's metaphysics, addressing what he actually wrote, or is this just a thread about our opinions of Aristotle, as a supposed wise man. You can see how we could discuss the latter without any knowledge about what he actually wrote. But what's the point of blind character assassination?

… the reason for our present discussion is that it is generally assumed that what is called Wisdom is concerned with the primary causes and principles … (981b)

What is generally assumed is not necessarily what is true. Aristotle’s method is to begin with opinions. At this point he neither affirms or denies this opinion. The question of whether this is what wisdom is remains open. Although he will focus on the primary causes and principles, we should be open to the possibility that the underlying reason for his discussion is not simply to disclose causes and principles but to address the assumption of what wisdom is.

If Aristotle is wise, then, according to what is generally assumed, not only does he know the primary causes and principles, he can teach them. Given his discussion of causes and principles he certainly does give the impression of being wise. But does his discussion teach us to be wise?

Starting where Aristotle does, with man, do we know what it is to be a man? What is the final cause, the telos of man? The question asks us not simply to give an opinion or account of it, but to know it by having achieved it, by the completion of our telos. Aristotle begins by saying that all men by nature desire to know. Is the satisfaction of that desire our telos?

The question of the telos of man is the question of self-knowledge. Socrates said his human wisdom is knowledge of ignorance. This is not expressed as an opinion but as something he knows. Is Aristotle’s wisdom, like that of Socrates, human or is it divine?

If it is through experience that men acquire science and art, then can there be knowledge of what does not come from experience? Our knowledge and experience is limited. We are somewhere between the beginning and the end. Without knowledge of the beginning Aristotle cannot know that the world is or is not eternal. If it comes to be then like all that comes to be it too will perish. He does not know what always was or always will be. Not knowing this he does not know how it was or will be.

So why does Aristotle make so many theological claims? I think the answer has something to do with the difference between opinion and knowledge, what can be taught and learned, and the competition between theology and philosophy. Aristotle was able to give his listeners and readers opinions that they could hold as true, but he could not give them knowledge of such things. As if to be told is to know.

Based on what is generally assumed about wisdom, Aristotle appears to be wise.

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually … (982a)

What does “so far as it is possible” mean? How far is it possible to know all things? Without the possibility of knowledge of beginnings and ends the wise man’s knowledge falls short of knowledge of all things. But the theologian claims to have and teach knowledge of all things.

The paragraph ends:

… for the wise man should give orders, not receive them; nor should he obey others, but the less wise should obey him. (982a)

There is then an important political dimension to the Metaphysics. The battle between the philosopher and the theologian is a continuation of the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. Aristotle’s strategy in this quarrel is the same as Plato’s. Just as Plato presents a philosophical poetry, Aristotle presents a philosophical theology. It is better for these opinions to be generally assumed rather than some others. It is better to hold these opinions then succumb to misologic and nihilism. Better to give the appearance of knowledge than reveal our absence of knowledge.

The wisdom that Aristotle teaches through arguments that confound us is human rather than divine wisdom, knowledge of our ignorance. But it is not always wise to reveal our ignorance.

None of this is meant to suggest that attempting to understand the Metaphysics is a waste of time. Aristotle does teach those who attempt to work through his arguments how to think, but if there is a failure to learn it is our failure not his. In addition, the limits of our knowledge does not preclude knowledge of how to inquire into those things that lie between the beginning and end.

If it is through experience that men acquire science and art, then can there be knowledge of what does not come from experience? — Fooloso4

He said,

Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience

He did not consider knowledge to belong to experience (the particulars). Knowledge, as he attributed to art has the form of a universal, conceptual, or non-concrete occurrence. Similar to Platonic forms.

Edit: lol. I misread the quote. My mistake.

In both the Physics and Metaphysics Aristotle introduces accidental causes. What are the implications of Aristotle’s accidental cause?

One implication is that teleology is not determinism. All that happens in the world does not come to be as the result of a determinate end. The teleology of the acorn is to become the oak tree, but not every acorn becomes an oak. To ask why is to examine accidental causes.

More generally, the implication is that the cosmos cannot be understood simply as teleological. The world is not as it is because it acts to fulfill some end. Because there are accidental causes, the world is indeterminate and does not yield a final account.

Aristotle is in agreement with Plato’s Timaeus in making the distinction between two kinds of cause, one intelligible and one unintelligible.

A picture emerges of a world that can be poetically described in Empedocles’s words
as a world of Love and Strife. In Aristotle’s more prosaic but no less inventive terms, a world in the constant movement he calls in his neologism ‘entelechia’. It is the never ending activity or work of an ousia to persist or continue to be what it is or is to be. The constant active struggle of the telos of a living being against its dissolution.

I think a wise person will seek wisdom. They will strive to know wisdom and to learn it. A mathematician strives to know math and excels in math. So, a wise person strives to know wisdom and excels in what is wise. And they seek wisdom because they love wisdom and enjoy wise actions.

"Nobody would call one just who does not enjoy acting justly." (NE, I, 1099a, 15-20).

This is in what being a philosopher consists.

Incidentally, I am presuming the reference to 'incontinence' is actually to celibacy or lack thereof. — Wayfarer

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction.

I think a wise person will seek wisdom. They will strive to know wisdom and to learn it. — NotAristotle

The way this is stated it seems as though wisdom is something like an object to be found.

At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). — Leontiskos

Why do you call phronesis an extreme?

Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4

Because he is inquiring into wisdom, and rather than artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom, he looks at what we already mean by it, and who we call 'wise'. In the subsequent section he assesses these widespread opinions about the wise man.

Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man?
— Fooloso4

Because he is inquiring into wisdom, and rather than artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom, he looks at what we already mean by it, and who we call 'wise'. In the subsequent section he assesses these widespread opinions about the wise man. — Leontiskos

If Aristotle is wise then why artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom?

If knowledge differs from opinion then why not start by telling us what the wise man knows rather than with our opinions of the wise man?

If Aristotle is wise then why artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom? — Fooloso4

I just explained to you why he doesn't do that. You seem to wish he had.

I just explained to you why he doesn't do that. You seem to wish he had. — Leontiskos

I wish to inquire what he may be up to. I take it that if he doesn't he has good reason why he doesn't. I don't think that not wanting to artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom gets at what is at issue. In my opinion the reader must play an active role. The reader does so by asking questions and looking to see how the text might address these questions.

If he is inquiring into wisdom does that mean he does not know what it is to be wise? If he is not wise can he determine whether others are? If others are not wise what it the value in discussing the opinions we hold about the wise man?

If Aristotle is wise then why doesn't he impart his wisdom to others? He does say that:

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach

(981b)

What role might examining the opinions of others play in teaching others? Does he teach them to be wise?

Perhaps he does have something to teach us about being wise. Perhaps what that is is not simply a matter of what is generally assumed, that is, that what is called Wisdom is concerned with the primary causes and principles … (981b)

If he is inquiring into wisdom does that mean he does not know what it is to be wise? If he is not wise can he determine whether others are? If others are not wise what it the value in discussing the opinions we hold about the wise man? — Fooloso4

Your line of approach reminds me of the Meno:

I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. — Meno, 80e, (tr. Grube)

Your line of approach reminds me of the Meno: — Leontiskos

There are several things at issue here. The opinions we hold about the wise man (982a) refers, on the one hand, to those who desire to be wise and on the other, more generally to common opinion. Those who seek wisdom should know the opinions of the many about the wise man in order to avoid the fate of Socrates.

At the end of this paragraph he says:

... the wise man should give orders, not receive them; nor should he obey others, but the less wise should obey him.

((982a)

There is a political dimension that the philosopher must deal with. This for his own sake, for the sake of philosophy, and for the sake of the polis.

Another aspect of the problem can be stated as follows: what is our opinion about the extent to which Aristotle or anyone else is wise and can teach us to be wise.

In this extremely compact section Aristotle also says:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually … (982a)

What does “so far as it is possible” mean? What are the limits of human knowledge?

[Added: More to follow]

Something has always bothered me ever since I first read Metaphysics. The term translated as principle.

In his recent translation of Metaphysics, Joe Sachs says the Greek term arche, is

A ruling beginning ...

and that it most often refers to a being rather than a proposition or rule.

He translates it as 'source'.

In more contemporary terms Aristotle's inquiry into the arche or source of things is ontological rather than epistemological.

Might I ask what bothers you about it?

It seemed wrong that what is first and primary should be some proposition or rule. What is first is being and beings not something someone, even someone regarded as wise, says about being.